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Abstract of the Thesis
This thesis is about the decision-making habits of the 
Indian Judge and in particular the judges who served in the Supreme 
Court of India from 1950 to 1971• The approach adopted has been to 
consider the predicament of the lawyer and the judge in India in the 
last two decades, sketch the background of the Indian Supreme Court 
judges (Chapter I) and briefly survey the manner in which Indian 
judges have interpreted and adapted the juristic techniques inherited 
from the British ta suit Indian needs (Chapter II).
The question posed in these earlier chapters is :
"Do Indian judges - the Supreme Court being used as a model - deciding 
complicated issues of law and fact, rely solely on their western 
training or do they also receive theoretical inspiration, instinctive 
or otherwise, from indigenous sources ?"
The technique followed has been not to try to analyse each 
one of the five thousand odd reported cases decided by t&e Supreme 
Court since 1950, but to select certain branches of Public and Personal 
law, attempt to show the techniques used as well as the sources relied 
on by the judges and contrast their actual performance against the options 
and possibilities open to the Court.
The areas concentrated on are s the constitutional rights to 
property (Chapter III); preventive detention and public order (Chapter 
IV); the Hindu joint family (Chapter V); the pious obligation of a 
Hindu son to pay his father's debts, the legal incidences attendant 
to the adoption of a Hindu son, and the property rights of Hindu 
Women (Chapter VI); ’’Obscenity", Contempt of Court, Official Secrecy, 
cow slaughter and religious rights and certain aspects of labour law 
(Chapter VII). The last Chapter attempts to answer the problem posed 
at the beginning of -the thesis........................................
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Mayne (lid.) refers to J. D. Mayne's Hindu law and
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Mulla (13d) refers to D. F. Mulla's Principles of Hindu
law (13th Edition 1966)
Seervai (1967) refers to H. M. Seervai's Constitutional
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Note: The books are usually referred to either by their name and date
or the name, the date and then the place of publication. This form has 
however been changed in the Bibliography where the usual library practice 
of name of book, place of publication and then date, is followed.
CHAPTER I
THE SUPREME COURT JUDGE - BACKGROUND AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR
1. The Broad Problem
This thesis attempts toIdentify and analyse some of the 
judicial techniques used by the Supreme Court while applying Common 
Law methods inherited from pre-Independence India.
The most obvious problem that the Court faces is to evolve 
a workable relation between the Common Law, which has its own pecu­
liar western background, and Indian ways of life and thought. A 
western jurist sums it up :
"There is a pattern of western law first introduced by 
the rulers of British India, and now enshrined in a written 
Constitution which expounds, in language inherited from 
Locke, the doctrine of individual liberty. This represents, 
though probably as yet much more superficially, another kind 
of living law in Indian society. It is obvious therefore that 
the positive law of India must represent a kind of ferment 
between these two historically and culturally opposed social 
forces. In a society with a relatively homogeneous cultural 
tradition it may still be possible for judges to assert that 
they are not concerned with the policy of law but merely to 
state what the law is and to apply it, for here the ideo­
logical factors remain concealed and merely implicit for the 
most part. But in the context of present day India, it is 
hardly possible for the judiciary, even if trained in (the 
West) ... in the most vigorous standards of legal positivism, 
to adopt this detached attitude without, by their very decision 
making it all too apparent how empty a formula this is." 1
To what extent have the lawyers and the courts succeeded 
in avoiding an indelicate confounding of borrowed concepts with 
indigenous life ?
1. Denis Lloyd: The idea of law (196*0 220. For a typical account 
of such detached empty formulas see Prof. K. Bentsi-Enchill: 
Institutional challenges of our time, reprinted Daily Graphic (Accra, 
Ghana) Wednesday, March 10, 1971.
A West Indian traveller to India felt compelled to remark
2
on the "craze for foreign things" suffered by his hostess in Delhi. 
This is hardly peculiar to Indians. It is the by-product of a con­
sumer society and limited, as one patient sympathetic observer has
shown, to metropolitan areas.^ The lawyer, a metropolitan creature,
A
is a natural victim caught like many other such "marginal men" and 
"intellectuals" in what has been called the gulf "between tradition 
and modernity", and has been criticised for going one step further, 
and looking solely to the West for his ideas. This view has been 
endorsed by at least one High Court judge who regrets "the lack of 
indigenous theoretical nourishment" and the fact that Macaulay’s 
Minute on Education made Indians become mere collectors of quotations.
2. V.S.Naipaul: An Area of Darkness (1964 Andre Deutsch), 90.
3. Maurice Carstairs: The Twice born (1961) 141-2.
4. The phrase is from E.V.Stonequist: The Marginal Man (N.Y* 1961) 
a world wide study of the problem.
5. See generally Edvard Shils: The intellectual between tradition 
and modernity (I96I). It is provocative though with too many genera- 
1 isationsY "X useful indication may be gained from the various studies 
on Indian students abroad (as these resemble the situation of the judge 
much more) on which see Mrs. Helen Kanitkar: The social organisation
of Indian students in the London area (submitted as a Ph.D. dissertation 
London 1972); J.Useem and R.H.Useem: The western educated man in India 
(1955 N.Y.); Amar K.Singh: The impact of foreign study on the Indian 
experience (1962) I Minerva 43-53; R.E.Park and H.A.Miller: Old world 
Traits transplanted (Harper, London and N.Y. 1921). For an early account 
see P.K.Narayan: The conflict of cultures in India (1922) 45 Hindustan Rev:. 
502-503; K.M.Munshi: As I look back - the changing social patterns (1963)
25 Hournal of the Gujerat Research Society, 278-284.
6 . S.S.Dhavan in a series of 5 lectures to the National Academy at 
Mussorie (1962) since then published as separate pamphlets. See esp.
Indian jurisprudence and the theory of state in Ancient India, 1-3- 
Thi¥‘ view is expounded again in a lecture in Simla in November 1971 
entitled "The legal system of Ancient India" (of which I have a transcript1!)• 
All these were commented on by G.W.Keeton:
(1971) Question. I am indebted to S.S.Dhavan for sending me a typescript 
of G.V/.Keeton1 s article.
Prima facie this charge is true. Almost every commentator 
in any legal textbook insists on using western terminology, refusing 
to look at the practical local problems that a statute might create,
n
and still relying on nineteenth century case law. A leading commentator
on the Constitution, proud that he was in the company of an Australian 
8Chief Justice, refused to take into account any political, social or
economic factors in interpreting the Constitution; though happily he
9 *later changed his mind. ^ Chief Justice of India discussing
"Democracy in India" (emphasis mine) lectured on the Greek and Western
approaches to the subject, v/ith only a casual reference to Indian
conditions.^ A professor in Bombay claims to have founded what he
calls the "synthetic school of Indian jurisprudence" ,^but despite the
12fact that Dean Pound blessed its claim to originality - perhaps because
13of its reliance on Pound's ideas - a foreign observer has rightly
7. See for example J.D.Jain: The Indian Contract Act (1966),
Allahabad; S.N•Shukla: The Transfer of Property Act (196A-), Allahabad• 
See, as a recent example: S.S.H.Azmi: A comparative study of the law 
relating to consumer protection under Indian, British and American 
systems (1971) I.S.C.J. Jnl. 5-18.
3. Seervai: Constitutional Law of India (1967) Preface ix, quoting 
Latham C.J.
9. Seervai: The position of the judiciary in ancient India (1970) where 
he enters into an attack on Dicey and maintains that the shadow of Dicey 
should not be case on the process of interpretation in India. Contrast 
his attitude in "The Constitution and Judicial Power" Foundation Day 
address delivered on Sept. 4, 1964, reproduced in XXXIII Government Law 
College Magazine (1964-65) 24.
10. M.Hidayatullah: Democracy and the judicial process in India (1966) 
Chapter II, pp 31-57-
11. M.J.Sethna: Synthetic Jurisprudence (1959); The essentials of 
a legal system (1966).
12. Roscoe Pound: Synthetic Jurisprudence (1963) 6l Bom.L.R. Jnl. 8-11.
13- See ibid at 11 and Sethna: The essentials of a legal system (supra
f.n.il) 14-18.
14remarked "the result is more of an aggregate than a synthesis11 •
A former Attorney General reflected on the ambition of all Indian
lajryers to achieve original, though western, standards of legalism,
when at the end of two famous series of lectures, he was content with
making the plea (or appeal):
"With the overgrowing expansion of Indian legal thought, 
there is bound to be greater interplay between legal minds 
in India and elsewhere in the world of Anglo-Saxon juris­
prudence* As judges and lawyers in India freely resort to 
English decisions, so may in the course of time, the 
English, ours." 15
16only to be asked by two foreign observers: "Why should they ?"
The language of the Common Law has dominated and a brief look at
17any law journal will show this. Indian jurists certainly feel
the need to recognise this problem and try to find Indian referents
for western labels. Thus a High Court judge insisted that the
principle behind Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908,
should be described by the Sanskrit tArm PrSng NySya rather than
l3the Latin res judicata. One writer wrote unsubstantiated articles
19suggesting that the rule of law was really dharma or
14. D.F.Derham: Editor of Patton: Jurisprudence (1964: 3d) 3 (f.n.3).
15* H.C.Setahrad: The Common Law in India (i960) 227; The role of 
English Law in India (1966) 76. Note the obvious pleasure with 
which M.Arunachalam (in his article Lord Denning,M.R. (1964) 1 
M.L.J. Jnl. 1 at 2) notes that in Exparte Soblen (1963) 2 Q.B. 243 
at 301, the Indian case of Hans Muller v Sundt. Jail (1955) S.C.J.
324 was followed. He add^s (at p.2) "This is a beautiful instance 
of judicial comity in recent years."
16. Derrett: Bk. review (1961) 10 I.C.LQ. 206. M.Galanter Bk. review 
(1961) 10 Am.Jnl.Comp «L292.
17* Some references are cited later.
18• S.S.Dhavan: In an unreported case cited to the author in a 
personal communication.
19* S.Varqdarajulu Naidu: The rule of law as dharma (1961) II 
M.L.J. Jnl. 11-12.
20 Zkarma - a habit which at least one Chief Justice of India relished
and to which at least one foreign writer succumbed. another
writer rightly complains that a book on legal history almost com­
pletely forgot about India’s legal thought before the advent of 
the English.^
The problem is not one of emphasising past glory, alleged 
prior antiquity, or terminology. Many years ago, Dean Pound began
telling American lawyers that their basic concepts of law were based
24 25on outmoded concepts of liberty, were mechanical and that they
2 6should give up the Common Law system of interpretation in order
to resurvey the social and other interests that they wanted to pro-
27 28tect. With him, other jurists examined the judicial process, the
20. S.Varadarajulu Naidu: The rule of law as karma (i960) I 
M.L.J. Jnl. 42
21. P.B.Gajendragadkari casual references to dharma (1957) 59 
Bom.L.R. Jnl. k at 6; message to Magna Carta Celebrations A.I.R.
1965 Jnl. at 75*
22. See for example Harrop, A Freeman: An introduction to Indian 
jurisprudence (1958) 8 Am.Jnl.Comp.Law 29-
23* Paras Diwan: Review of M.P.Jain: Outlines of Legal History (1967)
9 J.I.L.I. 265.
24. Roscoe Pound: Do we need a philosophy of law ? (1905) Col.L.fi.265 
ref. 339* On the contribution see Julius Stone: Law and society 
in the age of Roscoe Pound (1966) 1 Israel L.Rev. 173; E.W.Patterson: 
Roscoe Pound on jurisprudence (1960)~So Col.L.Rev. 1124.
25* Roscoe Pound: Mechanical jurisprudence (1908) 8 Col.L.Rev. 605.
26. Roscoe Pound: Common Law and legislation (1907) 21 Har.L.Rev. 383*
27* For the best account of this see Roscoe Pound: Jurisprudence
(1959) Vol. Ill generally; A survey of social interests (1943) 57 
Har.L.Rev. 1.
28. Cdrdozo’s classic work: The nature of the judicial process 
(1921) showing the importance of Philosophy (Lecture I), History 
(Lecture II), Sociology (Lecture III) and Precedent (Lecture IV) 
in the judicial process.
29 30appellate tradition, the lawyer’s quest for certainty, and
attempted to overhaul the whole system. Many years later in the
mid-sixties, jurists thought that sociological jurisprudence had
31been over-emphasised and even in Pound’s day an English professor
32had called his "jural postulates" the prejudices of a Nebraska local. 
Indian judges have not forgotten what Pound said about the Common
Law, but Indian jurists, as one Chief Justice of India pointed out,
33have rarely examined their judicial process.
Indian judges have carefully avoided the mistakes they
34were warned against by American jurists, have quoted Pound, and
carefully guarded themselves, as Fazl Ali J. does at the end of
35his judgement in Gonalan v Madras, from the charge that they are 
following nineteenth century Common Law ideas. They have therefore 
avoided America’s mistakes, but have they solved India’s problems ?
The criticism against the judicial process was well put 
in a recent exchange in Parliament :
29- See particularly K.Llewellyn: The Common Law tradition (I960).
30. Frank: Law and the modem mind (1930). An uncanny Freudian 
interpretation but it exposes the lawyer’s quest for certainty very 
well. He also analysed the judicial process of the lower courts 
in Courts on Trial (1949)
31* See Stone: f.n. 2k supra.
32. Ijaski: The American democracy (1949) , ,443
33• M .Hidayatullah: Preface to M.Imam: The Indian Supreme Court 
and the Constitution (1968).
34. See generally P.B.Gajendragadkar: Law, liberty and social 
justice (1964). See also S.D.Balsara: A humble tribute to Koscoe 
Pound (1964-65) XXXIII Govt .Law College Magazine (Bombay) 13 and 
note his almost uncritical acceptance of Pound’s ideas.
33* A.I.R. 1950 SC 27 at pr. 96 p. 68 col. 1. For a good illus­
tration of this attitude see Paras Diwan: Nationalisation under the 
Constitution (1953) S.C.J. Jnl.21.
* P. Ramamurti:* We are not concerned with the position in 
the United States ••• the Japanese ... (or) ... the Canadian 
Constitution(s) • • • of the laws of England • • • Instead of 
dealing with (the) specific subject (in the Constitution) 
these people (on the bench) go quoting Blackstone in his 
Commentaries on the law of England.'
V. Nair:'They might have learnt it by heart i
P. Ramamurti:'it is (not) something which they have 
learnt (by heart) alone. It is something in their blood. 36
And this takes us to the crux of the problem. Have our judges lost
contact with Indian ways of life and thinking because of their
western training and attitudes ? At its worst, the argument is,
as a politician said of the Indian Civil Service, that they pretend
that they are
"some kind of superior Indian, not equal to the English, but 
a sort of brown Englishman in this country." 37
At its best, the criticism accuses the judge of insensitivity to
India’s needs and its way of living, and states - to borrow a comment
Gandhi used about the Privy Council - that "on highly intricate
matters of custom, in spite of all their labours, they have often
38made egregious blunders I" (emphasis mine). The simple allegation
39of "black skin white masks" which emanated from Franz Fanon and has 
become a fashionable part of the post-imperial scene, will not
36. Lok Sabha Debates (hereafter L.S.D.) IVth Series Vol.39» No. 391 
col. 293* P.Bamamurti’s whole speech is interesting.
37- L.S.D. IVth Series (1970) Vol.40, No. 42, col. 251 (per 
B.Ali Mirza).
38. Hindustan ^ imes, Aug. 7» 1926, quoted G.H.Badbois: Evolution 
of the Federal Court in India (1963) 5 J.I.L.I. 19 at 26.
39* Franz Fanon: Black Skin, White Masks (1967) Grove Press N.?), 
remains the locus classicus on the subject. But his analysis is 
too simplistic and rendered more so by Fanon1 s unguarded remarks 
about the sex problems that a colonial might face when lost in 
western metropolitan cities.
fully explain the judicial process in India and at least one 
foreign observer insists that all this westernism is really a blind :
"My Indian brothe^” he remarks, "is not a brown Englishman. 
He is an Indian who has learnt to move around in my drawing-room 
and will move around in it as long as it suits himself for his 
own purposes. And when he adopts my ideas, he does so to suit 
himself, and for as long as it suits him." 40
It is unwise to go into the merits of the problem at this stage,
but the problem of finding an "Indian Indian" solution to the
41problem rather than an "Indian Western" solution remains.
For the present we will concentrate on trying to identify 
the pressures that post-Constitution India imposed on the lawyer 
and the judge. The Constitution with its tremendous scope for 
judicial review played no mean part in helping the lawyer and the 
judge to re-allocate to themselves a status, analogous to the one 
which they enjoyed in pre-independent India. To the importance of 
this significant new dimension wv now turn.
40. Derrett: Tradition in Indian politics and society (unpublished 
paper S.O.A.S. Page 4, dated 17*3*69) due to be published in a 
book edited R.Moore in Australia. I am indebted to Professor 
Derrett for a copy of the article.
41. These phrases are used by Derrett in his book review of 
Setalvad’s The Common Law in India (I960) (196l)ft?I.C.L.Q. 206.
2. The Lawyer
After Independence the lawyer experienced a decided 
decline in his social and political status. The Constitution 
had assigned to him no constructive role: the hey-day of mass
agitation and the lawyer politician was over. The Bar Association 
of one High Court passed the following resolution :
"Resolved that this conference protests against the 
growing tendency in responsible ministerial cirles to under­
mine the profession of law and lawyers and to belittle the 
part pbyed by them in the National struggle. Lawyers have 
played no unworthy part in the prolonged National struggle 
and they have been pioneers in the fight for freedom. This 
conference affirms that law is an honourable profession and 
that for the good government of any country, lawyers are 
absolutely necessary." 1
Six years later a prolific contributor to legal journals
remarked :
"Talking of the legal profession one may frankly state 
that the services of its members (in) the national struggle 
and in the early building up of the National Congress has 
been rather too soon forgotten. They are needlessly malig­
ned by political Cromwells as ’Parasites of Society* and 
’interrupters of Justice*. A true and keen student of 
public affairs will see that the lawyer is a very useful 
instrument in the apparatus of Justice." 2
The Attorney General while not willing to admit a decline
in standards to the Uttar Pradesh bar^ - perhaps because of their
L
sensitivity to criticism as their resolution shows - freely did
1. Third Uttar Pradesh Lawyers* Conference, 19^7* Kanpur. High 
Court Administrative Department Pile III, resolution 4-. I am ^ 
indebted to Miss Gillian Buckee for this reference
2. V.G.Ramachandfran: The legal profession as a social unit (1953)
II M.I.J. Jnl. 28
3. Law and Lawyers (1951) 53 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 17 at 19-
4. See footnote 1 and further Gillian Buckee: The Uttar Pradesh 
Bar before 1935 (to be submitted for a Ph.D. dissertation to 
London University in 1972).
5
so to the Madras lawyers. On the latter occasion he had just
returned from a Commonw£fttttj&.awyers* conference at Sydney, and
hoped that Indian lawyers
"speakihg with a united voice (would) be a most powerful and 
influential body which would in the course of time play a 
respected and dominant role in the country and work for the 
good of the nation as a whole.” 6
for to him
"lawyers (were) by (the) very nature of their training and 
occupation in the forefront of activities which make for 
national (•••) development ••• It would ••• be a serious 
impediment ... if (Indian) lawyers should not bear the stamp 
of integrity and if they fail to adhere to maintain the 
highest standards of conduct.” 7
The lawyer was reduced to patting himself on the back,
and put up the plea of discrimination. One judge seemed to think
that all this was part of a universal prejudice against lawyers by
g
collecting assorted quotations taken from history.
There were three options open to the lawyer - politics, 
the teaching of law, and practising at the bar.
At first the lawyer wanted the option of politics left 
open, and the Uttar Pradesh Bar passed a resolution at Kanpur in 
19^7 asking the High Court not to change its rules to close this
9
option. But the lawyer politician is a thing of the past in India,
5. Speech reported (1952) 5k Bom.L.R. Jnl. 1 at 5•
6. Ibid at 3.
7. Ibid at 5-
8. S.S.Dhavan: The role of the bar and the judiciary in the 
democratic state. Allahabad Centenary Volumes (1968) II, 303- k .
9. Third Uttar Prqdesh Lawyers* Conference 19^7» Kanpur. High 
Court Administrative Department File III, resolution 20. I am 
indebted to Miss Gillian Buckee for this reference.
even as a Q.C., M.P., and lawyer members of Parliament, like
M. C. Setakad and N. C. Chatterji, are better known for their legal
views than their contribution to public life or politics, even though
lawyers have often caught the public eye for political reasons.^
Some lawyers tried to tidy up the legal teaching profession
and a lot of literature has grown around that subject .^The Law
institute has been set up, with western help, and its journals
along with the journals of the faculties of law of Banaras and
Aligarh have increased the juristic output to a better quality than
that, provided by the somewhat unpredictable standards seen in the
{journals supplemented to the private law reports from Madras, Bombay,
Allahabad and Calcutta. The basis was rather well put by an
American critic:
"Indian legal teaching inevitably tend(s) to evolve in patterns 
that emphasise rote memory. To impart information, not critical 
understanding, remain(s) the goal of Indian education." 13
No change of law courses will by itself supply the need for
indigenous theoretical nourishment. is beyond the scope of this
thesis to comment on problems of legal teaching.
10. Note the manner in which the press followed N.A.Palkivalla 
during the Bank Nationalisation case (e.g.) Statesman Weekly 
Nov. 8, 1969.
11. A fairly representative list of the literature on the subject 
can be found cited by H.B.Sunshine and A.L.Bemey: Basic legal 
education in India (1970) 12 J.I.L.X. 139 at f.n.2.
12. See Merrillat’s account of this in (1959) Am.J.C.L.S/9
13* Von Mehren: Law and legal education in India (f?(?3) ?S 
Har.L.Rev. Il80 at II87.
Ik *  See for example the suggestions made by G.S.Sharma for a 
longer three year course in Essays in Indian jurisprudence (Ed. 
G.S.Sharma 1965) Chapter VIII.
Most lawyers, however, chose to practise at the bar,
which was and still is overcrowded, as the Law Commission Report 
15indicates. A lot of suggestions were made to deal with its
16organisation. Writers suggested the Russian system, others hoped
that seniors would evolve a superannuation scheme (aware that the
17State could not afford it) and gracefully retire. Newcomers
lampooned the system,^or objected publicly.^The problem was
20not like America's - an exodus to Wall Street - but simply one
of brieflessness. Corruption and "toutism" were rampant and one
such case even reached the Supreme Court, where the lawyer argued
that the Supreme Court did not have the power to frame rules
21preventing his activities in the area.
But despite all this the lawyer has gradually acquired a 
status of his own. The Constitutioh, social reform (like the Hindu 
Code) and administrative needs led to a flood of statutes affecting 
the life, property and social ways of many people. Litigation,
15• Law Commission Xiy th Report, Chapter 26, pp 556 ff, particularly 
Anneiure at 58^-5 showing total number of lawyers in India.
16. V.G.Ramachandran: Socialisation of the legal profession in 
socialist India (1956) 58 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 70; S.S.Dhavan: The 
challenge of communism and the legal profession (i960) 58 All.L.J.
Jnl.l. The latter delivered several lectures on this theme in 
August 1965* after his returh from the tour of the U.S.S.R. in the 
summer of that year. I have a personal oopy of these lectures.
17* V.P.Raman: Superannuation and the Bar (195^) II M.L.J. 23 
esp. 25-6, 28-9
18. See the rather funny A Freshman’s Lgment (1957 ) 59 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 26.
19. Ravi S. Dhavan: The young lawyer, radio talk (1969)* All India 
Radio Allahabad. I have a personal copy of the text of the talk.
20. On this see Ralph E. Engel: The young lawyer faces unemployment 
(1970) Am.B.A.J. 751
however, does not start on its own. Litigants, and this is more
important in India's context, bring their complaints to a lawyer
and ask him to perform his jugglery act to help them. It is here
that the lawyer is most important. A well known authority on Hindu
law has recently complained that irresponsible litigation has taken
22
place under the divorce provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955*
Who is to blame ? Indian society surely, but also the lawyer and his
tout - touting being a calling, if not a profession. Litigation is
initially made or broken in his office. Equally frivolous sometimes
are the lawyers' arguments in Court, and recently the Supreme Court
have chided counsel by saying that the case before them should never
have been brought before them.2^ t  is the lawyer who has in the past
made strange appeals "to the spirit of the Constitution” while arguing 
24impossible cases, made an indiscriminate use of Article 14 of the
Constitution as a platform for attacking almost any kind of govera-
25mental activity and more recently used the Court to attack the
government's political power to amend the Constitution in the famous
26case of Golak Nath v Punjab (1967) while the government moved on the 
assumption that it has the power on the basis of decision made by the
22. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955- See Derrett's 
exclamations in the Critique of Modern Hindu Law (1970) Appendix IV,
436 ff.
23* U.P. v Sushil Chandra AM1970 S.C. 2191 (per Shah 1) at pr 4, p 2192.
24. B.R.Ambedkar's arguments in Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252 
rightly rejected by the court.
25* See infra Chapter III.
26. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. These arguments were first made to the 
court in 1951 in Shankari Prashad v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458.
Supreme Court as early as 1951- Slowly the lawyer has involved himself
in the lives of the people and arrogated to himself a status often
unequal to the function that he performs. In 1950 the Chief Justice
of the Bombay High Court thought that the lawyer’s role was simply
to help the judge to whom the Constitution had assigned a constructive 
27role. But the lawyer’s role is more important than that for he is
the one who first decides what interests are worthy of protection.
Critics of the Supreme Court concentrating on the appellate tradition
are apt, sometimes, to neglect this role of the lawyer. It is true
that a lawyer must defend his client at all costs but is it not
possible that the lawyer in his quest for work and prominence has
forgotten some of the wider problems of the profession ? Latterly^
one Chief Justice of India has accused lawyers of sometimes delibera-
28tely mis-stating the law. Another judge sums this up very well:
’’Due to fierce competition caused by overcrowding some 
lawyers are compelled to encourage or even manufacture unnec­
essary litigation. If the administration of justice is thus 
perverted, the profession loses its very right to exist ...
The legal profession in India cannot sit idle while democracy 
is struggling for survival.” 29
Further the lawyer has distorted his own role. He has posed as 
the champion of liberty and used the Constitution as the justi­
fication of his own intrusion in Indian life, often merely paying 
lip-service to the western labels that he uses. There has therefore
27* M.C.Chagla: speech reported in his collection of essays:
Individual and the State (1961) 55-
28. M.Hidayatullah: speech at Bombay, referred to by Seervai:
Position of the judiciary under the Constitution of India (1970) 7^-75-
29- S.S.Dhavan: The challenge of communism and the legal profession
(I960) 53 All.L.J. Jtnl. 1 at 3, 7-
been a lot of doctrinnaire litigation, appeals being based on
western ideas of law. The process of self-indoctrination is
evident from the number of articles - appearing in Indial legal
periodicals - which praise without discussion well known western
liberal concepts. Some of these articles include :
lOur Constitution and our right to equality, liberty and property 
"Liberty and social control I! 31 
"Fundamental right si’ 32
"A pragmatic evaluation of fundamental rights*! 33
"Law and liberty!! 3A
"Liberty and democracy!! 35
"Law and lawyers!’ 36
"Freedom from law!' 37
"Evolution of a just legal order!’ 38
"Liberty and personal liberty!! 39
"The executive and democracy!’ AO
"Role of the lawyer in the Constitution of India 1' Al 
It is almost as if the lawyer is convinced that he has something 
to say and is looking for a platform to speak from. Thus one lawyer 
talks of how :
30. Gyan Prakash: (195A) 52 A11$.<L. Jnl. 5*
31. K.Venkoba Rao (1953) S.C.J. Jnl. 203
•
<\j H.S.Ursekar (I960 ) 62 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 129
33« B.K.Sharma (I960) S.C.J. Jnl. 18, 35 at 35 talks of fundamental 
rights as the aspirations of the people.
3A. M.C.Chagla (1950) 52 Bom.L.R. Jnl. A9
35. R.K.Ranade A.I.R. 1950 Jnl. 75, 83.
36. M.C.Setahrad (1951) 53 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 117
37. T.Ramalingam (1956) S.C.J. Jnl. 83.
38. V.G.Ramachandraa (1956) S.C.J. Jnl. 89
39. Ibid (1956) M.L.J. Jnl. AO
AO. Surya Kumar (1968) Lawyer 158-60
Al. Ibid (1967) Lawyer Al
"the salvation of the individual lies in the fundamental 
rights part of the Constitution.” A2
^hese are emotive ideas, such as made one judge actually talk of 
the Supreme Court ”as a Constituent Assembly in continuous session”.
This betrays an attitude which has a disastrous effect on litigation. 
Lawyers tend to regard themselves as John Hamj&ens fighting for a 
cause which is already won. Their duty now is to use their discretion 
to evaluate what needs and interests they want to protect instead 
of posing as champions of and for everything. It is in this sprit, 
partly as champions of the litigant (whether litigious or vexatious 
or neither) and partly as a profession manufacturing its own employ­
ment that lawyers patronise, as well as write, an extraordinarily 
voluminous literature, which draws its inspiration perforce not from 
India1 s real needs and conditions, but from a cosmopolitan legal 
scholarship, whose relevance to India is assumed not proven. Too 
much emphasis has been laid on other Constitutions. Thus a famous five 
volume commentary on the Constitution compares each article of the
Constitution with the corresponding provisions in the Constitutions
AAof the rest of the world. Several articles were written in the
......... 4 5 ........................................ . . . .
same spirit, differences were sometimes accepted, but the western
A2 M. Arunachalam: The individual and the Constitution (1959) S.C.J. 
Jnl. 68 at 78.
A3. K.Bhimasaakaran: The judiciary under the Constitution (1957)
39 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 129-32 at 131.
AA. D.D.Basu: Commentary on the Constitution of India (1950 2
but later in 5 volumes).
A5« See C.H.Alemandrowicz: American influence on constitutional 
interpretation in India (1956) Am.Jnl.Comp.L. 98; V.G.Ramachandram: 
Guarantees of fundamental rights in other constitutions (1956) S.C.J. 
Jnl. l8A; M.K.Nambiyar: American borrowings in the Indian Constitutions 
(195A) S.C.J. Jnl. 151.
model was inevitably accepted and the need for comparison reiterated.
All this has made the lawyer think in far more revolutionary terms
about law and his role as its champion, than was intended. The
effect of this uncontrolled 11 championship” has been felt in the
Courts, which apart from accumulating arrears, have had to adjudicate
on western concepts not always suited to India. With that we are
not concerned at present. What concerns us here is the aura of
emotion that the lawyer has tried to raise about himself, rather than
the simple fact that he expressed an affection for outmoded or
inappropriate western concepts. The lawyer often examined these
concepts and often wrote general articles (which asked somewhat
uncritically that the role of the State be re-examined) and lawyers
discuss the advent of “Democratic Socialism and its impact on the
47
Indian Constitution”. The then Chief Justice of Patna wrote an
48
article on “Parliamentary government and a planned economy” where 
he emphasised the supremacy of Parliament and retained this position 
as a Supreme Court judge in the famous case of Golak Nath v Pun.iab 
(1967).^ Others talked of :
Liberty and social legislation in the welfare State. *5°
46. See L.R.Sivasubramaniyam’s review of W.Douglas, Tagore law 
lectures published in America as We the Judges (1956), Univ.of Chicago 
L.Rev. 563 at 570
47- V.G.Ramachandram: Democractic socialism and its impact on the 
Indian Constitution (1953) M.L.3T. Jnl. 1
48. V.Ramaswami: (1953) II M.L.J. Jnl. 1
49. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643
50. V.N.Shrinivas Rao: (1968) Lawyer 74-78, 147-52
* Nationalisation in the welfare state5"1 
or asked
"Can socialism be introduced in the Indian Constitution ?" JL
But the answer in all cases seemed only to say what Holmes w^s trying
to say in Lochner v Hew York (1902) when he remarked that "the
53Constitution did not enact Spencer’s Social Statics" and in no case
dealt with Indian conditions.
The lawyers’ awareness of interests other than the individual’s
is not disputed at this stage. What is being emphasised is that arrears
of cases are increasing and lawyers must not think, as one lawyer
obviously does, that the more people resort to the courts the more
5kdoes it indicate that the rule of law is gaining hold. Litigation 
is becoming the favourite pastime of the Indian people. The lawyer 
is an important part of the litigation process. He has the capacity 
to restrict the number of cases that reach the court. But it appears 
that for reasons of his own he has not chosen to do so.
51* Paras Diwan: X1953) S.C.J. 21
52. C.S.Subram£nyam Aiyar: (1953) I M.L.J. Jnl. 31
53. Lochner v N.Y. (1902) 198 U.S.205
5k* V.G.Bamachandraa: Social structure in a welfare state, with 
particular reference to India (1956) S.C.J. Jnl. 37
3. The Judge
The Constitution has altered very fundamentally the impor­
tance of judges in India. Prior to 1935* the judges of the several 
High Courts were prominent and respected members of the community 
and decided on important social issues, but were not a part of the 
power structure. In 1930, in an exhaustive survey, the Indian 
Statutory Commission did not mention the judiciary at all, apart 
from suggesting the odd minor reforftu^ The Indian lawyer wanted 
a Federal Court which would take the place of the Privy Council 
in appellate matters and be part of the power structure in 
Constitutional matters. Sir Hari Singh Gour presented the first
Bill outlining the need for such a Court to the legislative
2
Council on March 26, 1921. Five attempts later, the Nehru Report
3
agreed that such a Court was desirable, - a view endorsed by the 
Government in a White Paper,^provision being made for the esta­
blishment of the Federal Court of India in the Government of
5
India Act, 1935* The history of this development and its political 
implications have been traced elsewhere and need not be outlined 
here.^ Under the 1935 Act the Federal Court was the first Court
1. See Volume I and II of the Report Gad 3568 and 3569 respectively. 
The administrative reform is suggested in Volume II, Part X, prs 
341-349-
2. Legislative Assembly Debates I, 1606.
3. Report of the All-India Congress Committee, Allahabad, 1928.
if. White Paper €md 3451-
5. Government of India Act 1935 sections 200 ff.
6. See George H.Gadbois Jr.: Evolution of the Federal Court of 
India (1963) 5 J.I.L.I. 19 and M.Y.Pylee Ph.D. Thesis : The *ederal 
Court of India (19&6)Chapter III 64.
in India which represented not just an independent judiciary, but 
a separate power in the apparatus of government.
This was something new to the Indian system, for inde­
pendence of the judiciary is one thing and separation of powers 
quote another. In ancient India the supremacy of dharma was
recognised but Manu emphasised the doctrine that subjects had
7
an overriding duty to obey their king. While it can be argued
g
that a limited right to disobey existed, it was nowhere suggested
9 mthat it should be articulated through the judiciary. The king's 
discretion in judicial matters was sought to be controlled by 
the inclusion of Brahmins (as a text of Katyayana^suggests) 
and others to assist him in the discharge of his judicial duties. 
Later, when a separate jhdiciary was established, they were not 
made part of the policy-making structure (not even in juris­
dictional mattersJ and what was emphasised was the virtue of 
non-interference by the king (i.e. independence) not a consti­
tutional check by the judiciary.^ -^gain, it has emphasised that
?. Manu VII 3-13.
8. See John Spellman; Political Theory in Ancient India (1964) 
Chapter IX Revolution p n 225-243- On the judiciary see A.S.Altekar: 
State and Government injlnclia' pp 203-204, 327-323, 244 and
an interesting section on popular courts at 250-261.
9- See for example John Spellman (supra f.n.8 ) on methods of 
revolution pp 238-243*
10. Katyayana (Kane’s Collection ) 58
11. For two briedl accounts emphasising this independence aspect see 
B.N.Chobe: Judiciary in Ancient India (1954) S.C.J. Jnl. 85; The art 
of governance in Ancient India (1956) S.C.J. Jnl. 19; see also Dhavan 
(supra section 2) f.n.6). For an account of procedure and jurisdiction 
see Sir S.Varadachariar; The Hindu Judicial System (Lucknow 1946).
But one has to be careful for one cannot be sure whether word was 
followed by action.
in Mughal days, judges often stood up against the executive (i.e. the
12king). Thus in State v Qazi Mir the Court refused to pass a sentence
13of death which the king had asked it to; in State v Shiqdar a police
officer had to pay damages for wrongful arrest. In several cases, in-
r 14eluding one which involved the East India Company, damages were
awarded against the State. There were several other Cases, where the
13independence of the judiciary was emphasised, but there are no cases 
where the judges thought in terms of judicial review, whether substan­
tive or jurisdictional.
16
The 1935 Act ushered in a new kind of judicial power. The
use of this power by the Federal Court was, however, much more limited
17than certain exaggerated accounts of the Court suggest. For a variety 
of reasons - the fact that its jurisdiction was limited to the inter­
pretation of the 1935 Act being the most important factor - itdid not 
set itself up as a "third power” in the constitutional set-up. It 
could not - nor had it the power to - pose as the champion of funda­
mental rights, although its power to protect a citizen’s right to
12. M.B.Ahmad: The administration of justice in medieval India (1941) 
68-9.
13. Ibid 88-9-
14. deferred to in Captain Hamilton’s Diary I, 227-32, quoted in 
M.B.Ahmad (supra) 193 along with ItajiZahid and Pirji v State, Sher 
Mohammed v State. Khan-e-Jahan1s case.
15. See the description of 10 cases by M.B.Ahmad 254-6 and on the 
relationship between the Qazi (the judge and the ruler) 68-70, 
88-9 0, 193 and esp. 277-279.
16. High Courts did of course control delegated legislation on which 
see S.Dad: The doctrine of ultra vires in India (1902) by the usual 
Common Law rules. See R.tf.Burah (1878) 3 A.C. -~88^  = 5 I.A. 170
17. For a somewhat exaggeratecj|picture see M.V.Pylee (supra F.n.6).
l8property was by no means non-existent. It did in certain cases, like
19 20Niharendu Putt Maujumdax v K.E. K.E. v Shibnafch and K.E. v Beonarilal
21Sharma (the latter judgement, according to one commentator, cost
Sir S. Varadachariar his appointment as Permanent Chief Justice of 
22the Court ), but these were largely in the sensitive area of preven-
tive detention. The Court’s achievement was that it tidied up the
l£ederal structure and absorbed foreign federal doctrine, thus avoiding
many of the problems that could otherwise have arisen after 1950. The
23Constitution is by and large hased on the Act of 1935 and it is to 
the Court’s credit that the Constituent Assembly did not alter the 
blue print in the 1935 Constitution.^ A detailed survey of the Court’s
25
performance can be traced elsewhere. Since the Court did not deal 
with Fundamental Rights it could not pose as the Champion of the People. 
In its history the Court decided 165 cases (not including four advisory 
references) and sat for an average of 28 days a year over the 11 years 
of its existence. This may be contrasted with a very conservative 
estimate by one Chief Justice of 600 per year for the present Supreme*
18. See S.299 of the Act and subsequent Supreme Court case law on that
esp. Jee Jee Bho^ v Asst. Collector Alffl-965 S.C. 1096. It was never
interpreted by the Federal Court.
19. A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 22.
20. IV F.L.J. 151.
21. IV F.L.J. 79.
22. Pylee (supra f.n.6) 252.
23. For a closer look at this see Seervai: Constitutional Law of India
0<?fc2_) 78 L.Q.R.3ff8«
24. On the legislative lists see the following cases on Mpith and 
substance”. U.P. v Atioa Begum (1940) F.C.R. 110; ChetHar v Advocate 
General of Madras (1.940) F.C.R. 188; Bank of Commerce Ltd. v Amylya 
Krishna Basu Roy Chourdhry (1944) F.C.R. 126; Bank of Commerce Ltd. v 
K.B.Kar (1944) F.C.R. 370; Lakh.i Narayan Das v Bihar (1949) F.C.R. 693 
esp. at 707*
25. For a survey of the Court’s contribution see Pylee (supra f.n.6) , 
Chapters VIII-IX, p. 156 ff; George H.Gadbois Jnr.: The Federal Court 
of India 1937-1950 (1964) 6 J.I.L.I. 253-
Court. In actual fact the disposal is somewhere in the region of 
263,000. The Federal Court was in this sense in no way a "dress 
rehearsal" for the Supreme Court’s later exercise of power, but its 
existence might help to explain why the early Supreme Court judges 
were so reticent about freely exercising judicial power.
" The Constitution assigned to the Supreme Court a construc­
tive role. A leading commentator on the Constituent feembly has 
remarked :
"The judiciary was to be the arm of the social revolution, 
upholding the quality that Indians had longed for in colonial 
days ... (T)he courts were also Idealised because, as guardians 
of the Constitution, they would be the expression of a new law 
created by Indians for Indians." 27
28But one must not be misled by these accounts, for the Constituent
Assembly distrusted the judiciary whenever faced with the problem of
granting them power to have the decisive decision in matters of social
and economic policy. Perhaps Mr. Nehru hinted at this when in another
context he made the oblique remark :
"Whatever the legal aspect of a thing there are moments when it 
is a feeble reed to rely on," 29 —
suggesting that the path of change lay elsewhere. The Assembly respec­
ted the Courts. One member hoped that the Court would take on additional
26. Estimate of Federal Court from Gadbois (supra f.n.25) 255; of the 
Supreme Court B.P.Sinha Chief Justice of India; Foreword to M.V.Pylee 
(supra f.n.6) pp viii-ix. Sinha’s estimate is unfair for in 1962 (when 
he wrote) the Supreme Court disposed of 1243 civil cases (for full details 
see infra) and 1048 cjbiminal cases by special leave, 889 civil appeals,
309 criminal appeals and 344 writ petitions. A total of 3&33-
27* Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution (1966 O.U.P.) 167* But 
this is not a lawyer’s account. His sympathy for India and for social 
revolution make his thesis somewhat suspect.
28. See generally ibid Chapter VII.
29* I Constituent Assemby Debates (C.A.D.) 6l.
30responsibilities (though to her this meant acting like the King’s
■Bench in England^) and another thought that its independence ought
32to be respected and remain unimpaired. But the fact remains that 
when it came to giving them power in matters of judicial review, 
property^, preventive detention and due process,^ the Constituent 
Assembly held back. One prominent member, not forgetting the 
American experience, put the general mood rather well :
"It might ... be that to give the judiciary an enormous 
amount of power - a judiciary which may not be controlled by 
any legislature in any matter except by the means of ultimate 
removal - we may perhaps be creating a Frankenstein monster, 
which could nullify the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution. I have in mind the difference that was 
experienced in another country.’1 35
The logic of the Constitution in the words of another
prominent member was that :
"instead of leaving it to the courts to read the necessary 
limitations and exceptions recognised in any well ordered 
state ... (they are) ... in the Constitution itself." 36
The Constitution was however imprecise, and the concept of "reasonableness
(on the due process model) left plenty of room for introducing judicial 
37policy.
30. Smt. Durgabai IV C.A.D. 712-13.
31. Ibid at 712-18.
32. Per Mr. 3.M.Gupta IV C.A.D. 796.
33« On property see IX C.A.D. 1191-1311 and Chapter III infra.
34. G. Austin (supra f.p. 27) 101-112 and Chapter IV infra.
35* VII C.A.D. 383 (per Mr. T.T.Krishnamachari).
^6. VII C.A.D. 336 (per A.Krishnaswami Ayyar).
37. Xhis is at present heing examined by Mr. T.K.K.Iyer in a dis­
sertation (to be submitted to the London University) enti6led "The 
Concept of Reasonableness in the Indian Constitution".
■5
How did the judges react to these limitations ? The earlier 
Court accepted them sometimes - even apologising for giving the impres­
sion that they were stepping out of line and claiming that they were
■58 39
misunderstood. Others emphasised the rule of law, and some the
iiQ
supremacy of Parliament. Judges were, however, prepared to think of 
themselves as a third and inferior chamber, though one judge did 
describe the Supreme Court as a Constituent Assembly in continuous 
session.^ The attitude of the early Court leaned on reticence, but 
later the Court became a little undecided. This may be illustrated 
by the equivocal position taken by Justice Hidayatullah in his Lala 
Lajpat Rai Lectures. At one stage he insisted that the Constitution 
was a "complete document ... containing all the answers to the problems
of State,lZf2but later said "its extreme brevity of expression requires
43
constant exposition in interpretation and construction" hastily 
adding however that what "the judiciary does ... i£ from within the
J1V1-
Constitution. It has no will of its own." In his introduction he
actually apologises if "in describing the role of the judiciary, he
45has strayed into hyperbole." The learned judge’s dilemma displays
38. Chief Justice Patanjali Shastri’s speech at Madras Lawyer’s 
Conference A.I.R. 1955 Jnl. 25
J
39* Chagla: (1950) 52 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 49; Individual and the State (1961)35
40. V.Ramaswami: Parliamentary government in a planned economy (1953)
II M.L.J. Jnl. 1. Gajendragadkar: Indian Parliament and Fundamental 
Rights (l972) reported Feb.26, 1972, National Herald.
41. K.Bhimasankaran (195^) Bf BomL.R. Jnl. 129-132.
42. M.Hidayatullah! Democracy and the judicial process in India(1966) 52
43. Ibid at 68.
44. Ibid at 69.
45• Ibid Preface.
the difficulty in making the choice between judicial restraint and
the possibilities of power.
It appears that the judges are now more prepared to make the
latter choice, suggesting that they are being driven to that position
by the legislature, and, as one ex-Chief Justice of India suggested,
46by Constitutional Amendment. More recently, judges have become a
47little bolder and are talking of "the judicial salvage of freedom*1 
and at least three Chief Justices of India have talked of their duty to
protect the Constitution taking a very wide view of their jurisdiction
48 .and their role. They havgqpunished for contempt the suggestion that
49they suffer from "class bias'* and publicly denounced the charge that
50they are "committed*.*
This new development poses problems. Firstly, can the 
judges tackle creatively as well as responsibly the various socio­
economic problems that the Court is faced with ? Secondly, would 
they be able to do this on the basis of "neutral principles"
Lastly *, do they have the staff and the equipment to deal with all the
problems involved or do they require a Ministry of Justice in the
52sense in which Cordozo meant it to help them ? Ihe latter idea was
46. See Chief Justice K.Subha Roa: Soine Constitutional. Problems (1970) 
170 ff.
47. See ibid Chapter II, 56-170.
48. K.Subha Rao (supra f.n.^6); Sikri (present Chief Justicejat 
Chandigarh reported (1971) I S.C.J. Jnl. 72; Ex-Chief Justice Shah Tafa 
Memorial Lectures, Bombay, summarised India Weekly, London, Apr.19, 1971*
49• E.M.S.Namboodripad v T. N. Nambiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015.
50. K.S.Hegde: speech in Delhi reported Statesman Weekly Jan. 27, 1971*
51. Discussed and explained infra.CWa.V^lIL^^^*^' ^
52. B. Cardozo: A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 Har.li.Bev.113L
r 53put forward in India and is being considered by the uovernment.
Perhaps it would be wiser to stick to the time-honoured formula of 
judicial restraint and confine itself as closely as possible to 
problems of jurisdiction and the power of review in the English 
rather than the American sense of the word. This is what the poli­
tician is complaining about. There is no lack of respect for the 
judiciary, for Parliament has recently expressed sympathy with the 
idea of an independent judiciary and suggested that their standards
54of living and salaries must be raised. Further, it has passed the
^ontempt of Courts Act, 1971» which protects the judiciary from criti-
55cism. The controversy centres around the right, power, and ability 
of the men who man the Court, and it is the adequacy, of their judicial 
techniques to take on the responsibility of discussing involved 
questions of policy, that is being questioned.
53* Put forward by Governor (of W.Bengal) S.S.Dhavan and endorsed by 
anM.P. in Parliament (1970) L.S.D. (IVth Series) Vol.43 No.8 col.83-8**. 
A plea for a somewhat different kind of Ministry of Justice is made by 
the Law Commission (XlVth Report) Vol.II 1224-1225-
54. See for example the discussion in Parliament (1970) at L.S.D. (IVth 
series) Vol.39 No.39 col.51-53; (1970) Vol.40 No.43 col.1-8.
55* See a newspaper account of the Parliamentary discussion of the 
Debate in Statesman Weekly Dec.25, 1971» p*4. Note however Mr. V.K. 
Krishna Me/ton M.P. (who argued the Namboadripad case (supra f.n.49)) 
and K.C.Haidar, M.P. (C.P.I.M.) Criticisms of judicial attitudes.
Ors. e *0 s /jp 4- *
4. The Supreme Court Judges - _a_ Portrait.
Although a great deal has been written on the Supreme Court^
1. See T.S.Rajagopala Iyengar: The creative role of the Supreme 
Court of India (1970)• Despite the flattering review at (T971TT"”
M.L.J. Jnl. 10-11 it is really an analysis of the Supreme Court on 
Constitutional law on which the more scholarly account of M.Imam:
The Supreme Court and the Constitution^(1968
Seervai: The position of the judiciary lrl /India (1970) anaan J 
excellent review of it by S.Sahav: Statesr&m (Overseas) Weekly 
Sept. 19, 1970 p.9; G.H.Gadbois: The Supreme Court of India - 
Preliminary report of an empirical study (1970) IV J.C.P.S. 33;
S.V.Raman: Judicial review and the Supreme Court A.I.R. 1969 Jnl. 122, 
130; T.K.Tope: The Supreme Court and the felt necessities of the time 
(1964-5) 55 Govt. Law College (Jnl.) 1; P.Trikamdas: The Supreme Court 
of India T1967) J.I.C.S. 15l; T.P.Dubey: Supreme Court and High Court 
Judges under the Indian Constitution A. I.R. 1953 Jnl. 16-18; Ed. Note: 
The Supreme Court and social justice Tl'965)' 70 C.W.N. Jnl. 11.
The only extended account of the Supreme Courts is S.R.Sharma: The_ 
Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution (1959, Delhi) but despite 
the praise accorded to it (A.I.R. I96Q Jnl. 72 col. 1) it is neither
a lawyer’s account nor does it deal with the techniques used by the
Court. Special accounts of the Supreme Courts on certain aspects 
of the law also exist, e.g. Soonavala: The Supreme Court and 
Industrial Law (I968); Soonavala: The Supreme Court and Criminal
Law~Tl966, Bombay Vol. I and II). But these are written from the
point of view of the practitioner and contain merely a digest of 
the cases decided by the Court. Articles on the Supreme Court’s 
performance in various cases can be found in several journals and 
will be referred to later.
i r>Vi W
2the judiciary and the judicial process in india, very little ^
2. R.K.Sircar: The position of the judiciary under the Constitution 
of India A.I.R. 1951 Jnl. 27-32; V.G.Ramachandram: The role of the 
judiciary in IndilTT.I.R. 1954 Jnl. 93-6; L.R.Ganu: Administration 
of law and Justice in India of tomorrow A.I.R. 1955 JnJb. 110; B.R. 
Mandlekar: Aministration of law under changed social conditions
A.I.R. 1957 Jnl. 116-7; R.K.Ranade: Justice in democratic India
A.I.R. 1956 Jnl• 41-2; L.S.Mehta: Delays in Courts A.I.R. 1959 Jnl.
36-7; Y.V.Dixit: The judiciary and political appointments A.1.3J." 1959 
Jnl. 2; K.K.Banerji: The life of a judge A.I.R. I960 Jnlh. 51-5; 
K.Umaraaheshwaram: Role of the judiciary under"the' Constitution A.I.R. 
i960 Jnl. 13; N.V.Gadgil: Appointment of judges A.I.R. i960 Jnl. 106- 
110; J.N.Malik: Removal of judges A.I.R. 1964 Jnl. 42; G. Cl.Las:' Role 
of the judiciary in the maintainence of law and order A.I.R. 1964 Jnl.
43-7; Ed. note: (1965) 70 C.W.N. Jnl. 19; see also ( I963J It S.C.A. Jnl 
43; A.S.Kuppuswamy: Appointment to the judiciary ( I967) I M .L.J. J n l. 77; 
T.Von Mehren: The judicial process with particular reference to the 
United States an®. India (1963) V J.I.L.I. 271; P.G.Rajagopalan: 
Dissatisfaction with the Courts" (1967) 1 S.C.A. Jnl. 11; Ed.note:
Judicial Independence (1966) 71 C.W.N. 37; T.Viswanath Aiyar: The law, 
the judiciary (and) the rule of law (I967) I M.L.J. Jnl. 7; R.M.Sahai:
Law, lawyers and judges (I967) 63 All.L.J. Jnl. 1; V.M.Bhojraj: A new 
approach to judicial decision making A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 110; G.S.Ullal:
Do judges live in an ivory tower ? A.I.R. 1966 Jnl. 37 (on certain eepects 
of delegated legislation); D.D.Sharma: Judicial independence add 
impartiality (1968) II S.C.J. Jnl. 24; Ed note: Parliament and the Courts
(1969) 73 C.W.N. Jnl. 169; B.K.Pal: Judicial behavior and the rule of 
law (I9Z9)' S.C.D. Jnl. 49; V .K.Thiruvenkatachalam: Judicial review and 
the Supreme Court A.I.R. 1969 Jnl. 122, 130; G.C.Singhvi: Separation of 
the Judiciary from the executive ... (1970) IV J.C.P.S. 288; R.N.Sarkar: 
Role of a judge in a democratic society (1970) 7% C.W.N. 118; B.Madhusadan: 
Delay in Courts and justice A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 69; S.S.Dhavan: on judges 
generally National Herald Dec.11, 1970; M.Hidayatullah: Judicial methods 
(B.N.Rau Lectures reprinted (1970) H I  J.C.P.S. 1. The best review of 
the judicial system remains the XlVth Report of the Law Commission 
(1956, Delhi Volumes I and II)
by way of material on^
3. The best accounts to date are those of George H.Gadbois Jnr: 
Selection, background, characteristics and voting behavior of Indian 
Supreme Court Judges in Schubert and Danelski (ed) Comparative judicial 
behaviour (1969 O.U.P.) Chapter 9i PP 221-56; ibid: IndTan^Suprerne 
"Court "Judges - a portrait (1968) III Law and Society Review 317-336; 
Autobiographies have been written by Mahajan: Looking back (1963); 
Hidayatullah: A judge's miscellany (1972 - forthcoming). The following 
biographical material is available - V.D.Mahajjan: Chief Justice 
Ga.jondragadkar (1967) containing a valuable anthology of his addresses 
pp 66-347; V.D.Mahagan: Chief Justice Subba Rao - Defendeyfof Civil 
Liberties (1968). See also on Subha Rao - V.G.Ramachandran: The ninth 
Chief Justice of India A.I.R. 1966 Jnl. 58-6O; K.M.Sharma: A.I.R. 1967 
Jnl. 18-9. On Hidayatullah see ed. notes: (1971) M.L.J. Jnl. 1-2; 
j£.I.R. 1971 Jnl. 21. Similar notes may be found on other judges e.g.
K.B.Mehta on B.K.Mukerjea A.I.R. 1933 Jnl. 57* Again information is 
also available in court references following the death of a judge - 
whether sitting or retired, e.g. on Mahajan at (1967) III S.C.R. (i)-(ii). 
A great deal of information is available in the autbbiography of the 
first Attorney General of India, M.C.Setalvad: My life ... (1970) notably 
in a speech of S.R.Das C.J. at a dinner on his retirement quoted in 
extenso at pp 366-8. There is a well prepared index which gives 
Setalvad’s views on various judges, e.g. on Sinha J. at 428-9, 500-1; 
on Kapur J. at 509; on Sarkar J. - his first impressions at 162.
Various accounts have been written on the contributions of particular 
judges to various branches of law. These include: P.Trikamdas: Justice 
Bhagwati as a lawyer (i960) II J.I.L.I. 5; M.P.Jain: Justice Bhagwati 
and administrative law (i960) II J.I.L.I. 7; H.C.L.Merrillat: Chief 
Justice S.R.Das - a decade of decisions on rights of property (i960)
II J.I.L.I. 183; F.B.Mukharji: Chiff Justice S.R.Das and Equality before 
law (i960) II J.I.L.I. 161; B.Sen: Chief Justice Sinha (1964) VI J.I.L.I. 
133; R.L.Narasimhan: Chief Justice Sinha - A review of some of his 
decisions (1964) VI J.I.L.I. 145; T.S.Rama Rao: Chief Justice Sinha 
and property rights (1964) VI J.I.L.I. 153; S.N.Dhyani: Justice 
Gajendragadkar and labour law (1967) VII Jaipur L.J. 69; P.K.Tripathi:
Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar and Constitutional interpretation (1966)
VIII J.I.L.I. 479; P.W.Rege: Contributions of Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar 
to Hindu law (1966) VIII J.I.L.I. 606; G.Chandra: Mr. Justice 
Gajendragadkar and Criminal lav; (1966) VIII J.I.L.I. 538; J. Duncan M. 
Derrett: The contribution of Mr. Justice Subba Rao to Hindu law (1967)
IX J.I.L.I. 547; T.S.Rama Rao: Chief Justice Subha Rao and property 
rights (1967) IX J.I.L.I. 568; S.N.Pijphad: Mr. Justice Subha Rao and 
fundamental rights A.I.R. 1967 Jnl. 19•
For background material I am very grateful to S.S.Dhavan (then Governor 
of W. Bengal) and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.B.Mukharji (then Chief Justice 
of the Calcutta High Court) who sent me short biographical notes on all 
the judges.
L
and by judges of the Supreme Court of India.
4. For autobiographical accounts see M.C.Mahajan (cited f.n.3 supra); 
Hidayatullah (cited f.n.3 supra). Other major works by judges includes 
B.K.Mukerjea: Hindu law of religious and charitable trusts (now see 
3rd edn. 1970); Ibid: Problems of aerial law (1930); S.R.Das (ed):
Mulla*s Transfer of Property Act; N.C.Aiyar: Mayne1s Hindu law and 
usage (11th edn. 1950); V.Bose:Preventive detention in India (1961)
3 Jnl. of Int.Comm.of Jurists 87; N.H.Bhagwati: (ed) Mullah Law of 
Insolvency in India ( .7 ); translated V.L.Mehta: Cooperative movement 
into Gujrati; For an address of B.Jaganadhdas: see A.I.R. 1955 Jnl. 42; 
T.L.V.Ayyar: Evolution of the Indian Constitution (1970); Ibid: (ed)
Mukerjea1 s Hindu law on religious and charitable trusts (i960 2d);
J.L.Kapur: Law of adoption in India and Burma (1935); •Gajendragadkar:
Law, liberty and social justice (1965); ^he “Constitution of India (1969); 
Kashmir - prospect and retrospect (1965); Secularism (1971); Indian 
Parliament and fundamental rights (1972 Tagore Law Lectures) see news­
paper reports National Herald Feb. 23, 1972, Patriot Feb. 26, 1972,
National Herald Feb. 26, 1972. K.Subha Rao: Our Constitutional problems
(1970) see review A.I.R. 1971 Jnl. 44-5; Property rights under the 
Constitution (Shroff Memorial Lecture reprinted)(1969) I S.C.W.R. Jnl.
1-24; The philosophy of the Indian Constitution (1969) rev. A.I.R. 1970 
Jnl. 179; Frequent tampering with the Constitution undermines freedom 
7l968) K.L.R. Jnl. 45; Freedoms in free India A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 21.
The jacket of the first work cited supra credits him with having deli­
vered the following lectures: Rt.Hon. V.S.Srinivasa Sastri Lectures;
Lai Bahadur Shastri Lectures; Lala Lajpat Rai Memorial Lectures: Dr.
Rajendra Prashad Memorial Lectures. K. Wanchoo: The role of the judi- 
ciary(1968) III Civil and Military Law Jnl. 11-24; M. Hidayatullah: A 
Judge* s miscellany (1972); Democracy and the .judicial process in India 
71968); Judicial methods (1970); B.N.Rau Memorial Lectures reprinted 
(1969) II J.C.P.S. 1; Humanism of Mahatma Gapdhi (1970); Ed. Mulla* s 
Principles of Mohommedan Law (1968 l6th edn); The Constitution, Parli- 
ament and the Court (Sri Ram Memorial Lecture 1972) see Patriot Feb.
19, 1972; J*C.Shah: Tata Memorial Lectures (1970): V.Ramaswami: Hindu 
law and English .judges A.I.R. 'i960 Jnl. 89: J.M.Shelat: Akbar (in 2 
volumes 1959 Bombay); Contributor to Munshi: His life and work; The 
tragedy of Shah Jehan (Bombay i960); The spirit of the Constitution 
(1967 Delhi). Hegde: The directive principles of the Indian Constitution,
B.N.Rau Lectures (1971) reprinted (1971) I S.C.J. Jnl. 50. P.J.Reddy:
In quest of justice (1970) an anthology of his lectures and papers, see 
review A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 150-1* M.H.Beg: Amendment to the Constitution 
(a cyclostyled essay written in 1968 of which I have a personal copy);<contrib.
G.S.Sharma (ed) Secularism, its implications for life and law in India 
(1966) and see comment of J.D.M.DerrettJ Religioug-.law and the state 
in India (1968) p. 535 A.N.Grover: Law oT obscenity and
freedom of expression (1968) III J.C.P.S. 6.
Judges to the Supreme Court arejkppointed under Article 121+
of the Constitution, subsection (3) of which lays down i
*A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge 
of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and
(a) has been for at least five years a judge of a High Court or 
of two or more such Courts in succession ; or
(b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court 
or of two or more such Courts in succession; or
(c) is in the opinion of the President a distinguished jurist."
A recent judgement of the Supreme Court suggests that ”an advocate of
a High Court” does not mean that he must actually have practised in
5
that Court or indeed anywhere at all. No one has yet been appointed 
under Article 12** (3)(c). The Chief Justice of India has recently 
observed that in all cases the opinion of the Chief Justice has been 
decisive.^
To date forty-five judges (excluding R. S. Naik and Khaliluzzman
n
JJ who formed part of a Bench to hear appeals from Hyderabad ) have 
been appointed to the Supreme Court of India. Two were directly
g
recruited to the Supreme Court from the Bar, six were judges belonging
Q
to the I.C.S. and therefore never practised at the Bar; five other 
judges had judicial training in courts lower in the hierarchy than 
High CourtAmongst the lawyer-judges recruited from the various High
5. C.P.Agarwal v C.D.Parekh (1970) 3 S.C.R. y^l+ at 356-7.
6. S.M.Sikri: talk at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, June
21, 1971.
7. For their contribution see cases reported (1950) S.C.R. 7^1, 7^7, 753
8. S.M.Sikri, S.C.Roy.
9. S.K.Das, K.N.Wanchoo, K.C.Das Gupta, R.Dayal, V.Ramaswami, V.Bhargava
10. N.C.Aiyar, J.R.Mudholkar, J.M.Shelat, P.J.Reddy (he joined the 
State Judicial Service and was between April-June 19^7 Secretary to 
the Law Department of his State), D.G.Parulekar.
Courts four had at some stage been Advocate Generals of their res­
pective State^and eight others worked as lawyers for their respective 
State governments as counsel in lesser capacities. 12The remaining 
judges had reasonably long careers as lawyers with private practice.^ 
As regards judicial experience, six had been judges of the
Ik
Federal Court oir India, twenty-two Chief Justices of various High 
15Courts, and twenty-three senior puisne judges of the High Court they
were recruited frora.^At the time of recruitment three judges were
17from the Allahabad High Court, although two others had at some stage
18i®. their judicial career belonged to that Court; seven were appointed
19from the Bombay High Court; J* M. Shelat had been a judge of the 
Bombay High Court but was later transferred to the newly created 
Gujerat High Court in i960; eight came from the Calcutta High Court 
(including one judge who was later transferred to the East Punjab High
11. S.J.Imam (Bihar - 1942-3)» M.Hidayatullah (Central Provinces and 
Berar 1943-6), S.M.Sikri (Punjab 1951-64), K.Mathew (1960-2).
12. B.K.Mukerjea, V.Bose, B.P.Sinha, P.G.Menon, P.S.Saju, C.Vaidialingam 
K.S.Hegde, M.H.Beg.
13. All the judges except those mentioned in f.n. 9» H »  12.
14. H.Kania, S.Fazl Ali, P.Shastri, M.C.Mahajan, B.K.Mukerjea, S.R.Das.
15* H.Kania (Acting Chief Justice), S.Fazl Ali, S.R.Das, V.Bose,
G.Hasan (Chief Judge, Oudh Court), 3.Jaganadhdas, B.P.Sinha, S.J.Imam, 
S.K.Das, K.S.Rao, K.N.Wanchoo, M.Hidayatullah, K.C.Das Gupta, V.Ramaswami 
P.S.Raju, J.M.Shelat, V.Bhargava, K.S.Hegde, P.I.Reddy, I.D.Dua,
H.J.Khanna, M.H.Beg.
16. P.Shastri, M.C.Mahajan, B.K.Mukerjea, N.C.Aiyaq N.H.Bhagwati, 
T.L.V.Aiyar, P.G.Menon, J.L.Kapur, P.B.Gajendragadkar, A.K.Sarkar, 
J.C.Shah, R.Dayal, N.Ayyangar, J.R.Mudholkar, R.S.&achawat, G.K.Mitter,
C.A.Vaidialingam, A.N.Grover, A.N.Ray, K.Mathew, D.G.Parulekar.
17* G.Hasan, R.Dayal, B.Bhargava.
18. K.N.Wanchoo, M.H.Beg.
19* H.J.Kania (but note that he was appointed to the Federal Court),
N.H.Bhagwati, P.B.Gajendragadkar, J.C.Shah, J.R.Mudholkar, D.G.Parulekar.
20 21 Court) ; eight came from the Punjab and Delhi High Courts, one from
22the Himachal Pradesh High Court; four from the Nagpur and Madhya
Pradesh High Courts (including one later transferred to the Bombay 
23High Court) ; four from the Patna High Court (including one judge 
later to the Nagpur High Court ).^\. S. Hegde at some sta^e of his 
judicial career belonged to the Mysore High Court, G. Hasan had served 
on the Oudh Bench Court and B. Jaganadhdas came from the High Court 
of Orissa. K. N. Wanchoo originally from Allahabad was later trans­
ferred to the Rajasthan High Court. Six judges had at some stage
25 26belonged to the Madras High Court; two to the Kerala and three to
27the Andhra Pradesh High Courts respectively.
Thus a total of ten judges came from Andhra, Kerala and 
Madras, eight from Calcutta, five from Bombay and Gujerat, t&n from 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, aid fourteen from Mattfcya 
Pradesh, Nagpur, Allahabad, Orissa and Patna. This shows a fairly 
even representation. There has usually been at least one judge from
20; B.K.Mukerjea, S.R.Das (later transferred to the East Punjab High 
Court), A.K.Sarkar, K.C.Das Gupta, R.S.Badhawat, G.K.Mitter, A.N.Ray. 
Note: S.C.Roy was practising at the Calcutta High Court when he was 
appointed to the Supreme Court.
21. M.C.Mahajan (Lahore and East Punjab), S.R.Das (East Punjab),
J.L.Kapur (Punjab), K.S.Hegde (Delhi), A.N.Grover (Punjab), I.D.Dua 
(Punjab and Pelhi), H.J.Khanna (Punjab and Delhi). S.M.Sikri was 
Advocate General for the State of Punjab when he was appointed to the 
Supreme Court•
22. M.H.Beg (originally from the Allahabad High Court).
23. V.Bose, B.P.Sinha, M.Hidayatullah, J.R.Mudholkar; B.P.Sinha came 
from the Patna High Court and Mudholkar was later transferred to the 
Bombay High Court.
24. S.J.Imam, B.P.Sinha, S.K.Das, V.Ramaswami.
25* P.Shastri, N.C.Aiyar, T.L.V.Aiyar, P.G.Menon, K.Subba Rao,N.Ayyangar
26. C.A.Vaidialingam, K.Mathew.
27* K.Subha Rao, P.S.Raju, P.J.Reddy.
the Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad High Courts (the oldest 
High Courts in India), but this practice is no longer followed and in 
1970 there was no judge from the Madras High Court, But despite the 
attempt at some kind of regional representation, Orissa, Rajasthan,
Assam and Nagaland have either been unrepresented or represented sparsely. 
As regards the educational qualifications of the judges,
28fifteen received some of their University education in England, and
29eighteen were called to the Bar at one of the Inns of Court in London.
This means that a total of forty per cent of the judges received Uni-
30versity or professional education abroad. The rest of the Court were
31 32educated solely in India and at least six were scholars of Sanskrit.
Only two judges did any post-graduate research. B. K. Mukerjea was
a Tagore Law Professor and delivered lectures on the Hindu law relating
33
to religious Endowments and J. M. Shelat wrote a post-graduate thesis
28. V.Bose (Pembroke, Cambridge), S.K.Das (S.O.A.S. London), S.J.Imam 
(Trinity, Cambridge), J.L.Kapur (Magdalene, Cambridge), M.Hidayatullah 
(Trinity, Cambridge), K.N.Wanchoo (Wadham, Oxford), K.C.Das Gupta 
(Magdalene, Cambridge), J.R.Mudholkar (Sidney Sussex, Cambridge),
S.M.Sikri (Trinity Hall, Cambridge), J.M.Shelat (London University), 
R.S.flachawat (London University), A.N.Grover (Christ’s, Cambridge),
A.N.Ray (Oriel, Oxford), P.J.Reddy (Leeds and Trinity Hall, Cambridge), 
M.H.Beg (Trinity, Cambridge). %, j  L  c>j\j q  q/ \ i)
29. All those in f.n.28 except Wanchoo and S.K.Das. But add the
following : Fazl Ali, S.R.Das, A.K.Sarkar, V.Ramaswami, S.C.Roy.
30. 15 went to a University in England - 5 others were called to the
Bar in England; but two of the I.C.S. judges who read in England did
not qualify at the Bar there.
31. H.Kania, P.Shastri, M.C.Mahajan, B.K.Mukerjea, N.C.Aiya, N.H.Bhagwati, 
G.Hasan, B.Jaganadhdas, T.L.V.Aiyar, B.P.Sinha, P.G.Menon, P.B.Gajendra- 
gadkar, K.Subha Rao, J.C.Shah, R.Dayal, N Ayyangar, P.S.Raju, V.Bhargava, 
G.H.Mitter, C.A.Vaidialingam, K.S.Hegde, I.D.Dua, K. Mat hew, H.J.Khanna,
D.G.Parulekar.
32. P.Shastri, B.K.Mukerjea, N.C.Aiyar, T.L.V.Aiyar, P.B.Gajendragadkar, 
V.Ramaswami.
33• Uindu law on religious and charitable endowments (1951)*
3kon the United States Senate.
Some judges, notably Gajendragadkar, G. Hasan, J. C. Shah 
and N. C. Aiyar, before their appointment to the Courts had been 
members of industrial tribunals. This had a significant effect on 
at least Gajendragadkar’s judgements on labour law in the Supreme 
Court. Fazl Ali, P. G. Menon, S. M. Sikri and K. S. Hegde had rep­
resented India at international conferences; N. H. Bhagwati, K. Subha 
Rao and M. Hidayatullah had been involved in education in various 
Universities before their appointment.
Very few of the judges have had political experience.
B. Jaganadhdas had been imprisoned for the part that he played in the
35Freedom Movement; J. L. Kapur had some Trade Union backing; P. Shastri 
had been a member of the Madras Legislative Council and K. S. Hegde 
alone had been a member of Parliament.
Supreme Court judges are usually appointed between the ages 
of 53 and 62.*^The average age o# appointment is 57 years. Four judges 
were appointed to the Supreme Court after they had retired as judges 
of their respective High Courts.^The judges retire at the age of 
65- But some judges have accepted office under the government or 
otherwise. Four died in office,”^ two resigned due to ill health^
J. R. Mudholkar resigned to become Chairman of the Press Council;
3k» Criticism and defence of the constitution of the Senate during the 
campaign for ratification 17&7-89. Thesis No. I/TV/ Dupl. Senate 
House, University of London.
35- On J.L.Kapur see generally A.I.R. 19^ -9 Jnl* 6l. I rely also on 
information given to me by Kapur J. himself.
36. Hidayatullah was almost 53 when appointed, N.C.Aiyar almost 62.
37* N.C .Aiyar, V.Ramaswami, B.Bhargava, Fazl Ali (appointed to the 
Federal Court).
38. H.Kania, G.Hasan, P.Menon, P.Raju.
39* B.K.Mukerjea, S.J,.Imam..........................................
K. Subba Rao resigned to contest the election for the President of
India; T. L. V. Aiyar, J. L. Kapur and Gajendragadkar later became
Chairmen of the Law Commission; P. Shastri, S. R. Das, N. Bhagwati,
B. P. Sinha and P. B. Gajendragadkar became associated with various
Institutes or Universities, Fazl Ali, P. Shastri, S. K. Das,
B. Jaganadhdas, J. L. Kapur, became members or Chairmen of several
Commissions set up by the Government. Fazl Ali also became the Governor
of Orissa dnd later Assam. By and large Supreme Court judges have not
been appointed to purely executive and diplomatic assignments. The
only two judges appointed to such positions have come from the High 
40Courts.
Judges have been criticised for seeking appointments to lead
41to some suitable appointments. The reason for this may be found in
the fact that judges in India are very badly paid, have inadequate
4? 43 4 4
pensions and leave privileges. The Law Commission and others
have criticised the present pay scales. The whole idea that judges
should look to the executive for further post-retirement jobs is an
unhealthy practice. It is true that Supreme Court judges are suited
to posts like Chairman of the Law Commission, but at the same time
40. M.C.Chagla ( of the Bombay High Court) who was given diplomatic 
assignments in London and Washington and later became Union Minister 
for Education; S.S.Dhavan (of the Allahabad High Court) who became 
High Commissioner in London and later Governor of West Bengal.
41. See Setalvads My life (1971) 509-10. See also Y.P.Dixit: The 
judiciary and political appointments A.I.R. 1959 Jnl. 2.
42. The salaries have been fixed by the Constitution at Rs, 5000 and
Rs. 4000 for the Chief Justice and Puisne Judges respectively. (Article
125). For an account of the pension scheme see Law Commission XlVth 
Report Vol. I, 43-4.
43* See the Law Commission XlVth Report Vol. 1, 40-46.
44. See Seervai: The position of the judiciary in India (1970) 31-41.
P.B.Mukharji: The critical problems of the Indian Constitution (1970) 
111-2.
Betalvad's example of a Supreme Court judge who tried to secure his
it5
appointment to that post while he was still in the Supreme Court
46
reflects on the system whereby judges retire at the early age of 65 
and look for other jobs after retirement in an effort to retain the 
status and privileges which they enjoyed before.
So far thirty-eight judges have been Hindus (seventeen 
Brahmins), two Christians (V.Bose and K. Mathew) and five Muslims 
(Fazl Ali, G. Hasan, S. J. Imam, M. Hidayatullah, M. H. Beg). There 
has always been one Muslim judge in the Supreme Court, and between 
1958 and 1962 there were two.
Thus it appears that a Supreme Court judge is usually in 
his mid-fifties, has been the Chief Justice of some High Court and 
does not usually have a political background. There is a 40$ chance 
that he may have been educated in England. He could be chosen from 
anywhere in India but more recruitments have been made from the 
Calcutta, Delhi (including East Punjab) and Bombay High Courts.
Before appointment he may have belonged to several Commissions of 
Inquiry but this is not essential. During his term and after he tends 
to write and say very little extra judicially. But after his term of 
office there is a good chance that he may be appointed to some post 
like the Chairman of a Commission. Most of the judges have been 
Hindus, but the Muslims and the Christians have been represented.
Chief Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed on the 
basis of seniority and accession to that office depends on how young
45. Setelvad: My life (1971) at 509-10. The judge in question was 
Mr. Justice Kapur.
46. The Law Commission XlVth Beport Vol. 1 37-58 did not suggest
an increase in the retiring age. But see P.B.Mukharji: supra f.n.44- 
111 suggestion that the retirement age be raised to 70 years for High 
Court and Supreme Court judges alike. (The present levels are 62 and 
65 respectively).
the judge was when he was initially appointed to the Court. Chance 
plays a very big part. Thus if H. J. Kania had not died in office,
P. Shastri, M. C. Mahajan and B. K. Mukerjea would not have been 
Chief Justices of the Court. Again if P. Raju had not died he would 
have been Chief Justice from July 16, 1973 to August 17» 1973*
A list of the Chief Justices of India and the prospective 
line of succession is given in Table I below. Table II below gives a 
quick summary account of the background and careers of all the judges 
of the Supreme Court of India.
TABLE I showing names and tenure of Chief Justices of India.
Dates
Name from to
Kania 26. 1.1950 6.11.1951
Shastri 7.11.1951 3. 1.195**
Mahajan 23.12.195** 1. 2.1956
S. R. Das 2. 2.1956 3 0. 9.1959
Sinha 1.10.1959 31. 1.196**
Gajendragadkar 1. 2.196** 15. 3.1966
Sarkar 16. 3.1966 28. 6.1966
Subha Rao 29. 6.1966 11. 4.1967
Wanchoo 12. *f.l967 24. 2.1968
Hidayatullah 23. 2.1968 17.12.1970
Shah 18.12.1970 21. 1.1971
Sikri 22. 1.1971
due to retire 
26. 4.1973
Future line of succession if no deaths or resignations occur and no 
reforms are carried out in the system, will be
Shelat 27. **.1973 16 . 7.1973
Hegde 17- 7-1973 11. 6.197**
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5. . Voting Behaviour and Patterns of Dissent in the Supreme Court.^
Although the large majority of judgements in the Supreme
Court are unanimous, there are a number of cases in which dissenting
judgements (which differ as to ultimate result reached) and separate
opinions (which concur in the result but for different reasons) have
been read by various judges.
In America, dissenting opinions play an important role in
evaluating the wisdom of the majority views, and sometimes even
2
supersede the majority judgements as time rolls on. An Indian com­
mentator has argued that dissents have played a similar role in
India.*'* This in fact is not so. His example of K. Subha Roa J.*s
L
dissent in M. S. N. Sharma v S. N. Sinha becoming the majority view in
5
the Advisory Opinion in In re Article 143, hardly bears this out 
because in the latter case reliance is also placed on the majority 
view in M. S. N. Sharma.*s case. In effect the Court in In re Article
n
145 came to some of K. Subha Rao J.*s conclusions quite independently.
1. There are only two existing analyses of this: G.H.Gadbois: Selection,
background, characteristics and voting behaviour of Indian Supreme Court 
judges - 1950-59 (in Schubert & Danelski (ed.) Comparative judicial 
behaviour (1969) O.U.P.) 221; D.C.Jain: Dissenting opinion and consti­
tutional revolution in U.S.A. and India (1969) IX Jal,L. Jnl. 113 
(hereafter Jain (1969))-
2. See C.E.Hughes: The Supreme Court and the United States (1928) 68;
R.Pound: Preface to Justice Musmano^s Dissents (1956 Indianapolis);
B.R.Powell: The logic and rhetoric of constitutional law (1918) 15 
Jnl. of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 645* All these 
are quoted by D.C.Jain (1969; at 113.
3. D.C.Jain (1969) 113 at 114.
4. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395 see D.C.Jain (1969) at 118-9.
5* A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 (per Gajendragadkar J for Subha Rao J.
amongst others).
6. Ibid at pr. 54 p.765«
7. Ibid at pr. 50 p. 765 (Subha Rao J.Ss most important point about
the paramountcy of fundamental rights is not acceded to).
There is in fact hardly any pattern of? sustained dissent in
the Indian Supreme Court. Judges put forward token dissents which do
not outlive the judgements they are inserted in, because the authors
of the dissents readily abandon their dissents in later cases on the
same subject which they participated in. Thus Fazl Ali J.1 s powerful
g
dissent in Gopalan v Madras is abandoned in later preventive detention 
cases.^ Again Shastri and Das JJ, dissented in Bombay v. Atma Ban?’® 
on whether grounds should be supplied to a preventively detained per­
son, is happily abandoned in later cases.
12.
Even K. Subha Rao J. who is usually consistent can be
accused of writing dissents which he later abandons.^In fact with
Subha Rao J. (as we shall later see) this becomes something of a 
technique. He mentions a point (whether in a dissenting or majority
8. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27
9. See Bombay v Atma Ram A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157; Tarapade De v Bengal 
A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 174.
10. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157 (They also dissented in the companion case 
of Tarapade De v Bengal A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 174).
11. See Ujagir Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 350 at 354 (where 
they accede to the majority view).
12. e.g. His 1:4 dissent on the power to tax by delegated legislation 
in Vasan Lai v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 4 became a 2:3 dissent in 
Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v Liberty Cinema A.I.R. 1Q6S S.C.ld>t7 (where 
Ayyangar J. wrote the judgement) to become a unanimous decision in 
Devi Das v Punjab A.I.R. 196? S.C. 1895* On these cases see (r.S.Ullal: 
Do judges live in an ivory tower ? A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 37*
13. e.g. his dissent in Somawanti v Punjab A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151 is 
abandoned in later cases on the same subject (i.e. Valii Bhai v Bombay 
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. I89O; Raja Anand v U.P. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 108l) where 
the court found a result satisfactory to Subha Rao J. but for different 
reasons.
judgement) then forgets about it only to mention it in another con-
14text as an established rule.
In fact, in India most of the constitutional change has come
from Unanimous or majority judgements. Apart from Subha Rao J. a
large part of the dissents have come from Bose, Sarkar and Dayal JJ.
But it cannot really be shown that the opinions of these judges became
the opinion of the court. Even Subha Rao J. has introduced most of
his new interpretations to the Constitution in majority judgements.
So much so, that on at least two occasions Hidayatullah J, who had
concurred in his judgement, had cause to plead confusion and state
that he did not subscribe to some of the wide propositions in the
15judgements which he had assented to.
Dissent is usually on a specific non-recurring matter,1^  
or of a token nature, where the judge merely expresses smother point 
of view, and having made his point makes no attempt to try to get the 
others to adopt his opinion.
Given below is a Table I showing the frequency of dissents 
and separate judgements.
14. e.g. in Kocfounni v Madras A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080 he introduced 
the "agrarian reform test" which he made into a rule in Vajravelu v 
Madras A.I.R. 1965 EC1017/ despite limited challenge to Subha Rao J.1s 
methods in Ran.jit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 632.
15. See Mohd. Yaqub v J.K. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 765 at pr. 21 p. 771-
16. e.g. the dissent of Kapur J. on the pardoning power of the 
Governor in K.M.Nanavati v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 112.
TABLS HI showing frequency of dissenting and separate opinions.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6
1950 41 4 5 8 22.8 41.5
1951 41 0 7 5 17.1 29.3
1952 68 1 5 5 8.09 16.4
1955 85 1 3 5 3.5 9.4
1954 78 5 0 3 6.4 10.3
1955 175 9 1 5 5.7 8.5
1956 61 2 0 3 3.27 4.2
3-957 72 1 0 2 1.4 4.2
1958 85 9 0 1 10.6 11.8
1959 186 7 3 10 5.37 10.75
i960 211 16 2 5 8.5 10.9
1961 228 17 7 2 10.5 11.4
1962 4D1 35 3 10 8.9 11.5
1963 266 26 4 5 11.2 13.2
1964 446 35 10 19 10.9 12.1
1965 243 22 1 10 9.5 13.6
1966 223 26 5 12 13.9 19.3
1967 289 14 3 2 5-9 6.3
1968 263 5 2 3 2.7 3.8
1969 515 3 1 7 1.24 3.6
1970 523 7 0 1 2.17 2.47
TOTALS 4,828 243 62 123
1. Total number of cases reported in that year.
2. Total nukber of two judgements dissents.
3* Total number of multi-judgement dissents (more than two judgements).
4. Total nuinber of cases where separate opinions given though the
result is concurred in.
5* Percentage of 2+3 to 1.
6. Percentage of 2+3+4 to 1.
Source: Extracted from the Supreme Court Reports 1950-1970* The 
difference between these figures and those of Gadbois (supra f.n.l) 
is that his are computed on the basis of date of decision, whereas 
the above are on the basis of date of Report.
We will see that a large part of the dissenting or separate 
opinions were dflLivered in the years 1950-55 and 1960-67. During the 
former period (1950-55) the court had just been inaugurated and every­
one on the Bench wanted to express :'§• opinion*.^ We will therefore 
notice a large number of separate opinions rather than dissents in that 
period. Most of the cases are usually on Constitutional Law. In the 
latter period controversy may well have resulted from the fact that
the number of judges had been increased in the Court by two Acts in 
l8
195£ and I960. The . dissents are still on Constitutional
matters, but there are also cases where the dissent has been on a
19 20 21point of law concerning Hindu law ^or the law of Torts or Contract.
The voting pattern also shows that dissents are usually l>ne
dissents, where simply one judge dissents. This is illustrated in
Table IV below.
17* Thus in the Advisory Opinion in 1951 (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 332) all 
the 7 judges gave their opinion, although 5 of them substantially 
agreed with each other. In two later Opinions (Re Kerala Education 
Bill A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956; Re Berubari Union A.I.R. 196Q S.C. 845) 
only one opinion was given. In Re Sea Customs Act A.I.R. 1963 S.C.I76O 
4 opinions were read for 9 judges, and in the controversial Advisory 
Reference concerning Parliamentary Privileges (Re Article 145' A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 745) only 2 opinions (one majority and one minority) were read.
18. See Supreme Court (Appointment of Judges Act) 17 of i960.
19* See Hegde J.’s dissent in V.D.Dhanwatey v Comrar. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 683
20. See for example Sitaram v Santanu Prashad A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1£#7.
21. See for example East India Commercial Co. v Collector of Customs 
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1893; W.B. v B.K.Mondal and Sons Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 779*
TABLE IF voting pattern in dissenting .judgements















Source : Calculated from the Supreme Court Reports 1950-1970
We will see that the dissenting judge is usually unsupported. 
70*1# of the dissents are one judge dissents whereas only 19*5# of the 
cases record a voting pattern of two judge dissents (i.e. where the 
vote is 3*2)• This substantiates our earlier point that the pattern 
of dissent is not always organised amongst the judges but is of an 
extremely individual nature, and usually a one case token dissent.
Given below is Table V which shows the voting, dissenting 
and judgement writing pattern in the Court.
TABLE V showing voting, dissenting and judgement writing pattern.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Kania 51 23 16 8 7 1 1 9 5
Fazl Ali 87 b3 14 6 2 6 6 12 4
Shastri 135 56 28 13 8 7 6 17 15
Mah$jan . 242 102 23 5 7 11 10 16 10
Mukerjea 246 79 26 10 11 5 4 18 9
S. R. Das 446 129 47 24 17 6 6 34 22
N. Ayyar 85 27 11 3 7 1 1 9 4
Hasan 129 25 9 1 7 1 1 8 3
V. Bose 269 82 31 5 15 11 11 16 10
Bhagwati 326 81 20 7 9 4 0 12 6
Jaganadhdas 162 43 9 0 2 7 0 7 4
T. L. V. Aiyar 242 91 21 5 12 4 0 7 3
B. P. Sinha 384 117 64 14 42 6 2 2 4
S. J. Imam 286 50 27 5 20 1 1 14 3
S. K. Das 445 142 59 24 27 8 7 11 5
P. G. Menon 49 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
J, L. Kapur 425 149 57 26 18 13 12 10 6
P. B. Gajencfegadkar 987 336 65 23 39 1 0 18 7
ft. K. Sarkar 514 183 92 25 32 45 41 38 26
K. Subha Rao 769 286 116 29 34 53 49 26 18
K. N. Wanchoo 812 274 76 18 48 10 8 31 13
M. Hidayatullah 935 391 86 30 19 37 31 25 18
K. C. Das Gupta 498 131 40 9 19 13 8 15 1
J. C. Shafe 1387 473 88 30 31 27 2k 27 18
N.R.Ayyanga 434 129 58 14 31 13 12 18 10
R. Dayal 431 136 64 13 21 30 25 18 9
J* R. Mudholkar 451 133 62 12 31 19 16 27 18
S. M. Sikri 617 153 4* 12 23 4 - 4 15 4.
TABLE . V  continued
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
R. S. Bachawat 386 154 43 13 15 15 14 17 14
V. Ramaswami 638 198 23 3 11 9 6 5 4
P. S. Raju 46 6 3 0 2 1 1 1 0
J. M. Shelat 271 99 16 4 6 6 4 4 2
Bha^ga^v 258 89 6 2 3 1 1 3 3
G. K. Hitter 275 43 11 3 6 2 1 6 2
C. A. Vaidialingam 192 51 12 1 9 2 0 2 0
K. S. Hedge 252 92 11 3 1 7 6 6 4
Grover 263 72 4 1 2 1 1 3 1
P. J. Reddy 35 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
I. D. Dua 58 16 2 0 0 0 0 1 0
1. Total number of cases participated in.
2. Total number of judgements written.
3* I’otal number of split decisions (dissents).
4. Number of majority judgements delivered of cases in column 3*
5* Number of majority votes without judgement of cases in column 3«
6. Number of minority (dissenting) votes of cases in column 3»
7* Number of minority judgements of those in column 6.
8. Number of split decisions where separate judgement but no dissent.
9* Number of judgements written in cases in column 8.
Note : Judgements in columns 4 and 9 can be the main or the minority
judgement in the case.
Source: Extracted from Supreme Court Reports 1950-70•
We can see from Table V that the major judgement writers 
in the Court in the early years were Shastri, Mahajan and S. R. Das.
Later on the majority writers were Gajendngadkar, Subha Rao, Wanchoo, Shah 
and Hidayatullah JJ. Setalvad1s opinion that B. P. Sinha shirked the
responsibility of writing judgements is borne out by the facts in the
22Table. We will notice that the majority judgement writers are in 
the main judges who later on became Chief Justices of the Court. This 
may well be due to the fact that these judges spend more time in the 
Court, but their contribution is disproportionate, which suggests that 
these judges know well in advance that they are going to be Chief 
Justices of the Court and tend to dominate the business of the ^ourt.
This reflects badly on the nature of the system of appointing the
23Senior Judge Chief Justice.
The major dissenting judges have also been judges who later
became Chief Justices of the Court (Shastri, Mahajan, Das, Sarkar,
Subha Rao, Hidayatullah, Shah). These are however exceptions to this
pattern. In the early years, Bose J. wrote dissenting judgements in
11 cases (most of which were concerned with the issue of personal 
24liberty ). In later years there were a large number of dissenting
judgements by Kapur J. His dissents are not bound together by a
25theme and stretch from issues in Constitutional Law to problems of
26
Official Secrecy as laid down in Section 123 of the Evidence Act, l8?2.
22. Setalvad; Hy Life (1971) 428.
23* See also the comments in the XlVth Report of the Law Commission 
Vol. I, pp 39-40.
24. See Gadbois (supra f.n.l) at p. 242-245*
25* e.g. K.M.Nanavati v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 112.
26. Union v S.S.Singh A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493• Kapur J. was very fond of 
upholding the English Law on a particular issue - See Setalvad: My Life 
(1971) quoting Das C.J. at 367 (an extrajudicial comment).
The other major dissenting patterns have been the judgements of 
^ubha Rao and Shah JJ. (whose main theme of dissent was that the 
individual rights are important) and Sarkar and Hidayatullah JJ. 
which cover a vast number of topics. The contribution of Subha Rao 
and Hidayatullah JJ. is well known, but that of Sarkar J. is usually 
overlooked. We will later see, in Chapter III, that Sarkar J. played 
an important role in developing the law of property, even though his
dissents never became the opinion of the Court. Bachawat and Dayal JJ.
27also wrote some dissenting opinions in some important cases.
We can see that the technique of dissenting in a case has 
not in fact matured as an important technique by which the judges in 
the Court have made their opinions felt. Judges like Subha Rao J. 
have sometimes made their presence felt but this has usually been as 
majority judgement writers, present "seniority" system has
encouraged a pattern of judgement writing, where prospective Chief 
Justices play an extremely important role.
Thus we can see that in the main the Court appears not to 
have relied on the technique of dissenting and separate opinions to 
achieve a constant dialectic in the Court. It is possible that a lot 
of discussion takes place between the judges before a judgement is 
written. But this seems unlikely in view of the statement by 
Sikri C.J. that a Supreme Court judge is usually responsible for at 
least 15 judgements a week 1 Again we have already seen how 
Hidayatullah J. has hinted on one occasion that the judgement he 
subscribed to ditnot contain so wide a proposition as the judgement
27. Note Dayal J.*s dissenting judgement in R.M.Btei v Union A.I.R. 
1966 S.C. 740, and Bachawat J.*s dissent in Golak Nath v Punjab 
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 164-3.
28which was actually read in Court. For a realistic analysis of the 
Courtfs decision making habits, we have to look more at the techniques 
which they actually use rather than the patterns of dissent. To these 
we now turn.
28. See Mohd. Yaqub v J.K. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 765 at pr.21 p.771. See 
also Gujerat v Shantilal A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 63^ at Pr.l.
CHAPTER II
AN EX ANIMATION OF SOME OF THE JURISTIC TECHNIQUES USED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT AND OTHER COURTS IN INDIA
1, The Doctrine of Precedent in India*
a. The need to follow precedent.
The publication of innumerable Digests^in India bears testimony 
to the fact that Indian lawyers tend to be precedent minded. Despite this
only one serious attempt has been made to analyse the theory of precedent
2 3
in India. There has been, however, the odd stray article on the subject
A
and the Digests contain a vast compendium on the subject of precedent.
This reliance on precedent is perhaps in keeping with Hindu and Islamic 
jurisprudence, both of which lay considerable emphasis on relying on 
earlier texts and ostensibly treat such texts as of a binding nature.
We have moved very far from the Blackstonian fiction that judges
5
merely declare the law. It is now accepted that judges rely on precedent 
but at the same time are able to devise ways and means to get away from 
the binding effect of what they feel is a bad precedent. More recently
1. See for example the All India Reporter Digests 1950-65; 1965-70.
2. I.C.Saxena: The doctrine of precedent in India in (G.S.Sharraa (ed)) 
Essays in Indian jurisprudence 110-136, reprinted at (1963) III Jaipur 
Law Journal 188-23A. This contrasts with the wealth of English law on 
the subject, on which see Winfield: History of Judicial precedent (1951)
L.Q.R. 207; Allen: Law in the making (7th ed) Chapter III where a 
historical account of the doctrine of precedent is given. See also 
references cited infra.
3* See for example Seervai: Justice, law and precedents in India (196 )^
66 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 65-73; T.Raraalingam: The Supreme Court of India and the 
doctrine of stare decisis (1965) S.C.J. Jnl. 9* This is a comment on Bengal 
Immunity Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661; V.A.Venkatachalam: Binding 
force of High Court decisions (I969T 1 M.L.J.Jnl. 65; Scope for reconside­
ration A.I.R. 1970 Jnl; *+0; Binding nature of precedent (1969) 73 C.W.N. 
Jnl. 1 39; G.Sitamasastry: English precedent and the judicial process in 
India (1969) Lawyer 119-125. See also the articles on prospective over­
ruling, cited infra. <*»- ^ eAoik flodVIs .cWOpW VU \ CN).
k. See A.I.R. Digest 1950-65 Vol.12, 630-669; see also on Article I k l  
of the Constitution Vol.IV, 31^519*
5. Blackstone (1765) I Comm. 63-^,,68-71; Hale: History of the Common 
Law (1820 Ed.) 89. Note also Bentham s comments on the ill effects of the 
retroactive nature of overruling an earlier case at Volume V Works 
(Bowring Edn.) 225. Note Austin II Jurisprudence (1873 Edn.) Lecture 29 
PP* 5^7-8 where he suggests that earlier case law should be departed from 
only "obliquely".
critical literature^has accumulated against the doctrine of precedent, 
and recent case law suggests judges are prepared (though with important
g
reservations ) to use the doctrine of precedent merely to perform the 
Junction of maintaining a continuity in the law without allowing the 
doctrine to prevent them from dissenting from the view in an earlier case. 
More recently, in Jones v Secretary of State (l972)*^two judges of the 
House of Lords were prepared to consider whether the American doctrine 
of prospective overruling should apply to England. Indian Courts have 
in fact accepted both these important modifications to the general theory 
of precedent, which they inherited from English law.
See Cardozo: The nature of the judicial process (1921) Chapter IV.
Note the following comment at p. 150 "But I am ready to concede that the 
rule of adherence to precedent though it ought not to be abandoned, ought 
to be in some degree relaxed." Report of the Cincinatti Conference on the 
status of judicial precedent (1940) 14 Univ.of Cjn.L.Rev. 203-355; 
Holdsworth XII H.E.L. 159; also 50 L.Q.R. 180 at 183 where he quotes Coke 
to say that a bad precedent should be overruled. Allent51 L.Q.R. 40 and 
196; Wright J Future of the Common Law 8. See also generally Rupert Cross: 
Precedent in English'Law (196# Bdn.) 32-34, and Chapters 6, 7 and 8; 
Salmond: Jurisprudence Tl2d) 141-188; Pat on: Jurispppdence (3d) 179-94; 
Julius Stone: Legal systems and lawyers1 reasonings (1964) Chapter 7, 
Section 3» pp.~281-300.
7« See for example the Practice Statement of the House of Lords in 
which they gave themselves the power to overrule earlier decisions (1966)
3 All.E.R. 77 I. W.L.R. 1234. On the position before 1966 and the way 
in which the House avoided the consequences of a strict theory of stare
decisis see Dworkin: Stare decisis in the House of Lords (1962) 25 Mod.L.R.
163-178. See also the House using the power it acquired in 1966 in 
ConwayyRimmner (1968) I All.E.R. 874. On the Court of Appeal see Gallie 
v Lee (1969) 2 Ch. 17; Broome v Cassels Ltd. (1971) 2 W.L.R. 853 where it 
stated that an earlier decision of the House of Lords was per incuriam
and refused to follow it.
8. See the recent decision in Oassels Ltd. v Broome (1972) Feb.24, 1972 
Times p. 27 where the House of Lords reproved the Court of Appeal for not
following precedent.
9* (1972) I All.E.R. 145 - Lord Diplock at 188-9; Lord Simon at 198-9.
b. Stare decisis and the Indian Supreme Court.
Courts in India have always defended the doctrine of precedent
on the ground that the law must be certain. In Keshava Mills v I.T.Commr^
Gajendragadkar J.laid down a number of reasons for not overruling a
case.^He further added :
n ... unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character 
make it necessary to do so, this Court would he reluctant to revise 
its earlier decisions.” 12.
The question whether an earlier decision can be overruled was first con-
1-2
sidered by the ^ourt in Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar (1955) where a
minority of 3 out of 7 judges stressed that the power to overrule a case
l*fmust be exercised very sparingly. The minority judges are referred to
to counteract the impression that Subha Rao J. gave in Golak Nath v
Punjab^that in the Bengal Immunity case all the judges were in favour
of abandoning an earlier view if they had the slightest doubt about it.
The Supreme Court has always emphasised that overruling must be done 
16with caution. This is apparent from the view of the majority and the
10. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. I656.
11. Ibid at pr. 23 p.l64*f col. 2.
12. Ibid at pr. 25 p. 1
13. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661.
14-. See T.L.V.Aiyar J. at pr. 186 p. 7^3; Sinha J. at pr. 213» p* 755; 
Jaganadhdas J. at pr. 115-28 p.711-l8
15- A.I.R. 1967 S£.l6*f3 at pr. 57 p« 1670-1. Subha Rao J. also quoted 
from his own judgement in W.B. v Corpn. of Calcutta A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 997 
which deals with the majority’s view of stare decisis in the Bengal 
Immunity case. Note the views of V/anchoo and Ramaswami JJ in Golak ^ ath 
v Pun.iab (supra) at pr. 118 p. 1690-1 and pr. 2771 17^2 respectively.
16. On this see Das C.J. In Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C.
66l at pr. 11-21 pp. 67O-I particularly pr. 19; Gajendradkar J. in Sajjan
Singh v Rajasthan A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 8^ +5 at pr. 22, Mudholkar J. in 
Vidyacharan v Khub Chand A.I.R. 196*f S.C. 1099 at pr. p. 1116-7;
Subha Rao J. in Corpn. of Calcutta v W.B. A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 997 at pr. 5 
1001; see also Shah J in the same case at 1013* See also Gajendragafikar J. 
in Maktul v Manbhari A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 918 at pr. 9 pp. 922-3 where English 
and American authority-supporting-stare, decisis-are cited.. -See further 
V.D.Dhanwatey v C.I.T. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 683; Shama Rao v Union Territory, 
Pondicherry A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1^80.
17minority in ^ uticorn v T. S. D. Nadar. In that case Hegde J, went on 
to say :
"Every time t(he) Court overrules its previous decision, the con­
fidence of the public in the soundness of the decisions of this 
Court is bound to be shaken," 18
19The High Courts have similar observations.
Despite this declared sensitivity to the need for precedent, 
the Supreme Court appears to have overruled itself in a large number of 
cases. This is illustrated in a chart below.
17. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 623 at pr. k p. 627 and prs. 37-8 pp. 637-8 
respectively.
18. Ibid at pr. 37-8.
19. P.J.Reddy C.J.; in S. Rao v Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur A.I.R. 
1969 A.P. 35 (F.B.) at pr. 7 P- 59 (but he stresses that in the instant 
case there was scope for more than interpretation); N.G.Shelat J. in 
State v Saifuddin A.I.R. 19^9 Gujerat 195 at pr. 9 P» 199 noting that
a F.B. decision should not be disturbed unless "a public interest of a 
gery serious nature is seriously affected"; U.P. v Firm Deo Putt A.I.R. 
1966 All. 73 per Desai C.J. at pr. 22 p. 79-&0; Bassanpa v Parvatamma 
A.I.R. 1952 Hgrd. 99 at pr. 6 p. 103; (per Ali Khan J.; at pr. ^0 p.Ill 
Tper Manohar Pershad J.); Chagla C.J. (for Gajendragadkar and Tendolkar JJ) 
in Sarkar v Chand Narayan A.I.R. 1951 Bom. pr.10 p.13 col. 2; Rama Krishna 
v Hardcastle &C0.A.I.R. 19&5 Madras 103 at pr. 5i p. 105 v/here Blind 
adherence to precedent is disapproved. PeramAnayakam v SivaranwfifUl.R.
1952 Mad. ^19 at pr. 80 pp. *+53-4- (per Raghava Rao J.) that precedent 
should be followed.
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Chart showing the extent to which the Supreme Court has overruled itself.
The chart has been tabulated in the form of a table which gives the 
exact figures from year to year.
SC PC SC PC
1950 0 1961 1
1951 0 1962 b
1952 0 1963 2
1953 0 196^ 2
1954 2 1965 2
1955 1 1966 3
1956 0 1967 6 3
1957 0 1968
1958 2 1969 3
1 9 5 9. 3 ....... I97O 2 2
i960 2
Source of the Table
The main sources of the table are the lists in each annual 
volume of the A.I.R. Supreme Court. The following additions have been 
made. Deep Chantfc v U.P* A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648 is taken to have overruled 
Bhikajee v M.P. A.I.R. 1933 S*C. 781 oiTthe strength of Das Gupta J.’s 
observations in M/S N. K. Bhawa'ni v Chief Tax Officer A.I.R. 1961 Mys. 3 
at pr. 7; Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080 is taken to have over­
ruled Bhanji Munjits case, A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 4-1; In 1962 the A.I.R. 
includes Automobile Transport Co. v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1406 as 
having overruled earlier case law, by having distinguished it. On this 
basis we have included Sitabati v W.B. (1961) reported (1967) II S.C.R. 
945 as having in at least one sense tried to modify fundamentally 
Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080 on which see the recent case of 
R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564; In 1965 we have included Kasturi 
Lai v U.P. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1039 as having overruled Vidyawati1 s case 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. on the strength of Dhavan J.fs observations in 
Chottey Lai v U.P. A.I.R. 1967 All 327 at pr. 10. p. 329. In 1966 we 
have included Manikayaka v Narasimhaswami A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 470 as having 
overruled earlier case law on the strength of Jagat Nard&n J.’s judge­
ment in Sachidanand v Mangilal A.I.R. 1968 Rajasthan 1. In 1967 we have 
included Golak Nath v Punjab A. I.R. I967 S.C. 1643 whi ch appears to have 
been overlooked in the A.I.R. list. In that same year we have included 
Devi Dassan v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S«C* 1896 on the strength of an article 
by G.S.Ullal: Do judges live in an ivory tower ? A.I.R. 1968 Journal.^ 7.
It should also be noted that in the 1954 list we have included 
Dwarkadas etc. v Sholapur Spg. and Wvg. Co. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 119 having 
overruled Chiranjit Lai v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 4l on the question of 
shareholders1 rights* Further we have stressed that Subodh Gopal v W.B. 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92 overruled Das J.fs views on the relation between 
Article 331 (l) and (2) inter se in the aforementioned 1951 case, even 
though his views had not at feny stage become the views of th^Court.
What is to be noted is the apologetic manner in which the rest of the 
Court dissented from the views of a brother judge.
In 1970 we have added that the Supreme Court has overruled 2 
Privy Council^ decisions in Raman Nadar v S. Raslamma A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
1759 and Raj fefonar v C.I.T. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 6747 "
It will be noticed that the Court began to overrule itself in
1954. There was a short lull from 1956-60 and since then there has been
a steady stream of overruling. It should be noted that these dates
accord with the appointments of new judges to the Court. The early
Court was small and compact and all the judges usually sat together.
20A large number of appointments were made to the Court in 1954. After
that the Court lost its compactness and began sitting in Benches that
were changed with increasing frequency. The next set of appointments 
21was made in 1957-8. After i960 t£e number of judges was increased to
22thirteen (it was originally five in 1950), and new appointments were 
frequently made to the Court.2\ he significanoe of thia can be se<m
later in the cases on agrarian reform in Chapter II. We will see that
in Kochunni v Madras (i960),^Sarkar J. protested at the majority's
effort to add the test of agrarian reform in cases where Article J±A
would technically apply. But neither Imam J (who concurred in his
judgement) nor he ever participated in any case in which the agrarian
reform test came up for discussion. The majority view became the law
without further protest. Again, in two very important cases on the
Constitution the Court overruled earlier case law by merely a bare 
25majority. It appears that in India the authority of an earlier case is 
really at the mercy of the manner in which a particular Bench is
20. See Chapter I Section 4«
21. See Chapter I Section
22. By the Supreme Court Act (13 of) i960. Note that in 1950 the maxi­
mum limit set by the Constitution was 7 (excluding the Chief Justice).
23. See Chapter I. .
24. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080
25* Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 66l (majority 4:3); 
Golak Nath v Punjab A.I.R. 1967' S.C. 16>43 (majority 6:5)*
constituted. The most startling examples of this are two cases on the
26relationship between Articles 19 and 31(2), Shah J. delivered the judge­
ment in both cases. In the first case, he respected the authority of a 
271961 decision and ruled that the two Articles were not related to each 
other but in the second case, in the company of a much larger Bench and 
in a changed situation two years later, he distinguished and overruled 
the 1961 case in the briefest possible terms. Another good example is
28W. B. v Corpn of Calcutta where a different Court overruled a i960
case and with it dispensed with the common rule of interpretation that
the Crown is not bound by a Statute.
The Court seems to have attained some kind of compromise
between the need for certainty and what W. Douglas J. in an extra judi-
29cial comment called the ’’dynamic component of history”. But it should 
be noted that the Court has not in fact laid down clear principles as 
to when it shall depart from a case. It has in the past often over­
ruled earlier authority with very little discussion. ^ The Court must, 
as the House of Lords is trying to do,^evolve definite principles on
26. Maharashtra v H.N.Rao A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1137 (reported 2 years late ); 
R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 364-.
27. Sitabati v W.B. (1962) reported (1967) II S.C.R. 945.
28. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 997-
29. Stare decisis (194-9) 4-9 Col.L.Rev. 735 at 736.
30. e.g. M.S.N.Sharma v Sri Krishna Sharma A.I.R. 1959 S.E. 395 on
Ganpati v Nafisul Hasan A.I.R. 1954- S.C. 636; Deep Chand v~U.P. A.I.R. 
1959 S.C. 6^ 0 on earlier case on the doctrine of eclipse. Dhaneshwar
v Delhi Adm. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 795 at pr. 4- p. 19&; Kulakhil v Kerala 
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1&14- on which see comment A.I.R. 19&7 Jnl. 36; Note 
the unsatisfactory way in which Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 
is overruled in R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 364- (a case which
did not even concern Gopalan directly) at pr. 64 p. 397*
31« Jones v Secy of State (1972) 1 All.E.R. 14-5* See particularly 
Lord Simon at 196-7*
Whether an earlier case should be followed or not. It will be clear from 
later chapters of this thesis that even the Court’s citing of its earlier 
case law on the subject has been very selective. To give one example s 
the leading case on the doctrine of colourable legislation is quite 
clearly Kameshwar v Bihar;^^but the principles in that case were some­
what widely expressed and this was obliquely pointed out in Gajapati v 
Orissa.^In future the latter and not the former case was cited as the 
leading authority on colourable legislation, even though the doctrine 
was in fact used in the former and not in the latter case. Casual over­
ruling and selective citing of case law has become an important feature
of the use of the doctrine of precedent in the Supreme Court. This will
34
be pointed out later.
c. The Supreme Court and the "interhierarchical” structure of 
precedent.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has not followed the 
doctrine of stare decisis very strictly, it has been severe in reproving 
single judges who have stepped out of line and not followed earlier 
Division and Full Benches of their own Court.
The High Courts have in the past followed the rule that a 
single judge of that Court is bound by an earlier Division Bench (of
7 C  -zf.
that Court) which is in turn bound by an earlier Full Bench. The
32. A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 232.
33. A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 375.
34. See Chapter III
33* See on this article by A High Court Judge: Binding nature of judge­
ments in High Courts A.I.R. 19&3 Jnl. 42-44; see also Ramazan v Bhimson
A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 195 (or a Supreme Court decision) at pr. pp. 197-8•
36. See article by A High Court Judge cited f.n. 33 nnf t I»R. 3.973:
Allahabad 231|-~A.I»R.-1973» Bomb* 3^7« But see that 
these rules do not apply where there is a Supreme Court decision on a 
point. Aleka v Jagabandhu A.I.R. 1971 Orr. 127 at pr. 11 p.t37; I.C.House 
v S.T.Officer A.I.R. 1971 All 230 at pr. 3 pp. 232-3; Trustees, Port of 
Bombay v Premise Automobiles A.I.R. 1971 Bom. 317; -Punara Chand v Subhakaran.
A.I.R. 1969 S .c . 347 at pr. 8 p.349-30.
37Supreme Court have approved of this set-up. But more recently two 
judges, one from Allahabad and the other from Gujerat, have not followed 
these rules. We will trace the manner in which the Supreme Court dealt 
with these ’’revolts” by the Single Judge.
(i) The ^evolt of the Single Judge.
Dhavan J. of the Allahabad High Court and Rqju J. of the 
Gujerat High Court have both at different times refused to follow 
division and Full Benches of their own High Courts. The former granted 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court without referring his doubts to a
70
larger Bench on the grounds that it would take too much time. The 
latter, however, took the view that the terms of his oath of office 
required him to uphold the Constitution and he would not subscribe to 
any view of law which he thought was unconstitutional. &e agreed 
however to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court because Article 
141 of the Constitution specifically mandates him to do so. Raju J.
39has consistently taken this view in five reported and unreported decisions.
no
In Sri Bhagwan v Ramchand Gajendragadkar J. agreed in substance 
with the conclusion that Dhavan J. reached on whether a Magistrate refusing 
to grant permission to evict a tenant was bound by the rules of natural
37- Jai Kuer v Sher Singh A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1118 at 1122-3; Kamalammal 
v Venkatalakshmi A.I.R. 1963 S.C.f349; Raghavamma v Chenchamma A.I.R.
19&4 S.C. 136; Mahadeolal v Ad/o.Gen. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 93&; Jaisri v 
Rajdewan Dubey A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 83; Sri Bhagwan v Ramchand A.I.R. 1965 
S.C. 1767; Tribhowani Das v State A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 372; Dhanki Mahajan 
v Rana Chandubhan A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 69»
38. Shri Bhagwan v Ramchand (1963) All.W.R. (H.C.) 525.
39« Dhanki Mahajan v Rana Chandubhan; Civil Rev.Ptnv.. 477 (I960) ref. to 
in &.I:R. 1969 S.C. &9; Mangulbhai v Gujerat Rev. Ptn. 1122 (i960) referred 
to in A.I.R. 1963 Guj. 175; Ratilal v Tribhowan Das Civil Rev. Ptn. 577 
of 1961 ref, to in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 372; Madansinghji v Gujerat ATT.R. 1963 
Gujerat 175; State v Ramprakasa A.I.R. 1964 Gujerat 223 at pr. 6-24.
40. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1767
justice, but reproved the fact that he had chosen to re-examine an issue 
on which the Division Benches of the High Court had laid down a clear and 
definitive ruling. He thought that the judge ought to have laid the rele­
vant papers before the Chief Justice, to enable the latter to constitute 
a larger Bench to examine the question. He observed :
"that is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters 
and is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and prop­
riety. It is to be regretted that the learned single judge departed 
from this traditional way and chose to examine the question himself."41
Dhavan J. in a letter to me thought the Supreme Court had not in fact
solved the basic problem that he had put before them :
"My concern in that case was to ensure that the litigant who 
had already spent a long time in trying to get his case heard by 
the High Court, should not go through the time consuming process 
of having his case decided by a Full Bench and thereafter by the 
Supreme Court. I was dealing with a statute which was enacted as 
a temporary measure to control rents in 194-7, and it appeared in­
congruous that a measure to speed up the process of allotment of 
houses should get clogged up in the judicial process of a Full 
Bench. The Supreme Court had begun to change their view of natural 
justice and I thought that since all the towns in the State of U.P. 
were going to be affected by ay decision the sooner it got confirmed 
by the Supreme Court the better. It is sad that the Supreme Court 
gave me lectures on judicial decorum, but did not lay down any 
guidelines on when a siggle judge can break this ’decorum1 and give 
leave to appeal to them without any further delay. I realise that 
such cases must be few. But that such cases should be inevitable, 
is something that the Court appears to have overlooked." 4-2
This indeed is a matter that the Supreme Court has overlooked, 3?he
Constitution forbids a single judge to grant leave to appeal in only 
4-3certain matters but the Supreme Court has however made some policy
44-statements on this in a recent decision despite their earlier decision
43that such appeals would be discouraged.
41. Ibid at pr. 18 p. 1773.
42* Letter dated July 2, 1971.
43. Article 133(3)
44. See Union v Jyoti Prakash A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1093 at pr. 17 p.1100, '
43* R.D.Agarwala v Union A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 299 and comment by Seervai
(1971) 73 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 54
V. Raju J. discussed his position at length in an unreported
46case and again in State v Ram Prakash where he emphasised the terms of 
his oath to uphold the "true" law and, further, the fact that accident 
played so important a part in particular decisions being decided tn the
way they were, that he refused to be bound by them.^In Tribhovandas v
48State Shah J. dealt with Raju J.’s arguments. Shah J.’s main argument was :
’’Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that he 
should not ignore ••• (Full Bench) decision of his Court. Our sys­
tem of the administration of justice aims at certainty in the law 
and that can be achieved only if judges do not ignore decisions of 
Courts of co-ordinate authority.” 4-9
50He rejected Raju J.’s arguments that a Full Bench had no status in law,
stressed that the terms of the oath merely imposed the duty to be
impartial, and added :
” ... but there is nothing in the oath which warrants a judge in 
ignoring the rule relating to the binding nature of precedents.” 51
Hegde J. repeated similar observations about another judgement of Raju J.
in Dhanki Mahajan v Rana Chandubhait^
It will be seen that the Supreme Court has been very strict in
ensuring that the interhierarchical structure of precedent is retained.
Their approach accords with the view of the House of Lords in Cassell Ltd.
...................... C-2   . . .  . . .
v Broome (1972) that the hierarchy of precedent must be retained and 
that judges who want a particular provision of law changed must go through
46. State v Ramprakash A.I.R. 1964- Guj. 223 at pr 6 pp. 225 ff•
4-7• Ibid at pr. 7*
43. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 372.
49. At pr. 11 p. 377 referring to Sri Bhagwan v Ramchand A.I.R. 1965
s .c . 1767.
50. At pr. 10.
51. At pr. 13 p. 377
52. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 69 at pr. 3 p. 71.
53. .The .Times. Feb. 24., 1972. at p. .2?............................
the existing channels. They are at liberty to record their protest, but
not pursue their views at the expense of upsetting precedent.
ii. The binding effect of an "obiter'dictum11 of the Supreme Court.
Article 141 of the Constitution lays down: ' The law . •
ii
.by the Supreme Court shall be binding onfall Courts in India. By 
and large all High Courts agree that they are bound by even an obiter 
dictum of the Supreme Court. leading judgement on this is that of
54. Allahabad High Court: Union v Firm Ham Gopal A.I.R. i960 All. 672;
Babu Nandan v Suaita A.I.R. 1961"All. 287 at 266: 0.I.iL_v_Ilanmal (1961)
42 I.T.R. 203 (All.); Sadhu Singh v State A.I.R. 1962 All. 193 at 196;
Khem Karan v U.P. A.I.R. 1966 All 255; N.I.A.Co. v Janak Dulari A.I.R.
1966 All. 266 a~t prr. 8 p. 26&V Rameshwar Prashad v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 
All. 88 ~at pr! • 5 (obiter persuasive); Ram Manohar Lohia v State A.I.R.
1968 All. 100 at pr. 13 p. 106; Chobey v Sonu A.I.R. 1969 All 305 at
pr. H.C.Mishra & Co. v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1969 All. 566; Swami Prashad 
v Harovimt Sahai A.I.R. 1970 All. 251 (but it left the question open).
Andhra Pradesh: K.C.Venkata Chalamayya v Madras A.I.R. 1938 A.P. 175 at 
pr. 16; Desu Rayudi v A.P.S.C. A.I.R. 19^7 A.P. 353 at pr. 32.
Assam: Nuruddin v Assam A.I.R. 1956 Assam 48. Bombay; K.P.Doctor v Bombay
A.I.R. 1955 Bom.220 at 224; Mohandas v A.N.Sattahathan A.I.R. 1955 Bom.
113 at 113; Narayanlal v Maneck Phiroze A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 320 at 327;
B.T.Bhosle v M.S.Amey A.I.R. 1961 Bora 29 at 41; Anant v Baburao A.I.R.
1967 Bom. 109 at 115; Vishnu v Mahahrashtra W & G Co. A.I.R. 1967 Bom.
434 at 437; State v Vali Mohammad A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 294; Hiranandini B.B.
& D Mfg. Co. A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 373 at 37&; Calcutta: Obiter distinguished 
in S.Muchand v Collector A.I.R. 1968 Cal.174 at 186; but see Gouri Gupta 
v Tarani Gupta A.I.R. 1969 Cal. at 309; State v D.Surya Rao A.I.R. 1969 
Cal. 594: Sailendra Nath Purnedu A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 169; A.K.Roy v K.C.Sen 
Gupta A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 252 at 257- Gujerat: Lalu Jela v Gujerat A.I.R.
1962 Gu.i. 250 at 255; Jaswantbhai v Nichhabhai A.I.R. 1964 Guj. 283 at 
287; P.V.Patel v State A.I.R. 1966 Gu.i. 102 at 105 (But not directly
on obiter); Prithvi Cotton Mills v Broach Mun. A.I.R. 1968 Guj. 124 at 
142; Chotalal v Vivekanand Mills A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 277 at 284; Himachal 
Pradesh:"Kalyan Singh v Baldev Singh A.I.R. 1961 H.P. 2 at 7; Union v 
Wazir Chand A.I.R. 1962 H.P. 24 at 26. Note the comments of Saxena (cited 
supra f.n.2) at 1331* Orissa: S.M.T.Haramani v Dinabandhu A.I.R. 1954 Orr.
54; F.C.Visalamma v Jagannadha Rao A.I.R. 1955 Or. 160 at 162; Nain v State
A.I.R. 1965 Or. 7 at 9- Madhya Pradesh: Suraj Mai v M.P. A.I.R. 1958 M.P.
103 at 111; Re Lachman Nand A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 261 at 269. Patna: Bihar v
B.L.Agarwala A.I.R. 1966 Patna 410 at 418; S.V.P.Cement Co. v Union A.I.R. 
1967 Patna 315 at 317* Rajasthan: Bri.i Sunder v Flection Tribunal A.I.R.
1957 Rajasthan 189 at 197; Jeevrai v Lai chand A.I.Rl^%aiasthan 192 at 209 
(the question asked ih this judgement is:HDid the Supreme Court intend to lay 
doun the law?”); Nag Ra.ii v R.K.Birla A.I.R. 1969 Rajasthan 245 at 247- 
Mysore: D.G.Vishwanath v Mysore A.I.R. 1964 Mys.132 at 138.(see also the 
opinion of Manipur in (1962) II ^ rim.L.J. 147. Madras: Veerappa Chettiar v 
I.T.Commr. A.I;R. 1959 Mad.56 at 6l (obiter entitled to the highest respect); 
Jammu and Kashmir: Sheikh Abdul v Jagat Ram A.I.R. 1969 J.K.16: Karim Bux
v State A.I.R. 1969 J.K.77 at 86.
55Dhavan J. in Union v Firm Ram Gopal where he observed:
”(I)t has been overlooked ... (in the various authorities cited 
before me) that the doctrine of supremaay o f any declaration of law 
by the Supreme Court has been made a part of the Constitutional law 
of the Republic. It therefore rests on a much loftier pedestal 
than judicial conventions under which every inferior Court is bound 
to follow previous decisions of a superior Court ... Article 1^1 
had the effect in addition to investing the decision of the Supreme 
Court with a binding force of creating a constitutional organ whose 
declaration of law pronounced ex cathedra shall be binding on all 
courts in India.” (emphasis mine)
The problem however is : What part of the judgements of the Supreme Court 
are made ex cathedra ? Thus even in the Allahabad High Court, judges 
have observed that obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are ohly of per­
suasive value.'^gain, Satish Chandra J. of the same High Court has 
opined that he is not bound by a ruling where the argument in the Supreme 
Court has proceeded on a concession.^^here are several decisions of the 
High Courts which distinguish a Supreme Court ruling on the ground that
it was merely a casual observation, and that the Court was bound by an
58obiter dietum but not by a casual observation. Chandrachud J. of the
Bombay High Court has further insisted that an obiter dictum is binding
59only if it is a considered opinion. This contrasts with the opinion of 
the Calcutta High Court which has ruled that the rulings of the Supreme 
Court are binding even if the point was not argued before the Supreme
55* A.I.R. I960 All 672 at 680.
56. Rameshwar Prashad v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 All 88 at 89.
51* Nathu v Sub.Divl.Officer W.Ptn. No: 2399 of 1988 referred to in 
A.I.R. 1970 Allahabad 231 at 255I£T
58. Mohandas v Sattanathan A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 113 at 118; Anant v Baburao 
A.I.R. 1967 Bom. 109 at 113; State v Vali Mohrt A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 294 at
295; Hiranandini v B B & D Mfg. Co. A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 373 at 378; Nag Raj
v R.KTlirla A.I.R. 19&9 Rajasthan 2b5 at 2^7«
59* Vishnu v Mahagashtra W & G Co. A.I.R. 1967 Bom, k jk  at 437? See 
also Chagla C.J. in K. P. Poet or v Bombay A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 220 at 22*f.
Court^°or if the ruling proceeded on an argument different from that
before them.^The Gujerat High Court has gone one step further still.
In Chotalal v Vivekananda Mills^^Mehta J. observed :
M(T)he point is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court, 
which is completely binding on us and it is not open to this Court 
to distinguish this decision on facts. It is only in case of the 
decision of the concurrent Court that the doctrine(s) of obiter, 
per incuriam or distinguishable on fact, could be applied.”
The Orissa High Court has taken the view that even an obiter of the
Federal Court is binding unless they make it clear that their view was
63intended to be a tentative one. The Madhya Pradesh High Court have also
6if
made this distinction between an obiter dictum and a tentative opinion.
The Supreme Court cannot really pass a definitive opinion on
this because any statement that they make will in fact be an obiter, in
as much as they will be commenting on a problem that deals with a situation
that ' they will never be involved in themselves, because of their rulings
65in the Bengal Immunity Case that Article l*fl does not apply to them.
The Court has however taken the view that their own obiter dicta are
entitled to the highest respect.^But more recently Shah3*1 observed
67
in Madhav %ao Scindhia v Union :
"It is difficult to regard a word, clause or a sentence occurring 
in a judgement of this Court, divorced from its context
60. Ajaib Singh v C.W.T. A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 2*f9 at 252-3.
61. Sailendranath v Punedu A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 169 at pr. 11 p.170.
62. A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 277 at 28k.
63. F.C.Visalamma v Jaganadha A.I.R. 1953 Or. 160 at 162.
64-. Re Lachman Nandu A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 261 at 269*
65. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 661.
66. I.T.Commr. v Vazir Sultan & Sons A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 8l4 at 821.
67. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530 at pr. 13 p. 578 col. 2.
as containing a full exposition of the law on a question, when 
the question did not even fall to be answered in that case ..."
68In G. L. Gupta v D. N. Mehta the Court ruled that when the attention of
the Court was not drawn to a particular statute, it can review its own
decision. The question remains : do these rules apply to the High Courts
and can they also distinguish tfre rulings of the Supreme Court in this
way ? The law on Article 141 is in a state of confusion. The Supreme
Court cannot solve this problem. It is up to the High Courts to achieve
some kind of uniformity. The Supreme Court has however promised that
it would not give "speculative opinions on hypothetical questions." 69
d. Ways of following and distinguishing a case.
It appears that although Courts in India adhere to a very strict
theory of precedent, in actual fact they have discovered a large number
of ways in which they can follow or not follow a precedent. K. Llewellyn,
analysing Appelate Court procedure in the United States of America,
noted that in America there were at least 64 different reasons given for
70following or avoiding preceding authority. Indian Courts have produced 
an equally interesting variety. At least 12 considerations that must be 
borne in mind can be found in Gajendragadkar J.fs judgement in
......................... 71
Keshava Mills v I.T.Commr. : The first three are the usual three reasons
which were declared in the classic Court of Appeal case of Young v
72Bristol Aeroplane Co. Gajendragadkar recounts them by asking :
"What is the nature of the infirmity of error on which a plea 
for the review of the earlier decision is based ? (In) ... the 
earlier decision did some patent aspects of the question remain 
unnoticed ? ... was the attention of the Court withdrawn (from)
68. A.I.R. 1971 N.S.C. 174.
69* S.K.Das J. in Central Bank of India v Workmen A.I.R. i960 S.C. at 28.
70. The Common Law Tradition (i960) 75-92.
71. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1636.
72.- (1944) K.B. 718 and comment Cross: Precedent in-English law (1968)
108-110.
any relevant or material statement or provision, or was any pre­
vious decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed ?" 73
To this his lordship added the following considerations :
"Is the Court ... fairly unanimous that there is ... an error 
in the earlier view ? What would be the impact of the decision on 
the general administration of the law or the public good ? Bas the 
earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by 
this Court ... or the High Courts(s) and would the refusal (to 
follow) the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship 
or mischief ? ... These considerations become still more significant 
when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous one of a Bench 
of the learned judges of this Court." 74
Courts in India have added further considerations that must be borne in
75mind; the Common Law view of the matter must not be upset; has the
76
decision stood the test of time ? will the decision lead to uncertainty
77in the area of property law ? is the point in law covered by a Full
78Bench decision of the High Court or of the Supreme Court ? will commercial
73. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. I636 at pr.23 p.1644.
74. Ibid
75* Director - of Rationing and Distribution, Calcutta v Corpn of Calcutta 
A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1355 at pr. 7* But note the dissent of Wanchoo J. and the 
fact that this case was overruled in W.B. v Corpn. of Calcutta A.I.R. 1967 
S.C. 997*
76. See Nirsin v Sudhir Kumar A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 864 at pr. 4, p. 866;
Raman Nadar v S.Raslamma A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1759 at pr. 10. p.1763; Smt 
Indi Devi v Board of Revenue A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 2294 (All); Sakarchand 
v Narayan A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 10 at pr. 10; C & J Bank v M.S.Alikhan A.I.R.
1956 Hyd7 65: Thayamma v~Giriyamma A.I.R. I960 Mys. 176 at nr. 4 p.177 
(per Hegde J.) Venkamma v Lamisonanna A.I.R. 1951 Bom 57 (par Bhagwati J.) 
at pr. 22 p. 66; S.K.Das J. in Bhagwat Sharma v Bai.inath Sharma A.I.R.
1954 Pat. 408 at pr. 18 p.414; Sakarchand v Narayan A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 10
at pr. 10; Smt Indi Devi v Board of Revenue A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 2224 (D.B.)
C & J Bank v M.S.Ali Khan A.I.R. 1956 Hvd 65 at pr. 12 p. 70; Benov Krishna 
v Ashotosh D.E. A.I.R. 1954 Col. 389 at pr. 11 p. 322; Anianevulu v Rang 
Charvulv A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 705 at pr. 6706; Smt Ravan v Smt Gouri Bai
A.I.R. 1959 MPP. 301 at pr. 14 p. 304; Ram Bhatra v Kondama A.I.R. 1965 
Mvs. 332 at pr. 11 p. 334-; Adinarananna v Mallama A.I.R. 1950 Mys. 13 
at pr. 13 p* 17; Ambika Prashad v Thakur Prashad A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 399 
at pr. 5 P* 401; p.230, p.405*
77. Venkamma v Laxmisonanua A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 57 (per Bhagwati J.) at 
pr. 22 p. 66.
78. See section on obiter dictum supra and Mohammad Raza v U.P. A.I.R. 
1955 S.C. 92 at pr. 11 p. 94.
79transactions be affected by th4 decision ? the existing procedure to
80be followed in Courts should not be changed; will the decision affect
8lthe hierarchy of precedent ? do the facts of the instant case demand
82that earlier cases be followed ?
All these considerations themselves involve further considera­
tions, depending on the facts of the instant case and the emphasis that 
a particular judge may put on the various factors that must be borne in 
mind. As Judge Frank observed :
"Courts in deciding cases are engaged in a sort of retail, 
not a wholesale job" 83
Detailed analysis of the effect of these considerations is
beyond the scope of this thesis, but these considerations will be horne
in mind in the analysis of particular problems later,
e. The application of an earlier ruling.
Before either the reasoning (ratio decidendi) or a casual
statement (obiter dictum) of one decision can apply to another, some
similarity between the two decisions must be proved. The earlier case
must be on the same point of law, the same or a similar section of a
statute, or a similar section in a statute in pari materia and with
substantially the same facts. Thus in Bombay Union of Journalists v
Bombay the Court was not willing to apply the observations made on
S.25(7) (*>) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in Bombay v Hospital
79- Rama Bhatia v Kondandarama A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 332 (per Hegde J.); 
Ambika"Prashad v 'fhakur Prashad A.I.R. 195# S.C. 399 a t pr. 30 P« 405; 
Admaranappa v Mallappa A.I.R. 1950 Mys. 13 at pr. 13 p. 17*
80. Benoy Krishna v Ashutosh De A.I.R. 1954- Cal. 382 (per Chakravarta J.) 
at pr. 11, p. 392; C & I Bank v M.S.Ali Khan A.I.R. 1956 Hyd 65*
81. See the comments earlier on the obiter dictum and Article 14-1 (supra).
82. Note the case of Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252 and contrast 
it with Gajapati v Orissa A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 375 on the doctrine of colour­
able legislation. On this see comments i'Kfra Chapter II Section 3; Chapt-III.
83. Courts on Trial (1969 Atheneum Paperback Edn) p.11.
84. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1617 at pr. 9 pp 1622-3.
Mazdoor Sabha^to S.25(7)(c) of the same statute, even though the sub-
86sections are similar. But in State v Bhanji Munji Bose J. applied the
87principle of gopalan v Madras on Article 21, to Article J>1 of the
88Constitution, In Kochunni v Madras Subha Rao J. applied a different 
principle to Article 31 and argued that it should apply to Article 21,
89even though he admitted that they were not in pari materia. The attitude
90
of the Courts in India on what is pari materia is not always consistent •
91Thus in Assam v P. Barua Grover J, felt that Section 22 of the Income
Tax Act 1922 was in pari material to Section 19(5) of the same statute.
92This contrasts with the view of Chagla C,J. in Bombay v R.E.Society
that the pari materia rule should not apply to fiscal statutes#
Further it should be noted that it has been argued in certain
Cases that even if the subsequent case is on the same section of a statute,
certain orders passed in the case cannot be treated as preedent. Thus
93in Satyanarayana Rao v Sree Ramun Sanjeeva Row J. refused to accept
ql
that an order passed in Re Ganpati Pillai restricted the revisional 
power of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provisional Small Cause 
Courts Act 1887# He felt that such orders were mere ipse dixits. In
85. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 610,
86. A.I.R. 1955 s .c . k l at pr. 6 p.
87. A.I.R. 1950 s .c . 27.
«00CO A.I.R. I960 s .c . 1080
87 Ibid at pr. 25 p. 1093 col. 1.
90. See G.:P.Singh: Statutory Interpretation in India (1966) 1^ +2-lMf.
91. A.I.R. 1969 S.cFat pr. % p. 837.
92. A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 673 at pr. k p. 67 .^
93. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. kSl at p. JM.
9k. (1912) M.W.N. 181.
95Dudh Nath v Sat Narain Jagdish Shhai J. felt that an order that a case
is fit for appeal is not a precedent. In Cantonment Board v M/S L.D.Hari 
96Ram Dua J. observed that in cases on the discretionary power under
Article 227 of the Constitution earlier precedent was irrelevant.
No two cases have the same facts. The Courts are not even
willing to apply the same rules of construction to facts. In Nita Ram v 
97Jiwan Lai Hidayatullah J. stressed in a tenancy case that facts vary
from case to case and than an earlier set of facts cannot be used to
98interpret later ones. In a case on Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
i860 (murder) Sinha J. pointed out that a previous Court's assessment
99of the facts is not relevant as precedent. In Jwala Mohan v State 
Desai C.J. protested against earlier judges imposing their assessment 
of the evidence in a case to similar evidence in later cases. Again 
Courts have held that documents^^deeds^^Teaies^^and wills^^and
95. -A.I.R. 1966 All. 315.
96. A.I.R. 1962 Puni. 490 at 491.
97.0 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 499
98. Prakash Chandra v U.P. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 195. See also Gurcharan Singh 
v Punjab A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 460 at pr. 9 p» 462-3 on the use of an earlier case 1
by way of illustration; Sinha J. in Kalidas v Univ. of Calcutta A.I.R. 1951
Calcutta 129 at pr.10 p.13*
99* A.I.R. 1965 All l6l at 163-5. See also U.P. v Randhir Sri Chand A.I.R. 
1959 All 727 at pr.17-18 p.730; Manik Chand v Bishambar Nath A.I.R. 1955 
N.U.C. 5504 (All.); Mohd Ishaq v Mohd. Bashir A.I.R. 1961 Pun. 8 at pr.ll p.11
100. Madho Das v Hukand Ram A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 48l; but see Munuswamy v 
Muniramiah A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 177*
101. M.P.Davis v Ag.I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 719 at pr.4 pp.721-2; but 
contrast VodaYar Vi.iavar Bank A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 318 at pr.5»
102. Mullick Chand v Surendra A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 21? at pr.26 p.220.
103. Ram Chand v Hilda Brito A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1325 at pr.15 p.1329.
r *a
contract s^^are to be construed without reference to earlier precedent, 
even though the Courts have accepted certain general rules of inter­
pretation.
Once we have decided that an earlier case is relevant to a
later case, we ask ourselves what the ratio decidendi of the earlier
case was. It should be noted that determining the "ratio” is a second
step in applying an earlier ruling. A great deal of controversy has
centred around this question. 105For our purposes the ratio may be defined
as the reasons for arriving at a particular decision as indicated by the
106facts of the case. Goodhart1s theory that a ratio must be read as
indicated by the "material facts" of the case does not solve the problem
as regards which judge - the later or the earlier - should determine the
ratio and select the facts. In fact Goodhart himself admits that often
107further decisions have to "(plot) the points on (the) graph" Opinion can
vary as regards determining both the reasons as well as the facts of the
case, as has been shown by an analysis of the famous case of Donoghue v 
108Stevenson. It will be seen later that varying interpretations of the 
ratio in a particular case have emerged in different judgements by 
different judges (and even often the same judge) indifferent cases.
It must not be thought that the ratio is in fact indeterminable.
104. Gulab Chand v Kudi Lai A.I.R. 1959 H.P. 151 (F.B.) at pr.l8 p.l6l-2.
105. See for example the controversy on GoodhartTs theory of the ratio 
decidendi: J.L.Montrose (1957) 20 M.L.R. 587? Goodhart (1958) 21 M.L.R. 155; 
Simpson: (1959) 22 M.L.R. 45; Stone: (1959) 22 M.L.R. 38.
106. See Determining the ratio etc. (1930 ) 40 Yale L.Jnl. I6l-l83» I have 
relied on the reprint in Essays in Jurisprudence 1-26.~~See also article 
cited f.n.lQ5 supra).
107. Goodhart (1959) 22 M.L.R. 117 at 124 citing from Paton: Jurisprudence 
(lid) 161.
(1952) A.C. 562. And note the analysis of Julius Stone in Legal System 
and Lawyers1 Reasonings (1964) 269-274.
Certainly in a large number of cases the ratio is clear, but at the same 
time it may or may not be capable of a wider application. This will be 
demonstrated in the area of Constitutional law later.
A ratio is contrasted with an obiter dictum, which consists 
of statements*which are not necessary to the reasoning of a case but 
nevertheless have persuasive value. We have seen above that in India 
judges have further distinguished an obiter dictum from "a casual 
observation”, "an argument proceeding on a concession" and "a Tentative 
opinion", and contended that the last three are not even of persuasive 
value.109
Thus, Courts in India are able to invent a large number of 
rules for distinguishing and applying earlier case law. The two basic 
questions asked are : (1) Are the two decisions in any way similar ?
(2) Is the particular argument a part of the reasoning of the case ?
But surrounding these two basic rules are a lot of fine but fundamental 
distinctions. This is illustrated later.
f. The doctrine of prospective overruling.
In Golak Nath v Punjab the Supreme Court held that Parliament 
cannot amend Part III of the Constitution. If this judgement were to be 
given retrospective effect (as all judgements of the Court must be) 
because of the Blackstonian fiction that judges merely declare the law, 
the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments and with them a large 
number of Statutes that t§ey were enacted to protect, would become, 
ultra vires the Constitution. The Court therefore ruled that their
109. For a good account of the language used in this area see J.L.Mont rose 
Language of and a notation for the Doctrine of Precedent (1952-3) 2 Univ. 
of Western Australia Annual Law Review 3Qli 50^«
judgement would only have prospective effect .^^he Court emphasised
that this technique of prospective overruling would be exercised only
by the Supreme Court and limited to constitutional matters. This doctrine
was evolved in America where it was used in the famous case of
Linkletter v Walker (1965)’^ ' that case the Court was anxious to
ensure that already completed cases should not be reopened because of
112the ruling in Mapp v Ohio, which altered fundamentally the rules 
about self-incrimination in State Criminal trials. As an idea it is 
extremely just as it recognises the simple truth that judges do change 
their minds and make "laws". More recently the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration in England has used similar principles to work out 
an equitable settlement, where a 1966 decision of the Courts had altered 
the rules relating to disablement benefit
We are here not concerned with the wider implications of this
110. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 Subha Rao J. at 1669; Wanchoo J. at I69O-I; 
Bachawat J. 17287 The last two (Wanchoo J. for Bhargava and Mitter JJ.) 
were against the use of prospective overruling. Subha Rao J. delivered 
his judgement for Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam JJ as well.
111. 381 U.S. 618.
112. 387 U.S. 6k3. See further B.H.Levy: Realistic jurisprudence and 
prospective overruling (1966) 100 Univ. of Penn L. Peg. 1.
113. See the Second Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (1970r71) dated Aug 3, 1971» See the recommendation 
at pr.21 p.9.
aspect of Golak Nath1 s case which can be discussed elsewhere, but we 
will concentrate on two main points*
Firstly, the Court has in fact used the doctrine of pros­
pective overruling in several cases, even though it has not admitted
115that it has done so, as in Venkataramna v Madras where the Courts
had declared the selection process of candidates for certain wivil
posts ultra vires the Constitution. But Das J* stressed that since
it was not possible to declare the selection of all the candidates
void, a place would be found for the petitioner without reference to 
ll6Communal rotation. Again in a similar situation, in P.Rajendram v
Madras1*^Wanchoo J. agreed to let current selections stand'^even
though they were ultra vires Article Ik of the Constitution. In
119B. N. Tewari v Union the same judge made an extremely intricate
ex poste facto calculation to reduce the number of vacancies from
forty-eight to forty-three to hold that the petitioner having no right
to the post could not upset existing appointments. Again in £agdev 
120Singh v J.K. in connection with a preventive detention
n  4~- 1 k j - r't*-
115. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 2 2 9 . .......................................................................................
11$. Ib id  pr.^f-5 p .229.
117. A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 1012.
118. Ibid pr. 16. He admitted that the basis for selection vas ultra
vires Article Ik at pr.13 p.1017.
119* A .I.R . 1965 S.C. 1430 at p r.7 .
120. A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 327.
matter, the Court was faced with a situation where certain rules had been
changed because the Supreme Court overruled its own earlier decision on 
121
a particular point. Wanchoo J. gave the authorities an opportunity to
correct their error and justified his ruling on the ground that they could _
122not possibly have anticipated the Court’s changing its mind. Ironically 
Wanchoo J. voted against adopting the doctrine of prospective overruling 
in Golak Nath’s case.^^
Secondly, the actual doctrine of prospective overruling has 
been given a curious twist in India. It should logically have followed 
that the Amendments declared invalid by the Supreme Court in Golak Nath's 
case should become invalid after February 27, 196? - the date of the 
Golak Nath decision. But in a recent case Shah J. on behalf of the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the Amendments are not invalid prospectively 
either, but that the power to amend the Part III was declared invalid and 
that the Court would declare invalid any future attempts to amend Part III. 
Thus it appears that prospective overruling in India has come to mean 
a warning by the Supreme Court that future excesses of power will be 
declared invalid by the Supreme Court, and that existing statutes though 
void shall be presumed to be valid botfc retrospectively and prospectively.
In Golak Hath’s case, apart from Hidayatullah J., the majority did not 
even examine the provisions of the statute to determine which parts of 
them were invalid and seemed content to deliver a warning to the legis­
lature on future exercises of power. It also appears that prospective
121. The decision in Sadhu Singh v Delhi Administration A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
91 was overruled in P.L.Lakhanpal v Union A.I.R. 1967 S.C• ISbl
122. See f.n.120 at pr.8 p.330
123. See f.n.110 supra.
12k. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 100. See also Narayan Nair v State A.I.R. 1971 Keraila 
98 at pr.6 but note the dissent of Mathew J. at 123-6.
overruling in the sense in which it is understood elsewhere is in fact 
a normal feature of the techniques used by the Supreme Court.
This approach of the Court may well have been dictated by the 
fact that invalidating the Amendments even prospectively would have led 
to disastrous results. But once again a broad principle seems to have 
emerged from a problem case. 
g. Conclusion
The Supreme Courts add High Courts have thus on the surface adhered 
very closely to precedent. The merit of following earlier decisions and 
not disturbing the hierarchy of precedent is recognised; but at the same 
time the Courts have devised ways and means of distinguishing earlier 
case law. The Supreme Court had made an independent contribution to the 
doctrine of prospective overruling and Indian Courts generally have made 
a very varied and rich contribution to the Common Law rules on precedent.
2. The Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation.
1 . 2a. The Supreme Court and the Rule of Literal Interpretation.
To some extent the Supreme Court displays the dilemma that any 
Gourt faces if it follows the rule of literal interpretation as well as 
taking advantage of some of the Common Law escape routes that have made 
the rule bearable. More recently, the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions have proposed aa easier way . out and suggested that the rule 
be changed drastically, if not abandoned altogether. The Indian Courts 
are, however, bound by the rule and have made full use of the escape 
routes that the Common Law specifically admits.
These escape routes are of three kinds. The first is a recourse 
to the rule in Heydon’s case (I584)*fwhich allows the Court to examine 
the statute in its ’’legal historical perspective”. The second relates 
to a situation where the Court uses the argument that any other inter­
pretation would produce an absurd result.^ The third escape route is the 
use of well known Common Law presumptions: it will be presumed that a 
statute does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts, bind the Crown, 
delegate excessive power or impose unjustified fiscal or penal burdens.
These three techniques are responsible for the existence of 
a system of interpretation which uses the rule of literal construction
1. The most comprehensive account of the Supreme Court and statutory 
interpretation is G.P.Singh: Principles of statutory interpretation 
(Allahabad) 1966. This section will use in the main post-1966 references 
so as not to duplicate his work.
2. Rule declared by House of Lords in Sussed Peerage Claim (1844) 11
C.I. & F. 85 at 143; Saloman v A.Saloman & Co. Ltd.(l897) A.C. 22 at 38.
3. Law Commission Report (I969 No. 21) pr.80; see also Scottish Law
Commission Report (1969 No. ll).
4. (1584) ~5^ Cokej Reports 7a = 76 E.R. 637
5. See for example Shyam Kishore Devi v Patna Mun. Corpn A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 1678 at pr.8 1682.
as a modus operandi.^ The Indian Court has followed this system, making 
occasional changes, which are by no means insignificant.
n
b. The first escape route :Heydonfs case
The Supreme Court has always accepted the fiction that the
object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature. It has recently observed :
"It is a trite saying that the object of interpreting a statute 
is to ascertain the intention of the legislature" 8
The Court also accepts the corollary to this :
"(T)he first and primary rule of construction is that the intention 
of the legislature must be found in the words of the legislature 
itself." 9
Courts do not want to go into the "real" intent of Parliament, although 
it has been recently suggested that they do so.^ The Supreme Court has 
made it clear that they will not fill gaps in a legislative enactment
12gather the intention of the legislature from what they failed to say,
6. To the extent to which this describes the actual law, this statement 
is an exaggeration. But it is a fair description of the judicial process.
7. (158*f) 3 Coke Rep. 7a.
8. Per Sarkar J. in S.Asia Industries v Sarup Singh A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
3l& at pr.7, 3^.
§. Per Gajendragadkar J. Kanai Lai v Paramnidhi A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 907 at 
910 coL 2.
10. Per Denning L.J. in Mayor & St. Mellons R.D.C. v Newport Corpn (1950) 
2 All E.R. 1226; on appeal note the comments of Lord Simonds (1952) A.C~
189 at 191• But see also the comments of the Law Commission (infra f.n.3)
at p.32-371 where a different approach is suggested.
11. Per Ramaswami J. in N.S.S.& G.R.W. v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1062 
at pr.9, 1068.
12. Per Hegde J. in Amalgamated Electricity v Aymer Mun. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
227 at pr.lif, 234.
13 14or add words; but follow the natural, literal, and grammatical
1 5
meaning. But in the last two cases cited the Court was decidedly
uncomfortable about taking the rule to its logical conclusion. Thus
Hegde J. was certainly looking for a way out in Bhagwan Das v ^aras Nath'
17and made a plea that the statute be redrafted. Similarly Shelat J. in
x8S. S. Sly v Workers* Uplon proceeded in the very next paragraph to 
examine the legislative history of the enactment before him.
In order to deal with the pressure on the Court to know more
i lQ
about a statute before them, the Court uses the rule in Heydon s case 
which permits the Court to consider the following factors :
**(1) What was the Common Law remedy before the making of the Act.
(2) What was the mischief and (the)defect that the Common Law did
not provide (for)
(3) What remedy tha Parliament hath resolved and appointed to 
cure the disease of the Commonwealth;
(4) The true reason for the remedy.*1
This expands the Court’s area of concern and prevents them
20from following what has been called ’’the path of least resistance**;
13. Per Shelat J. in S.S.Rly Co. v Workers* Union A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 513 
at pr.6 p.518 citing from Saloman v A.Saloman & Co. (lb97) A.C. 22.
14. Per Hegde J. in Bhagwan Das v Paras Nath A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 971 at 
pr.7 p.967 (on a U.P. rent control matter). For background see Sri 
Bhagwan V Ramchand A .I.R . 1965 S.C. 1767•
15. Per Sarkar J. in M.P. v Vishnu Prashad A .I.R . 1966 S.C. 1593 at
pr.3 p. 1595 (an important case on the law of property and referred to later).
16. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 971 at pr.7 p.97k-7*
17• Ibid at pr.7 p*973»
l8- A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 513 at pr.7 p.518-19.
19. (1584) 3 Coke Reports 7a.
20. The phrase is C.K.Allen’s : Law in the making (1964; 7<0 507*
✓ s. rv
Indian Courts have accepted this rule in a large number of cases. In
certain other cases the Court does not cite Heydon’s case but accepts
22the rule citing Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statues. TheJSupreme Court 
has?, however, stretched their inquiry beyond the narrow confines of 
Heydon’s case. They have allowed recourse to the Statements of Objects 
and Reasons that accompany a statute, though admitting that all they
23were really permitted to do was ascertain the object of the Statute.
24Reports of Commissions have also been referred to. In a remarkable
21. The leading case is Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 66l 
at pr.22 p.674; see also Kanai Lai v Paranm-idhi 1C7I.R. 1957 S.C. 832 at 
pr.14 p.835(citing the first case which is also cited by S.K.Das J at 
pr.33 p.841); R.M.D.C. v Union A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 628 at pr.7, 631; I.T.
Commr.. v Sodra Devi A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 832 at 833; Shivanaravan v Madras 
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 986 at pr.7 p.989; Mahijibhai v Manibhai A.I.R. 1965
S.C. 1477 at pr.20 p.1482 quoting Heydon’s rule from Maxwell’s Interpretation 
of Statutes (118) 18.
22. Shivanarayan y Madras A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 986 at pr.7, 989; U.P. v C.Tobit 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 414 at pr.3 p.416; Kanwar Singh v Delhi Administration 
A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 871 at pr.10 p.874.
23. It was first thought thqt these were not admissable for purposes of 
interpretation. See Shastri C.J. in Ashwini..Kumar v Arabinda Bose
1952 S.C. 369 at 378; S.K.Das J.: Central Bank of India v Workmen A.I.R.
I960 S.C. 12 at 21; B.P.Sinha J. in W.B. v Union A.I.R. 19.65 S.C. 1241 at 
1247; T.L.V.Aiyar in Jiajgal v Delhi Adm. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1781 p.1787;
Ran.jit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. £*32 at 637 (a controversial case 
discussed later); Subha Rao C.J. in Vairavehr v So.Dty.Collector A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 1017 at 1021; Grover J. in J.R.Mfg. Co. v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
1589 at 1398 col.l. But the "Statement^has been used as haekground material 
in W.B.ff Subodh Gopal A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92 at 104; M.K.Ranganathan v Madras 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 604 at 603; U.Coomr. v Sodra Devi A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 832 
at 839; Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080; Jialal v Delhi Adm. A.I.R. 
12.62 S.C. 1781 at 1787; Va.jrave&tvv Sn.Duty Collector A.I.R.1965 S.C. 1017 
at 1821-2; J.R.G.Mfg. Co. v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1589 at pr.ll p. 1593 
(some of these cases are discussed by G.P.Singh (supra f.n.l) 127-132. The 
last mentioned case summed up the law and is discussed later below.
24. See T.K.Musaliar v Venkatachalam A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246; I.T.Commr. v 
Sodra Devi A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 832 at 838; Express Newspapers Ltd. v Union 
A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578 at 587i 589» 822 , 623; Madanlal v S.Chandeo Sugar Mills 
Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1543 at 1533.
case recourse was permitted to the speeches in the Bombay legislature to
justify their ruling that under the proviso of Article 3 of the Constitution
25-the legislature need not be consulted at every stage of the negotiations.
In another references were made to speeches in the legislature to determine 
the nature of the financial emergency that necessitated the Government’s
26 27 t,
taking over an important weaving mill. In Kochunni v Madras Subha Eao J. -
28as Hidayatullah J. pointed out in a later case - misquoted a portion of the 
Statements and Objects of the Fourth Amendment Act to substantiate his novel
interpretation that Article 31A of the Constitution was only intended to
29 30protect statutes connected with agrarian reform. In Golak Nath v Punjab
the same judge (on behalf of four other judges) made extensive references
to Constituent Assemb(y Debates to substantiate his view that fundamental
rights were intended to be sacrosanct. When the Bonus Act 1965 was challenged
31at ultra vires the Constitution the Court went into the history of the
enactment and recounted the fact that the concept of Bonus was in fact a
32creation of the judiciary. As a result of the comparison they had mis-
33givings about Section 10(1) of the Statute but did not declare it invalid.
32.
In J. R. G. -Mfg. Co. v Union the Court’s reference to the Statements and
Objects of the Statute was largely responsible for their finding that the
35impugned fiscal statute was intra vires Article 1^ - of the Constitution.
25. Babulal v Bombay A.I.R. I960 S.C. 39 at pr.80 p.55-6.
26. Chiran.iit La & v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. Jfl. Note both these instances
are examples primarily of the legislative debates as "facts” of an eviden­
tiary nature rather than extrinsic aids to interpretation.
27. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080. For a different view see Seervai: Constllional 
Law of India (1967)
28. Banjit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C^^at pr. 10, 63?•
29* Subha Rao C.J. affirmed his position in Vajravedkiv Sp.Dtv.Collector 
A.I.R. 1965 1017 at pr.10 p.1022.
30. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 16^3 at pr.l8-24 pp.1656-7 .
31. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 691.
32. Ibid at pr.^-14 p.698-700.
33*. See also, ibid pr.22 p.?0*f............................................
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1588 at pr.ll p.1595-6.
35* Ibid at 1596.
The reference to past legislative history has been haphazard.
36In W. B. v Union the need for caution w^s expressed. In I. T. Commr.
37v Sodra Devi Bhagwati J. rebuked the High Court for not looking at the
38 39past history of the enactment which he considered at some length later.
In the field of constitutional law past history has been referred to in
Zj0 id
a large number of cases. In a recent case the Court made extended
references to the Joint Committee of Constitutional Reform (1933-4) to
determine the scope of Article 131 of the Constitution.
The Indian Supreme Court seems to have made casual references
to legislative history, whenever they thought it necessary. This has its
advantages but the Court must make a more systematic use of legislative
history. This will entail much more research and much wider perspective
42than the Court has hitherto been used to.
36. A.I.R. I963 S.C. 1244 at 1277.
3$. A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 832.
3 8. Ibid at 84) col.l.
39* Ibid at pp.838-9-
40. Gopalan v Madras A .I.R . 1950 S.C. 27 (Kama C.J. at 389; Mukerjea J. 
at 101; Shastri J. at 73); Shastri J. in Romesh Thappar v Madras A .I .R .
1930 S.C. 124 at 128; albeit later the same judge seemed to be against 
such a use i'n^ £. V. Factory A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 333; Golak Nath v Punjab 
which according to Imam is a distinct change of methods, see Indian 
Supreme Court and the Constitution (1968) pp. 41-42; Bihar v U^ion A.I.R. 
1970 1446 at pr.3 p.1450; also at p.1451-
41. W.B. v Union A.I.R. 1970 S»C» 1446 at pr.3 p.1450. See also at p.l451»
42. See on this a discussion of the problems and possibilities by
H.C.L.Merrillati The soundproof room: A matter of interpretation (1967)
IX J.I.L.I. 321. ^he Indian approaches discussed at 530-542; the 
general problems involved at 542-5^ •
c. The hardship rule : the second escape route*
The Court will however deviate from the literal construction
approach to ensure that the statute works* It has at several places
43
declared that it must:not follow a construction that is unworkable,
m . . 4 5
prevent "mischief” "read a law so as to make it valid", "not defeat
2*6
the intention of the legislature", not allow one section to defeat the
47operation of the other and apply the rule of harmonious construction
hS
to several inter-related statutes.
But the application of these rules is by mo means consistent 
as different judges harmonise different sections differently. A few 
examples from Constitutional law will illustrate the point. The Supreme 
court was called upon to render a harmonious interpretation to Articles 
13 and 194(3) of the Constitution on two separate occasions but it
2*9
reached different conclusions about their inter-relation on each occasion.
50Again in Nanavati v Bombay the Court tried to give a harmonious inter­
pretation to Article 163 (the Governor’s power to pardon) with Article
43* Subha Rao J. in Shyam Kishori Devi v Patna Kun.Corpn. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. ' 
1678 at pr.8 p 1682.
44. Sevantilal v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 697 at pr.4 p.700.
45« Shah J. in Rajasthan v II.S.Mills Ltd. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 880 at pr.8
882; T.S.Mankad v Gujerat A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 143 at pr.7 p.146; Advance
Insurance Co. v Gurdasmal A.I.fe. 1970 S.CT 1126 at pr.l p.ll32~
46. S.Asia Industries v Sarup Singh A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 346 at pr.7 p»349*
47* I.T.Officer v Damodar A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 408 pr.4, p.412.
48. Sanjeeva v Election Tribunal A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 12ihl at pr.4 p.1213.
49* M.S.M.Sharma v Srikishan Sharma A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395 overruled in
In Re Article 143 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745*
30. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 112 see infra section on Constitutional Law.
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143 (the Supreme Courts power to make its own rules). The majority and
the minority reached different conclusions hut both claimed that they
had given a harmonious interpretation of the two Articles. The famous
51case of Golak Nath v Punjab interpreted the relationship between
fundamental rights (Article 13) and the power to amend the Constitution
(Article 368), but the conclusion that they reached was fundamentally
different from the one that a differently constituted Court had reached
in 1951.^^here are two interesting cases where Shah J., writing the
judgement in both cases, reached a different conclusion on the inter-
53relation between Article 31(1) and 31(2) of the Constitution.
The Court has always made it clear that in order to avail of 
this escape route there must be a hardship. In a recent case, however, 
the Court did not want to soften a rigorous literal interpretation of 
a statute for the protection of tenants while admitting that the statute
54was for their protection. This takes us to the crux of the problem.
What is a hardship ? Does it depend on :
(i) hardship with respect to established legal principles;
(ii) Hardship resulting from the facts of the case;
(iii) Hardship in relation to the principles or canons of interpretation;
(iv) ^ardship of a public nature. 35
51. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643-
32. See Shankari Prashad v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 45$.
53• See R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 564 at 595-596 and pr.62
p.597; contrast Maharashtra v H.N.Rao A.I.R. 1970 S.C.1157 at pr.17 p.1165* 
See also his comments in Gujerat v Shaniilal A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634.
54. Jai Norain v Kishan Chand. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1165 at pr.6 p.ll67
(per Hidayatullah J. Tl
55* These are the four ways of ’'receiving” a statute outlined by R.Pound: 
Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 Har±.L.Rev. 385 at 385*
In the case of the statute involving the tenant, the Court
may well have avoided the hardship rule because they thought the tenant
undeserving because he tried to get out of paying compensation for
36damge caused by him fixed by the landlord at a mere Rs 500,
A good example of hardship of the fourth kind may be found
57
in Empress Mills v Municipal Committee where Kapur J. observed :
"The effect of the construction of import and export in Section 
66(1) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act (21f) 1922 insisted 
upon by the respondent, would make railborne goods passing through 
a railway station, within the limits of a municipality, liable to 
the imposition of a tax, on arrival at the railway station, on 
departing therefrom, or both, which would not only lead to incon­
venience and confusion but would also result in inordinate delays 
and unbearable burdens on trade, both inter and intra state. It is 
hardly likely that that was the intention of the legislature. Such 
an interpretation would lead to kn absurdity which according to the 
rules of interpretation is to be avoided." 38
P 59- •Co. is a-', f ' \ 1M. P. v Azad Finance . •'i  r j of the first and 
third kinds. Here the Court was not prepared to interpret the word 
"shall" in Section 11(d) of the Opium Act 1878 so as to make it obli­
gatory on the Government to confiscate goods which they had the power
to confiscate under that statute. They brought into play the Common Law
60presumption that a penal statute must be interpreted literally.
.........let another kind of absurdity emerges in Union v Shreeram
6lDurga Prashad. An exporter who had made a profit of Rs 3 crores by 
under-invoicing the export quota allocated to him was prosecuted under 
Section 121(a) and Section 23A of the Foreign Exchange Act 1947 read 
with Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act 1878. The Court divided on
36. Supra f.n. 54 at pr.l p.ll66.
37. A«I.R. 1938 S.C. 3A-1.
38. Ibid at pr. 22.
39. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 276.
60. Ibid at 278.
61. ,A.I.R., 1970 S.C., 1337.. . . .
- /'n
the question as to whether he was penally liable or not. Hegde J. (for
Bachawat J. and himself) said :
"(l)t is hard to believe that the legislature intended that any
minor mistake in giving full export value should be penalised ...” 62
Sikri J. took the hard line that the fraudulent exporter should be
punished :
"I cannot give an interpretation that will make a mockery of 
the section.” 63
In this case a lot of factors were brought into play. The fact that
the exporter had made a tidy sum; the foreign exchange argument (which
even Hegde J. considered important^); the introduction of the rule
that penal statutes must be literally construed; and the fear that the
statute would not, if given that interpretation, operate as a rule of
law (Sikri J.’s argument). An illustration may be found in a recent 
65case where the Court felt that the legislature cannot be presumed to
have intended something contrary to justice and reason.
66Examples can be multiplied. The essential point lies in the 
discovery that tfce Supreme Court, even though a Court of appeal, in fact 
uses the Hardship rule to meet the needs of the instant case, using the 
Common Law presumptions of interpreting statutes and accommodating the 
public need to preserve its interests. A haphazard policy underlies the 
use of the hardship rule, but it is useful to help the Court to meet the 
needs of the instant case.
The most important influences on the Court are the Common Law 
presumrtion. To the Court’s use of these we now turn.
62. Ibid at pr. 36 p.l6l2.
63« Ibid at pr. 23 p .1607 cot2.
i
64. Ibid at pr.37 p.1612-3.
63* Budhan Singh v Babi Bux A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 1880 at pr.9 p.1883.
66. See G.B.Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1966) pp.62-74.
d. The Common Law presumptions.
The Common Law has, as a result of historical process, pre­
cipitated certain presumptions, which are to be borne in mind while 
interpreting statutes, and which in turn have an effect on the drafting
of statutes. In the main these presumptions are P Statutes do not bind
67
the Crown unless it is expressly stated or can be clearly implied;
68the jurisdiction of a Court is not tot be ousted; penal and taxation
69statutes are to be strictly construed; remedial statutes are to be
70 . 71liberally construed, and delegated legislation is to be strictly controlled.
All this belongs to a period when the Courts were anxious to
protect the individual, hoped to preserve their own jurisdiction, oppose
excessive delegation of power, restrict the power to tqx and punish, and
at the same time respect the prerogative of the Crown by ensuring that
it is not bound by statutes.
Jurists aware that these are the product of history have
criticised the Common Law system of presumptions. An American jurist
thought they were wholly unsuited to modern conditions and suggested that
a new scheme involving the protection of a much wider range of interests 
72
be evolved. An Australian jurist complained that they leaned in favour
67* This can be traced to Plowdon in William & Barkly (1562) Plowd 223
at 240; now see Hancock (1940) I All ETK. 32 at 34. Madras Electric Cornn 
v Boarland (1955) 1 All E.R. 753 at 765* For the background to the presump­
tion see Craies: Statute Law (1971; 7&b 420-429.
68. See Garthwaite v Garthwaite (1964) 2 All E.R. at 241 * 242; Pyx Granite 
Cq» Ltd. v Minister of Housing & Local Govt. (1959) 5 All E.R. 1 (H.L.): 
Anisminic Ltd. v Foreign Conrpens&tion Administration (1969) 2 A.C. 147.
69. See generally Craies (supra f.n.67) 525-554 (Penal Statutes),112-116 
(taxation Statutes).
70. See G.P.Singh: (supra f.n.l) 414-418.
71• See Craies (supra f.n.67) p .289 ff.
72. R.Pound: Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 Har.L.Rev. 383; A survey 
of Social Interests (1943) 57 Har.L.Rev.l: (1959) III Jurisprudence, 
generally for an ahalysis of his scheme of interests........................
of an individualistic interpretation :
”When an individualist Common Law is modified by collectivist 
legislation, we sometimes see an unsympathetic construction.” 73
India has experienced a flood of statutes in the past few
decades. The Courts are naturally under pressure to ensure that these
statutes not only work but are interpreted sympathetically. A High Court
judge summed up the situation very well. Quoting from an American
magazine, he observed :
”’And as the fifties give way to the sixties, the question that 
India faces is : Can these poor people, multiplying at the rate 
of 9 million a year, be kept alive under a system of Free 
Parliamentary Government ? Or will India be forced, in a deqnrate 
attempt to keep its masses from starving, to throw aside its 
democratic institutions (as much of Asia already has) and adopt 
the ruthless methods of Communist China ?’ ... (I)f necessary our 
Courts should not hesitate to follow the English example and should 
not interpret the lav/ regardless of the economic emergency facing 
the nation.” 74-.
75Judges in India believe that the rule of law must be upheld. The
problem that they face is to evolve a system of interpretation whi£h
will be effective in dealing with India’s special problems as well.
The Indian Supreme Court has followed the Common Law system
of presumptions, but has made important changes as well. In Corporation
76of Calcutta v W. B. (1967) in an 8 : 1 decision it abandoned the Common
Law rule that a State was bound by a statute; Subha Rao J. for the
majority supported the dissent of Wanchoo J. in a i960 case v/hich had 
77followed the rule.
73* Paton: Jurisprudence (1964-) 3d) 218.
74-. Dhavan J. quoting from Newsweek Dec. 14-, 1959 in P.I.Authority v
Kashi Prashad A.I.P. 1962 All 551 at pr.102 p.567»
75» See supra Chapter I Section 5 * The Judge.
76. A.I.P. 1967 S.C. 997.
77• Director of R & D v Corpn of Calcutta A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1355
(disseht of "anchoo J.).
The Court has followed the view that taxation laws must be 
construed in a manner beneficial to the taxpayer.^^t has followed
79also the rule that expropriation statutes should be strictly construed.
But the Court has not overlooked the fact that there are other nuances
that must be borne in mind when considering taxation statutes. Attempts
have therefore been made to check tax evasion, although, as a recent
80thesis on the subject shows, the Courts have not really acquired the 
equipment to deal with the problem, ^hey have emphasised the principle
8l
that a person who claims exemption must prove that he is entitled to it.
32Again it was emphasised in Gurshai v I.T.C. that the general presumption 
that taxation statutes must be strictly construed does not apply to the 
procedural part of the statutes, which will be interpreted so as to make 
the machinery of collection effective.
But in its substantive approach the Court has made two signi­
ficant changes, both of which ultimately help the taxpayer. In Moopil
O7
Nair v Kerala the Court ruled that in future all taxation statutes will 
have to bear the brunt of Article 14 of the Constitution. 'Aiis overrules
78. A.V.Fernandez v Kerala A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 657 at 66l; I.T.C.Bombay v
Provident Investment Co. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 664 at 666; Gurshai v I.T.C.
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1062 at 1064; Banarsidas v I.T.0. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1742 
at 174^ f; J.K.Steel Ltd. v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1175; J.C.Tax Officer v 
Y.M.A. Madras A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1212 at pr.l6 p.1217.
79* See G.E.Board v Girdharilal A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 267*
C u j M i a  to L a.
80. K.D.Gaur: Tax Evacion in-India (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation London 
197l)» I am grateful to Mr. Gaur for having personally discussed these 
problems with me.
81• I»T.C. v Rama Krishna Deo A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 259 at 241-2; C.I.T. v 
Varkaswamyraidu A.I.R. 195& S.~C. 522 at 525-
82. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1062 at 1064.
85. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 552
84the view that the Court took in 1951 ^he effect of this will be that 
taxation statutes will also now be tested under the system of Constitu­
tional limitations from which they were hitherto excused. As aiexample
of how wise this control can be we need only refer to the case of
85Sfajravelu v Sp.Dty Collector where the Court was dissatisfied with the 
compensation provisions in the impugned statute. They were precluded, 
however, from considering matters of compensation because of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution; the Court therefore used the wide powers 
under Article 14 to declare the provisions ultra vires the Constitution.
The second contribution that the Court has made is a technical one.
86In Venkataram & Sons Ltd. v Madras the Supreme Court overruled the 
87Privy Council and held that an assessment of tax, where the charging 
section is ultra vires, is not an assessment under the Act. This gives 
the Courts the power to declare an assessment void ab initio, even though
their jurisdiction is otherwise ousted. But the struggle between preventing
88
tepe evasion and protecting the individual continues. No definite patterns
have Emerged in the general approach to the problem, though (as we shall
. 89
see later) in individual cases the Court has been vigilant.
84. jRamji Lai v I.T.O. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 97? Purshottam v B.M.Desai Aj._I.JR. 
1956 S.C. 20; see further Khandige Sham Bhat v Ag.I.T.O. A.I.R. 19^3 S.C. 
591; Rai Ramakrishna v Bihar A.I.R. 19^3 S.C. 1667; VTv.R.Varma v Union
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1094; Sattantal & Co. v Assor Auth.Patiala A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 1742; Commr.I.T. v K.V.T.Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 173*4.
85. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1017.
86. AI.R. 1966 S.C. IO89.
87. Raleigh Investments Co. v G.G.in Council A.I.R. 1947 P»C. 78 at 8l.
88. See generally K.D.Gaur (supra f.n.80).
V. & O A J L  CewUmji .
89. Baidyanath Ayurved BhagwanlA.I.R. 1971 S.C. 37^ at pr.8 p.380;
A.I.R. 1971 N.S.C. 15.
The ^ourt has been careful to ensure that the jurisdiction of
90Civil Courts is not ousted by legislation# It has made an extended inter-
91pretation of its own jurisdiction (as we shall see later ) and sought to 
examine detailed questions of election and industrial law#
But it is in the apea of strict liability that the Court has
made a significant contribution. It has always upheld the view that a
92 „
penal statute must be strictly construed. But the Court has considered
each offence on its merits. Often a mens rea clause is missing from a
93statute but the Court has imputed the mens rea provision. The case law
94is by no means uniform.
95In Nathulal v M. P. the Court took into account the heavy 
penalty of an offence under Sections 3 and 7 of the -Assential Commodity
Act, and introduced the concept of mens rea into the offence. But in
96Sarjoo Prasad v U.P. the Court felt that an offence under Section 7 of 
the Prevention of Food Adulteration was an offence of strict liability.
90. See Dua J. in Srinivasa v A.P. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 71 at pr*7 p-75 
quoting the 8 propositions declared by Hidayatuallah J. in Dhulabhai v 
MPP. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78; see also Ram Sarup v Shikar Chand A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 
893following Shree Bhagwan v Ramch'and(A.I.R. 1965 S.C.1767)at pr.14 p.897; 
Abdul v Bhawani A.I.R. 1966 S.C. I716. For earlier case law see G.P.Singh 
(supra f.n.70) Chapter 9» PP 357 ff*
9i* See Chapter II Section 6 (infra).
92. Mahajan J. in Tolaram v Bombay A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 496 at 498-9; Subha 
Rao and Wanchoo JJ. in Asst.Collector v Sitaram A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 955»
Motil Bhai v F.P.Co. v Collector Central Excise A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 829 
(per Hegde J. where it was held that only so much of the mixture as was 
non duty tobacco could be confiscated under the Control Excise Rules 
(1944) R.40 see pr.ll p.832.)
93- See the obscenity case EanjitUdeshi v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1965 S.C.
88l at pr.lo p.888 discussed infra Chapter VI.
^  tfv\ W A Pcaa v I U> o ^
I was directed to this by G.P.Singh (supra f.n.70) p.452 pr.13.
95- A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 116.
96. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 631 at 632-3.
97It has taken a similar stand where foreign exchange has been involved.
98In Gujerat v Kansaram the Court introduced the principle of vicarious
liability with respect to a statute which involved an offence under
Section 63 of the Factories Act 1948. The Common Law approach to the 
99subject was not subverted byt the judges seemed more aware of the need 
to make the statute work rather than the Common Law principle that a 
person cannot be found guilty for a crime committed by others. This 
new approach to problems of strict liability is significant and further
100
examples of this can be seen in the area of preventive detention, later.
The Court's attitude to the delegation of power will be examined 
later. It is slowly becoming aware of the needs of the administration.
But it is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand legal tradition demands 
it preserve a doctrinnaire Common Law distrust of the administration, and 
on the other Indian needs necessitate it has to make allowances for adminis­
trative needs. Thus, in Union v J. N. Sinha (197l)^°^it was called upon 
to apply the rules of natural justice to a case where the respondent was 
served with a compulsory retirement order. The Court refused to do this 
on the grounds that it must preserve
"the balance between the rights and interests of the individual 
Government servant and the ... public." 102.
97* See Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. v Jasjit Singh A.I.E. 1964 S.C.
1140 at 1149-50; Maharashtra v M.H.George A.I.R. 196f? S.C. 722; see Sikri{s 
dissent in Union v Shreeram Durga Prashad A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1537*
98. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1893 at 1897.
99* See Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (1969) 98-109* see also the recent 
House of Lords case Tesco v Nattrass (1971) 2 All E.R. 127 where a distinc­
tion was made between delegating a duty and delegating the performance of 
a duty.
10O.oInfra Chapter III.
101. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40.
102. Ibid at pr.8 p.43*
distinguishing very sensitively earlier case law where the rules of
natural justice were applied to cases in which the rights of the indi-
103vidual were affected.
The Court appears to have followed the Common Law system of
interpretation, but is making important changes to meet the needs of the
statute involved and the instant case. A Chief Justice of India seems
to confirm this when he says :
"The basic principles of statutes (as also documents which 
are the parent source) do not change essentially from one country 
to another(;) but in construing statutes in different environ­
ments differences do develop. These cannot be left unnoticed.
The task of the writer is not to cull the principles mechanically 
from various sources with a view to their inclusion in various 
chapters of his book, but to explain the light and the shadow,
the nuances and the inherent dissimilarities.” 10^ -.
e. Conclusion
The Supreme - Court has not evolved a new theory of statutory 
interpretation; nor has it wholly followed the Common Law system of 
interpretation. The policy that the Court has followed has been hap­
hazard. It has made extended use of legislative history, particularly 
in constitutional matters, and this has been responsible in more than 
one case for the view that they have taken on a particular point of law.
Thus a writer on Constitut .ional Law has shown that a large part of the
Constitution was in fact interpreted in the light of Constitut ;ional
*] AC
history. '^ he Court has, however, not accepted the rule that legis­
lative history can in fact be looked at. Will they in future establish
103. Distinguishing Orissa v Binpani Dei A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 1269; Kraipak 
v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150.
10*f. Hidayatullah: Preface to G.P.Singh(supra f.n.l).
105. M.Imam: Indian Supreme Court and the Constitution (1966) Chapter III
a new rule in this regard, or merely make references to the 
legislative history of particular enactments in order to elicit the 
object of the statute ? The fact that the English Law Commission has
chosen to recommend the abandonment of the Common Law approach to the
subject may considerably help the Supreme Court to make up its mind 
to follow a similar course. Given India1s*context and the complicated 
nature of some of its enactments, there is a need to follow a new rule.
The Court has made full use of the hardship rule to meet the
four kinds of hardship that we have outlined above. These hardships 
are however bound up in the Common Law system of interpretation to 
which the Court has adhered closely. But within the structure of the 
Common Law it has weaved a local pattern, which is not, at this stage, 
easily discernable. A notable contribution is their effort to extend 
the concept of strict liability. It will take time before the Court 
can, patiently adding precedent to follow on precedent, evolve a scheme 
wholly suited to India’s needs. As yet no predictable pattern has emerged
3« The Supreme Court's Analysis of the Constitution*
It is not necessary to sketch the historical background of 
the Constitution^nor to trace where the Supreme Court foilowed”history,
p
foreign doctrine or the text of the Constitution”. Nor is it necessary'
1. On Constitutional history before the passing of the Government of 
India Act 1935i see A.B.Keith: Constitutional History of India 1600-1935;
Sir P.S.Sivaswamy Aiyar: Indian Constitutional problems (Tarporevala&
Sons Ltd. Bombay 1928) describes very adequately the situation before the 
1935 Act. For the background to the Act see the Report of the Indian 
Statutory Commission (popularly known as Sir John Simon’s Report) Vols.
"I and II (Cmd. 3568 and 3569 respectively). The 1935 Act itself is dis­
cussed by P.Eddy and F.H.Lawton: India1s New Constitution (London 1935);
S.M.Bose: The working Constitution of India (Calcutta 1939); P.N.Murthy 
and K.V.Padmanabhan: The Constitution of the Dominion of India (Delhi 19^7); 
Sir Maurice Gwyer and A.Appadorai: Speeches and documents on the Indian 
ConstitutionfVcfls. I and II) (London O.U.P. 1957) is a good anthology of 
the basic documents on the subject. A lot of research has gone into the 
actual framing of the Constitution. The discussions are recorded in the 
Constituent Assembly Debates (C.A.D. 19*f7“50) in 12 Volumes. Other 
background material has been compiled in B.Shiva Rao (Ed.): The Framing 
of India’s Constitution, Vols. I-V (Rev. in A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 105-08)
(N.H.H. 1968). Further research theses include P.K.Ghi)sh: The Constitution 
of India (How it has been framed) (World Press Ltd. 1966). The best account 
of the background is Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone 
of a nation (O.U.P. 1966). But one must be wary of Austin’s account. While 
it is the most comprehensive work to date, it suffers from the fact that 
he is far too sympathetic to the social revolution that he thinks the 
Constitution intended to herald. But Upendra Baxi’s review: The little 
done the vast undone - Some reflections on reading Granville Austin’s 
The Indian Constitution (I967) 9 J.I.L.I. 323-^23 is hasty, ill-considered 
and unfair. It is almost as if Baxi were trying to get something off his 
chest for a long time, and used this as an opportunity.
2. This has been dealt with by M.Imam: The Indian Supreme Court and the 
Constitution (1966)(Eastern Book House, Delhi). But one cannot agree with 
him on all matters, for example the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the power to amend the Constitution has been treated as an example of 
textual interpretation (Chapter V, Section 13, pp 321 ff.) For an uncri­
tical review see M.Hidayatullah's introduction to tie booK and the review 
at A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 90-91.
3to write a commentary summing up the Constitutional provisions* All 
this had been dealt with by other writers. Nor is it necessary to 
examine the thesis of a foreign observer, that the Constitution is at 
variance with Hindu society, because all that that observer has done 
is to presume that Hindu society is static and juxtaposed it against 
the possibility of dynamism which the Constitution has the capacity
. kto empower.
5
Critical commentaries are, however, few and far between , 
although as a result of a changed approach in the Supreme Court after
3.5 The best account of this is Seervai (1967» with a supplement for 
1968) reviewed G.Marshal Cfr970)P»E. 37* For other accounts see M.P.Jain: 
Indian Constitutional law (l970/2d). D.D.Basu: Commentary on the Consti­
tution of India I \/ Volumes now in the Fifth Edition) for an account 
comparative with other Constitutions. There is also a shorter version 
in one volume. A Gledhill: The Constitution of India (196 )^ now out of 
date. V.N.Shukla: The Constitution of India (197O Allahabad); C.S.Anjanwala: 
The Constitution of India (1969 Bombay) rev. A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 2i8.
D.N.Banerji: Some aspects of the Indian Constitution (Worl'd~Press Ltd.
1966); G.V.Venkata Subba Kao: Constitutional Law Vol. I (the others have 
not been published yet). For the only case book on the subject N.A. 
Subramaniyam: Case law on the Indian Constitution (Madras 1969) rev.
A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 137-6. G.N.Joshi: The Constitution of India (Macmillan
1967); B.N•Sharma: The Republic of India (1966, Delhi, A.P.H., I966 
pp.125-429).
*f. This is an extremely fanciful thesis by V.C.V/atson: The Indian 
Constitution and the Hindu tradition. A thesis in part fulfilment of a 
Ph.D. North Western University U.S.A. 1957 USQAS Microfilm No.1123).
The thesis tries to cover Indian ways of thinking from Chandra Gupta 
Maurya to the present day, trying to show that certain traditional deci­
sion making centres like the Panchayat and the family decentralised the 
structure and that this feudal pluralism interfered with the overtly 
overcentralised Constitution. The assumptions about Hindu society as 
well as the Constitution are over generalised. Hindu institutions have 
an internal system of volition (as we shall see in later Chapters IV-SI).
The centralisation in the Constitution is of an impersonal nature for to
the Hindu the only relevant decision making body will continue to be the 
Civil Servant whose position and role has not been undermined in any way. 
Further, his position and status is nothing new to India - the office
can be traced back as a by no means unusual way of administering the
country from Mauryan days.
3. For the non-critical literature see V.N.Shukla (supra f.n.3)> C.S. 
Anjanwala (supra f.n.3*)» N.A.Subramaniyam (supra f.n.3)• Even Prof. G.V. 
Venkata Subha Raofs lectures are by no*means very critical in their 
approach. For a typical example of such an approach see R.C.Agarwala: 
Constitutional History of India and(the) National Movement, Book III.
i960 (especially in the area of property as we shall see) a steady stream
£
of critical literature is emerging. In more recent years several Supreme
7Court judges have themselves published observations on the Constitution.
We will first ask the preliminary question, whether the Court
g
has allowed "neutral principles" to be sacrificed in favour of declaring 
broad principles to achieve "ad hoc" results. Secondly, we will examine 
how the Supreme Court has tried to balance the various contending interests -
6. In the fifties, partly because of the lack of theoretical nourish­
ment and partly as a result of a paucity of Indian Constitutional precedent, 
critical accounts indulged in too much cross referencing with other con­
stitutions. A typedal example of this is Jennings: Some aspects of the 
Indian Constitution (1953)* For a sympathetic account for the same period 
see W.Douglas: Studies in Indian and American Constitutional Law, from 
Marshall to Mukerjea (Tagore Law Lecture's by an American Supreme Court 
Judge reviewed from a somewhat western slant by L.R.Subramaniyam:(1956) 
University of Chicago Law Rev. 563-570). But after the case of Kochunni v 
Madras' A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1030 where Subha Rao J. for the first time evolved
a new approach to an important provision of the Constitution, based solely 
on considerations demanded by the Constitution, we see the emergence of 
critical literature, e.g. Setalvad: The Indian Constitution (1950-1965); 
Seervai (1967); M.Imara (supra f.n.2); gTh. Joshi: Aspects of Indian Consti­
tutional Law (196*0; Seervai: The position of the Judiciary in the Indian 
Constitution (1970) rev. (1971) 13 J.I.L.I. 13*+-4l; P.B.Mukharji: fAie 
critical problems in the Indian Constitution (19j6&) rev.(1968) VIII Indian 
Advocate 117-llEu
7. Gajendragadkar: The Constitution of India (O.U.P.I969/7O); K.Subha 
Rao: Our Constitutional problems (1970) rev, somewhat flatteringly by 
S.hakshminarasu (1970) X Indian Advocate 180-185; The Philosophy of the 
Indian Constitution (1969 a^nysiLore) rev. at A.I.R. 1970 Jnl. 178-9; 
Convocation Address Madras University 1962 quoted in G.N.Joshi (supra f.n.6) 
135-6, 192-3? The Ideals of our Constitution (Swaraj Ann.N0.i968) *f3-7; 
Frequent Amendments to the Constitution, Hindu Jan.26,1966; M•Hidayatullah: 
Democracy and the judicial process in India (1968); Judicial methods 
(B.N.Rau Lectures 1970); Press & Parliamentary Privileges (1968) reprinted 
(1968) Jnl.of Const, and Pari. Studies; Judiciary, Executive and Legis­
lature under the Constitution, Mail Feb.26,1968; Role of the Judiciary in 
the present context, Ssynik Samachar (April 1968) pp.6-30; J.M.Shelat?
The spirit of the Constitution (Bhartiya Vidya Bh. 1967 p»50); T.L.V.Aiyar: 
Evolution of the Indian Constitutional taw (1966); K.N.Wanchoo: Role of 
the Supreme Court in the Constitution (1968) Civil & Military Jnl.of Law 
(I only have a transcript of this, very kindly supplied to iae by 
Dr. S.N.Jain, Director, Law Institute); K.S.Hegde: The Directive Principles 
of State Policy (B.N.Rau Lectures)reprinted in (1971) I S.C.Jnl. 50 ff.
8. ■fyiis is a term used by Professor Weschler and is clearly defined 
below.
some of-^ them peculiar to India - that have sought recognition within
the Constitutional set up, and the extent to which the Supreme Court
has deviated from traditional patterns of interpretation and why it
has done so. Thirdly, we shall examine whether any new patterns of
interpretation have emerged on the basis of the Directive Principles
of State policy.
|t. The Neutrality Principle
The question of "neutral principles" in interpreting Consti-
9
tutions was first raised by Professor Weschler in Harvard in 1959
raising a great deal of controversy.^ Dr. Imam has made a similar plea
11that such principles be followed in India - though.regrettably without
much discussion. Another constitutional lawyer in India has made a
12similar, though slightly differently phrased, plea.
Professor Weschler was anxious to prevent judicial decision
making from taking short cuts by advocating broad principles merely to
deal with the cumbersome peculiarities of the instant case, and asked
judges to endeavour to arrive at neutral principles by "principled
decisions" rather than ad hoc excuses.
"A principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons which in 
their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate result 
that is involved." 13.
9. The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: Towards neutral principles of 
law (1959) 75 -^ar.L.Rev. 1 (reprinted with some additions in Weschler: 
Principles, law and politics (I96I) Chapter I. But the additions are 
insignificant).
10. See Miller and Howell: The myth of neutrality in Constitutional 
interpretation (i960) 27 Univ.of Chic. Law.Key. 661; Pollack: A reply to 
Prof. Weschler (1959) 108 Univ.of Penn.L.Rev. 108; B.Wright: The Supreme 
Court cannot be neutral (1962) Texas Law Rev. 599; M.P.Golding: 
Principled decision making in the Supreme Court (1965) 65 Col.L.Bev. 35*
11. Imam: The Supreme Court and the Indian Constitution (196$) 25-7•
12. Seervai (1967), Preface viii-ix where he makes a plea^ that socio­
economic questions should not persuade the Court to take a stand while 
interpreting the Constitution.
13« Weschler: (f.n.9) at p.&9.
Before we proceed any further let us be very clear as to what
we are talking about. It has been argued that :
"neutrality is too ill-defined a yardstick to measure either the 
rare failures or the many achievements of the Court." 14
We are in no way trying to say that the Court must never assume a "stand",
which must inevitably result from a broad discretionary jurisdiction.
To that extent
"the process of ’non-neutrality1 continues today and will continue 
as long as the judiciary is part of the governmental system" 15
It must be clear in both America and India
"even to the blindest partisan ... (that) the Court has never been 
either purely judicial or legislative in its work." 16
It cannot, for example, be "non-neutral" for the Court to uphold certain
17values like "protecting the individual from the Leviathan of government" 
for that is implicit in the Constitution itself. What is being criticised 
is the manner in which a decision is arrived at, so that broad principles 
are allowed to emerge from a problem case. As an Indian Constitutional 
lawyer puts it :
"Paradoxically enough, the greatest danger to the administration 
of justice and constitutional interpretation arises from a genuine 
desire of judges to do justice in each individual case." 18.
14. Wright: (supra f.n.10) at 603, 6l6.
15- Miller and Howell (supra f.n.10) at 675.
16. Kurkland: Towards a more political Supreme Court (1970) 37 Univ.of 
Chic.L.Rev. 19 at 21.
17. Kurkland: (supra f.n.l6). Subha Rao J. states a similar value approach 
to the Indian Constitution in Basheshwar Nath v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1959
at pr.90 p.183.
18. Seervai (supra f.n.12). At p.ix. As a day to day example of this 
note a newspaper comment on an English judge who is praised because he 
"earned a reputation for riding roughshod over more pernickety points of 
lqw in his search for the merits of a case". See Mandrake: Court with a 
human face Jan.30,1972, Sunday Telegraph Good judges decide good 
cases but often make bad law.
This Weschler believed happened in the United States in the segregation
19and movie censorship cases, and this is what has happened in India. One
good illustration is the interpretation of the right to property, where
the Court (faced with the task of doing justice to the claims of landlords
whose property had been taken away with insufficient compensation and
cheated out of applying the principles of ’’eminent domain”) propounded
principles of review with respect to areas from which their jurisdiction
20had been specifically excluded by Constitutional amendment. This is 
more fully discussed in ChapterOJ., but we will take a few examples here. 
Some examples
21In Kameshwar Singh v Bihar (1952) ^he Court was obviously
22troubled by the fact that under the impugned statute one petitioner 
would have to pay Rs 600,000 instead of receiving compensation; in two
cases no compensation would be paid at all and in one case a ’’mere”
23Rs. 14-,000. The Court accepted, and Mahajan J. makes it clear that 
from this
’’one cannot jump to the conclusion that the whole of the enactment 
is a fraud on the Constitution.” 2k
But the learned judges thought a part of it might be a fraud with respect
.............. 25........................ ........
to some persons. In order to achieve a satisfactory solution, amidst 
wholesome lectures on ’’eminent domain”, two broad principles were
19- See the lecture cited f.n.9-
20. The First Amendment Act 1951* The Court agreed that its jurisdiction 
had been ousted (on this all the judges are agreed in Kameshwar Singh v 
Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252) and that this had been done by a valid Con­
stitutional Admentment. (See Shankari Prashad v Union A.T.R. 1Q51 S.C. 
k58- this case was however overruled in Golak Nath v Punjab A.T.R. 1Q67
1643).
21. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252.
22. Bihar Land Reform Act (XXX of) 1950.
23. See supra (f.n.21) para 571 p.275»
24. Ibid at para 58, p.276.
25. Ibid.
26formulated. The first was the ’’doctrine of colourable legislation”,
which the Court pruned down the very next year in Gajapati v Orissa 
27
(1953) where they made it clear ”at the outset” that the doctrine was
not concerned with the legislative's mal^fides but its competence.
Indeed in Kameshwar1s case it is not difficult to show that the Court
dealing with a difficult situation, was really dealing with legislative
malsfides, but constantly juxtaposing the statute against the principles
of eminent domain. This was an important factor that persuaded them to
decide that the acquisition of a debt (technically a chose in action) was
a colourable usurpation of power. This is the second broad principle
that they declared, viz. a chose in action cannot be acquired. At least
28"1one judge doubted the validity of the rule. xhe rule rests on the
supposition that the power of eminent domain cannot be used to enrich
29the coffers of the State. It is certainly not clear from the judgement
as to what exactly in the statute was objected to; was it that choses
of action are not property, or, that it was a forced loan and therefore
against "public policy" or, simply that it did not come within the
purview of legislative competence as stated in Entry 36 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Despite this obvious lack
31of clarity this doctrine declared in Kameshwar*s case was later followed
26. On which see Seervai (1967) 63-73 and Chapter III infra.
27. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 375 at pr.9 p*379 per Mukerjea J.
28. Das J. at A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 232 at pr.99 p.266-7.
29. All these reasons appear to have the support of Mahajan J. at 
para 3 5  P « 2 75•
30. See Kukerjea J. at pr." . 82 p.268. He is the author of the judgement 
in the case of Gajapati v Orissa (supra f.n.27).
31* Supra f.n.21
by the Court in three cases. The confusion that it caused was apparent.
32In Bombay Dvg. and Mfg. Co. v Bombay (1958), a totally dissimilar case,
33the Court emphasised, referring on the earlier case, that they rested
their decision that the appropriation of a debt was ultra vires the
Constitution on the ground that compensation wqs not paid (something that
the Court could not enquire into in Kameshwar1s case) and left open the
3bquestion whether choses of action can be acquired. Yet a nebulous broad
35principle had been precipated and in M. P. v Hanoiirao Shinde. Hegde J.
assumed ten years later that choses of action cannot be acquired. He said
MSo far as we are concerned, this question is concluded by the 
decisions of this Court ... M 36
while admitting that Kameahwar1 s case was totally irrelevant to the 
37instant case. The principle has now been confirmed by Hegde J,
38 VAhmdabad Mun. v New Spg. and Wvg. Co. Thus a broad principle seems to 
have seeped through, occasioned by the needs of the instant case.
Again, the mischief of a non-neutral decision appears to have 
crept into other areas where the right to property has been involved.
Contrast the restrictive interpretation of the word ”compensation” in
39 AOW.R.S.D.Ltd. v Madras with that in Jee Jee Bhoy v Bombay. These wer£
32, A,1,R, E9$8 S.C. 328.
33. Ibid at pr.ll, p.333-*f.
3b. Ibid at pr.10, p.333«
35. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1053.
36. Ibid see pr.7-8 p.1056-8 for the earlier case law. The quotation is 
from para 8 p.1057*
31. Ibid at pr.9, p.1058.
38. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1292 at para 10 p.1289.
39. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1753. at pr.26-27,p. 1763-4.
bO. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1096.
both cases to which the Fourth Amendment did not apply. But the broad
principle declared in the latter case was allowed to filter through to
41cases to which the Amendment did apply, to amaze at least one Chief
Justice, who was a silent participant to the whole process, ^ater,
looking back on what had happened, he openly admitted :
!,The judgement in the two cases (i.e. the pre-amendment and 
the post amendment case) were delivered on the same day ... (I)t 
escaped me that the discussion was in the wrong case and the other 
merely followed it.” 42.
43Yet this new approach to compensation, though repudiated later, has
44been revived and still continues. Again, as we shall see later, to 
meet the needs of the instant case Subha Rao J. (responsible for the
confusion in the ’’compensation cases") insisted on the broad principle
\
that in interpreting Article 31A of the Constitution, there is a super-
43added condition that the statute must be connected with agrarian reform.
Nor are"neutral principles" limited to situations where
46property rights are involved. In Kasturi Lai v U. P. the Supreme 
Court restricted the liability of the Government by a broad formulation
IIn Z+3 Vv^i fre.
of principle, distinguished earlier case law and c * _ . the Common
41. See the cases of Vajravelu v Sp.Dty Collector A.I.R. 196f/£oi7i 
Me-tal Corpn v Union A.7".R. 1967 3.C~.~ 637*
Oj.' .  ^ y  ftv- » -
42. Hidayatullah J. in v Qujtfra.t A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634 at pr.l
p.637. :
43* Ibid, in the judgement delivered by Shah J; for a sympathetic account 
of the whole process see U.Baxi (1969) IX Jai.L.J.
44. Shah J. in R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 364. For an unsympathetic
account of the process see Seervai: The Sank Nationalisation case (1970 
lecture).
43* Chapter II infra deals with this development. It all began with 
Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 1080, followed in Vajravelu v Sp.Dty 
Collector A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1017.~~See on this Atul Setalvad! (I965)
Zj Bom.L7R.Jnl. 105•
46. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1039 (p©r Gajendragadkar J.)
47. Ibid at pr.21 p.1046.
48. Notably the judgement in Vidyawati v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 933-
L.Q
Law principle of vicarious liability, in relation to Government servants.
The occasion arose because they did not want to hold the Government liable
where one of its servants had absconded to Pakistan with some gold that
was evidence in a Court case. At least one High Court judge was perplexed
50by this, circuitously followed the Supreme Court, and criticised them 
51extra-judicially.
Again the Supreme Court has made non-neutral formulations to 
ascertain what enactments of princely rulers are to be regarded as law 
within the meaning of Articles 366 and 372 of the Constitution (each
52
formulation depending upon the importance of the particular law involved).
It has been suggested that in the Advisory Opinion in the
53legislature case the majority wanted to protect the prestige of the 
judiciary and declared unnecessarily a broad principle on the relationship
between fundamental rights and parliamentary privileges, and that only
/ \ 5 ASarkar J. (in dissent) made the "principled decision" in the case. The
55controversy that followed supports this view. In Basheshwar Nath v
56I. T. Comrnr. Las C.J. made an appeal that the instant case did not call
*f9. See H K e w  v Samuels (1963) II All.E.R. 879; see also Dhavan J. in 
Chottey Lai v (J.r. A.I.R. 1967 All 327 at pr.9 p.329.
30. Dhavan J. in Chottey Lai v U.P. supra f .n.A9»
51. Dhavan: A historical survey of India’s judicial system, Allahabad
^entenary Volume I. 53 at 58. See also Dhavan J.’s judgement in Prem Lai 
v U.P. A.I.R. 1962 All 233 at pr.8 p . 236 where he makes a plea that the 
State ought not to claim privileges.
5?-. See on this the article by D.S.Mishra: Definition of law and the 
Supreme Court (1968) 10 J.I.L.I. k3k. The writer does not specifically 
make the point about non-neutrality, but the comment can be made on the 
basis of discussion by him.
53. Re Article 145 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 7^5-
5*f. D.N.Banerjee: The Supreme Court on the conflict of jurisdiction bet­
ween the Legislative Assembly and the High Court of Uttar Pradesh (World 
Press Ltd. 1966). A similar charge is made by Seervai (1967) pp 837 ff*
Note the latter argued the case for legislature. For a defence see: The law 
of Parliamentary Privileges in UK and in India by P.S.Pachauri (1970) N.M.F.
55- Setalvad: My Life pp.531-533• 
56. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. Ik9.
for the declaring of a general principle on the problem of waiver of 
57fundamental rights, but the rest of the Court seemed to declare such
58 59a principle for doctrinnaire reasons. In Golak Nath v Punjab five
of the majority judges declared one broad principle (Part III of the
Constitution is sacrosanct) followed by another second principle (the
doctrine of prospective overruling) to avoid the consequences of the
first, without even bothering to examine the provisions of the Statute
before them which only the sixth majority judge did. They naturally
incurred the scorn of a minority judge who accused them of replying to
a political "arguiaent of fear".^liore recently, in S.M.S. Namboodripad
v Kerala^the Supreme Court found the Chief Minister of Kerala guilty of
contempt of court for scandalising the judges because, he said, they
were part of a middle class state; but reduced his fine because they
taught him the correct Marxist position >on the problem. What was the
62ratio of this decision (which has been praised for its brevity ) ?
One commentator wryly seems to suggest that it was that a lecture on
Marxism will reduce a sentence, adding however :
“But I fear that if people were to qualify for conviction for 
misunderstanding Marx, the queue of offenders would be very long." 63
What emerged from the Court’s didactic spree was a broad law of contempt,
57- Ibid at pr.12 p.157* See further on this point: Nathaniel Nathanson 
(1962) k J.I.L.I. 157 at 160 praising S.K.Das J. for avoiding the prob­
lem altogether.
58. e*S» Bhagwati J. g.t pr. 90 p.183.
59- A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 164-3-
60. Wanchoo J. at ibid p.1700. See Setalvad: My Life (1971) p.587, who
quotes this passage.
61. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2013.
62. V.K.S.Nair: On Judgements (1971) K.L.T.Unl. 11-12.
63. G.N.Achaya: Blitz Dec.26, 1970, p-17-
which dealt with the one modern authority cited before it in the
• -i 64briefest possible terms.
Examples can be multiplied and will be apparent later in the
6*5
thesis. The Court is evolving dangerous patterns. Ad hoc generalisa­
tions perpetuating broad constitutional principles have rightly been
66called "the deepest problem of our times". The judges seem to be aware
of this and at least one Chief Justice tried his best to explain that the
principle behind the cases that led to a constitutional amendment were
not to be treated as declaring the wide principles that they were
67alleged to pronounce.
This formulation of "non-neutral" principles (whether as a 
result of technical jugglery to deal with the problems of the instant 
case^or as part of a self-protecting polemic^) may be one reason why 
the Court has found itself in the unfortunate controversies that appear 
to centre around it. Political diatribe and a lack of faith in its 
neutrality seemed to have joined hands to present an impressive, though
not fully justified, case against it.
64. The case of R. v Metropolitan Police Commr. (1968)1 All.E.R.fThis 
case is discussed in Chapter VII C c T c ^  ^
65. See Chapters III, IV, VII.
66. Weschler (supra f.n.9)«
67. P.Shastri at the Madras Lawyers' Conference 15.1.R. 1955 Jnl. 25 
at 29-50.
68. As in Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252.
69. As in the Contempt case (supra f.n.6l).
2. Balancing contending Constitutional Interests
A Constitution may be, and in this case is, a means of dividing 
power between the Centre and Federal units and prescribes the manner in 
which this power is to be exercised by organs of the State.
The Indian Constitution follows the federal principle and 
divides power between the Centre and the States; it invokes the princi­
ple of separation of powers to control the exercise of power, following 
both the American and the British models, leaving the judiciary in the 
uneasy position of being responsible for controlling ultra vires 
exercises of power in the American sense of the word but possessing, only 
the equipment and techniques of the British model; it accepts the
western theory of Constitutional limitations in the form of a Bill of
Rights; it dealdjwith a large variety of peculiarly Indian interests 
and imposes detailed rules concerning group minorities and heligious 
institutions. Lastly in its directive principles of state policy, it 
enunciates certain rules of constitutional interpretation,, which 
theoretically can have the effect of superseding the normal rules of 
constitutional and statutory^on the subject.
........  The Constitutional interests involved in such a set up are
A. A federal interest.
B. The interest of the Government :
i. as an abstraction.
ii. as conditioned by the principle of separation of powers.
C. The State - its interests as an organisation (with its problems 
of official secrecy and law and order).
D. The executive and its need to exercise both administrative and
legislative power.
1 ^
E. The judicial interests :
i. in its own independence..
ii. in maintaining its own jurisdiction.
iii. in controlling the exercise of executive power sanctioned 
by the Constitution.
F. The legislative interests :
i. in its own supremacy.
ii. in maintaining its privileges.
G. i. She interests of the individual (both personal and
proprietary).
ii. The socio-economic interests of the whole that sometimes 
conflict with the demands of the individual.
H. The problem of protecting group life within the nation, and 
violating the principle of equality with respect to such groups that 
need protective discrimination if they are to achieve, let alone 
enjoy, equality.
70 . . .Normal constitutional theory, based on a curious combindation
of Montesquieu, Blackstone, the French Revolution, Dicey and the Common
71 72 73 74Law, protects G(i), is afraid of B(i), respects C, has recently
realised that G(i) must yield to G(ii) (for even Dicey foresaw the change
70. See for example Keeton: Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence 
(1949) 267-268.
71. On the Common Law aspect see Judge Dixon’s paper (in relation to 
the Australian Constitution): The Common Law as the ultimate Constitu­
tional Foundation (1957) 51 Australian Law Jnl. 240.
72. As a good example see W. Douglas: Studies in Indian and American 
Constitutional law (195*0 TagoieLaw Lectures.
75. See Subha Rao J. Basheshwar Nath v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149 
at pr.90 p.185.
74. See below Chapter IV on public order qnd Chapter VII on official 
secrecy.
75from "individualism to collectivism" ), has regarded the need for D as
76
tragic but inevitable, has sought to preserve F as well as E (albeit 
in the latter case American theory tends to use the judicial process to 
juxtapose a polarity of power against the other organs of Government), 
supports the "State interests", but with the New Deal has come to
recognise the need for a constitutional revolution to usher in the need
77for federal supremacy, regards H as a new problem that conflicts with
78the principle of equality. Constitutional theory has in the past
neglected to provide principles of interpretation other than those used
in statutory interpretation and though some socio-economic principles
79have emerged, they are regarded as suspect.
75- Dicey: Law and public opinion in England. For a translation of those 
principles see Paras Diwan: Nationalisation under the Indian Constitution 
(1953) S.C.J. Jnl.ll: Das J. in Chiran.jit Lai v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41.
76. Dicey modified his views in an article called The Development of 
Administrative Law (1915) 31 L.Q.R. reprinted as an Appendix to Law and 
the Constitution (10 Edn.). The major attack came from Lord Hewart: The 
New Despotism (1929) which in its turn led to the formation of the 
Donoughmore Committee (Cmd 4360) which accepted as tragic but inevitable 
the Government’s increase in power. A far more responsible attitude 
accepting the needs of the Government was shown by Laski in his dissent, 
and Robson in Justice and Administrative Law (1925). Gradually theorists 
seem to have changed their minds. For an example note the change in views 
of Sir C.K.Allen from Bureaucracy Triumphant (1934) to Law in the Making 
(1964/7d). Jurists today accept the need for power but emphasise judi­
cial review. See Wade: Administrative law (l971/3d); Smith: Judicial review 
of administrative action (1968). For an Indian account see M.A.Fazal: 
Judicial review of administrative action (1969)O.U.P.).
77* Very adequately described in Corwin: Constitutional Revolution Ltd. 
(1941).
78. This is dicussed in Chapters III and VII.
79» See Latham J. quoted by Seervai (I967) viii. But his own views are 
discussed at viii-ix.
The Indian Supreme Court has not deviated in principle from
this pattern. In essence it has expressed its fear of governmental
80
power, and sought to protect the individual from its excesses, taking 
care however not to repeat the empty formulas of nineteenth century 
liberalism by expressly stating their sensitivity to socio-economic
3lproblems. In actual fact it has recently tended to lean in favour of 
fundamental rights.
a. The Supreme Court and Separation of Powers.
The Court has followed closely the theory of separation of 
powers. One can treat this theory in three different ways, '^he first
82is to trace power until one reaches a fountain source, usually the
83legislature in its legislative or constituent capacity. In this sense
separation is a mere modus operandi. The second is to talk of three
agencies of Government, each of varying strength, delimiting each other,
working on a logic of polarity with one agency having the reserve power
to resolve a crisis. The third is to recognise three separate powers -
powers being traced not to a body but a principle or a Charter. Nehru
believed that the Constitution embodied the first approach and that the
Parliament was supreme.^ But the Supreme Court' seems to have rejected
85this and in Golak Nath v Punjab attempted to take away from it its
80. See infra Chapters III and IV.
81. As a casual reference see Fazl Ali J. in Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 
1950 S.C. 27 at pr.9& p.69 where he took a libertarian position but 
took care not to be associated with an "absolute liberty" position.
82. Kelsen's theory in his General theory of the law and state (1946).
83. See further Judge S.N.Dwivedi: Location of sovereignty in India 
(3.967) 9 J.I.L.I. 71 at 84.
84. (1948) IX C.A.D. 1195-6.
85. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
- - y*y 
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86ultimate constituent power. The controversy carries on. The Court
appears to have followed the second and third approaches. In Ram
87
Jawayya v Punjab (1955) it ruled that the executive power exists inde- 
# pendent of the legislative power and can always be exercised as long as
fundamental rights are not upset, ^his view underwent some modification
88in M. P. v Bharat Singh (1967) where it observed :
"Every act done by the Government or its officers must, if 
it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by 
some legislative authority.M 89
Despite the reference to Dicey and the stress on the importance of legis­
lative power in the judgement, the existence of a separate legislature
is recognised and this is not doubted by the presiding judge in extra-
90 u 91judicial comments, nor its most trenchant critic. All that happened
was that the constitutional limitations imposed upon the executive were
expanded from fundamental rights to nthe prejudice of any person". More
recently Ramaswami J. (who had as early as 195^ expressed sympathy for
92legislative supremacy ) made the following observation in Chief
e 93Settlement Commr. v Qmprakash (1969) •
"(T)he authority to make the laws is vested in the Parliament 
and other law making bodies and whatever legislative power the
86. The Parliament has passed the 2*fth and 25th Amendment Acts (1971) 
asserting its power to amend the Constitution. See comments G.V.Subha 
Rao (1972) I.S.C.J. Jnl. 1-9.
37. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 5k9 at 556.
88. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1170.
89. Ibid at pr.5 p.117^*
90. K.Subha Rao: Some constitutional -problems (1970) 61-2.
91* H.M.Seervai: The -position of the judiciary under the Constitution
of India. (1970) 95-6.
92. Parliamentary government in a planned economy (1953) II M.L.J. Jnl. 1.
93. .(196,9) I.S.C.J. k79.
executive possess must be derived directly from the delegation of 
the legislature and exercised falidly within the limits prescribed."
His lordship did not even make allowances for the exercise of normal
administrative directions like, say, asking a peon to fetch a file. The
statement is clearly obiter as the case had already been decided on the
ground that the petitioner was not a displaced person and therefore not
affected by the administrative orders. Further his lordship relied on
Youngs Town Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952?"* - a case which involved
amongst other things t'- President of the United States1
exercise of his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Army
during the Korean crisis. It is submitted that Ramaswami J. has indulged
in wide generalisations which do not break fresh ground.
This approach seems to have led to accepting the presence of 
three separate powers - the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
(in relation to Part III) which exist independently of each other, posing 
problems of polarity between co-equalo. To the extent to which all 
these are responsible to the judiciary £as protector of fundamental 
rights) rather than the legislature, the judiciary seems to have carved 
out for itself a somewhat wider role than was intended for it. But the 
Court has been subtle in its approach and has never tried to tell the 
other powersjthat it "holds the trumps".
94. Ibid at 482
95. (1951) 343 U.S. 579-
0b. The Supreme Court and the Executive
The Court has preserved the need for executive power, respected
96the need for official secrecy, It has not made any plea for consultation
97 98and openness in the administration. Conway v Rimmer has been noticed
99 100 in only one Madras case and its principles enunciated in a Punjab case.
The Court has tried to restrict the liability of the Government
although in a remarkable 1967 Case it has done away with the Common Law
102presumption that a statute will not bind the State and it has preserved
103.
the Common Law that Government debts shall have priority over any other.
96. See Sodhi Sinffh v Delhi Aministration A.I.R. 1961 S.C. k93 (the 
leading case on the subject); Union of India v Indra Deo A^T.R. IQ8A. 
S.C. 1158: Sub. Div. Officer v Srinivas A.I.R. 1966 S.C. Il6*f; Hussain 
Umar v Dalip Singh A.I.R. 1970 S.C. k7, whi£h does not cite the earlier 
case law. The relevant statutory section is Section 123 of the Evidence 
Act 1872.
97* Cn the importance of this see the Fulton Report (Cmd 3638) I, 
pr. 277-280 p.91.
98. (1968) I All.E.R. 874 but see the later developments on this case
at II All.E.R. 30k.
99• ^am Srinivasan v Shanmughan A.I.R. 1969 Had. 3 7 8 ip-Skfe-
100. Narayan Deo v Punjab A.I.R. 1968 255 at pr. 28. All these cases 
are discussed in Chapter. V I I . .............  . . . .
101. Kasturi Lai v U.P. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1039* For a recent illustration 
see R.K.Banjra: Liability of the State for negligence (1970) 12 J.I.L.I. 
323 - a comment on Union v Segratai A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 13 where the Army 
was involved; So. Singh: Judicial interpretation of the State Immunity 
under the Constitution (1969) I An.17.Ren. Jnl. 19.
102. W.B. v Corpn of Calcutta A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 997 overruling Director 
etc. v Cornn of Calcutta A.I.R. I960 S.C.t355»For the background see 
G.P.Singh: Interpretation of the Statutes (1966) Chapter^ H>33?-afaritten 
before this case was decided.
103. Builders’ Supply Corpn. v Union A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1061 foil. In an 
Income Tax matter in Somasundaram Mills v Union A.I.R. 1970 Had. 190 at 
pr.6 p.192.
It has helped the Government whenever a constitutional imbroglio has
arisen and its action has been challenged on technical grounds - as for
104
example in the Budget crisis of Punjab or when the States of Bombay
(I960^°lnd Punjab10^were being subdivided into smaller units.
The distrust of executive power has followed on the pattern
107of Dicey’s rule of law formula. Thff principles for construing delegated
10S
legislation were constructed in Xn Re Delhi Laws (1951) • Hi© need for
extensive delegation has been recognised and in the years that followed
109statutes like the Essential Commodities Act have been liberally inter­
preted. More recently, a somewhat restrictive and uneasy policy has
110
emerged, which has restricted the power to tqx by delegated legislation.
The general attempt to judicialise the administrative process has been 
accepted. In this the lead has come from V/anchoo J. a Civil Service
10k. Punjab v Satya Pal A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 903-
105. Mangal Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 944, where the number of 
seats in the upper house of the State legislature fell below the con­
stitutional minimum. The Supreme Court condoned this.
106. Babulal v Bombay A.I.R. i960 S.C. 51, where the Supreme Court was 
willing to condone the fact that the requirements of their proviso of 
Article 3 of the Constitution were not strictly complied with (see pr.10 
p.55-6).
107. For a brilliant attack on this see Sesrrvai: The position of the 
Judiciary under the Constitution of India (1970) Chapter IV pp.7&-102.
108. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 332. Note Seervai’s Constitutional Law of India 
(1967) pp 864-7 (where he argues that the Court’s basic approach on the 
question is wrong and argues for more power being granted but on techni­
cal grounds viz. that R v Burah (1830) 3 A.C. 889 be followed) See also 
the I.L.I. publication: Delegated legislation in India, (1966, N.M. 
Tripath Bombay).
109. The leading case on the Act is H.S.Bagla v M.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 465- 
The Indian Law Institute has conducted a study entitled Administrative 
Processes under the Essential Commodity Act, (1966 N.M.H. Bombay).
110. The case of Vasan Lai v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 4 allowed such 
taxation by a majority of 4:1; the majority was reduced to 3*2 in Corpn. 
of Calcutta v Liberty Cinema A.I.R. 1965 S.C. and reversed sub silentio 
in Devi Dassan v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1895- These are discussed by
G.S.Ullal: Do judges live in an ivory tower ? A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 37-40.
.judge .^^Ridge v Baldwin^^has been specifically followed.^^hiis has
been? extended also to areas of licensing which till recently had been
U p ­held immune from the application of natural justice. But apart from
following English law, no independent broad principle of participation -
115
the need for whifih has been emphasised in India1 s context - has
ll6
emerged. A Lokpal (Ombudsman) has not been established, and the
Supreme Court appears to be thinking in traditional separation of power
terms, with the added nuance of accepting contemporary technical advances 
117in British Courts.
c. The Supreme Court and the Legislature.
The Court has tried to preserve the interests that the legis­
lature wanted to safeguard and followed the constitutional doctrines of 
"the presumption of the validity of a statute" and the doctrine of 
severability to ensure that a statute will be presumed to be valid and 
if found wanting will be declared ultra vires only with respect to the 
offending severable portions. The Court did, however, interpret the
111. Note his judgements in Assam v Bharat Kala Bhandar A.I.E. I967 S.C. 
1768; P.L.Lakhanpal v Union A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 1567'.
112. (1964) i.e. kO.
H3» Sri Bhagwan v Ramchand A.I.R. 1967 B.C. 1767; Associated Cement Comp. 
v Sharma A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1595~atT3oT and the cases cited supra f.n.lll.
114. For a review of this development see S.N.Jain: Some recent develop­
ments in administrative law (1968) IQ J.I.L.I. 531 at 536 ff. See also 
the recent case of C.B.Bdg. & Ldg. v Mysore A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2042 which 
followed A.K.Kraipak v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150*
115. Wilcox and Mukherjea: A constitutional balance (1967) 9 J.I.L.I. 275*
116. See (1971) 1 S.C.J.Jnl. 35-49.
117- For a general review of the Supreme Court’s performance see M.A.Fazal
Judicial review of administrative action in India and Pakistan (1968).
118. See Imam: The Indian Supreme Court and the Constitution (1966) 
128-156, 1*18-151; Seerva£T 1967) '61-65.
119doctrine of eclipse against the legislature, as we shall see later.
Despite this, of late an attempt has been made to attack both
the legislature’s supremacy as well as its internal system of privileges.
120In 1965 in an Advisory Opinion the Court made it clear that though the
legislature’s privileges werejthose of the House of Commons (vide Article
194(3) of the Constitution) they were subject to fundamental rights,
121thms reversing an earlier decision but leaving the legislature enough 
lee way to punish those who commit contempt in the face of the legis­
lature. Critics have criticised the decision as a.show of judicial power
122
rather than a victory for fundamental rights. ..While it is true
that legislative privileges need tidying up, for they imperil the rights
of a citizen, is it not preferable to follow the English approach
evolved in a recent 196? report to leave this to a body appointed by
123the legislature rather than the Courts ? More recently, in Punjab v 
Satya Pal~^ \ h e  Court approved of the Governor of Punjab proroguing 
the Assembly to render the Speaker of the Assembly’s adjournment order 
a nullity and thus validate the passing of the Finance Bill, ^hey made 
it clear that a gubernatorial order under Article 209 of the Constitution 
was to prevail over the Assembly’s rules of procedure.
119* See Seervai (1967) 163-169.
3.20. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745.
121. M.S.N.Sharma v Sri Kishan Sharma A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395*
122. See D.N.Banerjee: The Supreme Court and the conflict of jurisdiction 
between the legislative Assembly and the High Court of Uttar Pradesh (1966) 
See Also D.C.Jain: Judicial review of Parliamentary privileges - functio­
nal relationship of Courts and legislatures in India (1967) 10 J.I.L.I.205. 
Seervai (1967) 163-69; Set^lvad: My Life (1970) 531-533-
123• See Report of the Select Committee on Parliamentary ^rivilege (1967)
H.C. 34 on the procedural points suggested see particularly pr.177 p-45»
A far more serious attack on the legislature came in Golak 
125ijath v Punjab where they sought to prevent Parliament from amending 
^art III of the Constitution, and placing the sovereign power of the 
nation in the hands of a non-existent Constituent Assembly.
The triumph of the Courts ' the legislature is best repre­
sented by the editorial comment in the Calcutta Weekly Notes, where
foremost amongst the achievements of a judge was the fact that he had
126held the Chief Minister guilty of contempt of Court. This attitude is
127also reflected in their attitude to the executive. In He IA3 they told
the President, who had asked for their advice ex gratia, that they were
123 129not1 bound to comply with the request. In Nanavati v Bombay the Court
told the Governor that she could not exercise her power of pardon while
the matter was sub judice. The powerful dissent of Kapur J. and the
comments of the critics of that decision are eloquent testimony to the
130fact that the decision forced an issue which could have been avoided.
125. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 16 A3.
126. (1968) 72 C.W.N. 1. Note the casual remark ^Mr. Justice Banerjee 
also found a Ghief Minister guilty of contempt.”
127 • A.I.R. 1965 B.C. 7^ -5 at pr.13 p.755-6 on the intervener see pr.
63-5, 768-69.
128. Z.Khan J. had done this in a powerful dissent in the Federal Court 
in In Re Ref, under S.213. Govt, of India Act. A.I.R. 19AA. F.C. 73 from 
p.79- But he gave reasons for not advising the executive in a long paged
judgement, and did not after that like the Supreme Court give the advice
that he had thought it improper to give.
129. Nanavati v Bombay A.I.R. I960 S.C. 112.
130. Seervai (1967) 785-800. Note his argument at 798 that there was 
not in fact any conflict between the executive power of pardon and judi­
cial control of sentences. His view that this case had been impliedly 
overruled by Sarat Ghandra Rabha v Khagendranath A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 33 A 
is a little far fetched, because the rdio of the latter decision which 
asserts that the power of remission exercised by the executive is dif­
ferent from a judicial exercise of power, must be Confined to the 
interpretation of Section 7(b) of the Representation of People Act 1951*
The Supreme Court has been very careful to safeguard the
1 3 1
independence of the judiciary in India. In Chandra Mohan v U. P.
extending its protection to the lower judiciary it ruled that a High
Court must be consulted when District Judges are appointed. In an
132
earlier case - Assam v Ranga Mohd. - it ruled further that the power
133to appoint a Registrar belongs solely to the Chief Justice. In Orissa 
134v Sudhansu Mishra it opined that the extent to which a judicial
officer can be lent to the State for executive or quasi judicial duties
was a matter for the High Court to decide, though it was said obiter
that the State's requirements must be borne in mind. Hegde J. observed
"Just as the High Court resents any interference in the 
functioning of the judiciary, the executive has the right to 
ask the High Court not to interfere v/ith its functions." 133
In W. B. Nripendra Bagchi^^it held that the High Court alone can hold
disciplinary proceedings against a District Judge.
It has therefore tried to interpret separation of powers to
preserve their independence from the executive.
Having acquired this position of status, they have been a
little touchy about criticism and evolved (as v/e shall see later ) a
131. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1987.
2.32. A.I.R. 1967 S.C, 903.
133- Ibid at pr.ll p.630.
134. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 647 
133* Ibid at pr.13 p.652*
3-36. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 447.
137* Ihis is examined in some detail in Chapter VII. As examples see: 
R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1318 (where they issued papers for 
contempt against those involved in a public meeting to criticise their 
judgement in R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 384). See also E.M.S. 
Namboodripad v Kerala A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2013 (an aspect of which has 
been discussed above).
strict law of contempt to preserve it not only from criticism that
"scandalizes" their work, but also criticism which attempts to question
their status. This iaay partly have been the product of a legislative
138
crusade against the judiciary.
In interpreting statutes the Court has followed the rule that
1 3 9
the jurisdiction of the Courts shall not be ousted unless it is expli-
140citly taken away or clearly implied by statute. In su£h cases it has
. 141extended its power of review to cases where the decree was a nullity
and insisted on assuming fairly wide powers necessary to the exercise of 
142its jurisdiction. Its interpretation of its own jurisdiction - as we
shall see later - has been very wide and not being able to cope with the
bulk of litigation that finds its way before them, they are now trying
143to limit the use of their discretion as much as possible.
138. See below Chapter III. The judiciary v/as attacked right from the 
start. See HehrUi (1949) IX CAD 1195-6.
139* For the general approach of the Court see G.P.Singh: Principles 
of statutory interpretation (1966) Chapter 9* PP 357-390. The general 
principles that the Court intends to follow have been summarised by 
Hidayatullah J. in Dhulabhai v Gqjerat A.I.P. 1969 S.C. 78 at pr^ .32, 
pp 89-90* For a good illustration see Musamia v Rabari Govindbhai A.I.R.
1969 S.C* 439 at pr.7 p.446.
140. See Desika Charulu v A.P. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 806; Abdul v Bhawani 
A.I.R. 19%6 S.C. 1718 at pr.9 P*1719; Ram Sarup v Chand A.I.R. 195o~S.C. 
983 at pr. 15-18 pp.897-8. It has laid down the rule that privative 
clauses will be construed strictly. See the re£ent cases of I.T.O. v 
Hohd. Kunhi A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 430 quoting Maxwell: Interpretation of 
statutes (lid) p.350 at pr.4 p.433; S.P.O. Faizabad v S.N.Singh A.I.R.
1970 S.C. 140 at pr.8 p.142.
141. See Ram Sarup v Shikar Chand A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 893 at pr.15-18 
pp.897-8.
!42. V/.3. v I 8c S Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1298 at pr.9 pp.1301-2.
143* This is dealt with in considerable detail later, Chapter II, Section 6.
Ji. «J
The Court has therefore safeguarded its position froin outside
criticism, from the legislature, and from executive interference. At
the same time it has undermined their powers and asserted its right to
review their actions. It appears to have exceeded the role that the
144Constituent Assembly intended for it.
d. The Federal Structure
Indian federalism as embodied in the bare text of the 
Constitution is quite different from any other in as much as the dis­
tribution of power between the Centre and the States is heavily weighted
in the former's favour. So much so that India has been described as a
145"quasi federal state All the residuary power, some of which the
146Centre can exercise suo motu and some at the request of the State
147legislature or the Rajya Sabha can easily turn India into a unitary 
State. There are also provisions which enable the Centre to violate
144. See generally Chapters III and IV infra.
145. Cn the federal structure see R.Dhavan: India as a federal State 
(1967) I Allahabad Univ.Law Jnl. arguing that India was not quasi-federal 
because of the concentration of power in the Centre but because of Art.3 
which makes the territorial integrity of the State vulnerable. See also 
K.Santhanam in H.G.Gupta (Ed) Aspects of the Indian Constitution {1965, 
Allahabad). Kirs. R.Coondoo: The division of powers in the Indian Consti­
tution (1964 Calcutta) where she refutes the charge of overcentralisation. 
The Indian position is best summed up by G.N.Joshi: Aspects of Indian 
Constitutional Law (1964) see Chapter IV pp 136-162. Note the following 
comments at p.24 : "When one carefully examines the features and 
characteristics of Indian federalism, which is moulded hy the accumulated 
experience of other federations and which is devised in India's historical 
setting to solve the problems of a modern state, one feels that Indian 
federalism is a contribution to the theory and practice of federalism."
An opinion affirmed by Prof .A. V/. McMahon: Federalism - mature and emergent 
(1955) 16. See further B.Bharadwaj: Recent developments in Indian federa­
lism (1967) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 97.
146. Art. 248.
147. Art. 249 and 253.
the territorial integrity of the Constituent States* The Court has
149
interpreted this provision in the Centre’s favour.
The Supreme Court’s contribution to the federal structure has
not been significant and can be traced elsewhere. It has merely followed
the usual doctrines about pith and substance not always in the Centre’s
favour.^^It did however in a famous case^^prevent a State from taxing
152
inter-state sales, necessitating a constitutional amendment. An attempt
was also made to reduce the State's power to tax goods while interpreting
the "Freedom of Commerce" provisions of the Constitution under pressure
from Australian precedent but the Court has itself worked out some
153balance in that area. There have been only two cases in which there
was a direct conflict between the Centre and the States, in the first
the Court accepted (though not without dissent) the predominance of
State power and in the second it preferred not to exercise jurisdiction,
deciding the point on a preliminary issue without going into the merits 
154of the matter.
148. See Article III and G.N.Joshi: (supra f.n.14-5 12-14-).
14-9* See Babulal v Bombay A.I.R. I960 S.C. 51 where the Court suggests 
that the assent of the State legislature need not be elicited to the 
final plan evolved aftertheir opinion has been taken once (see pr.10 
pp.55-6) Mangal Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 944- where the number of 
seats in the lower house of the Haryana legislature were allowed to fall 
below the constitutional minimum.
150. See Seervai: (196?) Chapter XXII pp.898-970.
151. Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661.
152. The Sixth Amendment Act 1956.
153- Atiabari Tea Estate Co. v Assam A.I.R. l?6l S.C. 232; redressed in 
Rajasthan v Automobile Transport Co. A.I.R. 1962 sTc. 1406. See Imam 
(supra) 190-200; Seervai (1967) Chapter XXIV pp.980-1006. The influence 
of Australian case law is analysed later in the thesis in Chapter VII.
154. W.3. v Union A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241. Note the dissent of Subha Rao J 
who takes the State’s point of view; Bihar v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1446.
To sum up, while balancing constitutional interests, it has 
taken away from the legislature its claim to supremacy; insisted on 
exercising a suprevisory jurisdiction over every action of officialdom 
not sparing even Parliamentary privilege, and the executive power to 
pardon. It has championed fundamental rights as a means to achieve this 
supervisory power, but not always interpreted them with a bias against 
the Government. Within this broad framework it has respected legislative 
and executive and federal and state claims to power. In constitutional 
terms it has substituted a comprehensive theory of judicial review for 
the basic theory on which the Constitution was founded, namely, a theory 
of parliamentary democracy resting on the principle of responsibility 
to a supreme legislature.
3» Directive Principles: An Indian approach to the problem of 
Constitutional Law.
Constitutional interpretation tends to follow the golden rule
I55
of statutory interpretation that words must be interpreted literally.
More recently an Indian constitutional lawyer in Belfast while examining
the Supreme Court on property rights has made the plea :
"What is needed is a new approach ... to constitutional inter­
pretation, which will permit the Court to interpret property 
provisions in the context of Indian conditions and in the light of 
and guidance afforded by the economic objectives of the Constitution 
contained in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State 
Policy." 156
The Directive Principles provide a new approach to the problem of consti­
tutional interpretation substituting new principles, some of which are
135. See Craies: Statute Law (1971) 4th Ldn.507-512; Seervai (I967) Preface 
v; Wynes: Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (1970)
4th Ldn. Chapter II pp.b-2o particularly at p.8.
156. Jagafc. Narain: The Indian Supreme Court and property rights and the 
economic objectives of the Constitution (1968) III Journal of Law and 
Economic Development 147 at 180; see also his comments in Lqual Protection 
Guarantee and the Right to Property under the Indian Constitution 15
I.C.L.Q, 199 at ,20,6-7 and the comments,of U.Baxi:, IX J.I.L.I., 323- at 362 . 
f.n.110.
mere statements of intent,^'^some merely declaratory of the present law,^"^
some the product of American socio-economic interpretations of their
159Constitution adapted to Indian conditions and some peculiar to Indian
l60conditions. This classification does not differ from other classifi­
cations, but it is submitted that the classification of these principles 
into legal and non-legal does not serve any useful purpose as all these 
articles can have a bearing on the interpretation of statutes and 
the Constitution.^^
Of the words in Article 37 that the Directive Principles shall 
be regarded as "fundamental in the governance of the country," one writefc 
has said :
"ilhey) ... describe in rhetorical language, hopes, ideals, 
and goals rather than the actual reality of government. The 
principal object in enacting the Directive rrinciples appears to 
have been to set standards of achievement before the legislature 
and executive, local and other authorities, by which their success 
or failure can be judged.." 162
This approach, which can be traced back to one foreign
163observer, has gained wider circulation in as much as commentators
137. Articles 38, 43, 43, 47, 49 and 30.
138. Article 31.
139« Articles 40, 44, 46, 48, e.g. Article 48 (cow slaughter).
160. Articles 39, 41, 43 (on which in the context of labour law see 
Dhavan J. in Balwant Raj v Union A.I.R. 1968 All. 14 and comments of 
U.Baxi (1969) XI J.I.L.I. 245 at 260-I),' 447 4&7 47, 49, a§d 30.
161. For other classifications and the allegation that some principles 
are not legal see G.S.Sharma: Directive Principles of State Policy 
(1965) 7 J.I.L.I. 173; U.Baxi: Directive Principles of State Policy (1969) 
11 J.I.L.I. 245-269; Michael Coper: Definition of Law and the Directive 
Principles of the Indian Constitution (1969) 9 Jaipur Law Journal 1.
162. Seervai (1967) 759*
163. Jennings: The draft Constitution Nov.11,1948 - The Hindu; Ibid,
Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution (I953) 30-1;but note 
the comments of K.Markandam: Directive Principles in the Indian 
Constitution (i960) 314.
have tended to regard them as non-legal socio-economic declarations.
But more recently a judge of the Supreme Court (taking a more
165definitive stand than his brother judges have taken in the past) has
declared in his B. N. Rau Lectures that the Directive Principles are
another way of interpreting the Constitution and are not to be neglec- 
166ted - an opinion politicians have been trying, for their own reasons,
167
to put forward for a long time.
Are these principles legal principles '*  The Constituent
Assembly did finally agree that these principles were of great socio-
168
economic importance, but there seems to have been little emphasis on
16k. G.N.Joshi: The Constitution of India (1961, Macmillan, London) 121- 
128 (at 1 2 1 )."It is not clear how far these principles or inductions are 
to be kept in mind by the judiciary in the interpretation of legislation" 
but see contra at 127-128. B.M.Sharraa: The Constitution of India (1966,
APH, London) 192-198 particularly pp 197-8 treats Directive Principles 
as if they are addressed to the executive and legislatures. M.D.Widwans: 
Mature of the Directive Principles A.I.R. 1956 Jpl. 37-*+2; P.B.I-Iukharji: 
Aspirations of the Indian Constitution A.I.R. 1955 Jnl. 101 at 102 col.2 ff 
R.K.Sircar: The Constitution of India - its salient features (1950) Jfc§ 
Allahabad L.R. 127 at 131; Gobind Das: Juqfriqe in India (1967) 67—9;
P.K.Ghosh: The Constitution of India (1966 Calcutta) 118-9; Note the 
comment of K.C.Wheare: India’s new Constitution analysed (1950) 52 Bom.L.R. 
,Jnl. 25-7 *+8 Allahabad L.J. 21-2 "If these declarations of liberal
principles, strange as they may seem to British eyes, help the Constitution 
on its way and assist the people in working their government, they are 
more than justified."
165. K.Subha Rao: Our Constitutional problems (1970) 3i 5-6, contrast 
18-20, 27-8 and observe the plea for harmonious interpretation at 67. 
P.B.Gajendragadkar: The Constitution of India (I969) 12-22. For the limited 
approval of the lawyer who argued most of the cases that are now cited as 
precedent on this question see Setalvad: The Constitution of India (1967) 
51-53.
166. K.S.Hegde: Directive Principles of State Policy (1971) 1 S.C.J. Jnl.
50 ff.
167. Nehru in the debate on the First Amendment Bill (1951) L.S.D. May 
16,19511 col.8820; M.S.Gurupadaswamy: on Fourth Amendment Bill (195*0 
March 15,1955 quoted ^arkandam (supra f.n.163) l*f8-9.
168. There were three discussions by the Assembly on these principles. A 
preliminary discussion on their justiciability in Courts of law at III
C.A.D. 390 f; a minor debate at V.C.A.D. 353 ff; the main debate which 
lasted from Nov.19-25,19*^ 8 at VII C.A.D.470 ff. These are very accurately 
summed up by K.Markandam (supra f.n.163) Chapter III, 88-122; G.Austin’s 
account (The Indian Constitution,-.19^ 6) .is, a. little suspect from.a. . . . 
lawyer's point of view.
its legal nature and it was asserted that they were vague. One member
169called them "a veritable dust-bin of sentiment” - a comment made much
170of in a recent article. So disillusioned is the lawyer with the idea
of Directive Principles as legal aids that an authoritative work does
171not even consider them worthy of discussion. The Supreme Court has had
to give them a meaning and relevance in a legal context.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Directive Principles in 
17220 cases including one Advisory Opinion. It has evolved the following 
rules :
1. The Directives are not a source of legislative power for either the
17£Centre or the States.
2. ■Lf the Directives conflict with fundamental rights or any other
169. T.T.Krishnamachavi VII C.A.D. 583 (on Nov.24, 19^6 - the second day 
of the debate).
170. U. Baxi! (1969) 11 J.I.L.I. 245-
171. ilohammad Imejs: The Supreme Court and the Indian Constitution (1968).
172. Madras v Champakam Doraijan (1951) S.C.P. 925 (Article 46); Bihar 
v Kameshwar £ungti A.iTR. 1952 STC. 252 (acquisition of property); Bombay 
v Balsara A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 318 (Articles 37 and 47); Coverjee v Bxcise 
Commissioner A.I^R. 1954 S.C. 220 (Article 47); Subodh Gopal v W.B. A.I.R.
1954 S.C. 92 (acquisition of property); Bijoy Cotton Mills v "Ajmer A'.'l.fM
1955 S.C. 333; M/S Crown Aluminium Works v Workmen (193&) S.C.R. 6>5I 
(both concerned with Articles 39 and 47); Express Newspapers v Union 
A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578 (Articles 39 and 43); H.H.Qureshi v Bihar A.I.R.
T958 S.C. 731 (Cow slaughter Article 48); Re Kerala Education Bill A.I.B. 
19~38"s/C. 936 (Article 45); Deep Chand v U.P. A.I.~rUT939 S.C. 648 Tat 
pr. 26 p.663-4 stating that Directive Principles do not authorise legis­
lative powers); Atma Ram v Punjab (agrarian reform); Abdul Hakim v Bihar 
A.I.R. I96I S.C. 4^8 (Article 48); Orient Weaving Mills v Union A.I.R.
1963 S.C. 98 (Article 43); Devi Das v Union A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179 (Article 
46); All India Reserve Bank Employees v Reserve Bank of India A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 303 (Article 43); Golak Nath v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 (on the' 
general importance of the Directives to determine the scope of Part III); 
Hindustan Antibiotics v Workmen A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 9^ *8 (Article 39 and 43); 
Chandra Bhavan 3dg. & Ldg. v Mysore (1970) II S.C.R. 600 (Articles 38-9); 
Asst.Commr. v B & C Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 169 (the Directives do not grant 
legislative power).
173* Deep Chand v U.P. (supra f.n.172); Asst.Commr. v B & C Co. (supra 
f .n.172/.
17kpart of the Constitution, the latter shall prevail otfer the Directives.
3. These principles are however useful to determine the usefulness of
175an action under Article 19(2)-(6) of the Constitution.
4. In socio-economic matters, e.g. where questions like labour law are 
involved - the Directives shall play a general role to meet the needs of 
the instant case.^^
The above stated rules are very general, and the Supreme Court
does not at any stage tell the weight that judges are meant to attach
to the Directives. Judges have been imprecisely selective, and have
relied on other techniques to register their point -of view in a case, 
n 177'^ his in Champakan Dorai.jan v Madras we find Das J. emphasising the sub­
sidiary n:ture of the principles; but as we shall see later, he more
than any other judge in the early Court, did more to further the cause
178of socio-economic reform, ^gain m  Kameshwar v Bihar we find Mahajan J. 
praising the Directives even though in that case and in other cases he
174. Das J. in Champakan Doiraijan v Madras (supra f.n.172 - the leading 
case on the subject); M.H.Qurdshi v Bihai*'supra f.n.172); He Kerala 
Education Bill (supra f.n.172).
175* 3ombay v ^alsara; Coveriee v Excise Commr: Express Newspapers v 
Unionp Golak Nath v Punjab; Chandra Bhavan etc. v Hvsore: (all cited 
supra f.n.172). Note: Justice Hegde's comments at (1971) I S.C.J.Jnl 
30 at 70-1.
176. Bijoy Cotton Mills v Ajmer: ii/S Aluminium Works v Workmen: Express 
Newspapers v Union; Orient Wvg.Mills v Union; All India Reserve Bank 
Employees v Reserve Bank of India: Hindustan Antibiotics v Workmen:
(all these are cited at f.n.172)•
177• (1931) S.C.R. 325; see also i-l.H.Qureshi v Bihar A.I.H. 1958 B.C. 731; 
note that Hegde (cited supra) at68-71 seems to misunderstand Das J.’s 
approach altogether. Das J. was just trying to prevent the C0urt from 
being browbeaten by counsel into declaring the supremacy of the Directives.
178. Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.H. 1992 S.C. 252. Note the criticism of this 
case, from the point of view of Directive Principles, in P.K.Tripatti 
(cited f.n.190 infra) at 3*K26.
showed a marked preference for fundamental rights when pitted against
socio-economic arguments. In fact the Directives have not really been
treated as principles but rather as standards that one must bear in mind.
At this point a distinction must be made between s
"rules, principles, precepts, defining conceptions and precepts 
establishing standards." 179
lg0
For law, as the severest critic of AAart’s Concept of Law makes clear,
l8lis not just a system of rules. It consists of several principles, 
precepts and standards, which are of varying importance and help, more 
than anything else, to determine the growth of law. As an illustration 
of how a principle can often override a rule of law, we have only to 
look at the importance of the doctrine of mens rea in Criminal law. 
Precepts also play an important role. Concepts like "possession" have 
played an important part in both civil and criminal law. Later we shall 
analyse the importance of the concept of property and the extent to which 
it hac played a role in determining the scope of Article 19(1)(f) of 
the Constitution.
179- A distinction first made by Roscoe Pound; see (1959) III Juris­
prudence 124-32. .....................................................
180. Hart in his Concept of Law (1961) talks of a system of rules divided 
into primary rules which describe rights and liabilities and secondary 
rules or recognition, change and adjudication. Certainly precepts and 
principles and standards are part of the secondary rules but they do not 
emerge as strong factors in Hart’s evaluation of the judicial process.
181. Dworkin: in Sumner (Ed) Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1963); The 
model of rules (1969) 39 Univ. of Chic.Law Rev. 19; for a defence of Hart 
see G.Christie: The model of principles (1969) Luke Law Journal. U.Baxi: 
(1969) 11 J.I.L.I. 245 does try to introduce this controversy into this 
area of directive Principles but he does not pursue it seriously.
182. See for example Smith & Hogan: Criminal law (1969) 59-69; Hogan: 
Criminal liability without fault (1969) Leeds University Press published 
as a separate lecture. Now to be read in the light of the following "drug" 
cases: Sweet v Parsley (1969) 2 W.L.R. 470; Fernandes (1970) Cr.L.R. 277; 
Irving (1970) Cr.L.R. 942.
183. See generally Salmond: Jurisprudence (1968 12d) 265-297; Keeton: 
Elementary;principles of Jurisprudence Tl949) 180-194; Paton: Jurisprudence 
(1964.3d);" see particularly cases 510-522. .For .a .juristic, approach see . . . 
Pound: V Jurisprudence (1959) 77-117. For a good recent application in the 
area of Criminal law see Warner v Metropolitan Commr. (i960) II All E.R.
356 and later developments in Fernandez (1970)' CrlL~.R.277: Irving (ibid)942.
The Indian Supreme Court has merely treated the Directives as 
precepts establishing standards, rather than principles of interpretation. 
This contrasts with the Canadian approach to their Bill of Rights (which 
resemble the Directives much more than they do fundamental rights) in 
R. V. Drybones (1969)’^^i|where a statute was found wanting because it 
offended the Equality principle of the Bill of Rights. It is by no means 
suggested that the doctrine of Constitutional limitations should be exten­
ded to the Directives. What is important is that they be treated as 
principles of law, which help to determine the width and scope of the 
rules in the instant case.
As a concrete example, let us go back to our example of whether 
a "chose of action" can be acquired or not. The Supreme Court applied
185this American doctrine to India, in cases which involved agrarian re^omu
j~Cw tJct 3J
and the creation of a labour welfare fund. If the DirectivesJThad been
treated as principles in any meaningful sense a different result would
have accrued. The principle that the Court did in fact apply was the
187doctrine of eminent domain. Again, in another case, Hidayatullah J. 
in dissent opined that the acquisition of land for the purpose of fur­
thering village community life was an acquisition for which compensation . 
would have to be paid. Did this have something to do with his extrajudicial
18^. (1969) 9 D.L.R. (3d) *f73 and note the comments in Annual Survey of 
Commonwealth law (1970) 16-17, 88-90; F.H.Auburn (1970 ) 86 L.Q.R. 306;
719707 pVl. 213.
183. This is discussed supra in the section entitled "Neutrality Principles." 
The ease is Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252. Ranojirao v Mysore 
A.I.R. 1968 1053 was also concerned with agrarian reforms.
186. Bombay Dyg. and Mfn. Co. v Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 328.
187. Ajit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. I967 S.C. 856; Bhagat Singh v Punjab A.I.R.
1967 s.c. 927.
distrust of such bodies ? And, if so, was it not in defiance of the
principles of village community life laid down in the provisions of
Article A3 ? We shall later see that in many areas where the law of
property was discussed by the Supreme Court, foreign precepts much more
than the Directive Principles played a much more important role.
The extent to which the Directive Principles can be used in
interpretation can perhaps be illustrated by the notable attempt of a
High Court judge to extend them to non-constitutional matters, ^e upheld
an awarg^made by an Industrial Tribunal which had leaned in the workers’
189favour, because of the constitutional concept of a living wage. This 
shows that the argument that the Directives establish standards for poli­
ticians is not wholly tenable. It is true that a concept of a living wage 
is not feasible in the present Indian context but it is the principle that 
counts. No one has ever seriously argued that the doctrine of "mens rea" 
in criminal law should be consistently applied without exception.
In broad terms the Directives could, if properly interpreted,
190induce the following principles in Indian Constitutional law.
Firstly, Courts would have to recognise in principle the need 
for tremendous State legislative.activity in the areas which the Direc­
tives cover. T'hls does not mean, and the Supreme Court has made this 
191clear, that the Directives will be a source of legislative pow&r, but
188. Note the comment that he makes in Democracy and the judicial process 
in India (I968) at p . 38 "If only political parties would leave these 
bodies (the panchayats) ... alone or if village elections were abolished, 
and if ... control over land tenures and ownership were hot made over to 
them in the beginning, the panchayats would functionwell .1f( emphasis mine).
189. Dhavan J. in the case Balwant Raj v Union A.I.R. 1968 All 1A. Note 
the appreciative comments of U.Baxi: (1969) 11 J.I.L.I. 2A5 at 260-1.
190. Similar suggestions are made in P.K.Tripatti: Directive Principles 
odf State Policy: The Lawyers’ approach to them hitherto parochial, 
injurious and unconstitutional (195^ -) XVII S.C.J. 7-36.
191* See supra f.n.l73»
it does mean that a wider principle than the principle that the Court 
will presume the constitutionality of an enactment is required. In a 
sense this new approach is now enshrined in the new 25th Constitutional 
Amendment to the Constitution, where the rather extreme step of not
192
applying Part III to statutes embodying the Directives has been taken.
Secondly, the Directives would induce a major change in the areas
of administrative law, by granting more power to the Government and its
officers so that it may have the concomittant power to make the Directives
effective. This migft: also mean to give them a power to tax for schemes
which affect corporate life, and make a distinction between a tax and a
193
fee instead of construing the latter like the former. Courts should be 
concerned with procedural and jurisdictional ultra vires rather than 
reasonability of exercise.
Thirdly, both the Directives as well as the Chapter on funda­
mental rights contain the provisions which call for protective discrimination
19*+and which try to preserve various details of Indian life which may
192* The 25th Amendment Act introduces Article 31 C into the Constitution 
which reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law 
giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles 
specified in clause (b) or (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void 
on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes or abridges any of 
the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or J?l; and no law containing 
a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called 
into question by in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect 
to such policy; provided that where such law is made by the legislature 
of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply the veto unless 
such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has 
received his assent." See on this G.C.Venkata Subbarao: Property Rights 
and the 25th Amendment (1972) I S.C.J. Jnl. 1-9; V.G. Ram chand ran: People 
of the Indian Nation v The Judiciary and Parliament (1972) I S.C.J.Jnl-9-14.
193* In Commr. of H.R.E. v L.T.Swamiar A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282; Automobile 
Transport Co. v Bihar A.I.R. 19o2 S.C. The first case in which this was 
done was Mohd. lasin v Town Area Committee Jalalabad A.I.R. 1952 S.C.115 
(per S.R.Das J.) at pr.7 p.117-
194. These are all discussed in Chapter VI. The Constitution sanctions 
(protective discrimination (Articles 15(3);15(4);l6(4))and preserves 
the right of the minorities to maintain their own language and institu­
tions (Article 29-30)). These are all discussed in Chapter VI along with 
the. Supreme. Court f.s .attitude, to freedom of religion....................
militate against the principle of equality. We will examine the Supreme 
Court's performance in this area later, but it will suffice for the 
present to say that the egalitarian principles must be modified so that 
these curious oddities can be preserved. The Court sometimes forgets 
that the Constitution protects and encourages verisimilitude, and does 
not proclaim a synthetic para-secular approach to corporate life.
Fourthly, in every case where the Directives can be brought 
into play, the particular Article in question must-be treated as a 
fundamental principle on which the case would stand or fall, rather than 
a subordinate principle subservient to the rest of the Constitution and 
merely a point for casual reference. This will make more explicit and 
clear the approach that the Court takes to the Constitution. Gradually 
these will assume the status of being principles of law binding on all 
Courts in India.
Fifthly, Articles 19 1(f) and (g) contain the Common Law theory 
of freedom of contract which the Court has followed. That has to be 
modified in the context of the Directive principles.
So far all that the Supreme Court has done - and Justice Hegde's 
article makes, this clear - is to state that the Directives are important 
and when faced with a problem where the personal discretion of the judges 
needs to be guided, they will refer to the Directives amongst other 
things. A much wider and more legal approach to the challenge that the 
Directives offer is called for and necessary.
• Conclusion
What is the Supreme Court's contribution to the principles of 
Constitutional interpretation ?
We have seen that it has been non-neutral in its approach to 
the Constitution, interpreted the traditional theory of separation of
195* For the extent to which this has already been done, see an article- 
by-article analysis'in V.N.Shukla:' The' Constitution of' India' (1970;51<L) 
177-188;; Seervai (1967) 739 PF*
powers so as to make themselves umpires on every exercise of power within 
the country. It has reinforced the already strong federal bias in the 
Constitution and in certain areas followed foreign precedent to deprive 
States of their right to tax goods within their boundaries.
The Directives contain a new approach to constitutional interpre­
tation, in as much as they call for a reassessment of the accepted consti­
tutional principles of: delegation of power, the concept of equality and
freedom of contract. The Court has not made any effort to reassess these
196principles and apply them to an Indian context. In a sense a leading
197critic’s view that "the shadow of Dicey" has prevailed appears to be
right. The Supreme Court must realise that the Courts are concerned with
matters of jurisdiction procedure and malafides, not with problems where
they sit and review the decisions of those who are entitled to make them.
It is natural that jurisdictional questions are themselves bound up in
wider issues. The Court must adjust its approach to these problems so as
to make more possible the exercise of power rather than restrict it. As
a High Court judge puts it :
"Courts, which within strict limits have to essay social 
engineering, are not the sanctuary of age old but unwholesome 
(approaches) ... even if they are not the refuge of social re­
formers. In the inevitable chemistry of social change, Courts 
are certainly not anti-catalysts." 198
199More recently an ex-Chief Justice of India has admitted that 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution had forced the 
Government to resort too frequently to Parliament’s power to amend the 
Constitution. This self-admission is proof in itself of the Court’s 
adherence to traditional patterns of interpretation.
196. These are discussed at their appropriate places below.
197* Seervai: The position of the .judiciary under the Constitution of 
India (1970) Chapter V.
193. V.K.Krishna Iyer J. in Kunhu Mohd v T. R.Umanayathi (1969) K.L.R. 629 
(The report is not available at SOAS) quoted by Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970)
397 f.n.2.
199* Gajendragadkar: Indian Parliament and Fundamental Rights (1971)
Tagore Law Lectures as reported in National Herald Feb.231 1972, Feb. 
26,1972.
b, The Supreme Court, the Formula of Justice, Equity and Good 
Conscience and the use of English Law.
Many legal historians have argued that the ,fJustice, Equity 
and Good Conscience" formula (hereafter J.E.G.C.) was used to introduce 
English Law into India.^ This thesis has been contested by an English 
writer, who points out that the intention was quite contrary :
"It (the formula J.E.G.C.) was introduced in India by the 
East India Company under the influence of the theory that civil 
law was suitable to the Company’s Courts in the Presidency since 
the Common Law was not suitable to the conditions of the settle­
ments there." 2
It is by no means suggested that English law did not play an important 
role or that
"between 1772.and l8*t0 numerous rules of personal law were 
refused application on the ground that they were unenforceable 
for various reasons including natural justice, but this process 
is poorly documented and the personal laws became virtually 
settled by the middle of the century." 3
It is wrong to begin with the assumption that judges went headlong into
the rules of English law without looking for alternatives, ior the
Regulations lay down quite clearly that the formula was only residual
in nature and should be applied only where the fund of local law was
4 5
exhausted. In fact Gajendragadkar J. in Hurari Lai v Devkaran has
1. See M.C.Setalvad: Common Law of India (i960) pp.53-60$ 68-9; The 
role of English in India £1966) Chapter I generally; M.P.Jain: Outlines 
of Indian History (2dY$ J?K.Mittal: Indian Legal History (1963) 252-256. 
For a general review on the reception of English law into India and else 
where see: K.W.Patchett: English law in the West Indies (1963) 12 I.C.L.Q. 
9§22; The XlVth Report of the Indian Law Commission 677-69^ -; Lipstein:
The reception of western law in India (1957) UNESCO Int.S0c.Sci.Bull.85*
2. Prof.J.D.M.Derrett: Justice, Equity and Good Conscience in India 
d962) Gb Bom.L.R. Jnl. 129, 145-
3- Ibid at p.130 f.n.5-
b» Regulation III Section 21 (1793 Bengal); Regulation II Section II 
(1802, Madras); ■‘Regulation IV (1827,Bombay); Section 26, Bengal Civil 
Courts Act, 1887; Section 31, Madras Civil Courts Act 1873* The best 
examples of this remain in those pointed out by Derrett i.e. Ram Coomar 
Condoo v Chunder Coondoo (1876) b I.A. 23 at 50-1; Bai Dahi v Bai Sada 
A.I.R. 1961 Gu.jerat 105 at 109 col.l.
5* A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 225 at 228-9.
demonstrated that the Privy Council went out of its way not to enforce
the English law. The Courts always made it a point to apply the statute
6 7if it was clear and, except in the Punjab, never refused to apply the
local law on the grounds that it violated J.E.G.C. unless there was a
g
clear conflict in the personal laws. Nor was the English law the only
one to be consulted. Attempts to look at other laws ware also made. The
most notable examples are Sir Ashutosh Mukherjea's research on the status
9
of the posthumous son in Kusum Kumari v Dasrathi, Hidajatullah J.’s 
judgement in Kantilal v Balkrishrva^ o n  the problem of death by negli- 
cence and Gajendragadkar J.'s research into Hindu law on the clog on the 
equity of redemption.^”More recently the absorption of Goa and the 
French possessions into India has led to the application of Portuguese
6. See Derrett's examples notably Chandarvarkar J. refusing to romanise 
the Hindu law in Kaligovada v Somanna (1909) 53 Bombay 699. For an 
example of where there was a conflict of Hindu law texts see Rakhalra.i 
Mondal v Debendranath A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 356 at 358 col.l; and on 
Mohommedan law see Aziz Bano v Muhammad Ibrahim Hussain (1925) 47 All. 823 
at 837.
7* See Punjab Laws Act (IV of) 1872 Sections 5 - 6 .
0. There were other cases where customs were in fact declared to be 
not in consonance with J.E.C.G., see for example Holloway J.*s view on 
the Islamic law of preemption in Ibrahim Sahib v Muni Mir (1870) j$
M.H.C.R. 26; Collector of Hasulioatnan v Cavaly Venkata (i860) 8.
M.I.A. 500 and the discussion on this by Jain (supra f.n.l. p. 532).
See also Mayne: Hindu law and usage (lid) 80-81 citing case law. For 
cases on the refusal to follow foreign law see f.n.6.
9. A.I.5. 1921 Calcutta 487.
10. -(-1950) Nagpur 239* Note the reference to English, French, Germanic 1 
Islamic and Roman law at 268-276; but note the dissent of Mudholkar J. 
who tries to find a fair solution to the problem even though he believes 
at p.304 that nthe Common Law modified by statute should be the ghiding 
factor”. The majority overruled the case of Rakmahai v Dhanraj A.I.R.
1921 Nag. 102.
11. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 225 (This case is discussed in detail later).
and French in these particular areas. This law has recently been re­
viewed in a recent American journal.^
In our present context the application of the J.E.G.C. formula 
is not important, because the situations in which it could apply are 
fast decreasing with increasing codifiation. We will examine firstly 
the fate the formula has suffered at the hands of the Supreme Court in 
the three cases in which it has discussed it, and secondly briefly exa­
mine the general attitude of Courts in India to English law as an aid 
to constructing statutes based on English models or framed in an English 
or anglo-American Style.
a. The Supreme Court and the Formula
T$e first case in which the Supreme Court discussed J.E.G.C.
15was Namdeo v Narmada Bai in which the question was whether the formula 
could be used to introduce the principle behind Section £ijl(g) of the 
Transfer of Property Act 1882 to a lease executed before the passing of 
the Act. Mahajan J. (for S. R. Das J. and Himself) observed :
"It is axiomatic that the Courts must apply the principles of 
Justice, Equity and Good Conscience to transactions which come up 
before them for determination, even though the statutory provisions 
of the Transferjof Property Act are not made applicable." 14
The sole question to be decided was whether Section III'(g) represented
J. E. G. C. His lordship took the view that the formula in fact
represented English equity. He observed :
12. K.M.Sharma: Civil law in India (1969) Washington University Law 
Journal 1-40; See also V.S.Ramakrishnan: French law on Indian soil (1965) 
Lawyer 123-129; see also R.Whee: The Civil law and the Common law (MIS') 
14 Mich.L.Eey. $9 generally.
13. A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 228.
14. Ibid at pr. 16 p.230.
^  O  t-<+
"(T)he insistence in Section.£f]f(g) ••• that notice should be 
given in writing is intrinsic evidence of the fact that the forma­
lity is merely statutory and that it cannot trace its origin to any
rule of Equity. Equity does not concern itself with mere forms and
modes of procedure ... (N)otice ... by oral intimation ... (would 
not) in any way distur(b) the mind of the Chancery Judge.” 15.
l6He then briefly examined the origins of the rule in England and showed 
that in India
"there is a substantial body of authority for the proposition that 
in respect of leases made before the Transfer of Property Act for­
feiture is incurred when there is disclaimer of title or ... non 
payment of rent." 17•
He concludes that the rule in the Act was a mere rule of procedure.
This rather strict application of the English Chancery Court approach
may have been occasioned by the fact that the lessee was hardly deserving
of notice in the first place. Mahajan J. observed :
"It is clear that in this case the tenant is a recalcitrant 
tenant and a habitual offender. For the best part of 25 years he 
has never paid rent without being sued in Court. Rent has been 
in arrears at times..‘for six years, at other times for three years 
and at other times for four years and so on. And every time the 
landlord had to file a suit for ejectment which, was always resis­
ted by false defences. No rule of Justice, Equity and Good 
Conscience can be invoked for (such a) tenant." 19
xhis leaves us with a very unsatisfactory picture of what the contents
of J.E.G.C. are and we are led to believe that they are in fact English
equity and individual discretion as conditioned by the facts of the case.
A totally different approach was adopted by Gajendragadkar J.
20in Murari Lai v Devakaran. Here the question was whether the principle
15. Ibid pr.17 p.231.
16. Ibid pr.l8 p . 231
17. Ibid pr.19 p.231
18. Ibid at pr.23 p.233 col.l.
1 9. Ibid at pr.31 p.23^.
20. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 225.
that there must not be a clog on the qquity of redemption (embodied in 
Section 60 of the Transfer of Property A£t(l882) which did not apply to 
the State of AlvfiLr when the mortgage in the instant case was in fact 
made) was a general principle in consonance with the J.E.G.C. The 
Supreme Court reversed the view of the High Court and held that the docu­
ment in the present case did purport to make the mortgagee the absolute
21owner on the failure of the mortgagortto redeem. With the facts out
of the way the Court proceeded to consider that the following of the
rules of J.E.G.C. implied.
His lordship referred to several Privy Council decisions to
show that the early Privy Council had accepted the existence of mortgage
22by conditional sale in India and that while the High Courts had maintained
that unjust transactions will not be permitted, the approach of the High
Courts had been frowned upon by the Privy Council in Thumbuswamy Modelly 
23-v Hossain Rowther. But the common sense approach of the High Courts 
appealed to Gajendragadkar J. who examined the Hindu law texts to dis­
cover that the concept of the mortgage by conditional sale was perfectly
2Zf
acceptable to Hindu jurisprudence. Faced with the Privy Council and the 
Hindu law texts against him, his lordship referred to Mahajan J*1s
21. Ibid at pr.4 p.227.
22. Ibid at pr.7-8 pp 228-9 citing the following cases: Thumbuswamy 
Modelly v Hossain Rowther (1876) 1 Mad.l (P.C.); Pattabhiramier v Venkatarow 
Haicken (I87D  13 M.I.A. 5^0; Kader Moideen v C.W.Nepnean (1899) 25 I.A.
241;' Hehrban Khan v Makhana A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 142.
23-. (1876) I Mad. 1 (P.C.) The High Court cases are: Venkata Reddi. v
Parvati Ammal (1^63) 1 M.H.C.R. 460; followed in Ramji v Chinto Sakharam 
(1884) 1 B.H.C.R. 199 followed in Bapuji Apaji v Senavaraji (1878) 2 Bom.
231 (per Bestrop J. distinguishing the P.C. cases) Ramasami Sastrigal v 
Samiyappanayakam (1882) 3 Mad.179 at 190 (F.B.decision by majority,
■J-urner J. distinguishing the P.C. position)
24. Ibid at p.230 referring to Kane: III H.D. 428; Narado, ; MitSksharS 
on Y5|fravalka II 58; Ghose: Law of mortgages in India (T.L.L. 5c0 Vol I, 56.
25judgement in the 1953 case we have discussed above and represented that
case not as having decided that J.E.G.C. in fact meant following the
approach of English equity, but as having established J.E.G.C. as a
commonsense principle. He observed :
"These observations in substance represent the same tradi­
tional approach in dealing with oppressive unjust and unreasonable 
restrictions imposed by the mortgagees on needy mortgagors, when 
mortgage documents are executed." 26.
He also fouqdd support in some High Court cases which had approved of
21
Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act as a just and equitable principle.
This differs in style but not in approach from that of Mahajan
J. In this case the Court examined the local approach to the problem
as well as went into the English law and evolved a rule which was in
28consonance with common sense, as a general principle, rather than 
expedient to meet the needs of the instant case. The reference to 
the earlier 1953 case is purely to establish a consistency because the 
principle in this case is much wider than the one conceived by Mahajan J.
More recently we have seen the Court revert back to the view
that English law must in fact be applied. This is in the recent tort
29 30case of Khushru v Guzdur where mention is made of the formula. The
it
case involved a conspiracy (of six persons) to injure and harass the 
plaintiff ... (by giving) perverse rulings to prevent him from getting 
elected to the trustees of the Parsi Zorastrian Anjuman* One of the
25. Supra f.n. 13 and the text corresponding to it.
26. Ibid at pr.15 f.231. See a similar conclusion at pr. 231.
27. See Amba Lai v Amba Lai A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 321; Sabh Raj v Chunder
Mai A.I.R. i960 Rq. j asthan 47; Nainu v Eishan Guju A.I.R. 1957 H.P. 46.
28. On the use of this principle see Derrett (cited f.n.2 supra) 148-152.
29. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1468.
30; Ibid at pr. 17 p. 14-74.
defendants apologised and was released by the plaintiff. The question
was : Did this release operate to release the joint tort feasors ?
The High Court (through Dhavan J. who is, in what is otherwise an
unprecedentftlpractice, mentioned by name in the Supreme Court judgement
three times'^) thought it did, which appears to be the opinion of the
32
Indian High Courts on the subject. But Sikri J. who read the judgement
in the Supreme Court tried to show that though this was the law in
33
England it was different in 1605 and that America followed a different
3L.
rule. Further he stressed that the English law did not accord release 
to joint tort feasors where the offence was trespass to the persop. or
involved injuries to property (real or personal) unaccompanied by con-
35version or change of possession. He concluded ;
"It seems to us that the rule of Common Law ]prior to Brown 
v Wooton ... (1605) ... adopted by the American Supreme Court is 
more in consonance with Equity, Justice and Good Conscience. In 
other words the plaintiff must have received full satisfaction or 
which the law taust consider as such, from a tort feasor, before 
other joint tort feasors can rely on accord and satisfaction." 36
In his lordship’s opinion an apology by the defendant "cannot be treated
31. Ibid at^l, p.1469; pr.7» 1470; pr.10 p.1471*
32. See Makhan Lai v Panchmal Sheoprashad A.I.R. 195*+ Nagpur 226 at 227; 
Shiva Sagar Lai v Mata Din A.I.R. 1949 All. 105; the other cases where the 
plaintiff accords with one defendant and sues the others (Ram Kukmar Singh 
v Ali Hasan (1909) 31 All.173 at 175; Har Krishna Lai v Haji %iarban A.I.R. 
1942 Oudh 73) are distinguished by Sikri J. at pr.15 p.1474 "But in these 
cases the decree was not passed first against the tort feasor admitting 
liability." Note also the more recent case of V.E.Dachala v Rangaraju 
A.I.R. i960 Madras 457 where the State recovered the proceeds from the 
illegal sale of diesel oil; the other person involved was deemed not 
liable (at pr.14, 14(a), 13 pp. 461-2.
33* Ibid at p.1473-4. The case in question is Brown v Wooton (1605)
80 S.R. 47.
34. Ibid at p.1473 col.l. See Lovejoy v Murray (1865-7) 18 Lawyer Edn 129. 
35» Ibid at pr.14 p.1472 col.2.
36. Ibid at pr.17 p.1874
to be full satisfaction for the tort alleged to have been committed by 
the defendants.’’ 37
The English law makes a distinction between a joint tort feasor
and several concurrent tort feasors and lays dov/n that a release dis-
38
charges the joint tort feasor but not concurrent tort feasors. The
defendants were clearly joint tort feasors and the position at Common
Law is that the law will not allow one person to get off and make a
deal in a conspiracy because in a concerted action of that nature it
is very difficult to allocate the liability. The released party could
have been the one most responsible. Sikri J.'s distinction based on
. 39
history in which tie makes a reference to case law before 1605 and his
following the ’’strict” Common Law, establishes a precedent for selective
or eclectic use of the aspects of English legal history. It is possible
that his lordship was in fact trying to do justice in the instant case
and not allow the unapologetic defendants to get away. Is It not
possible that Dhavan J., who was closer to the facts, thought it was
the plaintiff who was trying to drag on a case merely to make an
example of the defendants, even after he had received a frank confession
40and an apology for the whole conspiracy ? Once again a broad principle 
has emerged to meet the needs of the instant case, but this time after 
strict adherence to the technical rules of Englibh law.
37. Ibid at pr.19 p.1474-5.
38. See Street on Torts (<(d) 487 and the following cases cited by him
Duck v Mayeu (1892) 2 Q.B. 511 (C.A.); Cutler v McPhail (1962) 2 Q.B. 292; 
Gardiner v Moore (19o6) 1 All E.R. 365.
39. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1468 at 1471-2.
40. In a personal communique to the writer. Letter dated Oct. 18, 1971*
It appears that the Supreme Court have in the 1953 and the 
1970 cases laid emphasis on following the English law (even though 
this might have been done in fact to meet the needs of the instant case). 
A far more comprehensive approach to the problem of finding the content 
of the formula was that of Gajendragadkar J. in the 1965 case where it 
is suggested that other laws particularly Indian law be looked into but 
the rule itself must be based on a common sense rule the object of which 
must be to establish rules which prevent injustice. The approach of the 
Courts in this case shows that judges will in moments of doubt still in 
fact find solace in the English law, often without reference to Indian 
conditions.
b. Indian Courts and their attitude to English Law.
-^t is only natural that a large part of Indian law should 
receive its inspiration from English law. This is not because of the 
lack of indigenous nourishment but because Indian statute law is based 
on English law.
But judges have been discerning in applying English law and 
stressed occasionally that it is not always applicable to India. Thus
in two cases on the Workmen’s Compensation Act the Courts refused to
41 42follow the English Law. Again in J. C. Mehta v P. C. Hody Chagla C.J.
(for S. T. DesaiJand himself) refused to follow the English law in an
insolvency matter as there was sufficient Indian precedent on the point.
The same judges reiterated this position in an Income Tax case in
41. Korwill J. in Alagappa Hudaliar v Veerappan A.I.R. 1942 Mad.ll6 at 
117 col2 "Should have thought that there is very little reason to suppose 
that the Indian legislature had studied the corresponding English J%ct.n 
Bai Kokilbai v Kisharlal Mangal Das (1942) Bom. 159 at 149-*A); but on the 
same statute contrast the attitude of Harries C.J. in Kamarhatty v Abdul 
Samad A.I.R. 1953 Calcutta 74 at pr.9-15 p*75 and the same bench in 
N I & S Co. v Honorma A.I.R. 1993 Cal. a$?r.lO p. 144 in which note the 
referenc^o a New Zealand case.
43I, T. Commr. v Donald Miranda and disapproved of the tribunal following
44 43the English law, though they did make the same mistake later. In
tfo r
Chauthmal v Sadarmal Jagat Narain J. emphasised that the English con­
cept of forfeiture was wider than that in the Transfer of Property Act.
47In Ram Dial v Sant Lai while interpreting the meaning of "undue influence
in an election matter" that the English statute was not in pari materia
43
with the one before him. In Bari v Tukaram Mudholkar J., while con­
sidering the custom of removing earth from the soil, observed :
"I do not think it proper that the expression ’immemorial origin* 
is to be understood in India in the same sense as in England." 49
The same attitude is retained with respect to Easements. In Keshav Sahu 
50v Dasrath the Court discussing the concept of privacy stressed :
"The fact that there is no custom of privacy known to the law of 
England can have no bearing on the question whether there can be 
in India a usage or custom of privacy." 51.
A recent article recounts the contributions of an Allahabad judge in 
52this area. However, one may contrast the attitude in Madras v Mohd. Ghani
43. A.I.R. 1959 Bom.33
44. Ibid pr.l p.34.
45. Ibid see pr.7-8 pp.36-8.
46. A.I.R. 1959 Rajasthan 24 at pr.9-10 p.26.
47. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 855 at pr.8 p.859.
43. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 54.
49. Ibid at pr.4 p.55.
30. A.I.R. 1961 Or. 154.
51. Ibid at 155.
52. See Mr. R.K.Kapur: The Easement of Nuisance A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 8,
commenting on the following judgements of Dhavan J.^tBhagwati v Dwarika 
ffrashad A.I.R. 19^3 All.3; Bankey Lai v Kishanlal A.I.R. 196? All. 43. 
Note the comments on judicial method at pr.lb p.9«
53* A.I.R. 1959 Madras 464.
where it was admitted that English law does not know of the problem of
5k £5riparian owners as it exists in India but followed it all the same.
There are however a lot of cases where the English law has in
fact been followed without fuss. Thus in Hotel Imperial v Hotel Workers1
56Union Wanchoo J. follows the law on the master-servant relationship
in an industrial dispute case without much ado. In Saurashtra v Hemon 
57Haji Ismail Hidayatullah J. follows the English law on "act of state" 
after some discussion.^In Union v Kishori La^Subha Rao J. (for the 
majority) was constructing a deed; but despite his claim to be unin­
fluenced by authority^he regarded the English law on this point well
61 6 2settled and followed it. Sarkar J. (in dissent) did not dispute the
CST.
authority of the English case law either. In I. T. Commr. v Jairam 
Val.ji^ the Court makes extended use of English case law on an Income Tax 
point.^In Maktul Bhai v Man Bhai^Ca.iendragadkar J. followed the 
^nglish law of stare decisis.^
5k, Ibid at pr.6.
55* Ib id  at pr.13 p.A67-
56. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 13^2. The case law cited is: pr.10 p. 13^5 citing 
tianley~v Pease Ltd.(1915) IK.3. 698; Wallwork v Fielding (1922) 2 K.3.66 
and Indian case law.
57. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1383 pr.2o p.1390.
58. Ib id  p r .10-17 pp.1387-88.
59. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1362.
60. Ibid at 1368.
61. Ibid at pr.5 p.1386-7-
62. Ibid at pr.9 p.1368.
63- Ibid at pr.26 p.1373-
6k. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 291.
65- Ibid at pr.2 p.292-3; pr.8-9 p.295; pr.13 p.296; pr.20 p.298; pr.21 
p.299; pr.22-3 p.299.
66. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 918.
•67. ' Ibid at' pr.9 p.922-3 quoting from the Corptis' Juris' Secundum and 1£ 
Halsbury (2d) 257 pr.557 •
1. vj' ^
The High Courts have followed the same course and in the
69 • rrecent Madras case of Sundaram Mills v Union Ramakrishan J. (for
himself and Sadasivan J.) preserved the Common Law doctrine that State
dues must be paid first.
The Supreme Court has between 1950 and 1970 decided 172 cases
on the Indian Contract Act 1872, 31 on the Indian Trusts Act 1882, 36
oh the Specific Relief Acts of 1877 and 1963» 942 on Criminal Law and
7020 (including Kushru v Guzder which we have discussed above) on torts.
In all of these areas the English law has by and large been followed.
But care has been taken not to offend the textual provisions of the
71text in the statute in each case. Thus in Satyabrata Mugneeram the 
Court stressed that while Section 56 of the Indian Contract did represent 
the doctrine of frustration in English law, the textual requirements did 
suggest some differences. The classic case on this is in fact the Privy 
Council case, in which they followed the text of Section 53A of the 
transfer of Property Act, and declared that the doctrine of part perfor­
mance which that Section embodied could on the terms of the text only be
68. See Madras v Mohd. Ghani A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 464 at pr.13 p.467 (on 
Easements); Kalappan v *mnhi Raman (1957) Mad. 176 at 185. "It is to our 
mind clear that-the (Indian) Statute enacts the same rule" (on Section 
128 of the Indian Contract Act 1872); Madras v Ramalingam & Co. A.I.R.
1957 Madras 212 (Contract) at pp.217-8; 221-2, 224-7, 235-6 and result 
thereof.
69. A.I.R. 1970 Madras 190 at pr.5 p.192.
70. A list of all these cases was compiled from the All India Reporter.
r£he list of Criminal law cases is taken from Soonavala: The Supreme Court 
and Criminal law (1968 Edn) pp.iv-lxliii. It includes cases on the Indian 
Penal Code i860, the Evidence Act 1872, the Criminal Procedure Act 1898
and the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The cases on the Contract
Act 1872 include cases on Agency.
71. A.I.R. 1954- S.C. 44-.
72used as a defence and not to establish a right. Again, the English
law on offer and acceptance has not been followed because of the terms
73of the Contract Act in cases of contract by telephone.
But the Courts have also tried to evolve in some cases a
different approach of their own. An extremely good example of the
influence of English law will be analysed in Chapter VII where we will
go into the way the Supreme Court has discussed the doctrine of Crown
privilege as embodied in Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872.
Another good example of the way the English law can be twisted in an
7kIndian context is Sitaram v Santanu Prashad in which the Court dis­
cussed the doctrine of vicarious liability in tort. Hidayatullah and 
Bachawat JJ. used the English law to hold that the owner of a taxi cab 
was not liable for an accident caused by his driver allowing the cleaner 
of the car to drive the car. Subfta Rao J. too used the English law to 
extend the liability of the absentee taxi car owner, and thus extending 
the principles of vicarious liability, so that the person v/ho could 
afford to pay the claim of the crippled man was liable, along with his 
insurance company.
....... Judges are keenly aware that the English law must not be
blindly followed, rAiis is very well illustrated by an incident related
by the Attorney General recounting his arguing the case Joesepit- Vellukumel
75v Reserve Bank of India. He observed :
72. P.K.Das v Dantmara Tea Estate Ltd. A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 1.
73- See Bhagwan Das v Girdhari Lai & Co. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. k3 (per Shah J.) 
For another example of this see Lakshmi? Amma v T.Narayana Bhatta A.I.R. 
1970 S.C. 1367 (on undue influence in Section 16 of the Contract Act I872) 
and note the comments of G.II.San (1971) 15 J.I.L.I. 127-13^*
7k. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1697.
75. (1962) 3 (Supp.) S.C.R. 632.
”tl) referred to American procedure which showed that even 
in the United States, the executive ... could initiate the closure 
... of Banks. Justice Kapur was a member of the bench. He was 
particularly well known for his fondness for English decisions, 
particularly those of the House of Lords. When I cited the 
American cases he interrupted : ’Mr. Attorney General, why must 
you travel that far, cannot you find authorities nearer home ?’
I promptly replied ’Yes, my lord, the position is the same in 
Japan ...MI 76
The whole Court, including Justice Kapur, laughed.
Indian Courts are aware that they must no longer look to the 
Courts of law outside the country for precedents. But they are also 
aware that they must interpret the law while taking into account the law 
of England, because the law in India is based on English law. The facts 
of the case before them, the text of the statutes and local conditions 
have been brought to bear in the interpretation of statutes. Certainly 
the emphasis on English law will continue. But beneath this following 
of English law, the Courts are evolving precedents which if read in 
the factual context of their respective cases disclose a not so apparent 
but extremely real adaptation of English law to Indian situations. There 
are of course, as we have seen, numerous cases where the English law is 
referred to, and followed without much fuss. The breakaway process is 
naturally gradual and formal adherence to English law i
To conclude, the Supreme Court in interpreting the content 
of J.E.G.C. look to the English law, but they have always been very 
selective in the process of selecting what the English law on a parti­
cular point is in fact. They create precedents which are expressed in
76. Setalvad: My life (1970) at 3&7« Note also the friendly but teasing 
Comments made by S.R.Das C.J. about Justice Kapur (quoted by Setalvad at 
367) ” ... Then comes my Brother Kapur, when an argument is in full swing, 
he distinctly remembers that there is a decision either of the House of 
Lords or of the Privy Council which is pat on the point under discussion 
but that decision he cannot for the moment unfortunately lay his hands on 
and all members of the Bar cannot find it until the case is over.”
terms of English law, but applied to given Indian facts. The rqtio of
the cases is often confused (as in the three J.E.G.C. cases above) and
difficult to follow, but the approach is distinctly Indian. It will
take some time for precedents illustrating this distinct adaptation
77nprocess to mature, as they have in America, -i-he profess is slow, con­
fusing and indirect. A foreign observer commenting on the process of 
adaptation of English law in the West Indies makes the following remarks, 
which are very appropriate in India* s context as well i
"At the present time it is premature to speak of West Indian 
law. For such uniformity of content and approach to be found among 
the fifteen different legal systems in the West Indies is largely 
a result of receiving and adopting English law. In some branches 
of law there has been a response to local needs, but too often 
perhaps it has taken the form of piece-raeal amendment to English 
provisions, too rarely has it been from an inquiry into first 
principles. If there is ever to be a body of law which can 
realistically be called West Indian, it can only be achieved by 
a systematic re-thinking of the basic legal principles in the 
context of the West Indies through some collaborative effort 
between the territories concerned." 78.
77• See for example Boscoe Pound : Jurisprudence (1959) on the fate of 
Hyland v Fletcher in the United States.
78. K. W. Patchett: English law in the West Indies. 12 I.C.L.%. 922 at 962.
5. The Supreme Court and the Use of Interveners.
The presence of an intervener in a case often widens the scope
of the appeal because the intervener brings with him a point of view
which may be different from the point of view of the parties in the case
in which an intervention has been made. So much so that intervention
has been compared to political lobbying.^
The Supreme Court rules say very little about interveners and
the principles that the Court will follow to determine whether they will
allow an intervention or not. The word "intervener" is used only in
°rder VI r.2 (iii) which reads :
"2. The power of the Court in relation to the following matters 
may be exercised by a single judge sitting in Chambers
(iii) ... application for striking out or adding party or for 
intervention in suit, appeal or other proceeding." 2
The only other relevant provision is Order XLIII whidh reads :
"1. The Court may direct notice of any proceedings to be given to 
tile Attorney General on India or the Advocate General of any State 
(;) and the Attorney General for India or the Advocate General to 
whom such notice is given may appear and take such part in the 
proceedings as he may be advised.
2. The Attorney General for India or the Advocate General for 
any State may apply to be heard in any proceeding before the Court 
and the Court may, if in its opinion the justice of the case so 
requires, permit the Attorney General for India or the Advocate 
General applying to appear and be heard subject to such terms as 
to costs or otherwise as the Court thinks fit." 3
1. Cn the importance of interveners see Philip B. Kurkland: Towards a 
political Supreme Court (1969) 37 Univ. of Chicago Law He view 19 at 3^6 
R.Seidman: The judicial process reconsidered in the light of the role 
theory (1969) 32 Mod.L.Rev. 516 at 525; Vose: Litigation as a pressure 
group activity 2'62 Annals~20, 27-30; Harper and Ellington: Lobbyists 
before the Court" Q.9537~1Q1 Univ. of Pa.l.Hev. 1172
Wiener: The Supreme Court's new rules (19540 6b Har.L.Rev. 20 80. 
Unfortunately very little has been written in India on the subject.
See Agarwala & Datta: Practice and procedure in the Supreme Court 
of India 157* ~
2. Supreme Court Rules 1966 as amended up to date.
3. Supreme Court Rules 1966 as amended up to date.
Thus we can see that no specific rules about intervention exist. Thus
4
the Supreme Court observed in M. H. Qureshi v Bihar :
’’There is no other express provision for permitting a third 
party to intervene in the proceedings before this Court. In 
practice, however, this Court, in (the) exercise of its inherent 
powers, allows a thiid. party to intervene when such third party 
is party to some proceedings in this Court or in the High Court, 
where the same or similar questions are in issue, for the deci­
sion of this Court will conclude the case of that party.”
5
Although in M/S Bam Chand Jagdish Chand v Union the Court 
would not allow a party whose petition had been dismissed by a High Court 
to intervene, its policy in allowing intervention has been fairly 
liberal. A statistical breakdown of the incidence of intervention
(as given in reported cases) is given in the Table(Lbelow :
Year




No. of Reported Cases 
in which 
Intervention Permitted
1950 if 1961 19
1951 9 1962 22
1952 10 1963 ■"21
1933 12 1964 16
1934 13 1965 19
1955 3 I966 29
1956 3 1967 14
1957 10 1968 19
1958 12 1969 10
1959 13 1970 21
I960 20
Source: A.I.5. Supreme Court Reports 1950-70 (See Appendix)
Interveners have the right to address the Court and in
Khyerbari v Assam ^ven granted the counsel for the intervener the
7
right to reply. In jtihjab v S.S.Singh there were two appeals before
A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 731 at pr.ll p.738-9.
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 563
A.I.R. 196if S.C. 925
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493
the Court - one of which was compromised. The Court allowed the argu­
ments of the counsel in the case that was compromised to be transferred 
to the case before them. The judgement shows a heavy reliance on the
g
arguments of the above mentioned counsel.
The intervener certainly plays an extremely important role in
9
a case. Thus in Ramakrishan Ramnath v Kamptee Municipality the 
Attorney General (along with S. M. Sikri - then Advocate General of 
Punjab and now the Chief Justice of India) intervened to widen a compari- 
tively simple matter of octroi duty to become an important constitutional 
issue.^ It should be noted that in Gopalan v Madras^ the Attorney 
General of India was instructed by the same agent as the State of
Madras. This was not so in other "public order" cases like Romesh
12 13 Thappar v Madras and Brij Bhushan v Delhi in which the Union did not
intervene officially. Can this account for the fact that wider issues
were raised in the former £ase and a different anti-government result
1 Zf
arrived at in the latter ? The Attorney General in his autobiography
recounts the role that he played in the former case but makes no
mention of the latter cases in which he participated as well. In
16
Rashid Ahmad v Uttar Pradesh the Union of India and the State of 
Uttar Pradesh intervened separately and the argument of the latter was
8. Ibid at pr.ll p.500; pr.17 p.502; pr.2*+ p.505; pr.26 p.505; pr.30 p.507-
9. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 11.
10. Ibid see para 9» p«13»
11. A.I.R. 1930 S.C. 27. See Setalvad (the then Attorney General) 
recounting this case in his autobiography My Life (1971) 15*t-9»
12• A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 12k.
13- A.I.R. 1930 S.C. 127. Note the fact that Mr. Setalvad was involved
in the latter.’
1A. Setalvad: My Life (supra f.n.11.) 15*f ff.
16.. A.I.R. ,1950 S.C. 163................................................
17
rejected by the Court. The role of Sir Alladi Krishnaswami (who inter-
18
vened for the Union of India) in Bharat Bank v Employees is quite
19evident from the judgement of the Court. This can also be said of the
20Attorney General1 s role in Trinura v Bast Bengal, Janardhan Reddy v 
21
Hyderabad and the famous preventive detention case of S. Knshnan v
Union^and several other cases.^
The Courts policy in asking for and allowing intervention has
2h
been by no means consistent. Thus in Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose the
Court admitted interveners to have "advantage of a full argument from 
25
all points of view" but it did not ask for a similar intervention in
other cases involving the Bar - one of which was important enough for
the Attorney General to recount^in his memoirs and to have a park named
after him as a sign of gratitude from the Muzzaffarnagar Bar Association
27 .
v/hom he represented. ^gain, in the important case of T. C. v Bombay Co. 
Ltd.the Union of India did not intervene - probably because the
17* Ibid at pr. 6 p.l65-
з.8.. A.I .R. 1950 B.C. 188.
19. Ibid at prf35 p.200; pr.^ fO p.202; pr.50 p.205*
20. A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 25 at pr.53 P-3A; pr.55 P-35; pr.59 P«36; pr.86 p.41.
21• A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 12^.
22- A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 301 at pr.10 p.303-4; pr.21 p.306; pr.23 p.306-7.
23. See Sarfosh Kumar v State A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 202; U.C.Bank v V/orkmen 
A.I.R. 1951 S.CT23O (in both these cases Messrs. Setalvad and Sikri inter- 
vened on behalf of the Government of India) Joylal v Bihar A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 
A8*t (An "essential commodities" case where G.N.Joshi appeared for the 
Government of India).
2k. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 369.
25. Ibid at pr.5 p.371* See also pr.36 p.379*
26. See Shiv Narain v Judge, Allahabad High Court A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 368; 
Babul Chandra v tJhlef Justice and Judges A.I.R. 195A- S.C. "524; Nageshwara 
v Judges of the Nagnur TTfglT’Court "A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 223; Brahma Prakash v
и.p. (T953) s\c7r TT!i59l
27. Setalvad: My Life (supra f.n.11) at p,195»
28;’ A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 367.
Attorney General appeared for the State involved. The same is true of
29the famous case of Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar, but the Union had
30intervened in Bombay United Motors Co. Ltd. which was overruled m  the 
last mentioned case. Can this account for the different results arrived 
at in the three cases ? Again the Union did intervene in the contempt
31
case of Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose, but not in M. Y. Shareef v
32Judges of the Nagpur High Court.
We shall never know what the exact effect of the intervention 
was in each and every case. But there are a large number of cases where
the Court specifically refers to the arguments of the counsel for the
33 34-intervener. In II. H.Qureshi v Bihar a pandit appeared as amicus curie
and the Court refers to him in the judgement. A foreign observer com­
menting on his role says :
29. A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 661.
30. A._IaRa  1952 S.C. 232 at pr.9 p.233-6.
31. A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 73-
32. A.I.R. 1933 B.C. 19.
33- Ramakrishna Ramnath v Kamptee Municipality A.I.R. 1930 S.C. 11 at 
pr.9 p.13. Rashid Ahmad v i-Iunicipal^ BoaTrd Kairana A.l'.R.” 1930 S.C. 163 
at pr.6 p. 163”; Bharat Bapk T^Hlm^lcy e"e's"~ATI.'RJ 1930 B.C. lob at pr.35 
p.200, pr.40 p.202; pr.30 p.203; State of ‘ilripura v~5ast Bengal A.I.R.
1931 S.C. 23 pr.53 P*34-; pr.55 p.33; pr."59 p*3 6; pr.86 p.4l. Janrdhan 
%ddy v Hyderabad A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 124- at pr.4- p. 126; S.Krishan v I-Iadras 
A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 301 at pr.10 p.303-4-; pr.21 p.306; pr.23 p.306-7; Ashwini 
Kumar v Arabinda Bose A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 369 at pr.5 p.371; pr.36 p.379;
W.B*. v United Rotors Co. Ltd. A.llRTl953 S.c/ 2 5 2  at pr.9*p.255-6;
State of T:C. v S.V.C.etc. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 332 at pr.39 p.3^35 Sundarmier 
8c Co. v A.P. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 468 at pr.ll p.4-78; M.R.Qureshi v Bihar 
A.I.R. 193^ S.C. 7^~3l" at 736, 739, 74-7-9; Godse vHoaEaHshtra“A.I.E.' 1961 
S.C. 600 at pr.3 p.601; Saifuddin Saheb jv^  Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S'.C.~~o53 at 
pr.7, 858-9; W.B. v Union A.I.R. 38963 S.C. 124-1 at pr.71; Anil StariSh Ltd. 
v Workers’ Union A.I.R. 19’So’ S.~C~. L3"4¥ at pr.5 p.1348; Himgir kampur” Coal 
Ltd. v Orissa A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 459 at pr.8*p.463-4-; L.I.C. v S.V.Oak A.112. 
1965 S.E. 975 at pr.9, 979. ~
- f,
34. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731
MIt is fair to conclude that the judges generally relied upon 
him rather for statistical and policy matters, than the orthodox 
doctrine with which (with one exception) being Hindus the judges 
were familiar.” 35
We can see that the range of interests represented by inter­
veners in a case is very wide, ^hus in the famous case of Golak Nath v
. 36Punjab the interveners included the Attorney General for India; , the
Advocate Generals of ten States and several individuals. In Jalan
37Trading Co. v Mill Mazdoor Sabha the nineteen interveners included two
38trade union organisations. In the Kerala education case there were
eleven interveners, most of them representing religious, cultural and
39
educational bodies. In Sundarmier & Co. v A. P. specific mention is made 
of the fact that counsel for two interveners (in this case two companies)
i|Q
supported the arguments of the respondent and that one of them raised a
41separate and independent point. To give an estimate of the range of 
intervention in cases before the Supreme Court a list of the 301 cases 
in which the Court allowed intervention is It will be seen that
in a large variety of cases stretching from Constitutional law to 
industrial matters the Court has permitted a vast number of bodies to 
present their case. The Chief Justice of India, talking about the impact
35- Cerrett (1958) 8 I.C.L.Q. 221 at 223 see f.n.6.
36. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
57. A.I.R. 1967 CO • 0 • 691.
58. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956.
59. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 468
40. Ibid at pr.ll p.478.
41. Ibid at pr.12 p.478.
of interveners at a recent academic gathering observed :
"It is with the help of interveners that we are able to place 
a provision of law in its proper perspective and allow the views 
of all the varied interests tha€£affected, to be represented. As 
the highest Court of appeal in the country, we are forced to look 
at the issues involved in a manner in which we are able to go beyond 
the facts of a particular case and adjudicate on a point of law, 
fully conscious of the public and private issues involved." 42
This view is supported by the Attorney General, who in his memoirs recounts
the impact that he made in the several cases in which he intervened in
43his official capacity for the Union of India.
The role of the Attorney General in broadening the issues of 
a case are by no means limited to cases where he appears as intervener.
He also appears for the Government, when it is a party in a case and 
represents their point of view. As Setalvad, the first Attorney Generail, 
puts it :
"As Attorney General, it was necessary for me to appear in 
the various High Courts on behalf of the Union of India when an 
important question affecting the Union arose." 44
The following Table shows the extent to which the Attorney 
General and the Solicitor Generals of India appeared for the governmental 
agencies, and represented the Government’s point of view. The figures 
are extracted from the All India Reporter and in each case represent 
an estimate for each year.
42. In reply to a question asked by me at a talk given by him in the 
institute of Advanced Legal Studies June 21, 1971*
43* See Setalvad: My life (1971) and note the comments he makes on his 
contributions to several cases. He refers to: Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 
S.C. 27 at p.154-9; to In Re Delhi Laws (1951) at p.l65-7> Bombay v 
Balsara (1951) at 167-9 (note that in this case he appeared~"for the State 
of" Bombay); V.G.Row v Madras (1952) at p.185-7» W.B. v Anwar Ali (1952) 
at p.197-9.
44. Setalvad: I-Iy Life (1971) at 161. Note that he justifies his taking 
up a private case at 193 f.n.7 and says "I could do so as the Government 
of India were not concerned in the matter." The case was Amaer-un-nissa 
Begum v Hahboob Begum A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 91.
TABLEAshewing a rough estimate of cases in which the Attorney and 



















Source : A.I.R. Supreme Court Reports
Note: These are rough estimates and include only such cases as I am 
aware of. The Table is purely illustrative and does not try to stress 
a pattern, though it should be noted that between 1958 and 1961 the 
Attorney and Solicitor Generals appeared more frequently in Tax cases.
In this way the Attorney General makes his impact felt in all 
issues in which the Government is involved. He naturally represents 
a viewpoint which is not always his own. There are also however several
cases where the Attorney General and Solicitor Generals appeared against
45 . 46the Government. The most notable example is Kochunni v Madras where
the Attorney General persuaded the Court to overrule a line of authority
which he himself had helped to establish earlier.
Another way in which the issues in a case can be widened is
the system whereby the Court allows several appeals which concern the
same subject matter to be heard together. A brief survey of some
recent cases in which this has been done will help to show the effect 
47of this. Later in the thesis this factor must be borne in mind when 
broad conclusions are allowed to emerge from multi-case appeals.
45* e.g. Mohanlal v A.P. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 786; M.K.Ranganathan v State 
A.I.R. 1955 S.c7To47 Bombay v S.S.Miranda Ltd. A.I.R. I960 ~S.c7 898!
K.Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. '1080; Madras v Noor Prashad & Co. 
A.I.R. I960 S.C. 123^; Hahboob Sharif 8c Sons v Mysore I.T.A. Authority 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 484; Amalgamated Coalfields v Janpada Sabha A.I.R. T96I 
S.C. 1214; Jute St Gunny Motors Ltd. v Union A.I.R. I96I S.C. 1214; Diamond 
Sugar Mill Ltd. v~U.P. A.I.R. 1961"S.C. 652 ;~T.K.Co. v Bihar A. I. R.~1963 
S.C. 577';' Valji" Bhai 'v Bombay' aTI.R. 1963 S.C. I82O; GoVind^Rao vUTP. 
A.I.R. 1965 S.'CT 1220; Raj~aJ^ohmiah v Mysore--A.I.R. 1957" S.C* 395•
46. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080.
47- See in the 1970 Volume of A.I.R. (S.C.Vol. ) Maharashtra v H.N.Rao 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1157 (discussed infra, Chapter ITl7 on~krticle 31(2)); 
Ahmedabad Qrp% v New S.S.V/vg Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1293 (municipal taxes 
declared ultra vires the Constitution)';' Rajasthan v Kartar Singh A.I.R.
1970 S.C. 1305 (on the Evidence Act 1872 and the Penal Code 1560)";
S.J.Hospital v K.S.Sethi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1437 on the meaning of "industry" 
in S2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947; Bihar v Union A.I.R. 1970 
S.C. 1446 see pr.l p.1447-8; Mohd. Ibrahim v S.T.A.Tribunal A.I.R. 1570
S.C. 1542 (S7(3) Motor Vehicles Act 1959 limited number of stage carriages) 
R.D. Chemical Co. v Comp.Law Board A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1789, on the meaning 
of satisfaction of government, on the appointment of a managing agency; 
Rajtfndra Singh v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1946 (on Art. 366(2) of the 
Constitution); Ker'ala~v Mother Provincial A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2079 at pr.3 
p.2080 (Statute declared ultra vires the Constitution)•
One cannot gauge the effect of all these factors on an 
appellate Court. This is all the more difficult in the context of the 
fact that Indian Law Reports no longer publish arguments of counsel.
But is is important to any study of an appellate Court that these 
factors be borne in mind. It is for this reason that a list of all the 
cases in which intervention was permitted, together with a list of the 
interveners who appeared in them,has been compiled and added as an 
Appendix. The impact of the intervener in each case is discussed 
later in the appropriate place.
For the present, one can conclude with a comment on the 
American Supreme '-'ourt, which is equally appropriate for its Indian 
counterpart :
MWhat we have come to see is the development of a lobbying 
practice, more decorous than the ones used in legislative halls 
but directed to the same ends. The Court instead of squelching 
the practice, has encouraged it." 48.
48. Philip Kurkland: Towards a political Supreme Court (1969) 57 Univ. 
of Chicago JLaw Rev. 19 at 55-
6. Problems of Jurisdiction, Arrears and Procedure.
The Supreme Court unlike the federal Court does not merely
have appellate jurisdiction in constitutional mattters.^ It has original
2
jurisdiction where fundamental rights are infringed, and to decide a 
dispute between the Union and the States or between the States inter
■z
se. Its appellate jurisdiction in civil matters extentbto cases where 
the subject matter of the dispute is valued at over Rs. 20,000.^ Recently
5
the Law Commission have suggested that this limit be increased to
Rs.100,000 following the example set by the Rajya Sabhafs abortive
S 7attempt to do the same. It also has a criminal appellate jurisdiction
g
(which was increased in 1970 ) and a discretionary jurisdiction to grant 
special leave to appeal, in both criminal and civil matters Mfrom any 
judgement, dedree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or
Q
natter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.”
1. Section 205 of the Government of India Act 1935; Article 132 of the 
Constitution.
2. Article 32 of the Constitution (on this there have been between 
1950-70 reported cases in the A^I.R. S.C.
3- Article 131 • On this there have been two cases: W.B. v Union A.I.R. 
1963 S.C. 1241; BiharvUnion A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1446. But see also Virenedra 
v’TTTPr JT.I.R. 1954 S.C. A47.
4. Article 133 of the Constitution.
5. See the recent circular of the Law Commission published A.I.R. 1971
Journal 97*
6. The Supreme Court (Enhancement of Valuation Civil Appellate Juris­
diction) Bill 1970? which was passed by that House on Aug.3, 1970 but 
lapsed before the Lok Sabha could consider it.
7- Article 134 of the Constitution.
8. The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act (28 of) 1970,
which grants a right to appeal to the Supreme Court where the High Court 
reverses an acquittal or in a case which it has withdrawn to itself, gives 
a punishment of imprisonment for ten years or more or life imprisonment.
9. Article I36 of the Constitution.
It takes over from the Federal Court jurisdiction to proceed to hear 
a case where a right to appeal existed to the Federal Court,^and like 
that Court has an appeiiette jurisdiction which it has exercised five 
times.^^The Court also has jurisdiction under Article 71 of the Consti­
tution to decide disputes arising out of the election of the President 
and the Vice-President.^ Under Article 317 of the Constitution the 
Court has a special jurisdiction to ensure that the removal of a member 
of the Public Service Commission is made in the manner prescribed by
lif
the Constitution.
Parliament has also used its powers under Article 138 to 
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certain matters. Thus 
under Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 (as amended) the 
court has the right to entertaip. applications for the transfer of the 
hearing of a criminal case from one place to another. This jurisdiction
10. Article 155 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has decided the 
following reported cases on this : Bombay v Khushaldas A.I.E. 19$0 S.C.
222 (an important case on certirari and natural justine) and Janardhan 
Reddy v Hyderabad A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 12^ where the Court vide Kania J. 
would not extend its jurisdiction to hear appeals and fill a lacunae in 
the Constitution; Daji Saheb v Shakar Rao A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 29;
Garikapatti v Subbiah Chowdhry A.I.R. 1957~~S»C« 5^ *0 where it was held 
(though not without dissent) that an appeal to the Court lay even where 
there was a right to appeal to the Federal Court; Yellapa Gouda v 
Basangouda A.I.R. I98Q S.C. 808•
11. Article 1^3 of the Constitution.
12. The cases are : In re Delhi Laws etc. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 352; In re 
Berubari Union A.I.R.~196>0 S.C. 845; In re Kerala Education Bill A.I.R. 
1958 S.C. 958; In re Sea Customs Act A.I.R. 19&3 S.C. I76O; In re 
Article lk3 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 7 ^
13. See Order of the Supreme Court Rules 1986, read with Part III of 
the Presidential and Vice Presidential Act (31 of) 1952. Order XXXIX.
l*f. See Order XXXVIII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966. The machinery 
for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Order is made by the ^resident 
of India. The Court communicates with him through the Registrar of the 
Court (see R.i and ii) Note the following rule in the order: "No Court 
fee ot process fee shall be payable in any connection with any reference 
dealt with by the Court under this order.”
15
is very wide and an interesting body of case law has accumulated. The
Oourt goes into Considerable detail considering the entire record of the 
l6case and going into various factors including the effects of political 
17pressure. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court under Section 38 of
T ^
the Advocates Act 1961 Under Section 257 of the Income Tax Act 1961
an appellate tribunal may
Min the event of a conflict of decisions of High Courts in respect 
of any question of law ... draw up a statement of the case and refer 
it through its President direct to the Supreme Court.”
Section 26l of the same Act lays down :
MAn appeal shall lie direct to the Supreme Court from any judge 
of the High Court delivered of a reference under Section 256 which 
the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the High Court.
More recently there is a direct right to appeal to the Supreme
Court under Section 55 of the Monopolies Restriction Act 1969 and a right
to make a reference to the Court .under Section 7(2) of the same enact- 
19ment. All this is in addition to the tremendously wide jurisdiction 
that the Court eqjoys under Article 136 of the Constitution.
^5* P.P.Kapur v Punjab Ptiy. no 19 of i960 decided Dec.l6, i960.
16. Hazara Singh Gill v Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 720.
17. See the leading case of G.X.Francis v Banke Bihari Singh A.I.R. 1958
S.C. 309; Gurcharan Das Chaddha v Raffasthan T/Ptn. 37/85 decided Apr. 4-, 
1966; Lakkhan Lai Kapur v Dr. A.N.Mukerjee T.P.2/1965 decided Apr.9*1965; 
P.P.Kapur v Dalip Singh T.P. 25/65 decided Nov.8,1965. Note the Supreme 
Court cannot use this power where a Court of Record convicts for contempt 
of Court• See Sukhdev Singh v Chief Justice Teja Singh A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 
186. All these cases are discussed by Datta and Agarwalla: Practice and 
■Procedure of the Supreme Court of India (1967) 38-41.
18. See Order V of the Supreme Court Rules 1966. See also the case of 
O.N.Mohindrov v Bar Council Delhi A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 888 where Order V R.77 
came up for interpretation.
19. On Jan. 7* 1971 the Supreme 0Ourt added Order XXA to govern the 
appellate procedure in such cases and Order XXXVIII to deal with the 
reference under Section 7(2) of the Act.
This tremendous jurisdiction has led to the accumulation of
a lot of arrears of cases in the Court, prompting the present Chief 
Justice to make the following remarks :
MAs far as I am aware no final Court of a country has been 
given original jurisdiction to deal, with alleged breaches of 
fundamental rights. It is a good thing to have, but the public 
is not aware of the heavy load the Supreme Court of India carries.
In no other country do election appeals lie as of right to the 
final Court of the country. No other such Court has to settle 
the labour disputes of the country. Our Supreme Court deals 
with the dismissals of employees, retrenchment bonus, wage scales, 
gratuity, tiffin allowance and a host of other things. Recently 
Parliament has in its infinite wisdom conferred on it more 
criminal jurisdiction. A right to appeal has been given where 
the High Court reverses an order of acquittal and awards a 
sentence of ten years or more.” 20
Given below is a list of the arrears that have accumulated 
in the Court over the years.
Arrears are slowly piling up. The judges are obviously
worried. The present Chief Justice recently used them as an excuse for
21not writing elegant judgements. The problem became very serious by I960.
22In that year the legislature passed an Act which raised the total num­
ber of judges in the Supreme Court from eight to fourteen. Since then 
the Court has been very troubled by these arrears and has amended its 
procedure and changed its interpretation of its jurisdiction to accom-y 
modate the pressures of a long waiting-list.
20.; ■ Chief Justice Sikri, Inaugural Address Chanigarh Bar Association 
d97l) I S.C.J. 72 at p.73 col.l.
21. S.M.Sikri: Lecture, Insititute of Advanced Legal Studies, Joae. Sil, 1971
22. The Supreme Court Judges Act ( I? °{,) i960.
STATEMENTS showing Institution and Disposal of Cases, 1951 - 1971
Sources i supplied by the Registrar of the Supreme Court by the
courtesy of Mr. Justice S. M. Sikri, Chief Justice of India.
Note : Detailed Tables showing disposal and arrears for 19£0 to 
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a. Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court.
Under Article 1*4-5 of Constitution the Supreme Court has
23the power to make its own rules. In 1950 the Supreme Court formulated
rules similar to those used by the Privy Council, But after changes in
195*^ 1939i^and 1962^adopted new rules in 1966.^ The legality of
28
these rules was challenged in Re Lily Isabel Thomas where it was 
argued that since the Advocates Act 1961 had given the petitioner the 
right to practise before the Supreme Court, the Court eould not impose
the restriction that she had to have an office within ten miles of the
Court. The Court not only refused to accept that there was a conflict
29between the Act and the rules but stressed in very broad terms their 
right to make rules over a large range of subjects. A commentator
suggests that the powers are not so wide.^ But In Re Sant Ram (1960)"^
is an authority for the proposition that the words "practice and pro-
32cedure" in Article 1*45 are to be construed in the widest possible sense.
23. Reprinted from -Gazette in (1930) 3.C.J. supplement 1-1*4- dated 
Jan.23, 1950. “
2*4. See (195^) S.C.J. supplement i-xviii dated Jan.l6, 193^-
25. Reprinted from Gazette in (1939) S.C.J. supplement i-xix.
26. Reprinted from Gazette (1962) S.C.J. supplement40-*42, see infra f.n.29.
27. Gazette Extraordinary Pt. II S3(l) 13th <5*1.1966 reprinted (1966) 
S.C.J. supplement 1-32 reproduced Datta and Agarwala: Practice and 
Procedure ih the Supreme Court of India (1967) App. I-9YI
28. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 855.
29. Ibid at 859- The rules in question were the 1962 amendment (see 
supra f.n. 26) Gazette Extraordinary ^art II S 3(1) 1308 published 
^ept. 8, i962.
30. S.Kumar: Constitutionality of the Supreme Court rules affecting the 
right to practice A.I.R. 1966 Jnl. 67 at pr.*4 p.68.
31. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 937.
32. Ibid pr.7, 93^- Here the Court upheld Or. IV Ar 23-2*4 S.C. Rules 
1950 which prevented bribery of counsel.
The Supreme Court has even assumed the right to organise the Bar. In 
1954 the system of agents and Advocates was substituted for one of
Advocates on record. At the same time it initiated the practice of
33recognising Senior Advocates whose position was to be like the Q.C.
34(in England) who can act only through and with a Junior. But the
recognising authority in this case is the judges of the Supreme Court
35and not a political body like the Lord Chancellor’s office. This
control of the Supreme Court is not wholly welcome but is to be
preferred to control from the Ministry of Law.
The most important change in the Supreme Court rules pertains
to the rules about the preparation of the record of a case. In 19501
the Supreme Court adopted the rules of the Privy Council under which
after leave to appeal was granted the responsibility for printing the
36record was left to the High Courts. This was suitable for the Privy
Council which sat in England but as the leading authorities on Supreme
Court on procedure point out :
"This division in the procedure resulted in a leisurely pace 
being adopted; experience disclosed that most of the delays in the 
disposal of the matters (before the Court) were attributable to 
this division in the administrative control (of the preparation 
of the record of a case).” 37
33- See 1954 Buies (as ataended) 0 IV r. 7 1966 ^ules 0 IV r. 2.
34. Ss 16(3), 52(1) Advocates Act I96I; (1966) S.C.R. 0 IV r. (2)(b).
35• See (1966) ^ules 0 IV v: 2(a) ’’The Chief Justice and the judges may, 
with the consent of the advocate designate an advocate as Senior Advocate 
if in their opinion by virtue of his ability, experience and standing at 
the Bar, the said advocate is deserving of such distinction”.
36. See (1950) Buies 0 XVI Note in 1954 r.2 was renumbered r.3A and 
minor changes were made in rules 3i 5i 6 and 9»
37* Agarwala and Datta (supra f.n.l?) p.12.
-U~
The 1966 rules lay down that immediately after the grant of a certificate 
granting further leave to appeal is given, the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court takes over the responsibility of getting the record of the case 
printed.^
The new rules also introduce other changes to accommodate the
pressure of arrears. The 1950 rules fixed the minimum number of judges
39on a Bench of the Court at three ; the new rules have reduced this to
h o  rn,
two, thus making possible more benches. The powers of a vacation
hi jV
judge have been increased. urther the 1966 rules contain a provision 
whereby :
"The Ohief Justice may from time to time appoint judges to hear 
and dispose of all applications which may be heard by a judge 
in chambers." 42
In the matter of transfer applications the new rules warn :
"Where the petition is dismissed the Court if it is of the opinion 
that the application was frivolous or vexatious, may order the 
applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has 
opposed the application such sum, not exceeding 1000 Rupees, as 
it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case." 43
■^■he ^ourt is gradually changing its procedure to ensure that it can
clear its arrears without incurring any more d£Lays. It has shortened
the time limit within which one can present one's appeal to the Supreme
38. (1966) S.C.Rules 0 XV r 14 -27; see in criminal matters however 
0 XXI r.17-22.
39. (1966) S.C.Rules 0 VII r.l.
40. 1950 S.C. Rules 0 XI r.l. This appears to have helped according to 
M.H.Beg, Judge of the Supreme Court (personal letter to me dated Feb.12,1971)
41. (1966) S.C. Rules 0 VII r.4. Vacation judges have tremendoug£owers 
as is evident from Sodhi Singh v Delhi A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 91.
42. 1966 S.C. Rules 0 VII r.3-
43. 1966 S.C. Rules 0 XXXVI r.4.
kkCourt after the grant of certificate from 90 days to 60 days; this
has also been done with respect to the time limit allocated for asking
45
for special leave to appeal.
The major problem however lies in the fact that its juris­
diction is much too wide. In the last 12 years the Supreme Court has 
tried to give a fcestrictive interpretation to the provisions relating 
to its jurisdiction. To this we now turn.
b. The Supreme Court’s view of its own Jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has tried to give a restrictive inter­
pretation to its jurisdiction. It first ruled that the remedy provided
45
in Article 32 is discretionary. But given the fact that the right to
move the Court is a fundamental right, the Court came round to the
view that the existence of an alternative remedy would not take away
the right to move the Supreme Court for the protection of fundamental
47
rights. But gradually arrears started piling up. In I960 the number 
of judges in the Supreme Court was increased to cope with the new load. 
In I96I the Court disposed of only 531of the 7&3 Writ Petitions pending
4 9  CQ
before the Court. In that same year, inBaryao y State the Court 
ruled that a petitioner who had obtained a decision on merit from the 
High Court under Article 226 could not maintain a petition hefore the 
Supreme Court under Article 32. This introduction of the principle of
kk. 1966 S.C. Rules
43. See 1966 Kules 0 XVI r.l c.f. 1950 rules 0 XIII r.l.
kS, See Diwan Bahadur v Union A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 1; Baburao v Union A.I.R. 
1955 S.C. 257; Baxmanappa v Union A.I.R. 1955 S.C.3.
47. Kochunni v Madras (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 316; Khatak Singh A.I.R. 1963 
S.C. 1295; See generally Seervai: Constitutional law of India (1967) 624-5 
(hereafter Seervai (1967).)
**3. Supra f.n.22.
49. See . Tables showing arrears(5^4* ^ - vA*\vo^. b-6^^0 *
50. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457; see further Seervai (1967) 626-30.
51res judicata into this area was novel and was affirmed in 196k. It 
followed in a sense the view of the English Courts that successive appli 
cations of Habeas Corpus cannot be made to the various divisions of the
High Court. This view has been recently affirmed by Section 14(2) of
52 53the Administration of Justice Act i960. In 1965 in Devi Lai's case
the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of constructive res judicata to
successive applications impugning the validity of Sales Tax impositions
54for the same assessment year. In Tilok Bhand Hoti Chand v B. H. Munshi 
55(1969) the Court by a 4 : 1 majority applied the doctrine of laches
(or delay) to applications under Article 32.'^’^his case was followed in
57Rabindranath v Commr. (1970) where the delay was of 15 years and
Sikri J. (delivering judgement for the Court) observed:
"It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, 
but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the 
Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles 
and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay." 58
51. Amalgamated Coalfields v Jajipada Sabha A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1013; see also 
Jaganath Baksh v P.P. A.I.R. I962 S.C. 1565- But see Gulanchand v Gujerat
A.I.R. 1965 SVC« II53; the earlier decision must be on its merits. See also
Joseph v Kerala A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1514; P.L.Lakhanpal v Union A.I.R. 1967 
S.C. 907; V.V.R.Hills v Madras A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1196. But note Nazrul Ali 
Holla v V/.B.' A.I.R. 1969 N.s7C.~l82 that a habeas corpus petition to the 
High Court does not bar one to the Supreme Court. The Court will also not 
allow Article 32 to be used for purposes other than those connected with
fundamental rights (see Gurdev Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1585 (on
Article 311 - the rights of civil servants))Y
52. See Heuston: Essays in Constitutional lav/ (1961 Edn.) 109-121.
53. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150.
54. See Seervai (196?) 629.
55. (1969) I S.C.C. 110.
56. See Seervai: The Supreme Court, Article 32 of the Constitution and 
Limitation: Justice reclaims its rights (1969) 71 BomL.R.Jnl. 35-8.
57. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 470 at pr.32 p.477.
58. Ibid at pr. 34 p.478.
Again with respect to Article 132 of the Constitution in R. D. Agarwala
59v Union (1971) the Court through Hidayatullah C.J. disapproved of a
single judge granting a certificate to appeal direct to the Supreme
Court. In doing this his lordship applied the rule contained in Article
6o
153(3) of the Constitution . This decision has been criticised as per
incuriam^ because it ignores Sleetion Commr. v S. Vankata Subha Roa (191
which specifically lays down that limitations in Article 133 of the
Constitution do not apply to Article 132.
The interpretations of Articles 132 and 133 have otherwise
been very wide. In Sir fhunnilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spg. 8c 
63Wvg. Co. Ltd. the Court held that the interpretating of a managing
agency agreement was a substantial question of law, thus widening the
scope of the provisions. But the volume of the appeals was sought to be
checked by declaring the principle that if the interpretation of
Constitutional matters is well settled, then no substantial question of
law is in dispute.^ In adtual fact the number of civil appeals (pending
and filed) has increased from 1939 in 19&1 to +^09^  in 1966. The only
way to cheEi£fchis is not by narrowing the interpretation of the phrase
Ma substantial question of law”, because it is only right that the
Supreme Court should resolve controversies on doubtful points as soon
as possible but by raising the limit for the valuation of property in
65Article 133 (l)a, as indicated earlier.
59. A.I.R. 1971 S.C.299.
60. Article 133(1):"Nothwithsanding anything in this article, no appeal 
shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provide, lie to the Supreme ^ourt 
from the judgement, decree or final order of one judge of a High Court”.
61. See Seervai: The Supreme Court and Article 132 of the Constitution
(1971) 73 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 5k-5.
62. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210; See Seervai (196?) 1013.
63- A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 131^.
6 .^ See for example on Article l*f J.K. v Ganga Singh A.I.R. I960 S.C. 356.
65- See supra f.n.5 and text corresponding to it.
The Court has played an important part in Criminal appeals.
66 67In this area there have been fewer appeals and fewer reported cases
68than those under Article 133» and Chief Justice Sikri’s hint that
Parliament should not have increased their jurisdiction in 1970 seems
unjustified in the context of the fact that this is the only area where
the Supreme Court has comfortably coped with the volume of cases before 
69it. The Court has always been keen to see that justice is done in
criminal cases and where the appellant has not been able to make out
an appeal under Article 134 the Court has allowed an appeal to be made 
70under Article 136. Its object is to ensure that criminal procedure is 
not violated and in one remarkable case where they felt that there had
71been an injustice they granted a discharge instead of remanding the case.
But by and large the Court does not go into questions of fact under
72 73Article 134 (unless the guilt of the accused is questionable )
66. See supra tables showing arrears.
67. There are between 1930-1970 115 cases reported on Article 133 and 
54 on Article 134. Source: calculated from the A.I.R. 1950-1970 S.C.
68. See supra Tables showing arrears.
69. Though some arrears seem to arise in this area too. See Table on 
arrears (supra) for January 1972/,J>4^ .
70. See Jariuada Dev v W.3. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 757? Achuyut Adhicary v W.B. 
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1039.
71. Ramayya v Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 287.
72. See e.g. Lachman Singh A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 167; Rameshwar Bhatia v 
Assam A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 435* Virendra.iit; v Bombay A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 247; 
Damodran v T.C. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 463; Adbul Ghani v M.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 
30; Hoti Das v Bihar A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 657; Narian v Punjab A.I.R. 1956
322; Mathew v T.C. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. ZU t; Badri v Bihar A_.I.R. 1958 
S.C. 953: Manavan Das v W.B. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1118; Mohd. Dastgir v Madras 
A.I.R. I960 S.C. 756; Deep Chand v Raiasthan A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1527; 
Bakshish Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 752; L.Choraria v Mhharashtra 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 938; Om Prakash v Harvana A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 654.
73• See Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 468; Raja
v Saurashtra A.I.R. 1936 S.C. 217; Maharashtra v M.H.George A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 722.
7kor 136/ though there are exceptional cases where the Court has been 
75known to interfere. In one case it refused to interfere where there
had been a delay of one year and ten months in disposing of an appeal 
76for special lease. It is not a substitute for the Division Bench of 
a High Court.^
The recent enlargement of its jurisdiction which gives the
Court the right to interfere in all cases where the High Court gives
a punishment of ten years or more of life imprisonment by reversing an
78
acquittal or in a case it has withdrawn to itself, is a good measure.
It is under Article 136 that the Court has an almost unlimited 
jurisdiction, covering almost every conceivable area of law. Between 
1950-1970 the All India Reporter records 3&7 cases under Article 136
79as against 112 on Article 32, 113 on Article 133 and 3k on Article 13*w 
But in recent years the number of civil appeals filed are exceeding the
Sototal number of special appeals.
From the very beginning the Court has given a very wide inter­
pretation to Article 136, which begins with a non obstante clause 
suggesting a very wide jurisdiction.^
7k* See f.n. 86.
75* See Hoti Singh v U.F. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 900; Chikkran^e Gowda v 
Mysore A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 731; Niranian Singh y P.P. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 1 
.Shambhu Nath v Bihar A.I.R. I960 S.C. 725; Bhagwan Das v Ra.jasthan A.I.R.
1957 S.C. 3^9; Panderang v Hyderabad A.I.R.~195g S.C. 216 (a death
sentence case); Anant v Bombay A.I.R. i960 S.C. 500; Raghava v U.P. A.I.R. 
1963 S.C. 73; Hazara Singh v U.P. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 931 (Pe]ujy^r:*- 
where sentence reduced to life imprisonment because intent/lacking.
76. Bhagwati J. in Bissu v U.P. A.I.R. 195^ S.C. 71^.
77. Kalawati v H.P. A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 131; H.P. v Ramakrishna A.I.R. 1954- 
S.C. 20. Madras v Guruviah Naidu A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 158.
78. See supra f.n. 8.
79- Extracted from the A.I.R. volumes.
80. See Tables on arrears supra., H.
8l. See Bharat Bank v Employees A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188.
The Court described the nature of this power in Dharkeshwari 
82Cotton Mills v C. I. T. where it observed :
"It is not possible to define with any precision ... the 
limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction 
vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in 
Article 136. The limitations, whatever they may be, are impli­
cit in the nature and the character of the power itself. It 
being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to 
be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special 
and extraordinary situations. Behond this it is not possible 
to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule.
All that can be said is that the Constitution having trusted 
the good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that 
itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power 
will be used to advance the cause of justice and that its exer­
cise will be governed by well-established principles which govern 
the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, 
plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person 
has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal 
within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a 
litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality 
of finding facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exer­
cise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this 
article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice 
is not perpetrated by decisions of Courts and tribunals because 
certain laws have made the decisions of these Courts or tribu­
nals conclusive." 83.
The Court has given a very wide interpretation to the word "tribunal"
which includes the Central Government when it gives an order directing
8 Ama Company to transfer certain shares. There are some restrictions
however and the Court has declared that the test to be followed is that
the body must be invested with a part of the judicial power of the State.
I'hus a customs officer acting under Section I67 of the Sea Customs Act
85is not a "tribunal"-even though he must act judicially.
82. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. (65)
83. Ibid at pr.7 p.69. See also the -^ rivy Council and federal Court posi­
tion which was not expressed so widely. Kapildeo Singh v K.S. A.I.R. 1950
F.C. 80; Smt Bibhabati Devi v Ramendra Earayan Roy A.I.R. 19A7 P.C. 19
8A. See flarinagar Su?ar Hills v Shyam Sundar A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 16A9;
Note the dissent of Hidayatullah J.
85. Inao China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v Jasjit Singh A.I.R. I96A S.C. 
11 AC.
The limitations that the Court has imposed in a large number
of cases are that it will not normally go into concurrent findings of
33 37fact unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice. ‘The Court will
86. See Seervai (1967) 1018 f.n.44 and add the following recent case 
law: E.i.g.C.O. v ^adras A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 380; Union v W.P.Factories iS.I.R 
1966 S.C. 395; M.P.Industries Ltd. v Union A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671 (no valid 
ground for decision by Government); Jas.jit Singh v Kartar Singh A.I.R.
1966 S.C. 773; «^ ri Sita Ram Sugar Mills v Workmen A.I.R. 1966 S.C. l6?Q; 
Abdul v Bhawani A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1718; Sita Ram v U.P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
1906 (decision by majority 2:1); I.T.Commr. v Canara ^ank A.I.R. 1967 
S.C. 417; Lloyds Bank Ltd. v Pannalal Gupta A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 428 (on 
the status of a workman); Charan Singh v U.P. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 520;
G.Tabbaya v Jagapathiraju A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 647; Gonathinayya Pillai v 
Palaniswami A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 868 (2:1); Hindustan Antibiotics v Workmen 
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 948; Ratilal Bhan.ji v Asst.Customs Collector A.I.R.
1967 S.C. 1639; Union v Indian Sugar Mills Assn. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 22;
N.S.Industries v Hanman A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 33; Madras v Habibur Rahman & ids 
Sons Ltd. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 339; ^hanapna Chettiar v Karuppa Chettiar A.I.R.
1968 S.C. 913; Rarnesh Kumar v U.P. A.l'.R. 1968 S.C. 1402; Kishan Chand 
v S.T.A. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1461; Ashiq Miyan A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 4; (where 
there is no legal error the Court will not interfere); Rarbada Prashad 
v Chagan Lai A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 395; Union v M.P.Sugar Mill A.I.R. 1969 
S.C. 630; Brook Bond Ltd. v Chandranath A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 992; U.P. v 
Harish Chand A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1020; Mudigowsa v Ram Chandra A.I.R. 1969 
S.C. 1076; Workmen V I-i.I.Co. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 12&0; Kartar Singh v Chaman 
Lai A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1288; J.Lakshmi Bai v P.Appa Rao A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
!355; Mst. Harkho v Bedariya A.I.R. 1969 N.5.C. 19; Lachman Das v Punjab 
A.I.R. 1969 N.S.C. 172; Bihar v Rathu A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 27; Hussain Umar
v Dalip Singh ,ji A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 45; Digvi.iay v rratap Kumar A.I.R. 1970 
S.C. 137; K.Krishna Chettiar v Ambal 8c Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 146; Gaziabad 
h'ng.Co. v Workmen A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 390; C.Rly.Workshop Union v '^ishwanath 
A.I.R." 1970 S.C. 488: Agra Electric Supply Co. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 512;
Vallabh Das v Hadan Lai A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 987; U.P.Mines v R.B.S.Durga 
Prashad A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1025; Lala Prashad v Hari Ram A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
1093; U.P.SWW.Corpn. v C.K.Tyagi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244; iaargun Sundar Das 
v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1970 N.S.C. 1514-; Tapinder Singh A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
'I566 (facts of no consequence); Rustam & Hornby Ltd. v Z.Engla ft. I.R.
1970 S.C. 1649.
.87. On the general rules regarding interference in criminal matters 
see Sarvana Bhavan v Madras A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1273 (note the dissent of 
Wanchoo and Ramaswami JJ.) Siddamma Apparao v Mahrashtra A.I.R. 1970 
S.C. 977 (dismissal of workmen improper); Govind v Maharashtra A.I.R.
1970 S.C. 1033; Pa.jasthan v ivarkar Singh A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1304 (where 
the Court appraised the evidence); Budh Sen v U.P. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1321. 
See also f.n. 71 supra.
also not allow new pleas; to be raised for the first time, except in
special cases.^But within these limitations its powers are very wide
\90
indeed and cover vast areas of industrial law (as we shall see later).
Its interpretation of miscarriage of justice, though atobitrary, is 
91very wide.
In a recent visit to England the ^hief Justice of India
informed an academic gathering that arrears in the Allahabad High Court
92have piled up to 80,000 cases. He feared that the Supreme Court might
88. See Seervai (1967) 1019 f.n. 54. Add the following recent cases : 
Cantonment Hoard v Pyare Lai A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 108; S.Asia Industries v 
•Sarup Singh A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 346;' Hindustan Antibiotics v Workmen A.I.R. 
I967 S.C. 948; Kamani iietal Alleys Ltd. v Workmen A.I.R. 196? S.C. 1175 
^stressed that appeal was not on every point of law); K.Kumar v J.K.
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1368;. I.T.Commr. v Hukum Qhand A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1907»
H/S Dabur Deoghar v Workmen A.I.R. I960 S.C. 17; Union Co-op Ins. Soc.
v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 78; Ragho Prashad v Sri Krishna A.I.R. 1969
S.C. 316; Mysore v Achiah Chetty A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 477; P.R.K.3.Works v Land 
Reforms Comrar. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 897; Lachmanndas v Jalalabad Mun. A.I.R.
1969 S.C. 1126; Athani Mun. v Labour Court A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1335; Ram 
Gopol y II.P. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 153; Dili an Singh v Saharanpur Mun. A.I.R.
1970 S.C. 318; Sitabai v Ramchandra A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343; C.I.T. v N.Behari 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 388; S.T.Commr. v H.P.E.B. Jabalpur A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
732;Assam v M.K.Das A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1255; Kala.ji Tamasanoa v Khyanegouda 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1420; Premlata v Lakshraan Prashad A.I.R. 197Q N.S.C.
1525; Murtaza & Sons Ltd.v Nazir Mohd. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 668 (the entire 
case is not at large).
89. See B.K.Bhandar v Dhanmangaon Mun. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 249 (the new plea 
was important) Hiralal v Kasturbhai A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1853 (the Court cone 
sidered an obvious point, which was missed in the Court below); State 
Bank. Hyderabad v V.A.Bhinde A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 196 (limitation plea allowed 
as no fresh facts had to be investigated); Contrast Madan Lai v Pun.jab 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1590 (plea based on fresh facts not be be investigated).
90.,( On procedural matters see Laliteshwar Prashad v Baleshwar Prashad 
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 580 (that the Representation of Peoples Act 1951 does 
not restrict Article 136); Master Oonst.Co. v Orissa A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
1047 (Article 136 can apply even if Article 226 is not availed of);
Siruur Paper Mill v W.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1520 ( .^ppeal maintainable 
even where normal procedure bypassed). But see O.N.Mohinder v Bar Council 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 888 (where alternative right to appeal not exhausted);
N.R. Co-one rat ive Society v Ind.Trib. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1182 (order in ^rit 
petition not appealable).
91. See supra f.n. 71» 8 7, 89.
92. Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies June 21, 1971*
find itself in the same boat, -‘•he judiciary has been called India’s
93most successful nationalised Industry. As more and more cases get
filed before the Courts this industry will flourish more and more, but
it will do so without ensuring that it fulfills the function which
the judiciary set out to serve. This malaise seems to have reached
the Supreme Court of India. One judge suggests that the Supreme Court
94decide only constitutional cases on the American pattern, but this 
would in fact mean going back to the Federal Courtfs function, which would 
be too narrow. Meanwhile an Arrears Committee has been set up under 
Ex-Chief Justice Shah.
The pressure of arrears is tremendous and must be kept in 
mind when we consider the special problems selected for study.
93• A. Gledhill in I.C.L.Q. Supp. No. 8. ^  ^
94. M.H.Beg, Supreme Court Judge. Personal letter to the author dated 
Feb.14, 1972. (But he discussed other schemes as well, while recognising 
the defects of his own suggestion).
CHAPTER III , ,, f,.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
1, Areas of controversy - The alleged political bias.
Two main criticisms have been levelled against the Supreme Court :
1. Its decisions are of a political nature.
2. It has followed Anglo-American Common Law ideas rather than
catered for Indian habits and needs.
The first is a popular criticism of the Supreme Court made by 
1 2
politicians and others • Lawyers too have assumed that the Court must 
either be ’’right” or ’’left” wing and that the Constitution can be inter­
preted in either of these two ways. Indeed one writer has made the
"right” wing attitudes of the Court the subject of a doctrinal disserta- 
3
tion. The reason why this argument had acquired credibility is because 
the lawyer, prompted partly, by the text of the Constitution and partly 
by the need to give his arguments a cosmopolitan objectivity, uses 
western political terminology. This is evident from the discussions on
4 Iproperty before Independence ,,
1. e.g. During the debate on the Fourth Amendment Bill e.g. (1935) L.S.D. 
Vol.II Pt.II p.1949; during the debate on Nath Pai’s Bill to Amend the 
Constitution (1970) Fourth Series Vol.36 No.10 col.241-329- Note however 
M.Desai M.P.’s comment on the Bank Nationalisation case (R.C.Cooper v 
Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564) as "one of the most learned judgements ever 
seen in the world" (at col.283). Politicians are responsible for drawing 
the Supreme Court into the arena of political controversies.
2. e.g. Government Publication: The Second Five Year Plan (1956 Delhi)
18; Freidman: Joint International ventures in India (1959) 39; D.E.Smith: 
Nehru and Democracy (1958) 141; Merrillat: A historical footnote to Bela 
■‘•'anerjee’s case ... (1959) I J.I.L.I. 183 at 184 (f.n.) citing the above refs.
3. H.M.Jain: The right to property (1968 Allahabad) e.g. at 151 (hereafter 
cited as H.M.Jain (1968)). See an illuminating though very brief criticism 
of the political tone of the book by Derrett: (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q.511 at 512.
4. See for example the Karachi Resolution (1931); The "Simon" (Indian 
Statutory) Commission Report (1930) Vol.II (Cmd.3569) at 36 were against 
the Bill of Rights "Experience has not shown them to be of great political 
value"; this enhanced their political importance and they were considered 
in the Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (1934) 
Vol.I, Part I (H.C.5; H.L.6) pr.336-372; 3.299 of the Government of India 
Act 1953 therefore incorporated the right to Property. For the background 
discussion see Hansard (1934-5) ^00 H.C.D. (Fifth Series)1071-90. See
also Merrillat: Land and the Constitution in India (1970) 37-51; (hereafter 
cited, as Merrillat (1970))-: H.M.Jain- (1968) 10-23..........................
in the Constituent Assembly"^ , and in the articles and text books written
6 7by lawyers and judges after Independence.
But the charge of "political bias" overlooks the fact that 
the Supreme Court has not in fact invalidated many statutes on the 
grounds that they violate the provisions relating to Property rights.
In i960 an American observer was surprised to find that in the field
The main discussion is at IX C.A.D. 1191-13H* But see also the 
earlier discussion at VIII C.A.D. 506-318 where ohly the abolition of 
Zamindari is discussed. See further Merrillat (1970) 51-78; H.M.Jain 
(1968) 2A-56; G.Austin: The Indian Constitution (i960) 8A-101.
6. See for example Gyan Prakash: Our Constitution and the right to 
Equality, Liberty and Property (195®) 52 All.L.J.Jnl. 5; K.Venkoba Kao: 
Liberty and Social Control (1953) S.C.J. Jnl. 203 at 205 (on police 
power and the right to property); M.K.Kambiyar: American borrowings in 
the Indian Constitution (195^) S.C.J. Jnl. 151; Bebi Prashad: A peep 
into the philosophy of law A.I.R. 1955 Jnl. 78; T.K.Tope: The Supreme 
Court of India and the right to property"Tl955) 57 3om.L.R. Jnl. 67; 
V.G.Ramachandran: Principles of Property Rights and the social, structures 
of States in the world (1959) S.C.J. Jnl. 1; G.V.Venkata Subha Rao: 
Vicissitudes of property as a Fundamental Right in Studies in_law (i960 
A.P.H.) 177; Ibid: Indian Constitutional__law_ Cl97*1) Vol I 379-39*2;
H.R.Ursekar: Fundamental Rights""(l^oT £>2 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 129; B.K.Sharma:
A pragmatic evaluation of Fundamental Rights ri96oT~S.C.J. Jnl. 18; 
P.S.Chaudhri: Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution A.I.R. 1962 
Jnl. 28, 33; D.C.Jain: Concept of property and the Supreme Court A.I.R.
I964 Jnl. 6; Surya Kumar: Right to property and public purpose (i960)
Indian Advocate 39; R.C.Hingorani: Concept of Property as a fundamental 
Right, A.I.R. 1959 Jnl. 28.= (1958) S.C.J. Jnl. 199; Jagat Narain: The 
Indian Supreme Court and Property Rights... (T968) III Journal of Law and 
Economic_Dev. 1A7-80; G.C.Vankata Subharao: Property Rights and the ZST^ 
Amendment (1972) I S.C.J. Jnl. 1-9 (but note emphasis on Hindu approach 
at pp.8-9); V.G.Ramachandran: People of the Indian Ration v The Judiciary 
and Parliament (1972) I S.C.J. Jnl. 9-14-*
7. More recently judges seem to have come out into the open to discuss 
more freely their views on the right to property. For a defence of the 
Supreme Court’s position see K.Subha Rao: Our Constitutional Problems
(1970) Chapter II; The Right to Property in the Indian Constitution (Shroff 
Memorial Lecture) rep. (1969) I S.C.V/.R. Jnl; Hidayatullah: The Constitution 
Parliament and the Court (1972 Sri Ram "Memorial Lecture) who is of the 
opinion that the right to property ought not to have been included in the 
Constitution but since it was the Court was bound to protect it. Gajendrad- 
kar, however, delivering the Tagore Lectures on Indian Parliament and 
Fundamental Rights (1972)(see Rational Herald Feb 26,1972, Feb 23,1972) has 
criticised the Supreme|3ourt for forcing Parliament to amend the Constitution
of agrarian reform the Court has invalidated ohly one such statute.
Tn the Table below is given an estimate of the extent to which the 
Supreme Court has invalidated statutes as ultra vires Property rights 
and the number of votes cast for or against the validity of a statute.
TABLE I showing the extent to which the Supreme Court has declared 
statutes ultra vires property rights.
Date
Total no. 










1950-54 22 7 31.8 118 81 37
1955-59 30 2 6.67 171 159 12
1960-70 147 23 16.3 696 568 128
Totals 199 32 16.84 935 808 177
Source: Calculated from the A.I.R.(Supreme Court) 1950-1970
As the Table shows, the Court has not embarrassed the Government
by declaring Property rights ultra vires the Constitution, even though
they have assumed controversial positions on various aspects of property
9
rights which have caused alarm and led to Constitutional Amendment , and
8. Merrillat: A historical footnote to Bela Baner.jee's case (1959)
I J.I.L.I. 183 at 18^ citing Rajasthan v Nath Hal A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 307.
He overlooked the fact that vital sections in the Bihar Land Reform Act 
1950 were struck down in Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252 and that 
a statute was declared unconstitutional in Raghubir v Court of Wards 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 375- But his statement is by and iarge accurate. The 
Court began to make its presence felt in the area of agrarian reform only 
after Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080 (the significance of which 
will emerge later in this Chapter).
9- The First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments (1951» 1954, 1964) were 
caused by decisions of the Courts. These are discussed in their appropriate 
places later.
forced the Court into declaring that the Government does not have the 
power to amend Fundamental Rights,'*’0 But the Court’s approach suggests 
that it is chagrined more by the fact that the Amendments are deviations' 
from the principles of cosmopolitan jurisprudence and deprive them of 
the power of review, rather than the fact that they might be of a poli­
tical nature. To understand the Court’s attitude we have to look to 
the problem of interpreting a Western theory of property in an Indian 
context, rather than allege the Court's political bias.'*"'*'
10. This was done by a 6:5 majority in Golak Nath v Punjab A.I.R. 1967
S.C. 1643 (for extrajudicial comments on this see f.n.7* The case is 
discussed more fully in Chapter VII).
11. The Court has rarely used the language of politics. A stray example 
is Gajendragadkar C.J.’s suggestion in Akadasi Paladan v Orissa A.I.R. 
1963 S.C. I cl4*7 at pr./lf Js,0S3t‘Aat the 1st Amendment Act was ideologically 
motivated.
2. The JT4stern and Indian theories of Property - A conflict between
modernity__jmd tradition*
There is a difference between the Western concept of Property, 
as it evolved after the Protestant and commercial revolutions in the 
sixteenth century,^" which is embodied in the Constitution, and the 
Indian concept of Property which governs Indians in their day to day 
relationship. The former treats property as if it were "owned" exclu­
sively by a person, while the latter thinks of "ownership" as a limited 
right conditioned by other rights and claims which operate simultan- 
ceously on the same property.
i(a). 'The development of Common Law ideas on Property.
In the reign of Elizabeth I, the State controlled every portion 
of the body-politic and every aspect of the individual’s life, liberty
and property. There was control on the price of foodstuffs, internal
2trade, the price of sugar and wine, the import of wool and to some
extent even the morals of the people. In Darcy v Allein (1602) the
maior reason given for the Crown's need to control the monopoly of
playing cards was the hope that
"servants and apprentices might arply themselves to more lav/ful 
. . and necessary trades" 4 .........................................
1. For a general account of this developfaent see Tawney: Religion and 
the rise of capitalism (1926). It must be noted that before the 16th 
century Roman law did think of ownership in a limited sense, see 
Roscoe Pound: V Jurisprudence (1959) 125-4. In English law equitable 
rights which operate simultaneously as legal rights are not regarded 
as rights of ownership strictu sensu.
2. See generally Holdsworth: IV History of English law (hereafter
H.E.L.) 501-2, citing from I Tudor and Stuart Proclamations.
5» (1602) Coke Re-ports 84 (or Vol. VI Coke Reports (1326) 159)•
4. Ibid at 84 b (and 159)- See also p . 85 b (and l6l).
But behind all this control - most of it ineffective - new attitudes
to property were emerging, to suit the merchants’ need. For instance, 
the law of Contract was gradually emerging as a separate branch of 
law. As an eminent legal historian puts it :
M(The) Actions of detinue,tfcover and Trespass were giving rise 
to more definite rules as to the rights of the owners and possessors 
of chattels ... It is clear ... that a law of personal property 
was being gradually disengaged from the law of Tort and this develop 
ment was assisted by two related causes (i) the growth of the law 
of Contract and (ii) the growth of jurisdiction of the Common 
law Courts." 3
g
The lawyer and merchant made a political alliance, developed
7
a political theory of possessive individualism, forced the King to
g
accede to their request that he would not grant further monopolies,
9
and in two well known cases complained that the Sovereign could not 
by prerogative alone tax a citizen under the disguise of upholding 
public interests, ^he Indian lawyer today is trying to play a similar 
role though in a different context.
5. Holdsworth: V H.E.L. ^17; see generally the Chapter on English, 
Commercial and Maritime Law V H.E.L. 102-15***
6. Note Hakewill’s comment in the House of Commons on the Case of 
Impositions (Bates Case) (l606) II State Trials 371 "If anyone should 
be free amongst us it should be the merchant1 ”Tquoted at c p.37*+)j 
Again Coke when presenting the Petition of Right (1627) prophesied 
that "the high talents and low ambitions of future lawyers will 
counteract against tht excesses of the royal prerogative" (quoted at 
(1606) II State Trials 371 at 37**) • See also the Petition of Right 
(1628) Sections I and II.
7. See the provocative thesis of Macpherson: The philosophy of 
possessive individualism -r A study of -political theory from Hobbes to 
Locke (1960)
8. See Darcy v Allein (1602) see supra f.n.3 at p.88 a (l6l)
9. The case of impositions (Bates Case) (1606) II State Trials 371
anc* R v Hampden (The Shipmoney case) (1637) III State Trials 82^-1316 
(giving a full account of the proceedings).
Out of this jumble of mercantilism, law and politics, three 
points of law emerged :
1. Property cannot be taken without the authority of Parliament^ 
(This was embodied in Article 31(1) of the Constitution).
2. No taxes will be levied without the authority of Parliament^
12(This was embodied in Article 265 of the Indian Constitution).
3. There will be a presumption that compensation will be paid
when property will be acquired by a statute. (This is embodied
in Article 31(2) of the Constitution).
The last mentioned proposition, which was evolved in the
13nineteenth century as an aid to Statutory Interpretation, but soon 
became an established principle of Constitutional and public law under 
the general doctrine of "Eminent Domain" which lays down that property 
cannot be acquired except for a public purpose and on payment of com­
pensation. The recent case of Birmingham City Corporation v West 
Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn. Inc. (1969 J^af firms that this is still 
an important part of Planning Law.
10. See Be De Keysers Hotel (1919) I Ch.197 (C.A.)
11. See IV Holdsworth 104-5*
12. This idea was later expanded in Moonil Nairjr Kerala A.I.P. I96I
S.C. 552. "
13. See Brett M.E. in Att.Gen. v Horner (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 245 at 257 
confd. on appeal (1836) 11 A.C. Davey L.J. in Comrar. of Public 
Works v Logan (189?) A.C.' 1?£ at 188; Jorge son v Sutton Gas Col (T898)
2 Ch. 614 at 621; L & N W Ply, v Evans (T89ID 1 Ch. 28*. In Newcastle 
Breweries v P. (1920) 1 K.B. 854, Salter J. relying on the above mentioned 
cases observed "It is an established rule a statute will not be read
as authorising the talcing of a subject's goods without payment, unless 
an intention to do so can be clearly expressed.. This rule must apply 
no less to partial than to total confiscation and it must apply a 
fortiorari to the construction of a statute delegating legislative powers .
14. (1969) 3 All.E.R. 172
These principles were transmitted to America where they
15
acquired the status of "Constitutional Principles". But the need
for the Courts to protect property was not felt till the passing of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Story’s editor^ writing in 1873; thought the
l6right to property fundamental, but observed
"(p)ublic lands hold out, after the discharge of the national 
debt, ample revenues to be devoted to the cause of education and 
sound learning and to internal improvements without trampling on 
property or embarrassing the pursuits of peox^ le by hard income 
taxation." 17
3ut,he insisted that the property be acquired for public purposes and
on payment of compensation^talked against control by the Government"^
and accepted the need for police powers to preserve public health and
morality only because they were only incidentally injurious to property.'
But the Supreme Court was at first not willing to accept argu-
21ments based on a substantive theory of "due process" which would enable
them to arbitrate on merits between claims between the State and the
22individual. In the Slaughter House cases (1873) only the minority 
judge was willing to evolve principles of substantive due process. In
15- The last clause of Amendment V to the American Constitution reads 
"...(N)or shall property be taken for public use, without just compensa­
tion."
16. Story: II Constitution of the United States (1873) Vth Edn. Edited 
by Cooley S. 1951 p.^9.
17. Ibid at S.1327 p.199.
18. On Article V of the Constitution at S.1720 p.5^7 referring to 
Kent II Commentaries Lect. 2k p.275i 276 (2d. pp.339-itO); Wilson III 
Law Lectures 905: Blackstone I Commentaries 138-1^0.
19. Ibid: S. 1790 p.4-59.
20. Ibid: S.1952* p.672.
21. Note however Taney C.J.'s comments in the controversial Dred Scott 
case (1^ 5^ -)»19 How.393 and the case Henbum v Griswold (I87Q)~B Wall, £03.
22. (1873) 16 Wall. 38 (The minority judge was Bradley J.).
2 3
Munn_ v Illinois (1877) the Court told litigants that if they wanted 
to reduce the maximum storage charges of grain, they must "resort to 
the polls, not the Courts". In Mugler v Kansas (1887) the Court 
accepted the substantive "due process" argument while considering a
25
prohibition statute and in Allegeyer v Louisiana (1897) they actually 
invalidated a statute on substantive due process grounds. After this
there followed a spate of litigation on socio-economic matters (of
2(3
which the famous case of Lochner v N.Y. is a typical example). By
one estimate, between 1868 and 1927 there were 248 cases of this type
considered by the Court, which invalidated statutes in only 28 cases
(6 before 1911 and 13 before 1920).27
A writer in 1919* commenting on this development,has remarked:
"The direct appeal to property and due process has for the 
most failed ... The indirect appeal through liberty is still 
going on ... (but) is dying." 28
The development of the concept of substantive due process in 
the Supreme Court resembles only too well a similar development in the 
Indian Supreme Court while considering whether the concept of reasonable­
ness in Article 19(5) of the Constitution should be generally applied to 
any infringement of. the. right.to property. What inspired this development 
in both cases was the Court’s desire to evolve principles whereby they 
can protect the right to property against unreasonable State interference.
23. (1877) 94 U.S. 113.
24. (1887) 123 U.S. 623.
23. (1897) 163 U.S. 578.
26. (1903) 198 U.S. 45.
27. R.A.3rown: Due process, police power and the Supreme Court (1927)
0^ Har.L.Pev. 943 at 9V+-5 (see the chart at f.n.14 p.943); see also 
Charles Warren: fhe progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court 
(1913) 13 Col.L.Key. 294. For Indian accounts of this development see 
Paras Diwan: Nationalisation and the Supreme Court (1953) S.C.J. Jnl.2.1; 
P.K.Trinathi: Directive Principles of State policy...(1954) S.C.J»>Jnl.
7-te.
28. C.II.Hough: Due process of law today (1919) 32 Har.L.Pev. 218 at 233*
The desire to protect "property" stems from the belief that
a person owns a "thing" exclusively and his rights should not be
interfered with by anyone, including the Government. Even in more
recent times the Common Law has only reluctantly recognised the need
to protect the interests of persons other than the owner of property.
Thus Courts are beginning to afford some kind of protection even to
29
a trespasser on another’s land; restrictions have been put on the
doctrine of "caveat emptor" (buyer beware) and the seller has been
30forced to recognise the rights of a prospective buyer, and the
categories of negligence have been extended so that a person has been
forced to acknowledge a general duty of care^to others for kinds of
32
loss other than pure economic loss.
b Juristic connotations of this development.
But despite these changes, the basic juristic attitude is
still to treat "Ownership" as giving absolute rights to the owner.
This attitude can be traced in nineteenth century descriptions of
ownership. Thus Austin defined property as :
"a right infinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of 
disposition and unlimited in roint of determination, over a 
determinate thing." 33
29. See Ojccunie^s_Liability__Act 1957; Videan v B.T.C. (1963) All^E.H.
860; Conmr. Rlys. v Wuinlan (1964) 1 All.E.R. 697; Goodhart: An infant 
trespasser on railways lines (1963) 7 9~ L~.Q.P. 596; An adult trespasser 
on railways lines (1964) 80 L.0.2. 559* For recent developments see 
Herrington v British Railways"Loard (1972) 2 W.L.R. 537 (H.L.); Pannett 
v P.KcGuiness & Co. Ltd. (1972*) Times Apr.l8,1972 p»7 (C.A.).
30. The most notable extension the I misrepresentation Act 1967 should be 
read in the context of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. 
(1964) A.C. 465. ' ' ~ ~
31. Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562.
32. See Weller & Co. v Foot & Louth. Research Institute (1965) 3 All.E.R. 
560; World Harmony Tl965~) 2 All.E.H. 139; Electrochrome v Welsh Plastics 
(i960) 2 All.E.H. 205; British Celanese Ltd. v A.H.Hunt (I969") l" V/.L.H. 
959; S.C.H.^U.K.) Ltd. v V/.J.1/hitall & Co.Ltd. (l97Q) 1 W.L.R. 1017.
33• Austin: II Jurisprudence 790*
In actual fact Austin, a Chancery lawyer, should have 
realised that property, in fact full ownership, of this sort, hardly 
ever exists, and that mortgages and trusts create rights which do not 
constitute ownership but are nonetheless property rights. Ownership 
became an exclusive ''power" and not just a component description of 
various rights an owner enjoyed. As an American jurist puts it ;
"The classical view of property as a right over things 
resolves it into component rights such as jus utendi, jus 
dispondendi, etc. But the essence of private property is 
the right to exclude others." 35
This approach became manifest in all the nineteenth century civil codes
like the Prussian Civil Code (1794); the French Civil Code (1804); the
Austrian Civil Code (I07I); the Californian Code (1872) ."^In the
twentieth century codes however a different pattern emerges. The
German Civil Code (1900) defined ownership as follows :
"The owner of a thing may in so far as the law or the rights 
of third parties admit deal with a thing as he pleases and exclude 
others from any interference with it." 37 (emphasis mine).
This is also reflected in the opinions of jurists.
34. See Noyes: Instituti_on__o_f Troperty ( 305; Paton: “eaning of
property ■ (1944)-*22 j2an.B.jtev.720; -Lawson: The law of Absolute ownership 
and division of ownership in Kiralfy (Ed.) British legal_ pap_ers (1959)3»
35- Morris Cohen: Property and sovereignty (1927) 13 Cornell L.Q. at 12 
See also O.V/.Holmes Jnr.: The Common Lav/ (lo3l) 246; Blackstone: I Commen­
taries 133; K.Pound: The law of property in recent juristic thought (1939) 
25 Am.B.A.J. 993 at 997-
36. See generally Boscoe Found: V Jurisprudence (1959) 121-3 - Prussian 
Civil Code (1794) Pt.I, Tit.8 pr.l; French Civil Code (1804) Art.544; 
Austrian Civil Code (l8ll) Sec.354; California Code (1872) pr.634. Pound 
quotes the text of all the codes.
37* (19G0) pr.903» Gee also the Swiss Civil Code (1912) pr.64l "The
owner of a thing has the right within the limits of the lav/ to dispose 
of it at will. He has the right to demand it back from anyone who wrong­
fully retains it and to take measures to prevent any unlawful interference 
with it." (emphasis mine).
38. See Pound: Jurisprudence (1959) 12; Keeton: Elementary Principles
of Jurisprudence (1949; 2d.) 172.
At the same time, jurists began to realise that there was a
juristic need to recognise that there were many proprietary rights of
a partial nature, This led to the development of a new concept of 
39’’possession1'. Possession began to be treated not as a second cousin 
to ’’ownership”, but rather as a general description which covers a 
variety of legal concepts defining the legal consequences that result 
from particular factual situations, This has been explained in a
ZjO
diagram by an Australian jurist.
Diagram
1 4FI - F4 = varied specific factual situation; LI - LI = varied legal 
incidences which result from the factual situations. Thus varied 
factual situations which describe the relationship between a person 
and property have varied legal connotations. This idea certainly 
militates against the Common Law attitude and a jurist has criticised 
it in that light :
"(T)o restrict the description of possession to a description 
of the facts and the rights would be to distort the picture.
Some of tiiO facts may be more central than others, equally so 
nay some of the rights. A mere catalogue of both will miss the 
pattern running through the whole picture." 41 (emphasis mine).
Le that as it may, this picture is far closer to Indian 
concepts than any other. Slowly, both the law and contempora.ry juristic
39. D.S.Karris: The concept of possession in English law n in. A.G.Guest: 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (19^1 O.U.P.) Chapter 4; Tay: Concept of 
possession in the Common law 0-964) 4 Ilelbourne Univ.L.Kev. 476 and reply 
by D.R.Harris: at 493.
hO. Paton: Jurisprudence (1964 3d-) at 523 (taken from Hoss: Lav; and 
Justice 171).
41. P.J.Fitzgerald: (Ed.) Salmond’s Jurisprudence (1963,12d) 269- One 
might ask: . central-to What .?.........................................
*** r\ r\,
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thought have come to recognise the existence of property rights as 
limited rights which must constantly be shared with society and others. 
In actual fact, underlying the whole movement is the tacit assumption 
that a man’s property is his and any intrusion on it will not be 
happily accepted, This is at complete variance with the Indian approach 
to the subject.
ii (a) The_Indian concejpt _of property and ownership.
The modern Indian lawyer, busy and perhaps happy with the 
western concepts of ownership, seems to have neglected the Indian con­
cept of property, on which little analytical work has recently been 
42done. Nevertheless, a distinct Indian approach does in fact exist 
and it operates on premises different from those of western concepts 
of property. The Indian concept of property does not deal with 
"ownership" as an absolute independent category but as a concept 
defining a variety of proprietary interests, including partial rights. 
An English jurist has remarked :
"(I)ndian jurists did not attribute to property a definite 
incidental content. There might be several owners of a thing, 
owning not merely shares, but extensive rights of different 
characters ... (They seem to ask:) what point is there in 
defining the owner of some rights over a thing as Owner and 
the owner of other rights as something other than owner: 
particularly when the word for 11 owner* implies nothing more 
than '^ belonging* , ’mastery* and the like ? It is relevant to 
note here that the fluid, syncretic, non disjunctive approach 
to ideas and phenomena is notoriously characteristic of Indian 
thought, gradually merging and broad identities being far more 
congenial even to their category minded attitudes than staccato 
separation of things which share a characteristic." 43
C-v>
Several examples of this may be given. C  ^property
is jointly owned by members of a family, yet certain independent legal
42. For a brief resume of the work done on the subject see Derrett: The 
development of property in India (800 - l800 C.A.D.) (1962) 64 Z.V.R.15 
at 19 - 20-1 (hereafter cited as Derrett: D.G.P.I. (1962))
43. Dettett: P.O.P.I. (1962) 15 at 20-1.
incidents regulate the alienation enjoyment and cessation of these 
interests which vary even amongst the members of the family. This
44
might appear all the more strange when we consider Mr. P. Sen’s view 
that the son is owner not just of his father’s ancestral property but 
also of his self acquired property, although he cannot restrain an 
alienation of the latter. He relies on the Mitakshara text :
"Property in the paternal as well as grand paternal 
(ancestral estate') arises by birth alone ." 45
Again, despite numerous controversies about her capacity to
46do so, a woman owns a limited interest in certain property owned by her. 
Indian jurisprudence contains a long controversy on the
43competing interests of God, priests and idols in Debutter property.
All these are discussed in detail later.
This has created an Indian view of ownership, whereby an 
owner of property has to admit, if sometimes grudgingly, the claims 
of others. This is an important characteristic of normal, day to day 
living. Professor Derrett, who has studied both the ancient approach 
and modern pressures on the concept of ownership, has rightly remarked :
"The modern Indian situation, where the wage owner earns
less for himself than others, and where the husband and wife
i
44. P.Sen: Hindu Jurisprudence (1913) 130-133* For an up to date account 
see G.D.Sonthaimar: The concept of Daya: A comparitive study (unpublished 
dissertation for Post Graduate Diploma SOAS London (1962) Thesis No. 153  ^
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies) pp 131-31 173-81.
45. I-Iitakshara 1.1.29 (translated for me by Prof. J.D.M.Derrett).
46. Derrett: D.C.P.I. (1962) 30-1, 93-9.
47. Derrett: D.C.P.I. (1962) 28-29.
43. For a recent account of the subtle controversies see G.D.Sontheimer: 
The juristic personality of Hindu deities (1965) 67 Z.V.R. 45* For the 
latest case Jagendranath ITT.Jdomr. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. IO89 and the 
comment of Derrett: (I969O 71 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 38-45.
(not less the latter than the former) live virtually for others 
than themselves can directly be traced back to these ancient 
propositions, or rather to the psychology which gave voice in 
and through them." 49
Indian Courts seem to have accepted this view of ownership
in matters of personal law (as we shall see later). But it also seems
to have p ir certain areavs of "public” law. •Lhus in
Gift Tax Commr. v P^-angaswami Naidu^  the Madras High Court ruled
that if a father merges his self-acquired property into the family
hotch-potch, it will not be subject to gift tax. The Courts assumed
the existence of a corporate need, if not (as P. Sen might have argued)
a corporate ownership.
This approach is also discernable in Mohammedan law. To
begin with, there is the restriction on a testator who is prevented
from willing away more than a third of his property."^ Again, a
person can create a private waqf whereby his legatees enjoy the
usufruct, but an ultimate dedication is made to God. The rrivy
52Council, rart of the Western tradition, considered this illusory.
More recently, the Supreme Court of India, while considering
the Islamic law of gifts, outlined the areas in which a gift could be
................................................................................................................53
made without a transfer of possession.
49. Derrett: The concept of property in Ancient Indian theory and 
Practice (1963) Faculty of Law, Groningen, p.15-
30. A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 441.
51. See Hedaya (Grady Edd. I87O) S.67I; Baillie: Hohomeddan law of 
Inheritance ”*(lB7 4, 2d.) 623.
32. See Abdul Fatah v Rusumoy (1894) 22 I.A. 7 6; 22 Cal. 619 at 631- 
See Derrett* R.'L.S.I. (19687 439- ”
53* Valia Predikandi v ftathakkalam A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 273; unhappily 2 
judges of the Allahabad High Court in Noor Jehan v Muftikar A.I.R. 1970 
All. 170 (see particularly prs. 40-45 pp.176-9) caught up in Western 
ideas of the transfer of property, declared such a gift to a daughter- 
in-law invalid. The Supreme Court case is discussed in detail by 
M.Aghahosseini in A Comparitive Study of the Islamic and English law 
of gifts (unpublished dissertation for Post Graduate Diploma in Law 
SOAS 1971).' I'am grateful'to Mr. Agh'ahbsselni for having' discussed this 
case with me.
Another area where the multitrial rights operating on the
same property are recognised in one plot of land can be found in the
Mohammedan law of pre-emption which has now become $ part of the law 
54of India.
Thus it appears that the day to day lives of the Indian 
people are governed by property concepts which are different from the 
Common Law concepts. This also seems true of traditional attitudes to 
the King's ownership of land.
b. ^he State*s ownership of land,
55The ancient law on this is-not definitive. A text of Manu
gives the King a share in treasure troves and the produce of the earth.
56A text of Katyayana gives the King one sixth of the produce because
he is the lord of the soil. Bhattaswamin’s Pratipadapancika on
Arthasastra (IIt 24) quotes a verse to show that the King is held to
be lord of the land, moveables (distinct from those that belong to
masters of families) as their oyanyam (owner); lands, tanks, water
57pools are all subject to revenue assessment on this ground.
All these have excited a lot of study, which has in part been 
directed.to support peasant proprietorship during British rule and even
54. This was established in Kahmood J.'s judgement in Behind Dayal v 
Inayatullah (1885) 7_A2KL._775 at 779* This has been discussed in an un­
published paper by M.II.Siddiqui; ?^he traditional lav/ of preemption and 
its practice in contemporary Indiq. (1970* SCAB, London). I am grateful 
to the author for lending me a cony of the paper and for permission to 
refer to it. See also T.Mahmood: Supreme Court’s decision on preemption 
a plea for reconciliation in Muslim Law (1965) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 9*1-6.
55* Manu: VIII, 39* Note also Kane III H.D. 867 where other verses in 
Manu, which controvert this, are given.
56. Katyayana (Kane's Collection) 16-7.
57* Bee (1925-6) XII Jnl. of Bihar and Orissa Research Society 13&; 
see also Brihaspati: XXV, ~&7-8 on the King's right of escheat.
after. Others have argued that there was joint ownership of land^ 
while others still admit that the King was landlord and the peasant 
proprietor had a perpetual lease contingent on the performance of
60an obligation. The controversy is, in a sense, academic because we 
have to look not at the texts but the actual land system for an answer.
We know that a large number of grants were in fact made to 
Brahmins and others.^ ^ student of the land system of Gupta times 
has remarked i
"The King’s right over land is substantiated by a host of 
Gupta inscriptions which accord the donations of plots of lands 
as well as entire villages, often with total exemption from taxes, 
which otherwise went to the King’s coffers.” 62
But it has been suggested that the King’s rights represented
63more a political power resting on symbolic ownership. In essence, 
it anpears that the King (when he had the political power) was 
acknowledged in theory and practice as overlord of the soil, with a 
capacity to make grants and exempt land from taxation. This system 
\^ as in fact continued by the iiughal and British administration.
A foreign observer sums up the position for our purposes 
very adequately :
53. e.g. K.P.Jayaswal: Hindu Polity pp.3^3» 3^i 350; L.Gopal:
Ownership of agricultural land in Ancient India (tQfcl) k J.E.3.H.Q. 151
59* Sir Henry Haine: Village Communities in Hast and V/est (I89O) 91-^ -j 
but see contra D.N.Jha: Hevenue system in^Post Hauryan and Gupta times 
(1967 Calcutta) Chapter II land Ownership and the King's Kight to Tax 
pp. 9-21.
60. II.H.Gopal: Hauryan Public Finance (1935) 62.
61. -See H.C.Sharma: Indian feudalism : c. 300-1200 (1965 Calcutta)
Chapter I pp.l-76 esp. 71- £uid 77j k.C.Sharma: land grants to vassals
and officials in flortherm India (1961) IV J.E.3.H.Q. 70 - 105; D.C.Sircar: 
landlordism and Tenancy i:n Ancient and, medieval records as revealed by 
epigraphical records (19^9 A.P.H.).
62. D.K.Jha: (supra f.n.f590 generally.
63. See D..C.Sirca (Id.,) jlaind_ system and feudalism in Ancient India (1966)
pp.2p-32 ait, 2,9-30,* ,  ...........................................
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"The King’s ultimate ownership of the soil would still not 
be open to debate if some Indian historians misled by publicists 
early in this century had not assumed that ownership in India was 
like ownership in England and that there was something unsatis­
factory about concurrent though distinct rights of ownership in 
land betv/een the ruler and the ruled. In medieval times the 
monarch seemed incredibly forbearing if he paid for a plot of 
land he required for his own purposes. In order to satisfy the 
subjects a King observed certain conventions - yet the former were 
always complaining that in practice the King's agents interpreted 
them too far in their master’s favour. But his inherent superio­
rity in the allocation of 'enjoyments' was a source of pride and 
not resentment. It was only when foreigners were found utilising 
the very large benefits of the situation to their own advantage 
that Indians awoke to the undoubted peculiarity of their rajas' 
position and, if they were educated in Western ideas, rejected it." 64
All this directly conflicts with the lawyer and judges' dream 
of "eminent domain". Certainly a check must be put on the State's power 
to acquire property and the Constitution contains generous provisions 
in this regard.
Two distinct natters of interpretation exist. On the one hand 
there is the Western theory that property rights are of an exclusive 
nature and are to be jealously guarded. This is accompanied by rules 
of statutory interpretation and the theory of eminent domain which 
require that interference with property rights be fully compensated.
On the other hand, there is the Indian approach which works on the 
assumption that the rights of an owner have to adjust -£and sometimes 
accede) to the competing claims of others and gives to the state 
extensive powers to interfere with the citizen's ownership of land.
The Western theory has been embodied by the Courts which have defined 
property more in the spirit of reform than on the basis on Indian needs, 
construed strictly the State's power to effect agrarian reform and upheld 
(despite the pressure of Constitutional Amendment) the ’Western theory 
of Eminent Domain.
64. Derrett: Bhu Bharana, Bhu Palana, Bhu Bhojana (1959) B.S.O.A.S. 108 
at 115. One should not overlook the fact that in British days land 
revenue was eauated with rent.
O'' n
3. The definition of property - The spirit of reform
Apart from using the Blackstone formula'*’ that property must be
capable of being "acquired, held and disposed”, neither the Constitution 
2
nor statute law define property. If the Supreme Court had followed the 
■ l^ackstone formula £losely, as they appear to have done in a few cases,^ 
they would have extended the protection of the Constitution to only such
if
rights which constitute full ownership in the Western sense, and
missed out a large number of typically Indian rights which have always
5
been treated by the traditional iaw as property rights.
The Indian Supreme Court began by stating clearly in Commr. v
L. T. Swamiar^ that they would protect
"those well defined types of interests which have the insignia 
and characteristics of property rights.”
Property was thus taken to include a large number of interests including
7
the right of a shareholder to manage his company, a right to evict and
1. See Blackstone I Commentaries (1773) 138; see also R.Pound: The law 
of property in recent juristic thought (1939 ) 23 Am.B.A.Jnl. 993 at 9971 
showing the Roman origins of the formula and citing the six elements which 
are usually associated with property rights. These elements are: jus 
possidendi, jus prohibendi, jus dispondendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus 
abutendi.
2. See Article 19(1)(F) of the Constitution. The words "immoveable” 
and "moveable property” are defined in S.3(26) and 3(36) of the General 
Clauses Act 1897 read with S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. But 
to follow those definitions for interpreting the Constitution would be 
to limit the definition of property to "tangible” goods.
3» See Amar Singh v Custodian Fvacuee Property A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 599 at 
pr.23 p.611; Azeez Basha v Union A.I.R. 196& S.C. 662 at pr.33 p.675*
i.e. the right to "acquire, hold and dispose” property.
5- e-g« the right to manage religious institutions or the right of pre­
emption on grounds of vicinage.
6. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 at pr.12 p.288-9.
7* Dwarkadass v Shoalapury Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 195*f S.C. 119
read with Chiranjit Lai v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 4l.
annul under-tenures, a mahant's right to manage a religious establish­
ment,^ an interest in a commercial undertaking,^ unpaid wages,the
12 13salary of a Government servant, a mining lease, a right to prior
14 15 16purchase, a money grant, property seized under the Income Tax Act,
17the ownership of land under a tenancy, the right to manage certain lit­
erary institutions,"^ a privy purse,and gold.^ There have also been 
a large number of exceptions both in the Supreme Court and the High ^ ourt.
The question is : What are the criteria used by the Court ?
Western concepts of property have certaihly played an impor-
22tant role. xhus in Amar Singh^v Custodian, Cvacuee Property the Supreme 
Court held that the right of quasi-permanent allottee of evacuee property
8 . W.B. v Subodli Gqpal A.1.R_._ 1_954_ 8• C_. 92.
9. Gpranr. H.R.H. v L.T.Swamiar A.1.5. 1954 S.C. 282.
10. Saghir Ahmad v J J . P .  A._I.k. 1954 S.J3. 728.
11. Bombay Mfg. U Dyg. Co. v Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 328.
12. Khem Chand v Uni011 A..I.R. 19^3 S.C. 6^7
13. Gujerat Pottery Works v 3.P.Good A.I.R. 19&7 B.C. 964.
14. Prem Dulari v Raj Kumari A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1578.
15. M.P. v^Ranojirao Shinde_ JC_._R!_1968 3_.C. 1053*
16. I.T.O. v Sethi Brothers A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 292.
17. Kalanki Devi v H.H.T. Naguur A.I.R. 197Q S.C. 439. .
18. Damayanti v Union A.I.R. 1971 JS.C. 966 (also discussed in Overseas 
Hindustan Times March "6"," 1971 p.4); see also Kerala v Mother Provincial 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C.207?
19. Kadhav Rao Scindhia v Union A.I.R. J-971 jS.C. 530.
20} Badri Pnphad v Collector A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1170.
21. Some of these are discussed below.
i. o
was not protected by the Constitution because
"the sura total ... (of his rights) d(o) not in any sense constitute 
qualified ownership of the land allotted (and are at best) analogous 
to what is called jus in re aliena ... in Homan law. ' 1 23
2kAgain in a series of cases the Supreme Court used English law
25distinctions to show that a right under an executory contract relating
to moveable property,^ a bare licence^7and rights under an unregistered
contract^were not property, whereas a profit a prendre,^a lease' or
30rights which are more than a bare licence were property. But this
reference to Western law merely camouflages the fact that the Court in
the first instance wanted to leave the administration enough lee-way to
31
cancel the allottee's rights, which would not have been possible if
23- Ibid at pr. 23 p.611.
2k» Firm Chotabhai C.J.Patel v K.P. AKE.K. 1953 S.C. 108; Ananda Behera. 
v Orissa A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 17; Shanta Bhai v Bombay A.I.R. 195$ S.C. 532; 
Mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 735; A.K.Mehboob v K.P. A.I.R. i960 S.C.
1657.
25- See A.K.Mehboob M Sons v M.J?. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1637 at pr.15 p.l6A3 
col.2.
26. See Anand Behera_v Crissa A.I.R. 1956 S_.C. 17 which relies on the 
terms of the Transfer of Property Act 1852 and stresses that if the con­
tract had been registered it would have been a profit a prendre and 
therefore property.
27. Firm Chotabhai C.J.Patel & Co. v M.P. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 108 at pr.21 
p.111. Mote that this case is still good lav; and Mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 
1959 S.C. 735 which purports to overrule it (at pr.23 p.7k2) merely 
decided that the rights in this case were more than bare licences.
Shantabhai v Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 532 at pr.5 p-533 (because it 
was not a profit a prendre)”; Mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 735 at pr.7 
p . 738 (because it did not run with the lane).
29. See Bose J. in Anand Behera v Orissa A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 17 at pr.10 
p.19; and his dissent in Shantabhai v Bombay A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 532 at 
pr.23 p-535 where he cites 12 Malsbury (Simonds Bdn.)~522.
30. HidayatullaijJ1 s judgement in Mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 735 
at pr.l8 p.7 0^ .
31. See A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 599 at pr.if p.601-2; pr.7 p.603; pr.20 p.607-8; 
pr.21 p.6'0"9-TO” Cwhere the impermanent nature of the interest is stressed) 
at pr.23 p-611 the Court refers to the possibility of "cancellation 
according to .the .exigencies of .the administration, of evacuee law.’! . . . .
the rights had become entrenched as protected constitutional rights. 
Similarly, in the second set of cases, the Court applied all these 
distinctions to ensure that licencees from landlords would not receive 
Constitutional protection, after Constitutional Amendment had taken 
away the rights of their erstwhile licensors. This is borne out by the 
fact that all these cases involved Zamindari rights. Further, the 
Court left the meaning of a bare licence undefined"^ so as to take 
away Constitutional rrotection from as many such licensees as possible.
In actual fact the Court’s guiding principle appears to be 
that it will protect such rights as it thinks are worthy of protection.
This is true even as regards rights tother than the right to property.
33Thus in R.M.D.C.Chamarbaghwallah v Bombay the °ourt held that gambling
was not a profession which merited protection, ^gain, in Cpyerjee v 
3Z4.
Zxcise Commr. they refused to protect the right to sell liquor,
35though that case has now been superseded by a recent case. In taking
32. bee Hidayatullah J.'s attempt to distinguish Chotabhaifs case (1953) 
in mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 735» His reasons for stressing that 
the contract was an agreement and agreements were more than mere licences, 
may describe their Indian nature but are not convincing as a test (see 
pr.lo p.74S) ................................
53. SbC. 699.
34. A.I.R. 1954 £h_C. 220 quoting at pr.7 P-223 from Field J. (who 
emphasises the Western religious aspect) in Crowley v Christenden (1890)
34 L.Bd. 620. See also Assam v Stristikar A.i.R._ I957__S.C. 414.
35- Subba Rao J.ls judgement in K.Xrishnan_v J.K. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1368 
at pr.ll p.1371-2. The learned judge took the view that liquor was a trade 
but it could be abolished altogether under the terms of Art.19(6) which 
allows reasonable restrictions. This attitude accords with the traditional 
idea that a MthingM may be legal but reprobated. See Derrett: The criteria 
for distinguishing between legal and religious commands in the Dharmashastra 
A.I.R. 1953 Jnl. 52-53, 57-62, Derrett D.L.S.I. (1968) 75-96. See also 
the more recenc High Court cases: P.Ramchandra v State A.I.R. 1971Her.46 
(F.3.) which cites Subba Rao J.’s judgement at pr.lb p.150$ Purxotama v 
Union A.I.R. 197C Coa 35 at 45-6.
this view, the Court has strictly followed the Common Lav/, which
declared wagering contracts void^ but protects the right to sell
37liquor as not opposed to public policy. But the Oourt appears also
38to have relied on Indian sources to come to the conclusion it did.
39hyain in Hamdard Dawakhana v Union £he Court, relying on traditional
4oattitudes to sex and obscenity, refused to accept that the right to
speech included advertising the cure of certain sexual disorders.
In defining the right to property too, the Court has assumed
a stance of moral and social reform rather than pretended to define
property in precise Western terms. A clear example of this is their
41decision in ~3hau Ram v Baij ^ath where the Court decided that the 
right to preemption on grounds of vicinage, which had been accepted 
as a property right since loSp, was not worthy of protection because 
it produced an atmosphere of communalism and prevented strangers from
36. bee Cheshire and Fifoot: The Law of Contract (7d0.pp.271-287 
S.30 Indian Contract Act 1872.
37- See 2^ g^ alsbuiy/- (3d) 514 citing K v^  Ijqwler (1669) 2 Keb. 506 (a
short note of tnis can be found at 84 F.R. 51*$} 5 Ihe resolution of the 
judges (1624) Hutt. 99-
30. See Das J. ’s. judgement , in the gambling case A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 699 at . 
pr.38 p.719 where he cites the Rigveda, Hahabharata, ilanu, Yajnavalkya, 
Kautilya, Brihaspati and the Hedaya. See on gabbling Kane III H.D.
538-42.
39. \ U o  S.c,5-5-Z+,
40. See infra Chapter VII. See for example the judgement in Ran jit 
Udeshi v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 88l which declared D.H.Lawrence1s 
Lach.r Chatterley1 s_ Lover obscene. This, as we v/ill see in Chapter VII 
contrasts with the position in other countries.
^  A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1476.
42. See Kahmood J.’s judgement in Gobind Dayal vlnayatullah (1885)
7 All. 775 (F.B.) which was approved by the Supreme Court* in the 1954 
case of Audh Behari v Gajadhar A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 417 at 421. But it should 
be noted that preemption has been accepted as a custom only in the North 
of India because in Krishna Me non v Keshavan (1899) 20 Had. 305 it was 
declared as contrary to Justice, Bquity and Good Conscience.
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moving into a locality. This decision has been generally followed
i+5except in cases where the right to preemption is that of a co-owner
46or someone in the family. Imbued with the spirit of social reform
the Court appears to have stressed the social objectives of the Indian 
47Constitution rather than cater to Indian needs. This is made clear
by Sarkar J.’s dissenting judgement, where he emphasised that the
48 49desire for privacy and the need to live in compact communities was
an essential ingredient of Indian life, which should be protected from
50the spirit of reformism.
But the desire to put on a reforming garb is even more clear 
in the Supreme Court's attitude to whether the right to manage religious 
institutions is a property right. In 1954 the Court took the view that
43- A_.I.ll._1962 S.j3_^ 1476 at pr.8 p.l43l (per Vknchoo J.). Reference
was made earlier to Article 15 of the Constitution, which prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of caste, colour, race or sex.
44. See 2am Sarup v Kunshi A.1.2. 1563 S.C. 553; Sant Py."! v  Labh Singh 
A.1.2. 1965 B.C. 314 (where it held that Bhau ham's case (supra) a relied 
to customary lav/ as well as statute lav/, "^ his had" the effect of almost 
abolishing .altogether the tradit ional law of precaution). vnj-kJuS
<3^ — I-YV-I fr. r-c K  0 u GaTL-^ J5-V-0 r<L-Qyj p- \ss ■ T J
45. See Mahboob Busan v Rata Bharosey A.I.R. 1966 All. 271 (where it was
held that preemption by Shafi-i-sharik (co-owner) v/as valid, but that
by Shafi-i-khilat (adjoining owner) v/as not).
46. See Ayyangar J. in Ram Sarurgv Hunshl A.I.R. 1963 jS.C. 553 at nr.21
p. 560. ....  .....
47. V.'anchoo J. in Bhau Ram v Baij i'iatn A.I.A.I962 S.C. 1476 (supra); 
Hidayatullah J. in Sant Ram v Labh Singh A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 315 at o^l. 2.
48. Sarkar J. (in a dissenting judgement on behalf of himself and Das 
Gupta J.) in Bhau Ram v Baij jdath A_.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1476 at pr.35 p.1489.
49- Ibid at pr. 33 p.i486; pr.37 p.1489.
50. See T.IIahmood: Supreme Court’s decision on preemption - a plea for
reconciliation in Muslim law (1965) I_ Jnl. 94-6 at 96 supporting
the judgement on the basis of Shafei School of Muslim law.
151 . 52the righ t of management of a mahant or a shebait was property.
Soon however the Government became a l i t t l e  concerned at the tremendous
power that the ownes of such o ffices were able to w ield and in  1962
55published the Report on Religious Endowments in  which a plea was
5/f
made that the powers of re lig ious managers be curbed. The Court did
55not reverse i t s  e a r lie r  ru lings, but took the view that i t  would not 
extend i ts  policy of treating  s im ila r rig h ts  as property r ig h ts . This 
is  quite apparent in  two decisions that i t  made just a f te r  the p u b li-
56cation of the Report, in  which i t  held that the rig h ts  of t ilk a y a t  
57or adya-sevak are not property. More recently  in  Kama j  an v Commr.
58H. R. E. (1971) the Court has actua lly  quoted from the Report on
51. See Commr. v L.T.Swamiar A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 282; S ri Jaganath v Orissa 
A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 400.
52. See the decision of Angurbal v Debrata A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 2951 which 
though on a personal law point was quoted w ith approval in  Commr. H.R.E. 
v L.T.Swamiar A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 282.
55- This is  popularly known as the C.P.Ramaswami Iy e r  Report (1960-2) 
discussed D errett in  (D.S.Smith ed.) South East Asian P o litic s  and Religion  
(1966 Princeton) Chapter 14; C.M.H.L. (1970) Chapter 10; R .L .S .ll  (1968) 
Chapter 14; I.M .H .L . (1963) Chapter 9»
54. Ib id  Report Chapter 16; Recommendations 2-7 esp.10, 26, 71 (commenting 
on Dargah Committee v Syed Hussain A .I.R . 1961 S.C. 1402) 79»
55- Thus the position on the mahant's rig h ts  is  maintained in  Digyadarsan 
v Madras A .I.R . 1970 S.C. l8 l ;  S.T.Swamiar v Commr. H.R.E. A .I.R . 19t>5
S.C. 966.
56. T ilkayat v Rajasthan A .I.R . 19&5 S.C. 1638.
57• B ira Kishore Deb v Orissa A .I.R . 1964 S.C. 1607.
58. A .I.R . 1971 S.C. 855
59Religious Endowments and held that the rig h t of a hered itary trustee
is  not property, even though the d ifference between a shebait and a
hereditary trustee is  not g r e a t .^  ^his decision, which may be per
incuriam because i t  ignores a decision reported in  1963,°^" does
demonstrate the desire of the Court hot to be seen to be protecting
tra d itio n a l entrenched in te re s ts .
This t ie s  in  with the fact that the 195 -^ judgements were
v;ritten by Hukerjea J . who was himself a scholar of the law of
62relig ious endowments v/hile the reforming trend was begun by 
Gajendragadkar J . who has otherwise been associated with a reforming 
trend in  the C o u rt.^
The Court is  caught between the need to protect the vast 
number of tra d itio n a l in te res ts  which are c lea rly  in  most cases not 
"property" in  the s t r ic t  Western sense of the word, and a desire to 
ensure that they are not accused of protecting entrenched in terests  
not worthy of protection . Instead of openly stating  th e ir  objection  
to the p articu la r claim canvassed before them, they have ostensibly  
applied 'Western leg a l terminology in  an e f fo r t  to dispel any fears  
o f . reformism. Professor D erre tt describes th is  process in  another context :
59. Ib id  at p r. fLf p.*??”/
60. See R._Choudhry_v__R. Mohanrabhu. A_.I.R._ 1971 Or*, 27 at pr.7  p .275*
61. See Anant Paghad v A.P. A .I.R . 1963 S.C. 89I ;  but in  Mamajan v Commr.
H.R.E. A . I . R .  I 97I  S.C. 891 (at pr.12 p.897T the more recent case of 
Samanada Ilu rth i v Madras (1970) H  S.C.R. is  distinguished.
62. -^ e delivered the Tagore Lav; Lectures on The Hindu Law of Religious  
and Charitable Endowments (1952) and wrote the judgements in  Commr.H.R.E.
6 oLitBIiSwhmiar _A._I_.R. 1_95^  S._C. 282; S ri Jaganath v Orissa A .I.R . 1954
s&Eb-r ' ~ "
63. Gajendragadkar J. wrote the judgements in  T i lk ayat  v Rajasthan A.I.JR. 
1963 G._C. 1638; Bira_Kishore Deb_ v Orissa A .I.R . 19b*f S._C. l601 . On his  
reformin'1 a ttitu d e  see Galanter: Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian  
Judiciary (1971) 21 Philosophy East and ’West *+6*1-487 • See also his own 
book on Secul a r ism (1971 Bombay)"^
"A modern state influenced markedly by European and 
American precedents hopes to protect b e lie fs  of a private  
character, w h ils t res tra in ing  overt acts, whether acts in  the 
nature of ’ doing1 or*not to lerating*, which are conceived to  
be against the public in te re s t. For example, the re lig ious  
b e lie f  in  the m erit of giving daughters in  marriage to an 
id o l w ith the expectation that they sha ll become prostitu tes  
is  not tampered w ith , but dedication of g ir ls  in  such circum­
stances is  prohib ited , and subject to penalty. The b e lie f  that 
animals should be sacrificed  to certa in  d e itie s  is  not con­
demned but the s a c rifice  is  prohibited . . .  ” 64
In  as much as the Court has sought to protect a large number of in te res ts
other than those which constitute ownership in the Western sense, they
have followed tradition. But in as much as they also assumed the garb
of reformism, they have taken an urban attitude to typically Indian
s itu a tions , without enquiring in to  the social need that moulded those
situations in  the f i r s t  place and without doubting the su ffic iency of
th e ir  purely leg a l techniques to be able to grapple with such problems.
64. D erre tt: Freedom o f re lig io n  under the Indian Constitution (1963) 
12 I.C .L .Q . 693 at 693-4.
k-. The Supreme Court and Agrarian Refojra.
The first major controversy between the Courts and Parliament
v/as in the area of agrarian reform. It began in the Constituent Assembly
2
in 19^ 7 and culminated in the case of Golak Nath v State of Punjab 
where the Court decided that all the Amendments of Part III of the 
Constitution (including those affecting agrarian reform) were invalid 
and beyond the competence of Parliament,
i. The Constituerit assembly. ^
The first clash between the landlords and their assailants 
began on the 2nd May, 19^7, when Rao Jaganath Baksh Singh (of U.P.) 
moved an amendment that the word ’’just" precede the word "compensation”
1. See generally M.L.Upadhyaya: Land legislation and the Indian Con­
stitution (I969) Law Review (,S0AS) 69-9; Merrillat (1970) Chapters 
I, II, V, VI, VIII; D.Narasu: Agrarian reforms (in G.S.Sharma(Sd.)
Pronerty delations in Independent India, i960) 131-1^ +6; B.Singh (Ibid) 
IA7-I06; A.Kuppuswami: (Ibid) 157-165; U.K.Jain (i960) Chapter 10. For 
an analysis of the reform in particular areas see: Moore and Freydig:
Land tenure legislation in Uttar Pradesh (1955; U.C.L.A. Modern India 
Project Monograph Ho. l); M.L.Upadhyay: Legal aspects of agricultural 
holdings in Madhya Pradesh (1967; Post Graduate Diploma h^esisj; University 
of London, 295? Chapter VI pp.lb5-207.
2* A-Ig.hn..l967.5*C- 16 A3-
3. The Constituent Assembly debated the Article on three occasions.
The first on May 2, 19^7 (see III C.A.D. 503- 13) on whether the word 
"just" should precede the v/ord "compensation" in the Article 19 (now 31) 
as it then stood. On Nov. 17,19^3 the Article again came up for discus­
sion but T.T.Krishnamachari proposed that discussion be adjourned (see 
VC.A.D. 372). The third discussion v/as the main discussion and is 
recorded in IX _C. A.D. 119M-f . Thebest account of this and of the dis­
cussion that took place in the background is contained in G.Austin;
'The Indian Constitution (i960) 87-99; Merrillat? Land and the 
Constitution (1970) 52-78; H.M.Jain: Right to Property (T9S8T 2A-56;
P.H.Ghosh; The_Jdonstitution of India : Kow iig was_frained (1966) 9^ —106 
(he discusses the later amendments as well)*; Merrillati; Compensation for 
taking property ; A historical footnote to Bela Banerjee’s case (1959)
I J.I.L.I. 375 ff.; Jagat Narain: The Indian Supreme Court on Property 
nights and the L’conomic Objectives of the Constitution (1968) III The tL 
Journal of Law and Bconomics Development 1A7-180 at pp.14-7-1^9*
. 5in the Article guaranteeing property rights. While Dr. S. C. Banerjee
thought that the Article as it stood was compatible with socialism,
A. P. Jain wanted the clause delet&d because he feared the clause
"would protect the microscopic minority of propertied classes 
and deny the rights of social justice to the masses.1' 6
S. Lagappa from Madras thought that compensation must be just but
thought
"(w)e need pay only what is reasonably required to enable him to 
maintain himself and his family (for) one or two generations.” 7
The idea v/as supported by V. D. Tripathi (a member of the U.P. Land 
Reform Committee) who warned that payment of compensation would even­
tually fall on the peasant, who would not be freed from his shackles
for at least another 25 years. The Rajas replied that their plea for
9
compensation covered the interests of the peasants as well and L. Sinha,
describing the plight of the Orissa landlords, thought that they should
be paid off as soon as possible.^ R. K. Sidhwa summed up the mood :
"It is very deplorable that at the present moment when 
various legislatures are out to abolish the jagirdari and
if. Ill C.A.D. 505.
5. Ill C.A.D. 503.
6. Jp?A.D_* 503-9 at 509* The whole speech is interesting and stresses
that the landlords have no title in the first place.
7. Ill C.A.D. 506-8.
8 . Ill C.A.D. 510-13* expressed the fear that the clause "may be 
so interpreted that any progress may be retarded and the Congress and 
public organisations may not freely advance in the direction that 
they intend to.” See also a similar sentiment by V.C.Keshava Sao ibid 
at 513*
9. Raja Bahadur Shyamnandan Sinha: III C.A.D. 51^ 1—6 »
10. Ill C.A.D. 517
and zamnindari systems by payment of small compensation or no 
compensation at all, under this clause we are asked to pay 
compensation for any property that is going to be acquired.” 11
Ae warned that
"(a)ny owner of the property will go to the Supreme Court and 
get his demand fulfilled under the clause." 12
The situation was compromised by V. Patel’s assurance that the discussion 
was premature.^
After this the debate moved away from the Assembly and nego­
tiations took place behind the scenes in order to negotiate a compromise 
but without adversely affecting land reform which had already begun in
lif
three States. As a result of these negotiations a formula was 
arrived at by which it was agreed that compensation, or the principles 
on which it must be paid, must be laid down in the enactment. But 
certain clauses saved legislation on agrarian reform'that was pending 
in the States.^ ■'•he landlords in the Constituent Assembly were aware 
that these clauses had taken away from them any protection that they 




13. Ill C--A.D. 318.
1^. The best account of this is given in Austin (surra f.n.3) 90-97;
Merrillat (1970) (supra f.n.3 ) 56-59
15. These were Article 3l(^) dnd (6) in the original Article.
16. Bee I I .Ahmad: IX C.A.D_. 1198; Baja Jaganath Baksh Sing: ibid at 1287; 
Aaharaja Darbhanga: ibid at 1270- Mote Pandit Ian’s observations on the 
U.P.Bill that he was responsible for sponsoring at ibid p.1238-9; and on
the Bihar Bill see ibid at 12 1^; there was even a suggestion that the
protection in the Articles that all such Bills should be presented to the 
Presidant for approval be done away with. Bee ibid 121p (per H.V.Kanath) 
and 1292 (per Bishwanath Das!}). Bor a discussion of the effects of the 
Constitutional provisions see Land Meform and the Law LasternBdonomist 
(March 13,1952)^728.
It was under these protected statutes that cases came 
before the Court to trigger off the first controversy betv/een the 
judiciary and the legislature on the meaning of the property pro­
visions of the Constitution.
The onus of deciding on the vires of the Bihar and U.F. Acts
fell on the ^atna and Allahabad High Courts respectively, The latter
declared that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition andLand Haform Act 1951 was 
17valid while the former decided that the Bihar Land Heform Act 1950 
though intra vires Article 31(2) of the Constitution because of the 
protection afforded by Article 31(4) and (6 ) was ultra vires Article 14 
(the equality provisions) because it provided a graduated scale of 
compensation related to the size of the landholdings, which seemed to 
the Court to be clearly discriminatory.^
Parliament (which in fact consisted of the Constituent Assembly 
acting as Parliament rending the general election) amended the Constitu­
tion by adding Articles 31A and B to the Constitution, the latter read 
with Schedule IX containing a list of Statues which were excluded from 
judicial review on the basis of Articles 14, 19 and 31i and the former 
containing similar provisions with respect to other aspects of 
agrarian reform.
This was followed by arpeals to the Supreme Court from U.P,, 
Bihar and U.P.
In the last 21 years the Supreme Court has considered a large 
number of cases on agrarian reform. In the first nine years it tried
17. Burya Pal Singh v U.P. A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 674. For a good account 
of this case and the arguments of counsel see F.J.Moore and C.A.Freydig: 
Land Tenure Legislation in Uttar Pradesh (1955 Berkeley, California: 
Modern india Project Monograph No. 1T 41-49*
Kameshwar Singh v Bihar A.I.R. 1951 Patna 91•
* S‘*s. ^f»J t
to use foreign principles to review Statutes which Constitutional 
Amendment has specifically excluded from their jurisdiction. They 
failed to evolve a consist§nt pattern of review on this basis. From 
i960 they evolved, without reference to foreign case law, a consistent 
test about agrarian reform which is now established. In 1962 the Court 
^ave a technical and restrictive meaning to the words of the Amendment 
in an attempt to bring cases connected with agrarian reform under its 
review. To these problems we now turn.
ii. The_ first ten cases; and the first ten years.
In the course of the first ten years 01 its existence the 
Supreme Court adjudicated on 11 important cases on agrarian reform.
The Table below gives the name of the cases and indicates which judges 
participated and read judgements in those cases.
Table II showing the 11 important cases on agrarian reform between 










5 6 7 8 '•9 10 ll 12
4
Mahajan *1 *1 *1 * V V V 7
liukher jea *2 vl vl * V * * V V 9
S.R.Das +2 ♦a *2 V V V V V * 9
Aiyar *5 vl V 5
Bose V V V V 4
"^ asan V V V V V 5
Bhagwati V V V 5
Jaganadhdas V * V 5
Ayyar V * V V 4
Sinha .V V 1
Imam V * - V 5
Key:
v = participation + = dissent * = majority judgement 
*1 +1 etc etc. with judgement VI etc agreeing with *1 etc.
1 = Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 j^ ._C. 252
2 -= Visheshwar v I I .P. (1952) S.C.R. 1020
3 = Surya Pal Singh v U.P. (1952) S.C.R. 1026
4 = G_ajanati v Orissa A_.I»JR. 1955 S.G. 375
5 = Raghubir v Court of Wards A.I.R. 1955 C. 573
6. = Zamindar of Eltayapuram v Madras A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 257
7 =, Verrappa Chettia/v Madras A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 603
8 = Dhirfobha Devi Singh v Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 47
9 = Anar Singh v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 47
1 0 = Kamakshya v A ssam A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 63
11 = Bhairebendra v Assam A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 604
12 = Total number of votes cast.
In only two of the eleven cases did the Court take a
19decision invalidating the statute before them. In only one of the
20cases, Kameshwar v Bihar, was there an extended discussion of the 
concepts and techniques used by the Court. In that case the whole 
Court agreed that the Bihar Land Reform Act 1950 was excluded from 
judicial review by the First Amendment Act 1951i hut the majority 
found that S.4(b) and 23(f) of the Statute, by which the State acquired 
rents and other debts due to the landlords and gave them 50 per cent 
of the value of these debts as compensation, amounted to acquiring a 
chose of action and was therefore a colourable exercise of power, out­
side the competence of the legislature. In achieving this result the 
Court was influenced by certain other considerations. Firstly, they made 
clear their hostility to the Statute. Secondly, they made extended 
references to cosmopolitan jurisprudence (especially the doctrines of 
eminent domain and colourable legislation) and found the Statute wanting 
on that basis. The latter doctrine was to give the Court a power of 
review where they had none, ^hirdly, they were considerably influenced 
by the facts of the individual cases before them. V'e will discuss
these factors separately..............
ii (a) Hostility to the Statute.
21Mahajan J (who read the leading majority judgement ) makes 
his hostility to the statute apparent.
"The title of the Act indicated that the law provides for 
some kind of land reform in Bihar. Its ... preamble gives no 
indication what that means ..." 22
19- Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252; Raghubir v Court of Wards 
A.I.R.' 1933"o~.C. 373. ~
20• A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252
21. Kukerjea J. accepts this at 279 col.l and K.C.Aiyar J. at pr.113 
p.293.
22., .Ibid, at pr..33 p.268............................................
"There is no scheme of land reform within the framework of 
the statute except the pious hope that the Commission may pro­
duce one ..." 23
"It may be conceded that the present statute does not disclose 
the legislative mind as to what it would ultimately like to do ..."
r-Iukerjea J. thought that the Act imposed onerous obligations
on the landlord without his consent, and complained that
" ... legislation of this character is a complete novelty, the 
like of which has seldom been witnessed before." 25
The attitude of the minority was quite the contrary. Shastri J 
put it very well when he said :
"The fact of the matter is that the zamindars lost the battle 
in the last round when this Court upheld the Amendment Act, which 
the provisional Parliament enacted with the object among others 
of putting an end to the litigation ... (I)t is no disparagement 
to counsel to say that what remained of the campaign has been 
fought with such weak arguments as overtaxed ingenuity could 
suggest." 26
Das J. (the other minority judge) made clear :
"We must not read a measure implementing our twentieth 
century Constitution though spectacles tinted with early nine­
teenth century notions as to the sanctity or inviolability of 
individual rights." 27
The minority, unlike the majority, also rejected the argument
that the Act delegated too much power to the executive, on the grounds
  20
that the delegation of such power was both necessary and inevitable.
23- Ibid at pr. 35 p.270.
2k• Ibid at pr.52 p27*f col.2. But note also his comments approving of
agrarian reform in the light of the Directive Principles of State 
Policy at p.27k col.l.
25. Ibid at pr.8*f p .280 col.2.
26. Ibid at pr.8 p.262-3- He is making a reference to his own judgement
in ghankari Prashad v Union A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 5^ 8» where it was held that
the First Amendment Act 1951 was valid and within the competence of the
legislature. See also Das J.’s comments at p.291-2 (see arguments on 
Ground "C" from pr.108).
27- Ibid at pr.106 p.290 col.2.
28. See Mahajan J. at pr.58; Shastri J. at pr.21 p.266 col.2.; Das J.
at pr.110 p.292-3 -
it must however be noticed that despite their hostility to
the statute the majority made it clear :
”(H)owever repugnant the impugned law may be to our sense 
of justice ... it is for the appropriate legislature to see if 
it can revise some of the unjust provisions which are repugnant 
to all notions of justice and are of an illusory nature.” 29
ii (b). The reference to cosmopolitan jurisprudence and techniques
The Court relied heavily on the Anglo-American doctrine of
eminent domain, -^ hus Mahajan J. quotes jurists from Grotius to Cooley^
31and case law not alv/ays of this century to conclude that choses of 
action cannot be acquired and that any attempt to do so is a colourable 
exercise of power. He thought :
”A11 these principles are well settled.” 32
29. Mahajan J. at pr.^ -9 p*273; see also pr.71 p.273; Mukherjea J. at 
pr.84 p . 280 col. 2 sub pr.3 *
30. He refers to Broom: Constitutional law (no page reference) at pr.po 
p.270; Thayer: I Cases on Constitutional lav; 953; Nichols: Eminent 
Domain. 3; ^rotius: pe Jureg Belli at racjs at pr.39 p.271; Oxford 
Dictionary Vol 3 p.l52(T on the rneanin;- of “'provision” at pr.A5 r.272; 
Willoughby: Corstitutional law 795 cat or. -^5 p.273; Cooley: II Constitu­
tional Limitations 113 at or.5A; Willis: Constitutional law 8l6";
Nichols: Lfiinent domain 97 at or.59 p.275»
31. At pr.55 p.275 reference is made to Cincinatti v Louisville etc. 
Nly._j3o._ (1912) 223 U.S. 390 as authority for the proposition that choses 
of action cannot be acquired; at pr.57 p . 276 the following cases are cited 
on the doctrine of colourable legislation: Iporan Proo.Ltd.__v Dty _Corrirnrjz 
(19^0) A.C. 838 at 830 ; Pox v Bishop of Chaster (lo24) 6 L.R. 531; ibid" 
(1329) 107 D.H. 520; Westminster Corpn v L & N 17 Ply (19*05) A.C. A26 at 
A30; AjLexander v Braerne 61355*) 205; Luciimeshwar _Sinr"h v
Darbangha Municipality (1890) 17. I^ _A« 90 (P.C.); at pr.59 in support
of the proposition "What cannot be done directly, cannot be done 
indirectly” the following cases are cited: South^Australia_v Commr.
65 C.L.K. 373; Madden v_ lie Ison & Port Sheppard R_ W. Co. (lo99) A.C. 626; 
Dty.Commr. v Moran Prop. _Ltd. "El C.L.R. 735 at 793 (passage cited); on 
colourability at pr.6l p.277 citing Att.Gen. v uueen Insurance Op. (1878)
3 A.C. 1090; Russell v wueen (1862) 7 A.C. 829 at 8^ -1; ^___ 1
32. Ibid at pr. 53 p.276.
33This was the opinion of the other judges also, including 
3kthe minority judges.
But if we take a closer look at the foreign doctrines used by 
the Supreme Court, we shall be bound to suspect that the Court gave a 
misleading account of both the doctrine ■ choses of action cannot be 
acquired as well as the doctrine of colourable legislation.
^t is clearly stated in American Jurisprudence that
33”The power of eminent domain extends to ... choses of action. 
But under ordinary circumstances, it does not seem that money, which 
in turn would have to be paid in money, and in many states in ad­
vance, could be constitutionally taken by eminent domain, especially 
by a private corporation, although there may be a great public 
exigency, as in the time of war, which would authorise the govern­
ment to take money by eminent domain.” 36
37Nor is the case of Cincinatti v Louisville etc. Co. an authority for
i 36the proposition that rights under a contract cannot be acquired,
3 3. Mukherjea J. at pr.8A p .280 quoting Lefroy: Canadian Co_nstjih;ut_i_on 
79-80 (on colourability); Cooley: II Constitutional Limitations 1113.1113 
'■at pr.82-3 p*280 (on whether choses of action can be acquired!". N.C.Aiyar 
J. at pr.IlS p.293 citing Att.Gen. v De Keyser_’_s Hojbel (1920) A_._C_._ 508;
L J'L u \I Kly _v Bvans (1893) 1 Ch.ib at 2*8 (on the rule of construction 
that compensation must be paid when property is acauired by the Govern­
ment); at pr.133 p.295-6 citing Long Island hater Supply Co. v City of 
Brooklyn (189?) 166 U.S. 685; Cincinatti v Louisville_etc. _Co. (1912T~
223 0 7  390- "............................... — -  — — -  -  ■
3k, Shastri C.J. at pr. 3 p»262 Atjt.Gen. v De Keyserj s___Koyal Hotel (1920) 
A,0^ 508; Central Control Board v Cannon Brewery (1919') A~._C. 7kk C on 
constructin:; statues which acquire property strictly); Das J. at pr.89 
p . 282 citing Chicago Burlington and Quincy Kailroad Co. v Chicago (189?) 
166 U_.jp. 226; Att.Cen.__y De Heyser’s Loyal hotel Ltd. (1920) A.Ch_ 508 
(on payment of compensation; later cited again at pr.91 P.283TI Some of 
the differences in opinion of the minority judges are discussed below.
35* Citing Narragansett Llectric Lighting Co_._v Sabre__50J3.I. 288 = 66
A.L.R. 1553«
3 6. 26 American Jurisprudence (2d) 737-8.
37. (1912) 223 U.S. 390. This case is relied by Das J. in A.I.K. 1952
ja.C^  252 at pr.99 p.286. Hatjajan J. is able to distinguish it at pr.55
p.275 in the briefest possible terms, while N.C.Aiyar J. at pr.135 P«296 
pretends that the case did not deal with choses of action at all.
3 8. See also the case Long Island Later Supply Co. v Brooklyn 166 U.S. 
683. The American Constitution (Art 1, S.10) contains a specific pro­
vision prohibiting impairments of.obligations..........................
because in that case Lurton J. says
"the obligation of a contract is not impaired where it is appropri­
ated to public use and compensation paid therefor. Such an execution 
of powers neither challenges its validity or impairs its obligation. M39
Further, in the present case the acquisition was of debts of a somewhat
uncertain nature. As Shastri C.J. pointed out :
M ... It is unrealistic to assume that arrears which had remained 
uncollected over a period of years during which the zamindar was 
landlord and had the advantage of summary remedies and other 
facilities of collection, represented so much money’s worth in 
his hand.”
let, as Das J. pointed out, the State was still willing to pay 50 per cent
1^of this uncertain debt as compensation.
Moreover, this introduction of American principles is a
little forced if we remember that the Court was then precluded from
examining the statute from the point of view of the eminent domain
b2provisions of the Constitution. Ihey introduced these principles on
the far fetched argument that the Legislative Lists preclude the
acquisition of choses of action, even though the relevant provisions 
hOin the lists make no mention either or eminent domain or of choses 
of action.
39- 1191.21 223. U.£. 390 at ifOO.
bO, A.I.A. 1952 S.C. 252 at pr.19 p.266.
bl. Ibid at pr.100 p.287.
b2, See Article 31(2) of the Indian Constitution. Ihis is discussed in 
Section 5 infra.
b3» List II Entry 56* "Acquisition of or requisitioning property, except 
for purposes of the onion, subject to Entry b2> of List III". Entry b2 of 
List III lays down: "Principles on which compensation for property 
acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or a State or any 
other public purpose is to be deternined and the form and manner in which 
such raornpensation is to be paid". Note that the majority did not think 
that the statute was wanting for lack of public purpose e.g. Mahajan J. 
at pr.52 p.27*f col.l; Mukerjea J. at pr.8^ p.280 col.2 sub pr.3»
The Court’s use of the doctrine of colourable legislation
is equally dubious. I'he doctrine is a device indented in Canada and
Australia because their Constitutions did not contain a Bill of Eights.
An authority on the Canadian Constitution has observed :
"Any wide use of the principle of colourability must deepen 
suspicion that constitutional limitations are merely the formal 
means by which Courts pass on the wisdom of legislation.” 44
Ehe Indian Supreme Court treated the doctrine as a general device to
prevent what the judges felt was an unwarranted exercise of power.
1’his is borne out by the fact that they rely on cases in which indi-
45vidual persons tried to evade the provisions of a statute and cases
46on delegated legislation. It is submitted that the criteria used in 
such cases are too narrow to be applied to a sovereign legislature.
47The Court also, however, relied on some Australian case law and in
particular cited passages from Koran Propriejty Etd._ y_JJt_y_._Cjoj;imrv_ foj..
A closer look at the Australian cases shows that in those
cases the doctrine was used where the Commonwealth had enacted statutes
4 9
which interfered with the functions of the States. Again, in the horan
50case the Court was concerned with whether the Commonwealth scheme of 
legislation discriminated between States in a manner contrary to S.51(ii)
44. Laskio; A note on Canadian Constitutional Interpretation (1945) V Univ. 
of Toronto Law Jnl. 171 quoted Herrillat (1970) 210-1.
5^* A.I.E. 1953 S.C. 252 at 276 citing Alexander v Braeme (1885) 44 
S.R. 205; Luchmeshwar v Darbhanga (1090) 17 I.A. 9*0.
b6. Ibid at p . 276 col. 1 citing Fox v Bishop of Chester (1824) 107 E.R2
520 at 527.
47• Ibid at 276 citing South Australia v Comm. 65 C.L.R. 373; Madden v 
Nelson & Fort Sheppard R W Co. (1899) A.C^ 626.
48. Moran Propriety Ltd. v Dty. Commr. of Taxation (1940) A.C. 838 at
S58; In the Australian High Court at 6l~~C.L.h. 735 at 795*
49. e.g. South Australia v Comm, (supra f.n.47) See comment Wynes (1970) 
(4d) 32-33.
50.. .Supra ,at. f,.n.43....................................................
of the Constitution, and the Privy Council and tne High Court both 
found that the impugned scheme was in fact satisfactory. Mahajan J. 
also omits to mention that Mvatt J. who he quoted from was a minority
51
judge when the issue was decided in the High Court. It appears that
even in Australia the doctrine is used to keep the Commonwealth within
the powers granted to it by the Constitution and not to check any
unreasonable exercise of power.
The Indian Supreme Court misconstrued these concepts in order
to acquire a power of review where none existed. The reason for this
might lie in the facts of the particular cases before them.
ii (c). The facts of the Case before them.
Mahajan J. was very troubled by the fact that in V/rit Petition
Ho. 229 the arrears were Ss.3vQ8l,867, in No. 330 Hs. 1,026,103, in 
“52No. 339 As. 952,937 and that in Ptn. 229 the appellant would get
nothing but pay Ks. 600,000 to the State, in Ptn. 330 the estate would
be acquired free r.r.d in Ptn. 331 the petitioner would -et a mere 
53 m 5A . 1Rs.Im-,000. Tpe minority made similar observations. xhese figures 
w&re made possible because of the deductions in 0.23 (f) (which the 
majority also invalidated as a colourable exercise of power)'whereby ' 
the state could deduct from the gross assets such sums as the petitioners 
snould have incurred to preserve works of benefit on their estate. The
majority thought that in view of the fact that some landlords had spent
55nothing a flat rate of deduction was unfair,' whereas the minority
51 • 6l C.L.P. 735 at 795 (per Hvatt J.).
52. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252 atpr.56 p.274.
53• Ibid at pr.57 p.275«
5*f. Ibid. See Das J. at pr.9o p.286 col.l.
55* Ibid Mahajan J. at pr.34 p.270; Mukerjea J. at pr. 76 p.279 (approving
o f Media j an1J1 s ar.gume nt s).
cited a Privy Council decision to show that the landlords were obliged
to make such expenditure and that such deductions were therefore
, 56m  order.
But if the facts justified intervention, why did not the
57majority interfere in the companion cases of Visheshwar v M.P. and
58Surya Pal Singh v U.P. ? In the former case despite the assertion
that arrears were left in the hands of the landlords and there is no
59artificial reduction of the gross assets, it is clear from the judge­
ment that a compensation of Rs. 2,500,000 was reduced to Rs. 65,000
"payable in thirty unspecified instalments and therefore ... 
purely nominal and illusory" 60
Again in the latter case the Court admitted that an estate of Rs.2,409,705
was being acquired for Rs. 203,000 even though it fetched an annual
income of Rs. 25,915*^ "*" it is clear that what inspired the Court to
misconstrue and then apnly foreign doctrines was less the facts of the
cases before them than the need to make a gesture that they would not
easily allow the Government to prevent them reviewing provisions which
openly violate the principles of cosmopolitan jurisprudence.
56. Ibid Shastri G.J. at pr.20 p.266 citing the Privy Council case of 
Ila_dra.s Rly Co. v Maharaja of Carvatenagaram (1876) I_I.A. 364.
57. _(1952)_ 3.C.R. 1020.
58. i!952). CyC.-il. 1056.
59• _(1952) S.C.R. 1020 at 1029-30* But note the admission at p.1028 that
deductions were made.
60. Ibid at 1030-31. Re stresses that the annual income of the estate 
was Rs. 565,000 and that Rs. 65,000 was not really compensation.
61• (1952) S.C.R. 1056 at 1070.
This is made even more apparent by the fact that in 
Gajapati v Orissa^ decided in the very next year, I-lukerjea J. for 
a unanimous Court, cut down severely the extended interpretation given
f - Z
to the doctrine of colourable legislation. In Kaneshwar_v Bihar
which was treated as merely having decided
"that the subject matter of legislation did not fa.ll within the 
ambit of Item 52 of List III Schedule VII” 65
Mukerjea J. stressed that the doctrine of colourable legislation was
65 .concerned solely with the competence of the legislature, he acknowledged 
that in the case before him the Orissa Agricultural (Amendment) Act 1950 
taxed the property at the rate of 12as.6p. in the rupee but added :
"Under L.52 List III, which is a mere head of legislative 
power, the legislature can adopt any principle of compensation 
in respect of the property compulsorily acquired, Whether the 
deductions are large or small, inflated or deflated, they jlo_ 
not affect_the constitutionality of jthe_ enactment underythis 
entry ... The fact that the deductions are unjust, exorbitant 
or improper does not make the legislation invalid, unless it 
is shown to be based on something unrelated to the facts.” 67 
(baiiliasis mine)
This is clearly inconsistent with the extremely wide doctrine used in
62. A-.I. 1953.SAy 375.
63. A.I.5. 1952 S.C. 252
65. A._I.S._1_953. S.C. 373 at pr.15 p.380.
65. Ibid at pp.379-80 citing Cooley: I_ Constitutiojnal^  Limitations 379;
Att. Gen. v Reciprocals Insurers (1925)__A«Cj^  326; Lefroy: Canadian
Constitution 75; A.G. for Alberta vjA.G. for Canadai (1939) A.C.il7 at 
130; union. Colliery etc. Ltd", v Lryden (1899) A.C. 580; Re "insurance Act 
of Canada (1932) A.C. 51; Moran v Dty. Commr. (1950) A.C. 630".
66. Ibid at pr.17 p.38.
67. Ibid at pr. 18.
Kameshwar v Bihar.°Q It is no accident that later cases^discussing
70the doctrine of colourable legislation refer to Gajapati v Orissa
71rather than Kameshwar v Bihar. In fact the doctrine was hardly used
72by the Court later, except in one controversial 1962 case.
After ICameshwar v Bihar the Supreme Court upheld all the
73statutes connected with agrarian reform that came before it. The
74only exception to this was Raghubir v Court of Bards where Mahajan J.
declared S.112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act (42 of) 1930
was entitled to the protection of Article 31A. That section "suspended”
the rights of a landlord who infringed the tenant’s rights and Mahajan J.
held that a "suspension" was not a modification within the meaning of 
75Article 31A. But the authority of this case is doubtful and it has
7 6been distinguished in later cases.
68. A.I.R. 1932 B.C. 232.
69. Bee Zamindar of Nttayaouram v jiadras A._I_.__2._1954 B.C. 257 read with 
the companion case '/errata Ohetti_ar v Madras A.I.R. 1954 B.C. 605; V.P. 
v Koraahwaj A.JEjjIi. I960 S.C. 790 at pr.b pp.799-000; Sonapur Tea Nstate 
Co. y Bihar A.I.R. 1962* B.C. 137 at nr.9 p.140; Kunhikoman v Kerala
A~.~I.h. 1962 sT c7 "72~3 at* pr.4-5 p.727-
7°. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 375-
71. A.I.R. 1952 B.C. 252.
72. Bee Maharaja Jayvant Singhji v Cuperajfc A.I_.R. 19§2 S.C. 321 where 
the question was not concerned with legislative power at all but whether 
the statute had the protection of Art.31A. The statute reduced the com­
pensation due to tenants by changing their status from non-permanent to 
permanent. In any case the doctrine of colourability was used only as
an alternative argument (see the first sentence of pr.14 p.833); Note
also the dissent of Barkar and Mudholkar JJ and see Seervai: (1967)
571-2 where the majority is supported on merits.
73- Bee Dhirubha Devi v Bombay A.I.R*_ 1955 J3.C. 47 (which upheld the 
Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act ("62 of) 1949; Amar Singh v Rajasthan A.I.R. 
,1955 S.C. 504 (upheld the Rajasthan Resumption of Jagirs Act 
Kamakshya v Collector A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 63; Bhairebendra v Assam A.I.R.
195^ S.C. 504.”””
74. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 373.
75« Ibid at pr. 10.
76. See Atma Ram v Punjab A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 519 at pr. I2> p.^ 2L^ >
Ranjit Singh'v"Punjab A.I.R.* 1965 S~.C. 632 at pr.ll p.637.
TABLE III showing voting patterns amongst the judges in the cases on 
impugned statutes connected with agrarian reform.
^ame of Judge Total number 
of vot&s cast
i
Votes in favour of ! Votes against 










Das 9 9 j
N.C.Aiyar 3 2 ! 1




Bhagwati ] 3 2 1:
Jaganadhdas \ ^ 2 11 j
T.L.V.Ayyar i ^ * i
Sinha j 1 1 i - i
Imam 3 5 i
Totals ! k6 ' 8 '
We will see that all the judges voted in favour of the statutes 
before them. The only exceptions were Mahajan (who wrote 2 leading 
judgements in the cases which invalidated statutes), Hasan, Bhagwati 
and Jaganadhdas (who merely subscribed to Mahajan J.'s judgement in 
Raghubir v Court of Wards (which turned, as we have seen, on a technical 
point), N. C. Aiyar (v/ho followed Mahajan J.'s lead in Kameshwar v 
Bihar) and Mufcerjea J., who followed Mahajan J.*s lead in the two cases 
in which statutes were invalidated, but later changed his mind and 
drastically limited the broad doctrine of colourability, before it could
make serious inroads into the programme of agrarian reform.
As a result of the Court’s protest E.A-2 of List III was
77amended. Further, the doctrine that choses of action cannot be
78 macquired became a part of Indian law. ^his is a clear example of
79evolving "non-neutral principles" in interpreting the Constitution, 
simply because the Court wanted to deal with the facts of the instant 
case and register its disapproval of the Government's policy of 
abandoning the accepted principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
After i960, the Court imposed yet another test which gave 
it a limited power of review over statutes connected with agrarian 
reform. But this time they relied more on original techniques rather 
than cosmopolitan principles.
iii. The second decade and the agrarian reforrn tests.
After i960, the Court did not use foreign doctrine to acquire 
a power of judicial review over statutes connected with agrarian reform. 
Instead Subba^ao J. made a reference to the Statement of Objects and 
Reasons of the Fourth Amendment and concluded that in order to get the 
protection of Article plA the statute in question must in fact be con­
nected .with agrarian reform.^
77. Seventh Amendment Act 1956.
78. See Chapter II (supra) discussing Ransfcji Eao Shinde v M.P. A.I.R.
1968 s .c . 1053.
79- This term is explained in Chapter II, Section 3 (supra).
80.See Merrillat (1970) Chapter 8 pp.172-183 particularly 178 ff. Atul 
M.Setalvad: Article 31A(l)(a) and the Supreme Court (1965) 67 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 
105; Seervai (1967) 538-5^; D.Narasuraju: Argrarian refomfTin G.S.
Sharma (ed.) Property Relations in Independent India) 131-1^ particularly 
from l^ tOff.; M.P.Jain: Property Relations in Independent India (1967)
3 Ban.J. Jnl. 28 at 63-5*
The techniques used are inconsistent and of doubtful validity.
li/hat the Court did in fact was to convert a rule of construction (i.e.
all statutes connected with agrarian reform must be liberally construed)
into a test of validity (i.e. all statutes which are not connected
with agrarian reform will not be protected under the provisions of
Article 31A). But even this test, which in its own terms must apply 
3luniversally, has been selectively and inconsistently applied.
Given below is a Table showing the voting and judgement 
writing patterns in the sixteen cases connected with agrarian reform 
between 1959 and 1969*
8l. This is clearly laid down by Hidayatuallah J. in Gullabhai v 
Union A.I.JR. J-9&7 at pr.6 p. 1112.
2 4 2
TABL.S IV showing the judgement writing and voting patterns in the 
cases connected with agrarian reform 1~959--1969»
1 2 3 k 5 6
CO 
I 
Cv- 9 10 11 12 13 H  15 16
Das C.J. V V  V
Bhagwati * V V
Sinha V * v V V V V
Imam V +
Kapur V V V
Ga j e ndragadkar V * V
Sarkar V X V V
Subbaftao V V V * V * * V V V
V/anchoo V V  * * * V V V V
Hidayatullah V * v * * V V




Shah V V V V v
Dayal v V V
Mudholkar V
Sikri V V V
Bachawat *
Kqjnaswami V V *
Shelat V *
Mi tter V V
Hedge V
Grover V
v = participation. + = dissent without judgement, 
x = dissent with judgement. * = judgement (majority).
5 etc. = cases in which tests of agrarian. reform used..
1 = Sri Ram v Bombay A.I;R. 1959 S.C. 59»
2 = Atma Ram v Punjd) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 519
3 = Raghubir v Punjab A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 475
4 = V.P. v Moradhwaj A.I.R. i960 S.C. 728
3 — Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080
6 = Gangadhor v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 288
7 2 Bihar v Rameshwar Pratap A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1649
8 Bihar v Umesh Jha A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 50
9 Sonapur Tea Estate v Dty Commr. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 137
10 = Ranjit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. i960 S.C. 632
11 = Vajravelu v SfcJ. Dty. Collector A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1017
12 _ Mahant Sankarshan v Orissa A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 59
13 _ Gulabhai v Union A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1110
14 _ U.P. v Amand Bihari A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 661
15 = Dty Commr. v Du^nath A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 394
16 =: B. Shankar Rao v Mysore A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 453
will be clear from the Table that the Court used the 
agrarian reform test in only 6 of the 16 cases on agrarian reform in which
s
the test could have been applied. In actual fact the test was created
by Subba Rao J. by some doubtful techniques, in an exceptional case in
32 33I960, and conveniently forgotten till 1965 when Subba Rao J. made
a skilful manoeuvre to reintroduce it. Let us examine the case law.
82. In Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080.
83. See Vajravelu v Sp.Dty Collector A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 1017 and Subba Rao J . 1 
handling of Ran jit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 332 in which Hidayatullah 
J. had exposed Subba Rao J.’s use of techniques in Kochunni v Madras A.I.R.
i960 S.C. 1080.
In the first fo. r cases decided in 3)959 aud i960, the Court 
merely tried to establish a rule of construction that Article J1A. must
84be liberally construed. A typical and oft-quoted statement of the
85
attitude of the Court was made by Sinha C.J. in Atrna ham v Punjab :
"Keepin~ in mind the fact that Article 31 A was enacted by 
two successive amendments - one in 1951 (First Amendment) and 
the second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment) - with retrospective 
effect in order to save legislation affecting agrarian reform, 
we have every reason to hold that those expressions (used in 
Article ylA) have been in their widest amplitude, consistent 
with the purpose behind those amendments.” 86
But he added
"provided, however that such a construction does not involve 
violence to the language actually used." 87
88
The Court maintained this attitude m  other cases, but no suggestion 
was made that a connection with agrarian reform was itself a test to 
ascertain whether a particular statute fell within the provisions of 
Article ;>1A .
89In Kochunni v Madras a new development took, place. The 
M a d r a s  legislature passed the i V a r u m a k k a t t a y a m  (Removal of Doubts) Act 
195 5  t o  gi/e the junior members of a tarwad b right to enforce a  parti­
tion of certain properties which had been declared impartible by a Privy 
Council decision in 1943.
8A. Cri Bam v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 459; Atma Earn v Punjab A.I.R. 1959 
S.C.519; Raghubir _v__Punjab A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 475*; V.P. v Koradhwaj A.I.R.
I960 3.0/796.
85. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 519.
36. Ibid at pr.ll p.526 col.2.
87. Ibid at pr.ll p.526 col.2.
88. e.g.Bhagwati J. in Sri Ram v Bombay A_.I.R.__1959 S.C. 459; referring 
to the Preamble of the Constitution, the Directive -rinciples of State
Policy (at pr.7 p.462) the socialist nature of the statute (at pr.36 p.
469) and the need to give it a wide interpretation (at p.463 col.2);
V/anchoo J. in fiaghubirg Singh v Ajmer A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 475 at pr.3 p.477-8
(where the Court upheld the power of the Collector to cancel leases made
by landholders in anticipation of agrarian reform); V/anchoo J. in V.P. v 
floradhvpoy A_.I_.R_.. 1.960 S.C. 796 at pr.3 (where he referred to all the 
earlier cases on agrarian reform from Kameshwar v _Bih_ar (1952) to Atmja 
hh'AJf r p (1959) hut no mention is made of an agrarian test).
•39 ' A.I.R. 'i960 S.C. 1030.................................................
90. Kochunni v kadras A.I.R._ 1949 J? • C.47 read with the Madras Ilarumakkatayam 
Act, 19328...
It was clear that this statute was not really connected with
the purposes of agrarian reform, but at the same time it was clear that,
technically saved by the terms of Article j>1A the property involved fell
within the definition of the term "estate” in Article 31A(l)(a).
Subba^ao J. for the majority evolved the test that statutes that seek
the protection of Article 31A must be connected with agrarian reform.
The reason for his doing so can be found in his belief that
"(fundamental rights have a transcendental position in our 
Constitution ... (which) describes certain rights and places 
them in a separate Part.” 91
92He talked 01 the "solemn obligation" placed by that Part on the Court
and stressed that a welfare state must be found within the framework of
Q
the Constitution. ' but this in itself would not have justified the
introduction of a superadded test of agrarian reform, which did not
derive from the text of the Constitution. He therefore relied on two
q/+
techniques. IjRRstly, he referred to the 1959 cases' and in particular
95to a passege from Atma idinjv Bombay to make the conclusion :
"i’his Court had therefore recognised that the Amendment 
inserting Article 31A in the Constitution and subsequently 
amending it, were to facilitate agrarian reforms ..." 96
From this he made the unwarranted conclusion that those cases laid down
91* A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080 at pr.22 p,10o9.
92. Ibid at pr.2A p.1091 (quoting from Bhagwati J. in Basheshwar hath 
b Commr. A .1,R. 1959 S.C. 1A9 at 161 - a case on waiver of fundamental 
rights and not directly relevant).
93• Ibid at pr.31 p.1096.
9k. Sri Ram v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. A59; Atma Ram v Punjab A.I.R. 1959
s.c. 519
95• Atma Rani v Punjab A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 519 at 526.
96. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080 at pr.17 p.1088.
that statutes taking refuge under Article 31A must be connected with
agrarian reform and regulate the relationship between a landlord and
97tenant, which the statute in the present case did not. The second 
technique was to refer to the Statement of the Objects and Reasons of
the Fourth Amendment Act 1955 to reinforce the conclusion that the
93
Amendment was to advance the cause of agrarian reform. Subbafcao J.
(and Sarkar J. for thejminority) stressed that this reference to the State-
99ment and Objects was not really permissible. Further, Hidayatullah J.
showed years later that Subba&ao J. had in fact quoted selectively from
the "Statement" and missed out a vital portion^^which read :
"the proper planning of urban and rural areas requires the bene­
ficial utilisation of vacant and waste lands and the clearance 
of slum areas."
By the use of such methods as these the Court was able to
convert a rule of construction into an agrarian reform test.
Sarkar J. (for Imamjj. and himself) following Sinha C.J.’s
warnin; that the test of the Constitution should not be violated, thought
that Cuboaffaa J.’s conclusions were not justified and observed :
"The article does not mention any agrarian reform. Under it 
any jarman right may be acquired, extinguished or modified; this 
. . would be.so whether the. land was agricultural land or land which
had never been used for agricultural purposes." 101
102
bnat is even more significant is the fact that m  the :our cases that
97- Ibid at pr.19 p.1089.
98. Ibid at nr.l5 p.1036.
99- Subbafloa J. at pr.15 p.1086-7 citing Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose 
A.I.R, 1952 S.C. 369; Sarkar J. at pr.7A p.ll0o~.
100. Hidayatullah J. in fpm jit Sinmh. v Punjab A.I.R. 1965 3._C. £>32 at prlO.
p.o37-
101. A.I.R. I960 B.C. 1030 pr.73 p.1103.
102. l/anchoo J. in Gangadhar v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 288; Das Gupta J.
In Bihar v Fame shwar Pratap A.I.R. I96I B.C. l6~4~9v Gubba&oa J. in Bihar 
vJJmesh Jha. A.I.h. l9o2_jS. 0. 50; Gajendragadkar J. in Sonapur Tea Bstate 
Co. v Dty Commr. A.I.R. 19^2 S.C. 137•
I
followed Kochunni1s case. no mention was made of the agrarian reform
test, even though the judgement in one of them was written by Subba£ao J.
103himself. fhe Court accepted the view of the 1959 cases tha.t Article Jlk
10 b
must be strictly contrued but went no further than that. In 3ihar v 
105
nameshwar Prashad the Court, replying to an argument that the
impugned statute merely augmented the revenues of the State and was
lacking in public purpose ,^^observed :
"That however is no reason to think that this legislation is 
is not also concerned with agrarian reform. It is, however, unnec­
essary for us to consider whether it is a law as regards land reform 
or not, it is clearly and entirely as regards acquisition of 
property." 107
Kochunni v Kadras^^was a forgotten case until Ranjit Singh v
109
Punjab where Hidayatullah J. made clear that the former case was a
very special one and
"(t)here is reason to think that the Kochunni case was regarded 
on other occasions too as one decided on its facts." 110
He stressed that the reference to the statement and Objects was of doubt­
ful validity"*"^ and showed that SubbaiRpa J. had misquoted a portion of
112 Pthe statement to suit his own purposes. hidayatullaryJ. supported the 
use of the agrarian reform test in Kochunni * s case, where he thought the
105. Bihar v Umesh_Jha A . I . R . Ig62 S.jC. 50•
10A. See Sonanur Tea Hstate_Co. v Dty Commr. A.I. lg_62 S.C. 137 at pr.8 
p.1^0 citing the 1959 cases.
105. a . I . R .  1961 S.C. 16A9.
106. Ibid at pr.6 p.1651; pr.8 p.1652.
107. Ibid at pr.6 p.1651*
108. A.I.R. I960 S.C. lOoO
109. A.I.R. I965 S.C. 632
110. Ibid at p r . l l  p.637 c o l.2.
111. Ibid at pr.10 p.637*
112. Ibid at pr.10 p.637»...........................................
statute did not fall under Article Jlk "however liberally construed ...”
but felt that the test would not apply
"to cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely 
agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancilliary 
there to rural economy has to be undertaken to give full effect 
to the reform." 113
Kochunni’s case was thus treated as a special case and the agrarian
reform test was obviously to be sparingly used.
Subba $3.0 J. came to consider these comments in Vajravelu v 
114
So. Dty Collector, where he held that the Land Acquisition (^adras
Amendment) Act 1Q61 enacted for purposes of slum clearance was not
connected with agrarian reform. He did not even enquire v/hether the
lands in question w&re "estates" within the meaning of Article 3LA,
and used the agrarian reform test before even considering v/hether the
115
Article applied or not. Faced with Hidayatulla J.'s judgement in 
Ranjit 3ijigh^_case he observes :
"That judgement accepts tin view that Article 31A was enacted 
to implement agrarian reform, but has given a comprehensive meaning 
to the expression ’agrarian refora’, so as to include provisions 
made for the development of the rural economy." 116
In an effort to restore the agrarian reform test he omits to mention
117
that some of the land was situated in rural areas and that slum . 
clearance fell within that portion of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Fourth Amendment Act 1955 which he had forgotten to cite
• 118m  iiochunm s case.
113. Ibid at pr.12 p.638 .  flote the extremely wide view of agrarian 
reform at pr.lp-4 pp.638-9.
114. A.I.R. 1965 S.O. 1017.
115. Ibid at pr.10 p.1021 col.l "From the material on record we cannot 
definitely hold v/hether the lands in question are held under ryotwair 
settlement."
116. Ibid at pr.10 p.1022.
117. This is quite apparent from the recital of facts in pr.l p.l019«
118 . They are however mentioned in another context at pr.10 p.1021.
Hidayatullah J. was a party to this case, but did not com­
plain at Subbafh.0 J.'sobvious distortion of his judgement. The 
explanation for this may well lie in the fact that four years later 
Hidayatullah J. freely admitted in another context that he thought the
judgement in this case belonged to another case decided by the same
119^ench on the same day. Hnat lends credibility to this view is the
fact that Hidayatullah J. himself does not refer to the agrarian reform
120test in ^ ahant Sankarshan v Orissa where he wrote the judgement of 
the Court.
121But the test had come to stay, for in GujUabhai v jJnion
Hidayatullah J. writing the judgement for a unanimous Court held that
certain sections of the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages)
regulation (27 of) 1962 was not protected by Article 31A, which was
construed as having laid the following two-fold test ?
"V/e have to consider first if the interest abolished comes 
within the compendious definition of ’estate' in Article 31A ... 
Next we have to consider whether the Regulation is a piece of 
agrarian reform in the public interest. Justification for the 
abolition of estates has been held by this Court to involve 
agrarian reform in the public interest." 122
‘Axis appears strange if we consider the fact that the first test was
123............................
not applied in Vajravelu’s case and that Hidayatullah J. himself had
124not applied the second t6st in ilahant Sankarshan v Orissa Again no
125mention was made of the test in two cases from Punjab even though 
both Hidayatullah and 3ubba$ao JJ wrote minority and majority judgements 
in them.
119. Bee Hidayatulla J.’s observations in Gujerat v Shantilal A.I.R.
1969 JhC. 634 at pr.l, a case on compensation and unconnected with 
agrarian reform.
120. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 59.
121. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1110.
122. Ibid at pr.6 p.1112.
123. :u.r._ 1017.
124. A.I.R. '1967' S.C. 59..........................................
123. See Ajit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1907 S.C. 856; Pritam Singh v Punjab 
A.I.R. 1967' 3^ 0. 930..
But gradually the Court came to accept th& existence of the
'‘agrarian reform" test and it was used by Sikri J. in U.P. v Anand 
1?6Brahma " without citing any of the earlier case lav/. In Durganath v 
127 „Dty. Cpmnr. Bachawat J. writing the judgement for the Court held 
that the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of 
Frosior. Act (16 of) 1955 was not connected with agrarian reform.
"The Act is a purely expropriatory measure.. It orovides for 
acquisition of lands both urban and agricultural for executing 
works in connexion with flood control or erosion. A piece of 
land aqquired under the Act need not be an estate or part of an 
estate. It has no relation to agrarian reform, land tenures and 
elimination of intermediaries. V/e may add that there is nothing 
on the redord to show that the respondent’s lands are estates 
or part of estates." 128
Once a-ain the Court had decided the issue of agrarian reform before
the ; had even considered whether the land was technically within the
purview of Article plA or not. 3y limited the meaning of agrarian
re fora to problems of land tenures and the elimination of intermediaries,
the Court hoUght to -orevent the use of Article 31A for anything other
than Zamindari abolition. The test has become a normal feature of the
129Court’s techniques, even though it is not always used.
126. A.I.R.' 1967 B.C. 66l at pr.14 and 14 p.664. See also B.Sharkara Hao 
v Mysore A.I.jI._1969 S.JC. 455 at pr.9 (where a casual mention was made of 
land” tenures even though Vajravelu v Dty So.Collector A.I.R. 1965 S.C.1017 
was mentioned in another and not this context).
127. AvI.R. 1963 j3.C. 394. A'Ae cites the following cases: Kochunni_ v Madras 
A.I.R. 19b0_ S.C. 1080; Ran jit Singh V Punjab A.I.R. 1965 8.C_. 632; Vajra­
velu v 3p.Dty Collector A.I_._E. 1965 S.C. lbl~7.
128. Ibid at pr.7 p-399 col.l.
129. fhe test v/as not mentioned in Ka.lanlci_Devi v JI.R.T.Kanrur A.I.R. 1970 
S.C^ 439 (see pr.6 p.442); Mother Provincal v Kerala A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 2079 
jC.Tl.IIedhi v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1971 B.C^ 199*2 (see pp.1996-7); Khajamian 
1/aof D s t a t e s 1971 S.j3. l6l (see op.164-5); Victor v Francis A.I.R. 
I97I her. 165 (F.B.); H.K.Thayal v At ate A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 65 (but note sug­
gestion at p.73 that Art.31A is different from Art.31BT. But the test was 
mentioned in Kudaliar v Madras A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 989 at pr.6 p.991; harayari 
Pair v state A.I.R. 19*71 y^er. 96 (F.B.), see pr.10 p.106; pr.98 p.l2(D;
C.A.Vaghela_ _v C".SUbbarav A.I.R. 1971 Guj.131 at 139-43; Krishna Pillai v 
Sankara Pilljai A.I.R. 1971 Ker.295 (where the Court invalidated Kerala 
Land Reform Act (1 of) 1964 as not protected by Article 31A see nr.5
The essential technique i s  the basic doctrine of English 
administrative law that a pov/er must not be used for purposes other than 
for which it is given. But the agrarian reform test is clearly an 
invention of the Court, achieved by reference to the Statement of Objects 
of an Amendment Act, and by erratic votin- behaviour.
The votin™ behaviour is shown in Table V below.










Las 3 - - 3 - - -
Bhagwati 3 - - 3 l - -
Sinha 7 1 - 6 1 - -
Imam 2 - - 1 - 1 -
Kapur 3 - - 3 - - -
Ga j e ndragadkar 3 1 - 2 1 - -
Sarkar k - - 3 - 1 1
Subbarao 10 3 2 7 l • -
Wanchoo 9 3 - 6 3 - -
Hidayatullah 7 if 2 3 1 - -
Das Gupta 3 l - 2 1 7 -
Mudholkar 1 - - 1 - - -
Ayyangar 3 l - 2 - - -
Shah 6 3 - 3 - - -
Dayal 3 1 - 2 - - -
Sikri 3 2 - 1 - - -
Bachawat 1 1 1 - - - -
karaaswami 3 2 1 1 - - -
Shelat 2 1 - 1 1 - -
Hitter 2 2 - - - - -
Hegde 1 1 - - - - -
Grover 1
1
1 - - - - -
Total Co o 28 6 30 10 2 1
-------------------------------------------
Column I gives total votes cast.
Column II participation in judgements where test used. 
Column III participation in cases where test not used. 
Column IV participation in cases where test rejected.
Columns B, D ,. I] show "vote"..........................
Columns C, 3, G show number of judgements delivered.
It will be clear that the agrarian reform test was adopted 
even though only 28 out of 30 votes were cast in favour of it. Further 
we shall see that two judges (.Sarkar and Imam JJ.) voted against the 
test; judges (Das, Bhagwati, Aapur and Mudholkar JJ.) participated 
in decisions which did not use the test; 12 judges (Sinha, Gajendragadkar 
Subba ianchoo, Kidayatullah, Das Gupta, Ayyangar, ohah, Dayal, Sikri, 
Ramaswami and Shelat) participated both in decisions which used the 
test and those which did not; k judges (B^chawat, hitter, Grover and 
Ilegde JJ.) consistently used the test and only k judges (SubbaRoa, 
Ilidayatullah, Bachawat and Ramaswami JJ.) wrote judgements supporting 
the use of the test.
Thus we can see that the test became law even though a majority 
of the cases and judges do not apply it consistently. 1/e cannot discover 
the extent to which the judges fully subscribed to the judgements on the 
agrarian reform test. Certainly one judge (Ayyangar J.) wrote a judge­
ment in a case in which he disapproved of using extrinsic aids to
130interpret the provisions of Article 31A. But what is clear is the
fact that Subbarao J. relied on his position as judgement writer to
131introduce the test in controversial, cases .like Kochunni_ v *gen rajs 
and Vajravelu v on. Dty Collector_^^ (where the case involved other 
controversial points^^) which may have clouded the agrarian reform issue 
An explanation for this can be found in the desire of the 
Courts to regain the rower of review which was taken away from them by
130. See his judgement Purshottam v Kerala A.I.R.^ 19o2 S.C. 69*f at pr.^6
p.722. ~
131. A1960_S.__C. IOoO.
132. A.I^ .IU 19p5 S.C_. 1017.
133• -‘■he 'main issue was about the meaning of the word "compensation" and 
the agrarian reform was treated merely as a preliminary point.
Constitutional Amendment, This trend is obviously a prelude to the
134famous case of Golak Path v Punjab, where, led by Subba&ao J., it
attacked the Constitutional Amendments themselves. The techniques
used by the Court are not consistent.
iv. The cases leading to the Seventeenth Amendment - an example 
of mechanical construction.
In striking contrast to the above cases are the Court’s
techniques in the three cases^hich led to the Seventeenth Amendment.
In these cases the Court rested their decision purely on the text of
the Constitution and the capacity of Indian judges to interpret the
Constitution literally. The question was whether a "ryotwari feenture"
was included within the meaning of the tern "estate" in Article 31A.
The Constitution merely lays down that the term shall be defined with
reference to the "local law".
136In Purshottam v Kerala "local law" had not defined "estate", 
and thd problem was whether the Amendments which were passed with the 
object of abolishing intermediaries could apply to "ryotwari" tenures, 
whicn involved no intermediaries. Ayyangar J. (the minority judge)
thought that they did not, but unlike -5ubba$po J. did not refer to the
............................. 157..................................
-Statement of Objects and Keasons but rather to the fact that the
tenures mentioned in Article plA (2)(a) and (b) must be read together
and the latter mentioned a catalogue of interests in land ending with
the words "any other intermediary". But Gajendragadkar J. who read
the majority judgement relied on earlier case law to show that Article J>1A
13k. A.I.A. 1967 S.jC. 16A3
133* Purshottam v Kerala A,I.P. J-962 S.jO. 69A-; Kunhikoman v Kerala A.I.H. 
1962 S . C .  723; Krishnaswarai v Madras A.I.S. 19-64 S.C. 1515 •
136. A._I.JA__19o2__S._C. 69A.
137* Ibid at pr.66 p.722. But note his reference to the Joint -Select 
Committee to which the Bill was referred at pr. 56 p.718.
17 8must be given a liberal interpretation to conclude that the tenures
139 i .were estates within the meaning of the Article. -‘-his case is a clear
example of two possible interpretations of the Constitution without any
reference to foreign doctrine and without distorting traditional methods
of interpretation.
At the same time the Court also decided the case of Kunhikoman 
140v herala in which the Court was dealing with land which had belonged 
to the Aadras state before the Ctates heorganisation Act 1956. In the 
Madras State the "ryotwari tenure" had not been included in the defi­
nition of "estate" given in the Madras Estates •band Act 1908. V/anchoo J. 
for the majority^ ^ (which included uajendragadkar J.) thought that this 
concluded the point and held that a ryotwari tenure in that part of 
Kerala which was originally a part of Madras not being included in the
local law was not protected by Article 31A. This decision was followed
142with respect to ryotwari tenures m  Madras in Krishnaswami v madras 
where once again h'anchoo J. read the judgement, but this time for a 
unanimous Court which included Ga j end ragadkar and Ayyangar JJ.
having re iioved the protection of Article A1A from certain 
ryo.twari tenures, the Court held the impugned statutes void from the ■ ■
point of view of Article 14 mainly because they provided a graduated basis 
of compensation v/hich gave the poor and smaller holders a proportionately 
larger compensation than the larger tenure holders. The Court applied
13o. At pr. 24 p.705 col.2 later citing Sri Rarn v Bombay A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 
459; Kahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1517; Bihar v Kameshwar A.I.R.
1961 sYc." 1 6 4 9 "
139. note the learned judge’s discussion of the local law declared by 
the ruler of Cochin in March 1905*
140. A.I.R. i962rs'.c. 1x3 .
141. Sarkar J. wrote a separate judgement on another point, and Ayyangar J. 
stuck to his reasons given in Purshottam’s case.
142. A.I.R. ,1964 S.C. .1515..........................................
the routine equality test contained in Article 14, without paying any 
attention to Sarkar J.’s dissent which stressed that if a graduated 
basis for taxation was acceptable, a graduated basis for compensation 
ought to be acceptable.*^
What the Court had done was simply to follow a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution to achieve the anomalous result 
that a fcyotwari tenure was within the meaning of "estate" in Kerala 
but not in Madras or areas which had originally belonged to the State 
of Madras. This led to the Seventeenth Amendment Act 1964 whereby 
ryotwari tenures were specifically included within the scope of Article 
31A and 44 more statutes were given the protection of the Ninth Schedule 
of the Constitution. The judges who decided these cases had simply 
followed the techniques of literal interpretation which they had 
inherited from Mnglish law without paying adequate attention to the 
nature of the ryotwari tenure. They appear to have mechanically applied 
the provisions of the Constitutional Amendments without considering 
the wider problems of agrarian reform, which had given rise to the 
Amendments in the first place.
. . v. . Conclusioji................................. . . .
Tf we consider the Court’s performance in the area of agrarian 
reform, we see a Court chagrined by the fact that Constitutional Amend­
ment had deprived them of the power to review statutes which obviously 
►
violated the principes of cosmopolitan jurispnudence. In order to 
remedy this the Court made the gesture of trying to re-introduce respect 
for these principles by the use of any V;e stern techniques and ideas 
which lay to their hands. The Court was inspired to do this by Mahajan J. 
but lacked the courage and conviction to use these techniques to preserve 
a sustained power of review. It therefore fell back on the doctrine of
143* See Kunhikoman v Kerala A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 723 at prs.34-36 p.740 Col.2.
v , , ■ r- f-J
literal interpretation,(conceivably a misuse of normal statutory 
methods of interpretation} and invented the agrarian reform test 
to check an unlimited exercise of legislative power and contain the 
use of the power given by the Amendments for the limited purpose of 
abolishing traditional land tenures. The result was obtained by a 
stran :e and inconsistent votin;-’ pattern, which is becoming a normal 
feature of the Court’s practice to achieve a particular result, The 
technique (which Subba Rao J. apnears to have mastered) consists of 
introducing broad propositions of law in special cases and allowing 
them to ripen until they can be brought out into the open, to be used 
more freely* Although this technique has worked ef ectively in 
achieving the desired result it gives a curious impression when used 
by the highest Court which has an unlimited power to reconsider earlier 
decisions or set aside the decisions of the Court below.
As a result of inconsistent voting patterns and the lead 
token by the judgement writers, the Court has collectively laid down 
a policy of intervention where none was intended either by the Constituent 
Assembly or the text of the Constitution. Further the Court has made no 
effort.to understand the agrarian system of India or taken note of the 
fact tradition accords to the State an extended control of the land 
system which the Amendments sou lit to preserve. The Court in an 
attempt to preserve its own status and cosmopolitan principles (whose 
relevance it ha^ assumed without examination) has made a bid- to controvert 
the allionce between tradition and socialism and to acquire for itself, 
the lawyer e.nd the Western concept of property, a more meaningful role 
than any of them were intended to play.
5. The durreme Court and the Doctrine of Uninent Domain.
Article 31 (2) of the Indian Constitution incorporates certain 
provisions which resemble the American doctrine of eminent domain. 
Accordingly an acquisition cannot be made Except for public purpose 
ar.d on payment of compensation. The Constitution did not incorporate a 
theory of substantive due process, but more recently the Court has 
extended the tost of Reasonableness1' in Article 19 in an. effort to 
introduce such a concept into India. In this part of the Chapter we 
will concentrate on the following problems :
i. The meaning of compensation.
ii. The concept of public purpose in a mixed economy.
iii. In which cases must compensation paid.
iv. The development of "reasonableness" as a due process concept.
2
U a L  The leaning of Compensation
dven though the Constituent Assembly''’ specifically exempted 
provisions connected with agrarian reform from the requirement that 
compensation must be paid, that requirement was applicable to all other 
kinds of acquisition. In fact certain Ministries put forward the sug­
gestion that the words "equitable", "fair" or "just" qualify the word 
compensation. ' At the sar.ie time individuals in the Constituent Assembly
1. The best American account of this is to be found at 26 American 
Jurisprudence (2d) 623-937; 27 American Jurisprudence (2d) 16-463-
2. See generally I I . I I .Jain (i960) 133-211; Kerrillat (1970) Chapter 10;
S.D.Tewari: Compensation for the acquisition of land, in S.I I .Jain (ed.) 
Lav/ and urbanisation in India (1969) 133-147; T.S.llama Eao: Problems of 
compensation for acquisition of urban lands (ibid) 148 ff. U.Jaxi: The 
travails of land use planning: Compensation and urbanisation (ibid) 133- 
172; N.Dharmadan: Zminent domain and Indian Constitution (1970) K.L.T. 
Jnl. 21-2.
3. The main discussion is at IX C.A.D. 1191-1300.
4. See herrillat (1970) 33-59-
put forward the view that the amount of compensation be left to the 
legislature.'^ In actual fact the Constituent Assembly followed very 
closely the terms of Section 299 of the Government of India Act 1935 
and left open the question whether "compensation11 paid must be equal
g
to a "just" equivalent of the property acquired.
We have already seen how the Supreme Court was influenced by
the inadequacy of compensation while considering whether a Statute was
7
a colourable exercise of power. But the Court was actually called upon
to decide the meaning of the word in Article 31 (2) in Bela Banerjee v
S
U. J3. In that case property v;as acquired in a fashionable area of 
Calcutta for the settlement of refugees from hast Bengal and was handed 
over to a Co-operative Credit Society to develop. In accordance with 
Section 8 of the V/est Bengal Planning and Development Act 1958 the 
Society paid a compensation of lis. 173*623 for 51 acres of land, some 
of which was Mrs. Banerjee1 s. Section 3 laid down that compensation 
be fixed with reference to the market value on an anterior date (in 
this case Dec. 31* 1956). Shastri C.J., for a unanimous Court, admitted 
that the Statute had laid down principles of compensation as required by 
Article 31 (2) and that unlike the Australian Constitution which. (vide 
Section 31 (xxxi)) used the terms "just terms" the Indian Constitution 
had merely used the word "compensation". But even though he doubted the
5. See the summary of the Constituent Assembly position in the Kaj_ya 
Sab ha hebajtes (1955) Vol. IX ho. 19 col. 2A50-2.
6. See Herrillat (1970) 61-63; kerrillat: A historical footnote to Bela
•^ anerjee's case (i960) I J.I.L.I. 375; H.M.Seervais(1967) 517-8,522; 
S.L.Saksena recounting the Constituent Assembly Debates at L.S.D.(1955) 
lart II col.5905; G.V.Venkatasubha Eao: Vicissitudes of property as a 
fundamental right in Studies in law (1961 A.P.H.) 177 ff. But see the
contrary view of H.II.Jain (1*9~63) 52-9 and Chapter 8 generally.
7. See the discussion of Kameshwar v Bihar A.I.H. 1952 B.C. 252;
Visheshwar Bao v K.P. (1952J*5s.C.E. 1020 at 1030-1; Surya Pal Singh v U.P.
11932)' S.'C.H.~1056~at 1070-1 ‘supra.
9relevance of the Australian case law, he was obviously influenced by 
it, as is clear from his observation :
"(S)uch principles must ensure that what is determined must 
be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the ov/ner has 
been deprived of. bithin the limits of this basic requirement of 
full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution 
allows free play to the legislature's judgement as to what princi­
ples should guide the determination of the amount payable, whether 
such principles take into account all the elements which make up 
the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters 
which are to be neglected is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated 
by this Court." 10
he thought that the fixing of an anterior date did not ascertain the
"true equivalent of the land appropriated." 11
Although Ghastri J. makes no reference to any case lav/, it is
clear that bote concepts ("just equivalent" and "compensation cannot be
fixed with reference to an anterior date") ased are in fact taken from
12Anglian law affirmed there in a recent case.
As a result of this case, the Fourth Amendment added to article
31 (2) the following clause t
" ... no such lav/ (i.e. which fixed the compensation or lays down 
the principles on which it is to be determined) shall be called 
into question in any Court on the ground that the compensation 
provided by law was not adequate." 13
The. Amendment-was-not retrospective in operation, which meant that the
Court Could discuss the adequacy of compensation in cases that arose from
statutes before the Amendment, but not in those passed after the Amendment.
9. Ibid at pr.? pp. 172-3* he referred in passing to the Australian case: 
Grace Brothers Pty. Ltd. v Comm. 72 C.L.h. 269; for the position in the 
Australian Constitution see bynesl 0-970')' (Ad) 323-33A.
10. Ibid at pr.6 p.172.
11. Ibid at pr.8 p.l?3 (he also tallied of price rises in Calcutta 
aft.r the war.)
12. See Birmingham City Corpn. v best Midland etc. Ltd. (1969) 3 A11.E.5. 
172.
13. Inserted by Section 1 of the Fourth Amendment Act 1955*
Till 1965 the Courts accepted the restrictions that the
Amendment placed upon them and in two cases made obiter observations
14that the Court could not enquire into the adequacy of compensation.
In Kunhikoraan v Kerala^ the Court dealt with a post-Amendment statute,
which clearly contained inadftjuate provisions, but refused to challenge
l6them because of the Amendment. What is even more remarkable is the
17
case of A. L. D. Ltd. vjgadrajs (a pre-Constitution case not
affected by the Amendment) where the Court accepted the authority of
lSBela Banerjee*s case, but referred to the Amendment and stressed that
19
"just equivalent" did not necessarily mean market value. further, the
20
onus of proving tnat market value was not paid was placed on the petitioner. 
It therefore appears that the Court generally took the view that its 
powers were limited by the Amendment in post-Amendment cases, and that 
•°ela Baner je3' s case v/as to be strictly applied even in pre-Amendment 
cases.
Tue only exception to this attitude was Subba Aao J.'s judge­
ment in Deep Chand v U. P. (1939)^ where the learned judge made an 
ingenious attempt to revive the Court's power to review the adequacy of 
compensation. Subba kao J. put forward the argument that since the 
Constitution had continued to use the word "compensation" even after the
14. Note lludholkar J.'s observations in 11/3 Burrakur Coal Co. v Union 
A.I.h. 1961 S.C. 994 at p . 963 col.2; Subba kao J.'s observations in 
Paresh Chandra v Assam A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 167 at pr.7 p-170 col.l.
15. A.IA3. 1962 S.C. 723.
16. Ibid at pr.6 p.728.
17. A.I.ia. 1962 s ;c . 1733
18. Ibid at pr.20 p . 1763
19. Ibid at pr.23 p.1763
20. Ibid at pr.26 £.1763-4.
21. A.I.Ik 1959 S.C. 643.
4. ) r*> a 
fsj O
Amendment, Parliament had accepted the Court’a view that ”compensation”
22
v/as a just equivalent. While this accords with a well known rule of
O I7
construction,^ it ignores the fact that it was common knowledge that 
t::e legislature had not accepted the Court’s view of "compensation”* 
Subba Hao J. then proceeded as if the Amendment had not even happened 
and observed :
"Let us examine the question from the standpoint of a business 
deal ... (T)he question is whether compensation provided by Section 
11 is anything like an equivalent or quid pro quo for the interest 
in the commercial undertaking acquired by the state.” 24
Although these observations are obiter because the provisions were
25adequate and the case was decided on other points, they are very impor­
tant because the same judge used this interpretation later in 19631 
after which the Court fully by-passed the restrictions placed on it by 
the ihnendment and assumed a very wide power of review.
After 1965, the Court not only revived the use of Bela 
^anerjoo’3 c:\30 with respect to pro-Amendment cases, but also used the 
same principles wnile considering post-Amendment cases, The basis on
wnich they did so was the doctrine of colourable legislation and the
26argument whica Subba Rao J. used in Deep Chand v U. P. viz. that 
Parliament by reenacting the v/ord "compensation” even after the Amend­
ment had accepted the judicial interpretation given to that v/ord in
27Bela Banerjee's case. The Court argued that since Article 31 (2) pro­
vided that the legislature either fix the amount of compensation or the
22. Ibid at pr. 39 p.670.
23. See Craiesi Statutory Interpretation (6d) I67. This point is dis­
cussed infra.
24. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648 at pr.^ iO p . 672 col.l.
25. In any case the point proceeded on a concession see pr.39 p-370.
26. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648.
27. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170.
principles on which such compensation is based, principles which failed 
to offer a "fair equivalent" were illusory and a colourable exercise of 
power. The Court made a distinction between the following kinds of
compensation :
A. Illusory - which were a colourable exercise of power.
3. Hot illusory but not a just equivalent
C. A just equivalent
D. A just equivalent but inadequate. 23
The Court’s power of review extended over Categories A, 3 and
C but not to Category D. T}llls as far- as the Supreme Court was concerned
the Amendment merely excluded that power of review from those exceptional 
cases where the compensation, though a "just equivalent" was not adequate 
Once again the Court made a dubious use of hestern techniques 
in interpreting the Constitution and Statutes. V/e have already shown
that the doctrine of colourable legislation was neven intended for
29
universal application in this way. equally doubtful is the Court's use 
of the rule of construction that a statute -which reenacts a v/ord which 
had received judicial interpretation must be deemed to accent the meaning 
of. the-word accorded to it by the Courts. The Court merely cites the 
authority of a text book for this proposition.^^ But it is clear that
31
although the rule has been generally accepted it creates noz^fmore than
28. Bee ralkivala's arguments in Vajravelu v Sg_._Dt y Co lie c tor A.I.R._196j? 
S.C. 1017 at pr.lq p.1022; see also Herrillat (1970) 2ol.
29. See the discussion on the Supreme Court and Agrarian He form, supra 
Chapter III Section 4.
30. Subba Hao J. in Vajravelu_v madras A.I.S. 1965 S.C. 1017 at p. 1024 
col.l citing Craies: Statute Law (6d) 1*67•
31 • See Jay v Johnstone (1393) 1 Q.3. 23 at 2o; Barlow v xeal (I885) 15 
Q.3.D. 403 at 404-5;" Bx«P• Campbell '(1370) L.R. 5 Ch.A'pn.*703"at 706; see 
also the ^rivy Council decision in V/e bb v Cut rim (T907T A.C. 8l at 89.
32 33a presumption, and has not been applied on several occasions. The
rule was intended to be used for the interpretation of consolidating 
34
statutes, and ib has often been stressed that the background of the
33earlier cases must be looked at. What the Indian Supreme Court 
appears to have done is to stress the technical,.aspects of the rule and 
omitted to refer to the common sense principles on which it is based.
This is an example of the misuse of English principles of law to suit 
the Court’s purposes.
What is even more significant is the manner in which the Court 
failed to distinguish cases arising out of statutes passed before the 
Amendment with those arising out of statutes passed after the Amendment. 
i (b)_JThe revival of the Court'_s Power of Review : 1963 ~ 19&9»
From 19o3 to 1969 the Court decided nine pre- and post-Amendment 
cases on. compensation. The Bench construction and voting patterns in 
these cases are illustrated in the Table V below.
32. ilote tue observations of Lord hacmillari in Barras v Aberdeen oteam 
Trawling and Fishing Co. (1933) A.G. 402 at 4-46-7*
33- e.g. Royal Crown Derby Porcelain 60. v Russel (1949) 2 K.B. 417 
-here the meaning- attached to certain words in 0.3(1) of the Increase 
of Rent and hor&gage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 was not accepted 
by a later Court.
34* See Grey v I.R.C. (i960) A.C.l; hitchell v Simpson (I89O) 23 Q.3.D.
183 at 18lT.
33- See -Evershed M.R. in V/right v Walford (1933) l <$.3 . 363* See also 
V/ebb v Out rim (I9O7) A.C. ul at 89 where it was stressed that they must 
be considered decisions on txie subject.
TABLE VIshowing t.io Bench construction and voting patterns in the 
compensation cases 1965 - 19o9»
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9















v = participation. * or *1 = judgement of majority.
*2 = concurring judgement. x = dissenting judgement.
+ = dissent without judgement
1 = Madras v :,_amasivya A.I.R. 1965 &+G* 190.
2 = Vajravelu v Madras A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1017.
3 = Jeo Je >y v union A  1 ■ S.C. IO96.
4 = i.et oration v Jnion A I.R. I967 S.C. 637*
5 = union v .. , i   ___ 1, - S. J. 377-
6 = Udai ham v Union A.I.R. i960 S.C. II3 8 .
7 = M.P. v Sanojirao Shindle A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1053*
8 = • 3;Shark, r Rao v ujerat A.I.R. • 1969 _-S.C. 453*
9 = Gu jjerat v Shu-ntilal A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 637-
r-
tv w  c_J
Notes: to Table J T
1. Cases 1, 3 and 3 v/e re pre -Amendment cases.
2. Case 8 has been included. It did not consider Article 31 (2) as 
the case v/as covered by Article 31A. But it suggests that if it had 
n°t Bela Banerjee A.I.R. 1954 B.C. 170 and case 2 would apply, see
A.I.a. 1969 S.C. A33 at prs. 3 and 7 at pp. 456 and 439 respectively.
The revival of Bela Banerjee15 case began with Hadms v D.
3bKanasivya (a pre-/amendment case) where Shah J. followed the Bela hanerjee 
view that compensation which must be "a just monetary equivalent ... a
37true value” cannot be fixed with reference to an anterior date. He 
ignored and did not cite Gajendragadkar J.’s observations in W. 2. B. D.
T O
Ltd. v ^adras^ 0 (which had taken a very restrictive view of the Court’s
power of review), placed the onus of establishing that compensation was
39not the market value on the Government and not the petitioner, and did
not accept information supplied by the Government that prices had in
40fact risen because of the Government’s notification. It v/as clear that 
the days of judicial retreat from Bela Banerjee*s case_ were over.
Boon after this, Subba Rao J. began the process of establishing 
that the meaning of ”compensation” v/as unchanged even after the Amendment. 
He got an excellent opportunity to do this in Vajravelu v Sp.Dtjr^ 
Collector (a post-Amendment case) and Jee Jee Bhoy v dnion 1 ( a pre-
Constitution case based on S.299 of the Government of India Act 1955 
which is in pari material with Article 31 (2) as it stood before the 
Amendment), which were decided on the same day. ue cited Bela planerjee1s
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 190 see pr.5 p.193-4 where S6!a Banerjee^ case is 
citea.
37* Ibid at pr.4 p.193 col.2.
3d. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1753 (see pr.23 p.1763-4, pr.26 p.1764).
39. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 190 at pr. S ' p.lflt4 •
40. Ibid at pr. 6? p. .
41. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1017.
42. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1096.
iJ ;J  G
and s case in the post-Amendrnent case^and purported to show
that the meaning of compensation as a just equivalent was constant
whether applied to cases before the Constitution and the 1955 Amendment
44 45or after. In Vajravelu v Sp.Dty Collector he found the Land Acquisi­
tion Amendment Act (25 of) 1961 which assessed the value of the land on 
the basis of the average value over the last five years and added a 
solatium of 5 ±>QT cent was inadquate but not illusory and therefore 
vires Article 51 (2). But his lordship want one step further and found 
the compensation provisions ultra vires Article 14 (the equality article)
because it offered less compensation than what would have been offered
46if the property had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 •
By using Article 14 instead of Article 51 (2) Subba Kao J. was able to
declare the compensation provisions invalid, establish a theoretically
wide power of review on the issue of the adequcy of compensation for use
on future occasions, but at the same time give rise to the semblance that
the Court felt itself bound by the Amendment. This is reinforced by
the fact that the use of Article 14, by comparing the impugned statute
with the possibility of a hypothetical exercise of power under another
unrelated statute, is. unprecedented and has been followed by the Court
47m  only one other case.
This is a devious use of technical rules. So devious that 
Hidayatullah J., who subscribed to the judgements in both these cases, 
looking back on the techniques used openly admitted that he had thought
48the judgement in ¥a§ravelutis case in fact belonged to Jee Jee 3hoyfs case.
45- Vajravelu v Bp.D^y Colle^ ctor A_.I.KV 1965. S.C. 1017 at pr.14 p.1025-4. 
44. See Jee Jee Bhoy ± JJnion A.I.S. 1965 S.C. 1096 at pp.1099-1100*
5^- A.I.A. 1965 S.C. 1017.
46. The solatium offered under this statute is 15/'j and the market value 
fixed with reference to the market value on the date of notification.
47. See Balammal v hadras A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1425 at pr.7 p.1428.
43. See Gujerat v Shantilal AII.A._ 1969 S.C. 654 at pr.l.
A commentator on the Supreme Court was similarly confused and missed
i 49the use of Article 14 altogether.
By these techniques Subba Rao J. re-established the Court's
power of review. Hereafter the Court cited Bela^  Banerjee1 s case and
50these three 1965 cases on the meaning of the v/ord compensation together,
without making an/ distinction between statutes enacted before and after
52the Amendment."'’ In Metal Corpn. v Union Subba Rao J. (for Shelat J.
53and himself) held a stqtute which provided that compensation paid for 
unused machinery would be the price on the date of acquisition, with 
such deductions as were made on the basis of statutes relatin ; to
Income fax, cannot be deemed to provide relevant principles for the
54 55
determination of compensation. In K. P v  Hanojirao Shinde the
Court assumed that compensation must mean "just equivalent". In Udai
49* See Mohd. Imain: The Indian Supreme Co Art and the Constitution (1968) 
262. ~ ^  '
50. Se: Metal Corpn. v Union A.I.R. If67 S.C. 637 which at pp.641-3 cites
Bela Banerjee1 s case; 1’jamasivya v Madras Aid 1965 S.C. 190; Jee Jee 3hoy
v Union A.I.A. 1965 S.C. 1096; Va j rave lu v Sp.Dty Collector X.I.R. 1965"
S.C. 1017; Union v Kamalbhai A.I.R. 19b6 S.C. 377 (which also cites all
these casesj; B.Bhankara hao v Gujerat A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 453 at pr.7 p.453.
51* The following are post-Amendment Ccises: Metal Corpn V4 Union. A.I.R. 
I967 S.C. 637; Uclai Ram v Union A.I.h. 19 6% S.C. 1133; M.P. v Hanojirao 
A.I.I:. i960 S.C. 1053* The following is qipre-Amendment case: Gujerat v
Kamalbhai A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337•
52. A.iiu 1967. 3 3 4 .
53* The Metal Corporation of India (Acquisition and Undertaking Act
(44 of) 1965.
54. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 637 at pr.7 p.641 col.2.
55- A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1053 at pr. 7 p./GTHHegde J. observes:"Further,
the compensation referred to in Article 31(2), as held by this Uourt in 
various decisions is tue just equivalent of the v&lue of the property 
taken. If for every rupee acquired 50 paisas or less is made payable as 
compensation, the violation of Article 31(2) would be patent and in those 
circumstances the exercise of the powers of the legislature would be con­
sidered as a fraud on the exercise of its powers and consequently ... a 
colourable piece of legislation." But note this v/as an alternative 
argument. The main argument v/as that choses of action cannot be acquired.
5  6
EarnJ3hcirma v^ Uniori the Court divided on the isdue of compensation, and
the minority (Shelat J. for Vaidialingam J. and himself) were prepared
to invalidate a statute which froze the value of property acquired
57v/ith reference to the date of notification, for two years* But both 
the majority and the minority accepted the authority of the 19o5 cases
cP
on the meaning of the word compensation, even though the majority
refused to accept an argument based on Article 14 of the sort used in 
59Vajravelu*s case.
The acceptance of a uniform meaning for the word "compensation** 
means that the Court had in varying degrees accepted the approach 
inaugurated by Subba Eao J. in Vajravelu*s case. The degrees to which 
they agreed to this process are shown in the Tqble below.
ThBLE_ J/lish_owing_ varyin ; degrees of acquiescence to the view that 
compensation was a just equivalent.
pi | P2 P3 P4 P5 p6
Ga j e ndragadkar vl j T ? (4)
Subba Eao v | V V
yanchoo V j V V V
Hidayatullah V j V V V
Shah V V . ?(2) ?(5)
Dayal V V V ' V i
Ayyangar V V V
Sikri V V V v 1
Bachawat V V V iV j
Hamaswami V V v !
Shelat V V v (3) V v 11
Mitter V V V V
. j
V I
Vaidialingam V V V V j
Hegde V
v V V V
Grover
—
V V V V !
g>6. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1138.
57. Ibid at prs. 58-61. For the background to this controversy see 
Merrillat (1970) 273-4.
38. Ibid at prs. 32-34 (the majority); prs. 58-61 (the minority).
59. Ibid at prs. 35-7 p.1155-6.
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Key to ^able J/Tl
PI - P6 indicates predictable patterns.
PI includes those judges who subscribed to Bela Banerjee1s case in 
cases involving pre-Amendment statutes.
P2 includes those who agreed that compensation is equal to a "just
equivalent" and applied that meaning to both post and pre-Amendment 
statutes.
P3 includes those judges who were agreed that compensation is a just
equivalent but v/ere party to cases which involved only pre-Amendment 
statutes.
PA those that make no distinction between pre-and post-Amendment cases
and delivered judgements to that effect.
P5 The same as PA but including those judges who had merely concurred
in the judgements, not written any themselves.
P6 those who could be predicted to decide post-Amendment situations by
enquiring whether a just equivalent was paid or not „ ,
(v = yes; ? = insufficient information).
Ilotes:
1. It should be noted that Gajendragadkar J* did modify the accent of
Bela Banerjee1 s case in Ii/5 h.M.IC.D. v Union A.I.P. 1962_S.C. 176p-
2. Shah J.’s judgement in I-ladras v Namasivya A.I.P. 1963 S.C. 190 
did not deal with a post-Amendment situation. It was the first in 
the 1965 series.
3. Shelat J. delivered a vigorous dissent in hdai_ Ram vJUnion A.I.R.
1963 S.C. 1133 supporting the 1965 cases.
A. Gajendragadkar J. at no stage dealt with a post-Amendment situation.
3. Shall J. participated in only pre-Amendment cases, and in B. Shankara
Rao (case 8 on fable VI, 011 which see Note (2) to Table SID in which the 
comments made are clearly obiter.
V/e shall see that all the judges (with the possible exceptions
of Gajendragadkar and Shah JJ.) had either delivered or concurred in
judgements uhicn accepted the new developments. But in Gujeratpjv
Shantilal a Court consisting of Eidayatullah C.J., Shah - who wrote
the judgement - Ramaswani, hitter and Grover JJ, overruled Metal Corpn.
v Union^ clearly distinguished between pre-Amendment and post-Amendment
case law f^ severely limited some of toe observations in Vajravelu1s case
o3disa .proved of the approach in Bela Banerjee1s case and abandoned the
view taken in Bela Banerjeefs case_ that compensation cannot be fixed
6 3v;ith reference to an anterior date. The Court did not overrule,
Vajravelu* s case. but merely took the view th ,t t.ie meaning of the word 
"illusory'' was not to be found with reference to concepts in pre- 
Amendnont cases like Bela Banerjee* s case, because the Court was 
precluded from considering the adequacy of compensation by the fourth 
Amendment.
/- r
Ilidayatullah C.J.' clearly admitted that ho had made a mistake• 
But the attitude of the other judges is a litle difficult to understand.
Shah J. had in fact approved of Bola 3anerjee’s case in his judgement
(~
in. D. Nanasivya v Madras . .and all t.ue other judges had accepted in 
varying degrees the fusing together of pre-Amendment and post-Amendment 
case law. Ramaswami J. had written a judgement where he accepted by way
60. yA.I.R. 1969 S.C. 63k.
61. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 637 overruled in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 63k
62. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 63A at pr.43 p.6^ 9.
63. Ibid at pr.^ -7 p«637»
6k. Ibid at pr. 36 p.6^8 .
63. Ibid at pr.36 p.6 {^o
66. .Ibid at .pr.l p.6.37-3..............................
67* A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1096 at pr.8 p.1099-1100.
of an obiter dictum this fusion of case lav/ • Grover J. had subscribed 
to this obiter dictum and later also assented to Hegde J.’s judgement
69in H. P.yRanojirao Shinde v/hich had accepted that "compensation” meant
a "just equivalent"; Hitter J. wrote the majority judgement in Udai 
70
ham v union where he accepted the new interpretation even though he did 
not apply it to invalidate the statute before him. Is is not incon­
ceivable tuat these judges had merely subscribed to Subba Roa J.Ts 
interpretation, but were looking for an o p p o r t u n i t y  to overrule it ?
We can suspect once again that the judges relied on discussions outside 
the Court (as demonstrated by their inconsistent voting) rather than 
upon open discussion by the use of dissenting judgements.
One would have thought that ShantilalTs case would have been the
71last v/ord on the subject, but in Lachmandass v Jalalabad Municipality
Sikri J. (for Hidayatullah C.J. and Bachawat, Hitter and llegde JJ.)
once again began to talk in terms of the importance of compensation as
"the full value of the property ... (and) the point of time at which
72tile value was to bo ascertained". They held that the impugned statute
which left these questions in the han-Hs of the executive was ultra
vires Article pi (2) as it stood bofore the Amendment. At leaslr one
foreign observer v/as surprised to discover that this decision had been
73made after the Shantilai case. The retreat from Snantilal had already
7kbegun and culminated in R. C. Cooper v Union (the famous Bank
68. See 3_. Bhankara Rao v Mysore A.I.R. 19o9 G«C. 433 at pr.3 p.456-8; 
pr.7 p.439*
69. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1053.
71. A.I.hr 1969; B.C. 1126..
72. Ibid at pr.10 p.1129*
73. J.II.Finnis (1970) A.S.C.I. 37-
74. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 364.
Nationalisation case) which, was decided only a fev/ months after the 
Shantilal decision.
,:illusoryn used in Va jravelu * s case and suggested that that case and 
Chantila&'s cose merely represented two converging lines of thought.
Shah J. (who was the author of the Shantilal ruling) observed :
’’Both lines of thought which converge in the ultimate result, 
support tne view that the principle (of compensation) specified 
by the law is beyond the pale of challenge if it is relevant ... 
and is recognised principle for the determination of compensation 
and the principle is appropriate in determining the value of the 
class of the property sought to be acquired.” 75
All that the 6ourt had done was to substitute the concept of ”recognised
principle” for the concept of ”just equivalent”. The former is in fact
be seen from tne specimen catalogue of what it considered to be recognised
principles, which included :
'ki.umcet value, capitalisation of net annual profit of houses, the 
bona fide cost of reinstatement elsewhere, the cost of demolition, 
estimation of all the property taken as a unit. ” 7b
Applying these principles to the instant case the Court by a 10 : 1
majority held that the Banking Companies Act (3 of) 1969 violated these
nn
principles because it had not valued all the Bank’s assets separately,
78not paid for the goodv/ill of the banking Companies nor compensated
79the banks for the unexpired portion of the leases.
In C. Cooper’s case, the court revived the concept of
universal
Instead of following hay J.’s dissenting view that ’’illusory”
76. Ibid at pr.103 p.609-610
77. Ibid at pr.104 p.6l0.
73. Ibid at pr.107-9 p.611.
79* Ibid at pr.110 p.oil.
1meant "shockingly illusory", the Court had even gone further than Bela 
Banerjee * s case. Their view that the power to fix compensation cannot 
be wholly delegated to the legislature contrasts with the attitude taken
3lby the House of Lords in a case from Ulster,
After K. C. Cooper1s case the Court began to use the words
"inadequate", "illusory" and "market value" in all kinds of cases
82interchangeably. Thus in 3achan Singh v Punjab (a pre-Amendment case)
the Court observed : -
"In our view, the compensation payable is neither inadequate 
nor illusory, but on the other hand is not less than the 
market value and may even be more."
The Bank Nationalisation judgement may well have resulted from
the new additions to the Bench that decided the case. Sikri J. had been
a party to the 1963 cases, Shelat J. had actually subscribed to the
o3judgement in Metal Corpn. v Union which'was overruled in Shantilal*s
8hcase and written the minority judgement in Udai_Lam_v Union , Hegde J.
O r*-j- O Jhad accepted the "just equivalent" approach in SI. P. v hanojirao Shinde 
and hay, Heddy and Dua JJ. were new to the problem. Only Shah and 
Grover JJ. had been party to Shantilal's case. Once again we are faced 
with, an inconsistent voting pattern without any explanations from the 
judges themselves.
80. Ibid at pr.204 p.638. Note his view at pr.220 p.641 that the compen­
sation given by the impugned statute, though not an equivalent, was 
nevertheless not illusory. For an example of "shockingly illusory" see 
^angalji v Rajasthan A.I.H. 1971 Raj. 167 at pr.10 p.170-1.
81. See the decision of the House of Lords in P.P.Cars case (i960) 2 W.L.R. 
l4o on the Northern Irish Constitution,1920 (Sect.5CD) that it was intra 
vires to permit compensation to be decided on the basis of a Ministry 
decision.
82. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2164 at pr.13 p.2127-
83. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 637.
84. A.I.R. 196g S.C. 1138.
83. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1053.
The implied use of foreign doctrine.
Despite this inconsistency, the Court had at last established
on a sound basis a pattern or review based on the recognised principles
of cosmopolitan jurisprudence, liven though the Court does not mention
any foreign case law, it is clear that the Court was inspired by foreign
concepts rather than the text of the Constitution. The emphasis on
"full compensation*' is an important feature of Anglo-American case law
and was incorporated in the Indian Land Acquisition Act as early as 1o94.
The desirability of taking into account the potential value of the land
86can also be traced to a Privy Council decision which was cited in
O r p gg
Va jravelu* s and Shantilal1s cases. The Supreme Court obviously did 
not want to abandon the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition
Act and in various ocher cases took particular care to ensure that they
89were preserved. It is against the pattern of that Act, rather than 
the Constitution, that the Supreme Court has deliberated on the meaning 
of the word "compensation".
The result that the Supreme Court has achieved accords with 
the position in Lnglana,
86• Vyricherla Narayana v Revenue Piv.Officer A.I.R. 1939 P.C.96. See 
also State"V Des'ai" A.I.K. 1969' Guj. 276 at pr.7 p.280-1.
87. A.I.2. 196b S.C. 1017 at pr.17 p.1026.
83. A.I.2. 1969 S.C. 634 at pr.36 p.643.
89. See ii.P. v Vishnu Prashad A. 1.5. 1966 S.C. 1393 (and comments of 
Kerrillat~(1970) 226-229; Udai Ham v Union A.I.R. 196$ S.C. II38; Balammal 
v Madras A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1423 at pr.7 p.1428-9; pr.12 p. 1429; A.I.T.and 
T.C. v Collector A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1233 at pr.3 p. 1233; Daisy v Kerala A.I.R.
1971 S.C. 2272. See also the following High Court decisions; Doongarsee
& .Sons v State A.I.R. 1971 Gaj. 46 at pr.9 p-54; State v Hohd.Mustafa 
A.I.R. 1971 had." 213 (on the' "solatium") pr.3 p.214-5; Rohtas industries 
Ltd_. v Union A.I.R. 1971 Pat.414 at 424-5 (on compensation generally!".
90. See Birmingham City Corpn v West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association 
(Inc.) (19697 3 W .L.R. 977 and comments thereon Brownlie Cl970) A.S.C.L.
ISO; Mann 119^9)~~o3 L.Q.R. 516.
91 92 93the United States, Australia, Malaysia, but the question whether
it deals with tue problems of underdevelopment is left at best on the
surface open. Unable to tackle the moral and economic problems, the
Court drives the legislature into saying explicitly what the Court
seems to wish to avoid admitting openly. Inadequate compensation is
QZf
becoming a normal feature of African public law. In direct contrast 
to the Bank Nationalisation case we find a Zambian statute whies, specific­
ally lays down that no compensation shall be paid for the goodwill of 
05
a Company.^ Spurred on by Anglo-American ideas of fairness the Court
has tried to keep abreast of western ideas, but failed to apply a
96theory of "distributive justice" in India’s context.
The Court’s desire to keep within western patterns might have 
been justified if it were warranted by the text of the Constitution.
But what the Court seems to have done is misused techniques of inter­
pretation and indulged in inconsistent voting patterns to achieve a 
power of review which was clearly denied to it by the terms of the 
Eourth Amendment.
91. Bee the recent case of -U.S. v >/.G. Reynolds A.I.R. 1971 U.S.3.C. 21; 
Cora v U.S. 73 Eed.Supp.233 and comment 61 har.L.R. oo0-2; McCormick:
The measure of compensation in Eminent Domain (1933) 17 MinnML.hev. A6l; 
Michelmann: Property, utility and fairness: Comments on the ethical 
foundations of "just compensation" law. (1967) 80 liar.L.Hev. H 65 (where 
the whole issue is discussed from a wider point of view).
92. See V/ynes (1970 M.) 328-33^*
93- See Alagappa JJhettiar v Collector (19*63) 1 llal.L.Jnl. 2A3 (F.C.).
9A. See Tanzania G.N.lJo. 90 and 166 of 1968 which make no mention of 
compensation; Tanzania Land Acquisition Act (A7 of) 196? which gives a 
restricted compensation but allows recourse to Courts to settle disputes.
95* See D.C.M.Yardley (i960) A.S.C.L. 1A9 where the Tanzanian statues 
are also mentioned.
96. For a discussion of this see Michelmann (1967) cited f.n. 91 supra 
and U. Baxi: State of Gujerat v Bhantilal : A requiem for just compensation 
(1969) 9 Jai.L.Jnl. 29-
Baxi deals with too many western concepts to put forward a plea : of 
egalitarianism without really-discussing- India-’s-needs-...................
97ij The concept of public purpose in a jnixed economy.
a. The concept of public purpose generally.
98 h-In HamabhatFramjee Fetit v Secy, of State the rivy Council
approved of the wide definition given to "public purpose" by Batchelor J.
The latter defined it as
"an object or aim in which the general interest of the community 
as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly 
and vitally concerned."
99_,
This has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court, following this 
line of reasoning, Courts in India have taken a very wide view of public 
purpose. Thus in Kame shwar'_v_j3ihar^^al though they found the statute 
a colourable exercise of power, they did not invalidate it as lacking 
in public purpose. The following have been approved as falling within
the meaning of public purpose.; agrarian reforrn,^^slum clearance to
102 103 house the homeless, procuring a house for a diplomat or an office
104for a State trading Corporation, acquisition 01 land to construct a 
dharamshala,^^house members of a co-operative society,^^for industrial
97- Bee generally J.karain: The concept of public purpose in Article 31
(2) of the Constitution of India (l$64) 6 J.I.L.I. 175-34; H.II.Jain (i960)
136-154; V.N.Shukla: Concept .of Public Purpose and Band Reuse•Planning 
in 3.K.Jain (ed)) Law and urbanisation in India (196$) 93-102; P.P. 
Raraa.chandra Eao: Public purpose and compulsory acquisition of property, 
in (G.3.Charma (ed)) Property relations in Independent India (l$68) 107-114.
93. (1914) 42 I.A. 44.
99. ICameshwar v Bihar A._I_.Ih_ 1952 S.jC. 252; Bombay v Kanji_ A. I. RJL95j6 
S.C. 294; Soraawanti v Punjab A.I.R. l$o3 S.C. 151 at pr.30 p.l62.
100. A.I.2. 1952 S.C. 252 at 274.
101. Kaneshwar v Bihar A.I.2. 1952 B.C. 252; Gurya Pal Singh v U.P.(1952) 
S.C.R. 1656."*™'
102. Bhanji Kunji v Bombay A.1.2. 1955 B.^ C. 41 at pr.l8 .
103* Bombay v Kli Gulshan A.I.R. 1955 B.C. 8l0.
104. Bombay v. Nanji A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 294.
105. Thambiran v Madras (1952) Mad. 892.
106. Bhagwat Dayal v Union A.I.R., 1959 Pun..479 .......................
development j^^planned development ^ ^housing schemes,^^houses for
workmen, ^"^or for a iiahatma Gandhi Memorial.^"'"
The Court has also not usually declared statutes ultra vires 
112for want of public purpose and has followed strictly the text of
Section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act I89A which lays down that a
declaration by the Government that land is wanted for a public purj^ ose
shall be conclusive evidence that the land is wanted for such a purpose,
11A
unless there is a colourable exercise of power. More recently the
Punjab High Court has held that an acquisition for one public purpose
may, in the absence of mala fides, be transferred for use for another 
115
public purpose. 3ut that decision is difficult to reconcile with
ll6another decision of the same Court.
lO?. A Rodericks v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1783.
103. Jage_ Ram v Haryana 1971.S_.CJ. 1033-
109. Rafrilal v Gujerat A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 98A.
110. Gee Land Acquisition Act I89A 3ec.A0(l)(a) and cases in it discussed
infra.
111. K.H.Chinai v Gujerat A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1183 at pr.P-
112. e.g. Bombay Land Requisition Act (23 of) 19A3 in Bhanji Munji v_
Bombay A.I.R. 1939 G>C« Al; see also Bombay v Ali Gulshan. A.I.R. 1939 
G.C.| blO; Lilavati v Bombay A.I.R. 1937 B.C. 321; Collector Akola v 
Ramchandra ^ .I.n. 19°8 S.C. 2AA. '
113* Jhandu Lai v Gujerat A.I.R. I96I S.C. 98A; Somawanti v ^Punjab A.I.R. 
1963 B.C. 151; both of which are cited and followed in Ratilal v Gujerat 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 98A; Anand Brahma v U.P. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1091 (which 
with the first case cited in this footnote is cited in Jage Ram v Haryana 
A.I.R. 1971 B.C. 1033.
11A. Hudholkar J. in Somawanti v Punjab A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 131 at pr.AO 
p.163~6. In this the Court approved of the Government's policy of acquiring 
land for companies after paying a nominal amount of Ss.100. But this policy 
was approved by Courts even before Independence. But see Ponnaxia v Secy. 
of State A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1099 (where the Government's contribution was 
1/90,000 of the total compensation) which did not approve of this policy.
113• Suresh Varrna v State A.I.R. 1971 A66. But note that the Govern­
ment had spent a lot of money on the original purpose.
116. Y.3.School v Punjab A.I.R. 1971 ft & H 337 at pr.3 p-339-AO relying 
on'a'dubious and admittedly irrelevant decision of the Supreme Court.
Courts in India have taken the view that the Government has
more information about public needs and must be left with a discretion
117to deal with problems which it faces.
But there are certain disturbing decisions which suggest that
the Supreme Court may tend to fuse the wide concept of public purpose
with dis-related legal principles, which though important to the lawyer
are not in themselves the proper criteria for determining public purpose.
Il8'^ hus in Lachmandas v Jalalabad Municipality Sikri J. held that though
providing housing for the homeless was a public purpose the impugned 
119statute was lacking in a public purpose because it neither provided for
120alternative accomnoaation nor adequate compensation. In Khub Chand v 
121Ra.iasthan the Court laid down the rule that statutes which acquire 
property must be construed strictly and stressed in the instant case
122that insuificient public notice had been given. In Raja Anand v U.P.
the Court admitted the lack of jurisdiction to enquire into public
purpose but.nevertheless indirectly reviewed the acquisition on the
basis that the Government had made an error relating to jurisdictional
fact because the Court thought it had not applied its mind to the question
before it. There are also various cases where the Court, abandoning its
123usual policy of condoning technical defects, nasi invalidated a notification
117- See Bose J.’s observations in Bhanji Hunji v Bombay A.I.R. 1553 S.C.
Al at pr.3. ~
118. A.I.R. 1569 S.C. 1126.
119. Section 203. Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act 195A.
120* A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1126 at p.12 p.1129.
121 A_.JI.ih 1966 S.C. 107A at 1077.
122. A.I.RVJL967 S.C. 108l. Here a use is made of Bnglish administrative 
law techniques to enquire into the Government’s satisfaction*
123* See Babu Barkya v Bombay A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1203 at 1203 (which Subba 
Rao J. had some difficulty in distinguishing in Khub Chand v Rajasthan 
A .I.R. 1966 S.C. 107A). For a recent illustration see K.H.Chinai v 
Gujerat A.I.H. 1970 S.C. 1188 at pr.12 p.1192.
because it contained &. technical defect.
1 2 5
More recently in C. Cooper v union the Supreme Court held 
that Article 31 (2) is linked to Article 19 (9) of the Constitution.
This means that a "public purpose" must now also be in the interest of 
the general public. Does this mean that it must be based on established
"recognised principles" of lav; and that legal criteria, like the adequacy
of compensation, will also be considered while ascertaining the extent 
to which the statute subserves a public purpose ? The decisions discussed 
above suggest that the Court is not averse to the idea of determining 
the public content of an enactment not according to the secular criteria 
of public need, but on the basis that it may not be a public purpose if
it offends accepted legal principles.
further, there is a real inconsistency in subscribing to a
wide view of public purpose and at the same time adopting the rule that
the statute which acquires property must be strictly construed.
b. 'Hie concept of_ public use in a rrdxed__ep_qnomy.
Keeping this in rnind we turn to the Court's interpretation
of the concept of "public use" in Cection (b) of the Land Acquisition
Act l8S4 v/hic h .permits acquisitions by the Government-for -the benefit
of a company (with the company paying the compensation) where
"(b) ... such acquisition is for the construction of some work and
that such work is likely to prove useful to the public."
1n such cases, the company enters into an agreement (with the Government)
which d stall s under Lection 41 (5) of the same statute
124. See Shyam_ Behari v H.J?. A.I.h. 1963 JS.C. 646, where the Court inva­
lidated the notification because it did not say that it was for a company 
altaough it did state that it was for the Premier Refrigerating Factory 
(see pr.12).
125. .i.I.A. 197Q B.C. 364 at pr.43-62. But see the dissenting view of 
Ray J. a.t pr.l^o.
A' B 0
. the tine within which and the conditions on which the work
shall be executed or maintained and. the terns on which the public
shall be entitled to VS& the work. 51
The problem is : should the phrase* :'useful to the public" be limited to
constructions which are actually used by the public or can it include a
wider spectrum of activities which though not used directly by the
public can be said to subserve a public need ? The former view would
limit Acquisitions for constructions like parks, dharamshalas, baths,
crematoria, and so on. The latter view would enable the Government to
make an alliance with private enterprise and buy up land for them for
industrial development in depressed areas where there is unemployment
or insufficient capital investment. This latter view would enable the
Government to use the statute for regional planning and achieving its
declared economic objectives.
Some attempt has been made in America to accept the latter
12?view.
In A. L. Arora v U.P. (no. 1)  ^the Government acquired land
for the establishment of a textile mill. It was contended that the 
establishment of such a mill was in itself likely to prove useful to the 
public. But V/anchoo J., for the majority, held it was not. He refused 
to believe that
"it was the intention of the legislature that the government should 
be a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in order 
that the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities 
for private profit ... simply because the company might produce 
goods which would be useful to the public." 129.
126. For a general review of planning priorities see Streeton and Lipton 
(ed) The Crisis of Indian Planning (196J) Chapters 2,3,5*
127. See on "public use" l6A Corpus Juris Secundum 9^-2; "public utility" 
73 Corpus Juris Secundum 991 ff. See also on "public use" 26 American 
Jurisprudence (2d) 666-733 but particularly 67I-67A (urban redevelopment 
through private interests (p.693-6)p the fuel industries (pp.711-22).
12S. A_.I_.I-U 19.62 S.J3.74>l+ .
129. Ibid at pr.13 p.770 col.l.
Relying on the "agreement" clause in Article 41 (5) that the public
should be entitled to use the work, he rejected American precedent on
the interpretation of "public use" in the Fifth Amendment, on the grounds
that that Amendment was not in pari materia to the statute before it.^^
This approach is technically right but it is clear that Wanchoo J.
evaded the responsibility of discussing "public use" in the context
131of a mixed economy, which the American decisions did.
In complete contrast Sarkar J. (the dissenting judge) took the 
view that this approach was too narrow and cited Indian case law to 
suggest that public use had been regarded even in India as something
132 rmore than constructing items for general use by the public. xie was
even willing to dispense with the provisions of Section 41 (3) in cases
133 1of public utility like the construction of a "drug factory", a "hospital"
135or to house the workmen of a company.
Parliament supported the dissenting view and after a lively 
debate^°in which the Socialists criticised the Court for not allowing 
the Government to acquire land for the benefit of private enterprise (I) 
added Section 40 (aa) to the Act. This clause permitted acquisitions
130. Ibid at pr.l6 p.772.
131; His lordship referred to 18 American Jurispurdence 661-2 without 
citing any case law. See however Berman v barker" 3 4£TU.S. 26. See also 
the references cited f.n.127 supra).
132. Ibid at pr.32 p.777 where he cites Ezra v Secy. of State (1905)
32_I«_A» 93 (acquisition for the Bank of Bengal to house a public debt 
office for the Government); kadha Raman v U.P. A.I.R. 1934 All.70 at pr.13 
p.703 (land for a co-operative housing society); Ranibala v V/.3. (1953)
62 C.I/.I-I. 73 (extension of a textile mill).
133- Ibid at pr.35 p -778.
134. Ibid at pr.37 p.779*
135- Ibid at pr.33 p.779-
136. See L.3.D. 21, 29, 30 Aug. 1962. The debate is briefly recounted 
by H Hi .Jain (1963) 143-6.
n(aa) ••• f°r the construction of some building or work for a 
company which is engaged or talcing steps for engaging itself 
in any industry or work which is for a public purpose."
The corresponding agreement clause was to contain details of
"the time within which and the conditions on which the building 
or work shall be constructed or executed."
Section 7 of the Amendment Act made these provisions retrospective.
These provisions came to be considered in R. L. Arora v U.P.
137(ho. 2) where './anchoo J. for the majority upheld the validity of the 
Act and in contrast to his earlier attitude took the view that the
TV n
statute must not be interpreted in a literal and mechanical way.
But he went on to take a restrictive view of Section 40 (aa) and 
observed that it
"does permit acquisition of land of some building or work, which 
is for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the 
land is acquired also subserves the public purpose of the industry. "139
inis point is further developed by Ayyangar J. in his dissenting judge­
ment. he admitted that industrial development may be a public purpose
but that the statute was invalid because the statute gave "carte blanche- 
140
to the Government" ' v/hich could acquire land for a company to build a
141private house or a swimming pool for the Directors. Once again the
Court was trying to use the Common Law techniques of distrustingdelegation
1^2of power and fusing it with the meaning of public purpose. In any
137. A^I.K._ 19.6AJ3.C1. 1230;
138. Ibid at pr.1230 col.l. He also quoted from Kedar ijath v Bihar A.I.R.
1962 S.C. 955 to invoke the Constitutional rule of construction that the
Court must lean in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment.
139. Ibid at p.I230.
140. Ibid at pr.30 p. 124-5.
141. Ibid at p.1241-2.
142. Getalvad: The Indian Constitution 1930-65 (1967) 142-3 makes the 
sane mistake. His comment begins "Further, apart from trusting the 
executive ... "
'■'j Li o
event to say that the construction of a house on a vast industrial 
estate was for private purposes is to ignore the nature of such 
estates and the terns on which private corporations agree to develop 
certain areas.
143 , vl44In V/. 5. v Taluqdar following R. L. Arora v U. P. (No. 1)
1/anchoo J. held that an acquisition for accommodation for the staff of
the Ram Krishna Mission was not a public use within the meaning of
1^5
Section 40 (b). He further suggested that Section kO (aa) did not 
1 46apply either. Sarkar J. subscribed to the judgement in this case, 
even though he had specifically approved of acquisitions for siich
147purposes in an obiter dictum in his dissent in R. L. Arora v U. P. (No.JL).
143Again, in Agarwala v W. 3. ' Shah J. for a unanimous Court held
that acquisition of land for the Bharat Sevashram Sangrah to maintain 
students, a publication department and guest houses, did not fall 
within the meaning of Section 40 (b) and would have been invalid but 
for the fact that Section 40 (aa) had been passed with retrospective 
effect. Thus land could not before the Amendment even be acquired for 
public charities, unless it was for actual use by the public.
.......  However distafe.fceful the idea of the Government using private ■ ■
companies for development and planning purposes may be, it is clear 
from the Government’s Industrial Resolutions of 1946 and 1956^^ that
143. A.I.R. 1967 B.C. 746.
144. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 7&4 at pr.15.
3.45• A.I.R. 1969 3.C. 746 at pr.13-4.
146. Ibid at p.653 col.l because the nature of the work of the servants 
of the Mission was not explained.
147. A^I^J-9.62 S..:C. 764 at pr.po p.773.
i43. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 795 at pr.9.
149 • See Myrdal: II Asian Drama Sl6-23.
this is a part of Government policy. An eminent economist has suggested
that the Government have been motivated by practical considerations
150rather than ideology. It is clear that private enterprise is an
important part of the Government’s policy of industrial development,
151which the Court agrees is a public purpose. The importance of their 
involvement can be seen from the Table below.
TA3LG VIILsiiov/ing the relative share of public and private enterprise 
in the national product 195Q-19C2 (when the cases were decided).
net output 1950 1955-6 1560-1 ' 1961-2
Public 290 kZO 570 610
Private 8,830 6,990 12,730 13,060
(in crores of rupees)
Source* II. M. Jain: Aight to ^ property (1963) 279*
Tnis may well amount to what a foreign observer has called
152"post office socialism" ‘"but that is no concern of the Court’s which 
must seek to define public purpose according to what are (at least 
theoretically speaking) the wishes of the Indian people expressed 
through Parliament. In any case, the Government’s use of private enter­
prise to ease unemployment.and further development is becoming a normal 
feature of the modern State.
Apjart from Sarkar J. the Court seems not to have even discussed 
the concept of public purpose within the meaning of the needs of a mixed 
economy even though it has made public its view that it could not have 
been the intention of Parliament to sa.netion the acquisition of lands for
150. See Gunnar Hydral: III Asian Drama 816-S32.
151. Ibid 823-826 particularly 826.
152. Ibid quoting Ambassador J. K. Galbraith.
purposes of private profit. The Court, despite its formal protest 
that it has not, has followed a, strict and only technically proper line 
of construction, has assumed an attitude (on a vital question) which 
does not reflect well on the capacity of the Court to adjust the meaning 
of public purpose to the Indian needs or to be able to interpret the 
terms of an 189  ^statute so that it can still be used to suit the 
country's changing needs.
iii. Jin which cases must compensation be paid ?
One of the most important questions of constitutional law
centred around the question of when compensation must be paid. Apart
from the technicalities involved in constructing the text of the
Constitution, it must be made clear from the beginning that the problem
is a practical one involving a policy decision by the Court. This is
1
accepted even in a rich country lihe America. Nor can the State be 
expected to pay for destruction pauipted for reasons of public health 
(popularly called an exercise of"police power"), though years ago a 
young student at Harvard rightly observed :
. . "The distinction that the Courts have established between
destruction and appropriation is I believe without exception but 
it does not seem to be founded on any principle of sound justice." 13k
Ultimately the Courts must make a policy decision that certain rights
are worth compensating. Thus in America the Government has been asked
133* See 16A Corpus Juris Secundum 712-?20 and see Berman v barker 3kS 
U.S. 2b; liabeeyj/hite Plains Publishing Co. 327 U.3. 178; Bowles v Willing­
ham 321 U.S. 303 (no compensation for diminution in value - but now see 
Griggs v Alleghany County (1$62) 3&9 U.S. 8^; Tuget Sound_Power__and 
Light Co. v City of oeattle 291BU.3. 8I9 (incidental damage). But compen­
sation can be deemed payable for unreasonable restriction on the enjoyment 
of property, see Block v Hirsh 236 U.S. 135*
13A. E.Abbot: The police power and the right to compensation 3 Ear.L.lev. 
189 at 20 1^-3 .
to pay compensation for interference due to airplanes making a noise
156or because of the inconvenience caused by the drainage of a dam.
The Supreme Court of India had three options. Firstly, the
Court could follow the common sense approach of the Federal Court of
157India in Jaganath Baksh v United Frovinces where it was held that a 
statute safeguarding the rights of tenants was not an acquisition which
was to be compensated for. The Supreme Court did not even lfaention this
153case in Subodh Gojpal v W. J3. - one of the controversial cases which
159 loOled to the Fourth Amendment - even though it was directly in point.
l6lIn later cases, the Supreme Court approved of the Federal Court, but
its relevance appears to have been limited to tenancy matters.
Secondly, the Court could have followed the view of the
1 "^ 2Australian high Court in Minister v Dalziel ' where the test laid down 
was whether expropriation was liable to compensation if a statute
155- Gee U.S. v Causby (19k6) 323 U.S. 256 and see the comment at (i960) 
7k Har.l.k. 1561 at 153 k.
156. See Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v b.S. (19k7) 7k Fed.Supo. 655 
(a k:l decisionf and the comment on it at (Thko)" bl Kar.L.R. bb2-k.
157. (I9k5) F._C.K. 72 affirmed by the Privy Council (19k6) 73 I*A. 123.
For a discussion of this in the constitutional context see Seervai (1967)
513 ff-
153. A.I.R., 195k S.C. 92.
155- -See the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Fourth Amendment 
Act 1955. Gazette Bxt. Pt. 1 Sec.l p»7k5»
160. 3oth concerned the question as to whether the control of a landlord’s 
rights in relation to his tenants could be controlled without paying him 
any compensation.
161. See Singh v Bombay A.I.A. 1955 3.C. 5kO; Kishan Chand v Rajasthan 
A.I.A. 195jl ShC. 795? Guru_hatt Shanna_v Bihar A.I.R. i960 S.C. IbiSk at
p-r.2*3,30 p.1697. For another tenancy case where the common sense approach 
was followed see D.K.Nabhirajah v Mysore A.I.R. 1952 B.C. 339 at pr.lS p.3k2.
162. (I9k3-k) 63 C.L.R. 261.
"seize something short of the whole bundle (of the rights that 
constitute property) owned by the person it was expropriating." l6p
16kIn Chi ran jit Lai v (Jnion all the judges of the Court adopted this 
approach and stressed that the Court would not take the formal view 
that for Article J± (2) to apply interference with title was necessary.
There was however a difference of emphasis on the application of the
165Australian cases. This Australian case was also approved in Subodh
Gopal v W. B.^°and Dwarkadas v Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd.^^ It
must however be noted that the Australian provisions are not in pari
materia. The majority view in the Australian case was not followed
168by the Bombay High Court. But though the Australian case is not
irrelevant because it does away with the need to follow a formal approach,
it does nevertheless take a wider view than the text of the Indian
Constitution, and Indian conditions, admit.
Lastly there was the text of the Constitution. Article 31 (l)
of the Constitution lays down :
"Ho person shall be deprived of his property, save by 
authority of lav/." (emphasis mine)
But Article 31 (2) lays down that compensation shall only be paid if
the property "was taken possession of, or acquired for public purposes.".
163. This passage is cited in Chiranjit Lai vJJnion A.IKS•__1951 kl
at p.56 col.l.
A.I.R. 1951 S.C. kih at p . 56 col.l (per Kukerjea J.) at p.6l col.2 
(per DasJ.).
165. Das J. took a slightly narrower and more ©ell defined view of what
would constitute an appropriation.(Recounting his emphasis in I>warkadas1s
case A.I.R. 195k.S.C. 119 at pr.51 P-13& h0 observed:"My observations were 
much more definite than those of Kukerjea J.")
166. A.I.R. 193k B.C. 92.
167. A.I.R. 195k B.C. 119.
I60. Bhagwati J. in Tan Bing Tain v Collector A.I.R. 19k6 Bom.216. This 
case is mentioned in passing in Dwarkadas1s case A.I.R. 195k S.C.119 
p.129 col.2 (per Mahajan J.).
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The Court could either have emphasised the concept of ndeprivation" in 
Article 31 (1) stressed that Article 31 (l) and (2) were inter­
related, alternatively it could have emphasised Mtaken possession of 
or acquired" in Article 31 (2) on the grounds that that Article was an 
independent provision and stood on its own.
If this simple textual apprach, supported by the Australian 
cases, had been followed there v;ould have been no problem. But Das J. 
in a desperate effort to increase the State's power to acquire property 
without paying compensation, confused the whole issue by introducing 
American concepts and identifying Article 31 (l) with the "police power" 
of the State and Article 31 (2) with the doctrine of liminent Domain.
This view was first put forward in Chi ran jit Lai v Union^^where the 
Court relying on the Australian case held that a shareholder was not 
entitled to compensation simply because the Government had taken over 
the management of the petitioner's company. Das J. put forward his 
theory that Article 31 (l) contained a police power which gave the state
wide powers to deprive without payment of compensation^in addition to
171
the power to restfict the use of property in Article 19 and the power
1?2to promote public health and prevent danger to life and property m  
Article 31 (3) b (ii)4. Kukerjea J. for the majority rightly thought
3.69. A.I.II. 1931 S.C. *fl.
170. A. Ip IK 1951,_S_.jC. hi at pr.7o p. 63.
171. Article 19(1) "All citizens shall have the right 3L- (f) to acquire, 
hold and dispose property." "(5) Nothing in sub claus(e) ... (f)(of 
Section 1) shall affect the operation of any existing lav; in so far it 
imposes, or prevent(s) the State from baking any law imposing reason­
able restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred ... either in 
the interests of the general public or for the protection of the 
interest of any schedule tribe."
172. Article 31(3) "Nothing in clause (2) shall affect:- ... (b)the 
provisions of any lav; which the state may hereafter make:- (ii) for the 
promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property.
that these American concepts were irrelevant .^^Indeed as long as the
17 if
Court kept away from these ideas it evolved a practical approach.
175Sukoflk Gopal v V.r. 3. the whole Court held that Section
7 of the Bengal Revenue Sales (Nest Bengal Amendment) Act (7 of) 1950*
which made restrictions preventing landlords from evicting their tenants
and causing all pending suits to abate for compensation, was intra vires
Article 31 (2)- Ihis was in keeping with the whole Court’s view that
substantial rights were not taken away.
But once again Das J. referred to the arguments he had raised
in Chiranjit Lai’s case. He argued that the police power in Article 31
(5) b (ii) was "too narrow” to suit the complex problems of modern states.
Declaring his willingness to allow a "sense of the sanctity of private
property (to be) shocked ... (by being left to) the unfettered mercy of 
177the legislature", he quoted American authority (especially a judgement
of Holmes J.)^°for his wider view of police power, giving six examples
of a possible exercise of the power of acquisition, which would not fall
179within Articles 13 and 31 (5).
173. A.I.H. 1951 3.C. 41 at nr. 56 p.5o.
174. See D.K.Nabhirajah v hysore A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 339 o.t pr.lo p.342 (per 
N.C.Aiyar J. for Shastri, Kahajan, Hukerjea and Das JJ.).
175. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92.
176. Ibid at p.110 col.2. Reason (iv).
177« Ibid at p.110 col.l.
17o. He cites at p.Ill col.2. V/illoughby: III^  Constitutional law of the 
United States 1774; Lnbank v_ Richmond^ (1912T 22cg U • 137; Holmes J. in 
Noble State Bank v Haskell (1910) 219 U._3.~104~.
179- Ibid at pp.110-1. The six examples are (1) acquisition of obscene 
pictures (2) requiring baric guarantee deposits (as in the Holmes judge­
ment supra f.n.178) (3) stoppage of trains resulting in management by the 
State (4) control of black marketeers (5) opening up congested parts of
towns (6) the destruction of property by fire brigades.
In actual fact his six examples quite easily fall within the
loOexercise of powers allowed by Articles 31 (5) and 19 (5)« further, 
l3lAmerican jurists writing at the time when Das J.’s American
authorities were written suggest that Das J. exasperated the American
position. His reference to Holmes J. ignores the fact that Holmes J.’s
lo2opinions were in themselves extremely controversial and also the fact
that Holmes J. left open the question about the width of the police
183power in the case relied on by Das J.
Das J. followed an extremely doctrinnaire approach and seemed
to attack a theory of individualism and an orthodox system of Constitu-
18^tional interpretation based on Blackstone, instead of concentrating on
the simple issue before the Court. The majority naturally assumed a
doctrinnaire reply. Shastri C.J. replied:
"(3)ocial welfare is not inconsistent with the ownership of 
private property and does not demand arbitrary expropriation of 
such property without compensation. Cn the other hand as pointed 
out by Blackstone: 'The public good is in nothing more essentially 
interested than in private rights as modelled by the municipal law.'"135
loO. with reference to f.n.179* Examples 2,3 and k do not involve an 
acquisition by the State, examples 1 and 6 fall within Article 31(5)b(ii). 
Example 5 is a complicated example of Town Planning Lav/, which cannot 
really be considered as a police power, though if it were it would come 
under Article 19(5) if the word "restriction" in that section were taken 
to include destruction as held after years of controversy in Karenda v- 
Union A.I.R. i960 B.C. b3Q. Examples 3 and Vcould also be controlled 
under Article
181. See R.A.Brown: Due process of lav/, police power and the Supreme 
Court (1926-7) bO Har.L.R. 9^3 at 957 ibid: Police power: Legisla­
tion for health and personal safety (1928-9) 2^__Har.L.Hev_. 866.
182. For an account of Holmes J.’s controversial position in Constitutional 
lav/ see Frankfurter: The Constitutional opinions of Hr. Justice Holmes 
(1916) 29 Har.L.H. 633; Ibid: Twenty years of Hr. Justice Holmes’ consti­
tutional opinions (1923) 56 Har.L.Rev. 909; Hr. Justice Holmes and the 
Constitution (1927) *+1 Har.L.Rev. 121.
183. See Noble State Bank v Haskell (1911) 219 U.3. 10^ at 112.
lo^ f. A.I.R. 195^ S.C. 92 at p.107 col.l (where he refers to both 
Blackstone and Erotius).
.185., Ibid at. pr.18. p.100. col.2 . (see also-his .comments at p . 101 quoting - - 
from Cooley: I Constitutional Limitations (od) 535•
In  th is  way a small point of law was converted in to  a broad controversy 
about the ind iv idu al and the S tate. This could have been avoided, fo r  
Jaganadhdas J . ,  who supported Das J . ' s  emphasis as regards when compen­
sation must be paid, did not approve of h is finding American p a ra lle ls
l36to the provisions of the Indian Constitution.
There was however a d ifference of emphasis between the views 
of the n ih o rity  (Das and Jaganadhdas J J .)  and those of the m ajority  
although a l l  agreed that A rt ic le  31 (2) did not apply to  the present 
case. The m inority f e l t  that compensation should be paid, not fo r  a l l
|On
kinds of deprivation but only where property was requisitioned or
l88ac tu a lly  acquired, whereas the m ajority  were w illin g  to pa.y fo r
lo9substantial deprivations of the righ ts  which constitute property.
This whole dispute about le g a l in te rp re ta tio n  was reenacted
1°0 191 in  Dwarkadas1s case^  '  which was a continuation of C h ira n jit L a i’ s case.
The State, whicn had taken over the management of the p e t it io n e r ’ s company,
called up the unpaid c a p ita l, which in  the context of the p e titio n e r
meant paying Rs.1 ,62 ,000 . The whole Court agreed that th is  a ltered  
192tne s itu a tio n  and that tne p e t it io n e r ’ s rig h t to property had been
193v io la te d . Das J. once again put forward h is e a r l ie r  views, which were 
136. Ib id  at p . l lo  co l. 1 .
187. Ib id  at p . l lo  c o l . l  (per Jaganadhdas J .)
lo o . Ib id  at p .113 p o l.2  (per Das J . ) .
189. Ib id  a t p .99 c o l.2 (per Shastri J.O
19°* A . I .R .  195A- S.C. 119.
191• A.I.R. 1931 S.C. Al.
192. A ,1,93 ^  S.C. _ 119 at 130-1 (per Hahajan J . ) .  His d is tinc tions
were accepted by Bose (at p r.72  p .138) ,  Hasan (at pr.73 p*139) JJ-
^ee also Das J . at 135-
193* Ib id  at 136.
194rejected by the majority. The majority, driven into emphasising that 
Article 31 (l) was not connected with police power but was interrelated 
to Article 31 (2) emphasised a test based on ’’substantial deprivation”
in the former Article rather than "taking possession of" or "acquiring”
195m  the latter. But it was no more than a point of emphasis.
'Puis emphasis on "substantial deprivation1* rather than a 
practical following of the Australian case (which had been approved) 
was soon to become a normal feathre in the Court, and gave the wrong
impression that the Court wanted to compensate every feasible kind of
196deprivation. In ^ aghir Ahnad j/y li. J?. the High Court at Allahabad
held that the new scheme of nationalisation of motor routes was a mere
deprivation of the petitioner's interest and did not create a coopen- 
197satable interest. But when the natter came up before the Supreme Court, 
the Court emphasised "deprivation" instead of "tailing possession of" 
and "acquiring”, and hold that compensation must be paid, './hat is more 
important is that the Advocate General even conceded the point, as 
Subba xlao J. observed in a later case.^^*
Shastri C.J., after retirement, told the Madras lawyers’ con-
199.1erenee that the Court had in fact not sought to compensate every case 
of deprivation, but had in fact decided quite the opposite. This is
134. Ibid at pr.l3 where Mahajan J., quoting Willis: Constitution law 716 
(see also conclusion at pr.23 p.128) held that Article 3l(l) and T2T"both 
related to American Domain. The other majority judges (Bose J. at p.133; 
Hasan J. at p.139) do not talk about eminent domain, but do stress that 
Articles 31 (l) and (2) are interrelated.
193- Ibid at 138 (per Bose J.).
196. A.I;R. 1954 B.C. 728.
197* In the High Court the case was Hotilal v_U.JP. A.I.R. 1931 A11.3.SQ
-1-98• A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728 at 740 col. 1 • Bee also Bubba Rao J. in Deep
Chanji vjJJ.J?. A.I.R. 1939 S.C. 643 at pr.38 p.669.
199- 'The proceedings are reported in A.I.R. 1933 Jnl. 23-30; see the 
summary at.(1933) 1 M.L«J.Jnl.3« Note' that the resolution'at p . 6 however 
talks in terns of the individual and the State.
borne out by their ultimate decision in Subodh Gopal’s ca.se, which had 
decided in favour of the Government,
The Government, confused perhaps by the Shastri-Das JJ. 
dialogue on the individual and the State, and perturbed by Das J.'s 
forced interpretation that the "police power" in the Constitution was 
inadequate,^ "amended the Constitution limiting the operation of the 
compensation requirements to cases of requisition and where the State 
actually acquired the right to ownership and possession.
These cases illustrate aptly the confusion that can be caused 
by judges making unnecessary references to foreign doctrines and dis­
cussing the point in issue in a wider context of a doctrinnaire 
discussion about the individual and the State. In actual fact, the 
differences between the majority and the minority were much narrower 
than they were made out to be. The Court had mentioned "substantial 
deprivation" only in passing, but soon, more a result of the public 
controversy than the Court’s desire to take an individualist’s stand, 
it became the established test for all cases to which the Amendment 
did not apply.
202In three.cases that followed,, the Court automatically 
assumed that the real test to determine whether compensation needs to 
be paid was the "substantial deprivation" rather than an analysis of 
whether rights had been taken over and acquired, even though there
200. See the Statement of Objects and Seasons to the Fourth Amendment 1955 
Gaz.Mxt.Pt.I.S.2. p.745; the Statement of the Minister of Law (1955) L.S.D. 
Vol.II Part if col.2005.
201. Article 51(2) was redrafted and Article 51(2)A was^  added to the 
Constitution.
202. Bhikajee v H.P. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 41 (Bose J. at pr.7 p.44 quoting 
his own view in Dwarkadas v Sholapur etc Co.Ltd. A.I.R. 1954 S.C.119); 
Shanti Swaroop v Union A.'l.RV''1955 's.cV 624 at pr.10 p.626; Bombay Dyg. 
and Mfg.Co. v Bombay A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 523. See also Tika Ramji v U.P.
A.I.R. 195&" S.C. Qf'o at pr.51 p.?12.
Aj kJ
2 0  5were two decisions where the Court took note of the -words "taking 
possession o$!" or "acquired".
204
Finally, in 1955 Subba Eao J. writing the judgements m  two cases 
took care to end any remains of the controversy. He supported the 
substantial deprivation test and made much of the point that the
205Advocate General of U. P. had conceded this point in Saghir Ahmad v U.F.
But the substantial deprivation has come to stay as is evident from a
20 61965 decision. Thus we can see how a public controversy, which stressed 
that the Court had taken a particular stand, in fact led to the Court 
taking the stand, which it was alleged to have adopted. This is accom­
panied by the usual erratic voting behaviour. Das J., who took the 
minority view in the 1954 cases, voted in favour of the substantial 
deprivation test in later cases.
The controversy is by no means irrelevant even after the 
Amendment, A r t i c l e  31 A proviso 2 uses the word "acquisiton" and lays 
down that compensation will be paid if the land of a person, under
personal cultivation, below a certain ceiling was acquired. In two 
20 3recent cases the question was whether land given to a Panchayat for
203. dee Anand JBehera v Orissa A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 17 at pr.13 p.19j 
Shantabhai v jdombay A.I.R. 195b S.C. 332 at pr.6 (both these cases 
emphasised that the Government had not taken over contractual rights 
held by individuals). But these cases have another facet which is 
discussed in the section "The definition of property" (supra).
204. Deer Chand v U.P. A .I.R. 1959 S.C. 643 at pr.pS p.669-70; Gullapalli 
Nageshwar hao v A.P.3.K.I.Corporation A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 303 at pr.6 p.315*
This case law is reviewed in Union v Sudhansu A.I.R. 1971 B.C. 1594 at 
pr.9-10 p.1595-9- See also Hahendra Lai v U.P.~~A.I.E. I9rbT S.C. 1017 at 
nr.13 d.1026. In this case and Been Chand*s case (supra) the Court took
^  M  I ■ I. — .... II III
a narrower view of the doctrine of eclipse so that pre-Amendment pro­
visions applied to statutes which would normally have been eclirjsed.
Cn this last point see Seervai (1967) 162-171*
2°5* A.I.E. 1954 S.C. 728 at 740.
206. il.P. v Chamalal A.I.R. 1965 B.C. 124 at pr.10 p.130.
207. He subscribed on this point to the decisions in Bhfkajee v II.P. A.I.E. 
1,555.J>• C• 41; fika Eamjee v U.P. A.I.E. 1956 S.C. 676; Deep Chand v U.P. A.I.R,
1959 S.C., 64u,; puJjL^ polli Hiageshv/ar Eao v_A.J?.E.S.^ T.Corjqn.A.IjJi. -1959 S.C. - -
50o. But he also participated in Shantabhai v Bombay A.I.E. 1955 S.C. 332.
203. Ajifc Singh v Punjab A.I.E.I967S.O.G56; fritam Singh v State A.I.E.
1967. S.C.. ........
communal purposes was such an acquisition. The majority relied upon the
209195^ cases and held that the land was not acquired by the State.
But Hidayatullah J. (for Shelat J. and himself) stressed that though
the person who lost his land got an indirect benefit, there was never-
210
theless an acquisition. If the minority view becomes acceptable, the
211wnole scheme oi rural reform, based on Cooperatives may be affected.
Indeed, the minority view may have been motivated by a belief in the
inefficaceousness of introducing these Cooperatives, as is evident
from a comment by Hidayatuallah J., in an extrajudicial capacity :
"If only political parties would leave these bodies (the 
Panchayats) ... alone, or if village elections were abolished 
and if ... control land tenures and ownership were not made 
over to them in the beginning, the Panchayats would function well."212
We can see how the Court, by talking in wide generalised terms
and appealing to cosmopolitan jurisprudence, alarmed the Government
into amending the Constitution, and the Amendment of the Constitution
and the pqt?lic controversy attendant to it, caused the Court to accept
an interpretation v/hich it had not wholly subscribed to. It is the cases
discussed here which have been responsible for giving the Court the
reputation of being "right wing" and "political". In actual fact, v/e
can see that the allegation was a product of unnecessary.reference to
principles of American public law and an equally unnecessary exaggeration
of a legal point of emphasis by political and public controversy.
209. A.1.3. 1967 B.C. 856 at pr. 9 p.930.
23.O. Ibid at pr. 31 p.867.
211. Gee G. Myrdal: II Asian Drama 1339-56.
212 Hidayatullah: Democracy and the judicial process in India (1968) 3 8.
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iv. The development of "reasonableness"'' as a due process concept.
The Constituent Assembly had talien particular care to draft 
a detailed Constitution, which dealt with each separate subject sepa­
rately,-. Unlike the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution had 
specified the details v/hich had to be considered while deciding a 
particular question, without leaving it to the judiciary to invent 
broad concepts to sustain a policy of judicial review. Thus separate
2^v
and presumably unconnected Articles dealt with the power to tax,
21kthe power to control trade and commerce, the power to make, reasonable
restrictions on the use of property,4- the power to acquire property
for a public purpose on payment on compensation, ^ "^the power to acquire
217p r o p e r t y  in the interests o f  public health, the power to deal with
213statutes connected with agrarian reform and the duty not to discriminate 
219between citizens.
220The early Court accepted tnis position. In Gopalan v Iladras
(as we shall see later) the Court held that .Articles21-22 relating to
preventive detention were not to be judged according to the concept of
221reasonableness in article 19. Again, in a 1951 case it was held that
215. Articles 265 and 3l(5)b(l).
21A. Articles 301-9- But note that the individual’s right to follow any 
trade or profession is dealt with separately in Article 19(1)(g).
216. Article 31(2).
217- Article 31(5)(b)(ii).
218. Articles 31(^)(o) and later Articles 31A, B (read with the ninth 
Schedule).
219. Article Ik v/hich guarantees "equality before law” and "equal protec­
tion of all laws".
220. A.JE.Th 1950 S.C_. 27. See Chapter IV.
221. 2amji Lai v I.T.O. A.I.A. 1931 S.C. <77
the power to tax was a separate power which must he considered separately.
222Gradually, however, the attitude began to change. In 1961 the Court
admitted the possibility of taxation statutes being adjudged on the
basis of the quality provisions in Article 14. In fact, gradually
Article 14 came to be used for controlling even statutes v/hich acquired 
223property. V/e have already seen an indication of this in Vajravelu1s 
224case earlier in this Chapter.
In the area of property one of the basic problems was whether
the concept of reasonableness in Article 19 (6 ) applied to statutes
acquiring property under Article 31 (1) and (2). The early Court
rejected Shastri C.J.’s theory that Article 19 related to capacity and
'>25
Article 31 to concrete rights,1- but at the same time accepted that 
Articles 19 and 31 v/ere not interrelated because the latter dea It with 
cases of acquisition of property while the former could be invoked 
where there was an interference with the use of property other than a
226deprivation. Tnis was first asserted in an obiter in Gopalan v hadras.
22°In three later cases'- f\ie get the impression that Articlcsl9 and 31 can
222.. Moopil Hair- v-l!erala A.1.2. I96I S.C. 332. ■ . . .  .........
223. This was hinted in the minority views in Giiranjit Lai v Union A.I.R.
1931 S.C. 41.
224. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1017 (the techniques involved are discussed supra).
223. This theory was first put forward in Subodh Sopal v v/.B. A.I.R. 1954 
S.C. 92 at pr.6-8 p.93-6. But see the comments of the other judges at 
pr.64 p.117 (per Jaganadhdas J.) pr.64 p.106 (per Las J.) pr.60 p.117. 
Hereafter the Court stated in Commr.H.R.E. v L.T.Sawmiar A.I.R. 1934 S.C. 
232 that the Court had all proceeded on the assumption that Article 
applied to abstract as well as concrete rights. The controversy was 
closed in S.M.Transport v Sanakaraswamigal A.I.R. 1963 3.C. 364 at pr.13 
p.2o9 (011 which see thb- comment in (1965) XIV IYBIA 47b-o).
226. A.I.R. 1930 S-g. 27.
227. See i/azir v II.P. A.I.R. 1934 S.C. 413 at pr.S; Virendra v U.P. A.I.R. 
1354 Shf. $47» _£a j as than v uath lial A.I.R. 1954 JS.C. 3'37 (where Articles 
19(l)(g) anc^  3 1(2 ) are used to achieve the same result).
both apply to cases of deprivation of property, but it is clear
from the 1954 cases and Bombay v Bhanji Ilunji that Article 19 applies
when there is an interference with property and 31 only when there is
229 230a deprivation. This view was followed in later cases.
But in the meantime, two developments took place. Firstly,
as we have seen, the Fourth Amendment Act 1955 made possible a larger
number of deprivations under Article 31 (1) for which compensation would
07' *1
not be paid under Article 31 (2). Secondly, in Narendra v Union
232the Court put an end to a long controversy and held that the word 
"restriction" in Article 19 (5) included "deprivation".
^  /
The result was that after this decision read with the Fourth / 
Amendment Act there were three kinds of acquisition of property - (a) 
under Article 31 (2) v/hich required the acquiring statute to be for a 
public purpose and pay compensation; (b) under Article 19 where the 
statute had to be a reasonable restriction in the interest of the 
general public and (c) under Article 31 (1) where all that was required 
was a valid statute.
The court could have stuck to their view that Articles 31 (1) 
and (2.) were, interrelated and interpreted them so that 31 (1 ) dealt
22o. Subodh Gopal v W.B. A.I.k. 1954 S.C. 92; Dwarkadas v Sholapur Spg. 
and Ivvg. Ltd5 A . I . R .  1954 S.C. 119*7
229. A.I.k._ 1955._G.C. 41.
230. See Sadhu Kan v Custodian General A.I.k. 1956 B.C. 43 at pr.3;
Barkya Thakur v Bombay A.I.R. I90Q S.C.&Q^; See also kudholkar J. in 
Somawanti v Punjab a.I.A. 19&5 S.C. 151 pr.22 p.160-1.
231. A.I.k. I960 S.C. 430.
252. For cases v/hich left tuis point open.see Gopalan v Madras A.I . E .
195Q B.C. 27; Subodh Gopal v W.B. A.I.h. 1954 S.C. 92; Dwarkadas v Sholapur 
Spt. and b'vg. Ltd. A.I.h. 1954 S.C. 119; Saghir Ahmad U.P. A*.I.A. 1954
B.C. 72o; Coverjee v_ excise Cormnr. A.JE.Fh JL954 X 2201-1.B.Cotton Assn. 
v Union A.I.h. 1954* S.C. 634"; h.h.D.C. Chamarbaugwalla A.I.h. 1957 S.C. 
o99, G * AJ-g. Co. v .>omoay A.I.h. 19hC S.o. 3ho.
o*K J  i+J
v;ith the larger power of acquisition for ufyblic purposes and that
Articles 31 (2) and (2A) merely laid down when compensation must be
paid. But the Court wanted to connect the concept of reasonableness
233to acquisition statutes and in Kochunni v hadras held that Article
19 would control all acquisitions under Article 31 (1)- The Court,
assuming the position Das J. had abandoned very much earlier, held that
Article 31 (l) read with Article 19 was in fact the police power, and
had to be interpreted with reference to the ’’judicial decisions of
the United States".^\liat motivated the majority judgement (written
by Subba Eao J.) was his belief that fundamental rights occupy "a
235transcendental position in our Constitution" and that when inter­
preting the Constitution
"She correct approach (was) ... first to ascertain what is the 
fundamental right of the petitioner and then to see whether 
the lav; infringes that right." 236
llic lordship tooh the vie;; that the 'welfare state must be within tne
. , 237framework of the provisions protecting fundamental ngnts.
From the point of view of ,State powers, the concept of"reason- 
ableness" in Article 19 is in fact much narrower than the concept of 
public purpose, which as.we have seen earlier, is very.wide indeed. The
233* A.I.h. I960 S._C. lOoO. For the view that this interpretation is right 
and the only obvious one see P.K.Tripathi: Constitutional provisions and 
problems of interpretation (in G.S.Shama (ed) Property Eelations in 
Independent India (i960)) 63 at 69-70. Note that fripathi wrongly assumes 
that' Subba hao J. was speaking for a unanimous Court. In fact the minority 
did not pass any opinion on this point (see pr.75 p.1109)-
23*f. Ibid at pr.30 p.1093.quoting from Willis: Constitutional lav; 7275 
Willoughby: III Constitutional law of the United_3tates 177^5 holmes J. 
in the fifty year old case on bank guarantee deposits: hoble State Bank 
v hapkeU _(l,910)_ 219 U.S. 10A.
235- Ibid at pr.2*f p.1091-2.
236. Ibid at pr.32 p.IO96 quoting from Bhagwati J. in Basheshwar Hath v 
LkT.Comnr. A.I.h. 1959 S.C. IA9.
237- Ibid at pr. 31-
S O  0
reason for this lies in the fact that under the concept of ’’reasonableness*' 
the Court is concerned not merely with whether the public will be bene­
fited but a large number of other considerations as well. Ihe best 
description of the term "reasonable" was given by Shastri J. in madras 
v V.G.uow where ho argued that a lot of factors go into deciding the 
meaning of the word as applied to a particular case, and observed :
"In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own 
conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a 
given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the 
scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should 
play an important part ... "
he added, however, that judges should show self restraint and remember
that the impugned legislation was passed by an elected legislature, he
can see that although' Bubba Rao J. refers to these observations and two
American cases for determining what is reasonable, he afoandons
Chaetri J.’s view that there must be a presumption in favour of the
legislation, here, once again therefore, v/e get a plea for a broad-based
system of judicial review in line with American cosmopolitan ideas.
Subba iiao J., anxious that the concept of reasonableness be generally
accepted was even prepared to hold that a similar concept be apjplied
to preventive, detention, cases - aril that the majority view in Gopalan v 
2*'0iiadras ' be overruled. This broad view was not accepted by the other
judges in the Court in the cases that immediately followed, either in
241the area of personal liberty or in cases of acquisitions under Article 31(2)
233. _A.I_.h._ I932 _3._C. 196 at 200.
23 9 • A.I.xt. i960 S.C. IO80. at pr.32 quoting from V. G. How * s_ case_ and citing 
Henry febster v reter Cooper (1869) 14 Law.Hdn.510 at 317; Citizens Saving 
and Loan Assn. v Topeka (13"77) 22_Law.Hdn. 443-461.
2AO. Ibid at pr. 23®
241. See Kharak Singh v A.?. A.I.A. I963 O.C. 1241. But now see li.C.Cooper 
v Union A.I.A. 1970 B.C. 3^4 at pr.64 (discussed Chapter IV).
2A2 /Sitabati Devi v W. 2 . Sarkar J. (who had been a minority judge in 
Kochunni’s case^1^) read a judgement for a unanimous Court in which he 
made it clear that Article 19 applied only to Article 31 (1) and not to
Article 31 (2). In fact in one case reported in 19&3i the Court even
2A5gave the impression that the old case of Bhanji I-lunji, which had held
that Articles 19 and 31 were mutually exclusive, was still good lav;.
Subba Kao J., the minority judge in this 19&3 case, appears
not to have dissented on this point. But in S. K. Transport CjO_ Ltd. v 
2A6Sankaraswamigal Subba kao J. for a unanimous Court seerned to accept
the limitations imposed by Sitabati1s case (even though he does not cite
it) by referring only to the interrelation between Articles 31 (1) and
2A719. Again in Ishwarlal v Gujerat the Court affirmed tne view of the
21*3Gujerat high Court below, on this point, whicn nas been taken to mean 
thq.t they approved of the view that Article 19 does not apply to Article 
31 (2).2^
2A2. (I96I) but reported (1967) 2. ,3.C.jR. 9A3»
Ml
2A3« 4I.I.K. I960 S.C. 10o0 at pr.VS^ ffcfyCnote that he had left his view: 
open on this point).
2AA. A.I.K. 1965 S.C. 131 at pr.22 p.l60-l.
2A3- A.I.S. 1933 S.C. Al.
2A6. A.I.Jk 1963 B.C. 86A at pr.23. Ae constantly refers to Article 31(1) 
not 31(2) see pr.23 p.672; pr.23 p.u72; twice in pr.29 p.o72-3; and once 
wuile referring to Kochunni v madras A.I.K. 19^0 S.C. 1030 at pr.29 P-673 
col.2.
2A7. A.I.K. i960 S.C. 87O at pr.2o p.ool.
2 AS. See the High Court judgement (1967) Guj.620 at 63A-5 which in turn 
appears to have relied on Shelat J.’s judgement in I-langalbhai v State 
(19'6A) 3 Guj.L.2. 329. Shelat J. appears to have changed his mind in 
K.C.Cooper v Union A.I.K. JL970 S.jC. 56A.
2A9. 'fhis is the opinion of the A.I.K. reporter and seems justified in 
view of the Court’s approval of the high Court in the words "(l)t is 
sufficient to say that (on this point) the high Court's judgement ... 
adequately answers the objections" at pr.26 p.38l.
But gradually the attitude began to change and in K._ 2 .^ v 
250Kanojirao Sliinde Hegde J. for a unanimous Court held that the II. P.
Abolition of Cash Grants Act (16 of) 1963 was invalid because it acqhired
251a "chose of action". But he went on to observe :
"The power conferred by Article 31 (2) is not a taxing power 
... (and) cannot be utilised for enriching the coffers of the state, 
(which) cannot be considered a public purpose under Article 31 (2)
... (N)othing so bad could be within the contemplation of Article 
31 (2). The article must be construed harmoniously with Article 
19 (l)(f). If so construed it is obvious that that article does 
not include enriching the coffers of the state." 252
Here we get a clear indication of how Article 19 can be used to give a
restrictive meaning to public purpose in Article 31 (2). But are we
to assume that Sitabati * s case was overruled sub silentio ? evidently
253not. In two decisions Shah J. held that Sitabati's case was good
law. The second of these cases was reported in 1970 (after It.C.Cooper
25 A /.n
v Union the Bank Nationalisation case) but decided in 1963.
Ironically it was Shah J. who read the judgement for a 10 : 1
255majority in A. C. Cooper_v_ Union, distorted the importance of SitabatiJ_s
case which he had previously accepted. He observed that Sitabati1s case
had accepted Bhanji I:nnjifs case without discussion, thus ignoring the
fact, that Sitabati's case had in•fact considered the implications-of
Kochunni1s case and that Shah J. had himself treated it in that light.
2o3Again II. P. v hanojirao Ghinde ■" is treated as having dealt with the case
257law on the subject even though it does not even mention Sitabati’s case. 
25°. A.I.H. 1963 S.C. 1053-
251. 'This aspect of the controversy is considered in Chapter II (supra).
252. A.I.h.1 963 S.C. 1053 at pr.8.
253. Shantilal v Gujerat A.I.A. 1969 S.C. 634 at pr. 53. 
haharashtra v H.h.Sao CT9S0 ) reported A.I.A. 1970 S.C.|15"7 jpllUf
254. A.I.E. 1970 S.C. 564.
255. Ibid. The comment on Sitabati*s case is made at pr.54.
256. A.I.h. 1963 S.C. 1053.
Establising a link between Articles 19 and 31 (2) Shah J. observed
"Limitations under Article 19 (5) and 31 are not generically 
different for the lav/ authorising the exercise of the power to take 
the property of an individual for a public purpose or to ensure 
the well being of the community, and the law authorising the 
imposition of reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (5) are 
intended to advance the larger public interest. It is true that 
the guarantee against deprivation and compulsory acquisition of 
property operates in favour of all persons ... whereas the posi­
tive declaration of the right to property guarantees the rights 
of citizens, (b)ut a wider operation of the guarantee under 
Article 31 does not alter the tru character of the right it 
protects. Article 19 (5) and Article 31 (1) a n d o p e r a t e  to 
limit the exercise of the right to hold property." 253
In fact Shalfi J. went a step further, and altering the whole basis of
constitutional interpretation, said :
"In our opinion the assumption in Gopalan's case ... that cer­
tain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific 
matters and, in determining whether the infringement of the indivi-' 
dual's guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action 
along need be considered ... cannot be accepted as correct." 259
Thus the Court in its desire to protect the individual’s rights rather
260than state action sought to fuse together the varied concepts which the
Constitution by its very length had sought to keep apart. The concept
of reasonableness was now to apply to "preventive detention", "public
purpose" and perhaps even "compensation." Further, The Court could fuse
into the meaning of all these concepts any cosmopolitan legal principles
which it thought appropriate. It is premature to predict what the
26limplications of this complete Change, in approach will be.
258. Ibid at pr.46.
259» Ibid at pr.64 p.597* Note however Ray J.’s dissenting judgement at p.620-
260. Gee pr.46 p.596. "Impairment of rights of the individual and not the 
object of the state in taking the impugned action, is the measure of pro­
tection. (sic)To concentrate mainly on the powers of the state is therefore 
to ignore the true intent of the Constitution."
261. There has been very little case law on the subject. See Deokinandan 
Prashad v Bihar A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1409 at 1413 col.2 (on Article 31 ClT and 19); 
Bachan Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2164 where the impugned legislation
is held intra vires Articles 31 and 19, but no case lav/ is cited). V.Laksh- 
minarayana v State A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 19 at pr.12 p.27 (decided after R.C.
Cooper1s case) which assumes that Article 31(2) and 19(6) are not interlinked
is clearly v/rongly decided.
•q  n  . 3 O Si
But we can see how the Fourth Amendment Act 1955 which was designed to 
increase State powers resulted in fact in decreasing them, in as much 
as the Court could now invoke the concent of reasonableness and had 
used the Fourth Amendment as a stepping stone in the arguments put 
forward incorporating the use of the concept.
Once again the result has been obtained by erratic voting 
behaviour, which is shown in the Table below.
2:1 \X v.e. orm.;rotin_, tne voting patterns of the judges in the cases 
in this subsection.
1 2 3 k 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sinha * V V V
Imam V + V V
T.L.V.Ayyar V
Ga j e ndragadkar X
Sarkar v X *
Subba -Kao * * +
Wanchoo V V V









Mitter V V V
Vaidialingam V V V
Hegde * V V
Bhargava V v





v =s participation x = dissent with judgement 
+ = dissent without judgement * = majority judgement
1 = Barkya Thakur v Bombay A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1203
2 = Kochunni v Madras A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1080
3 = Sitabati v W. B. (1967) II S.C.R. 945
4 s S. M. Transport (P) Ltd. v Sanakaraswamigal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 864
5 = Somawanti v Punjab A.I;R. 1966 S.C. 151
6 = M. P. v Ranojirao Shinde A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1053
7 - Ishwarlal v Gujerat A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 870
8 = Maharashtra v H. N. Rao AIR. 1970 S.C. 1157
9 = Gujerat v Shantilal A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634
10 = R. C. Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564
Note : Subba Rao J.’s dissent in case 5 was not on this point; in fact 
he agreed with the majority judgement on most points, including presu­
mably this one.
^t will thus be clear from the case law that the voting pattern
is by no means consistent, except as regards Gajendragadkar* T. L. V.
Ayyar, Ramaswami, Bachawat, Sikri, Ray, Reddy, Dua JJ. who appeared in
only one of the cases which dealt with the point under discussion.
Shelat J. appears to have taken a different view from the one he assented
26 2to in R. C. Cooper v Union in a case decided by him as Chief Justice
263of the Gujerat High Court. Sarkar J., who wrote the opinion in 
Sitabati^  case, however, voted consistently. Subba Rao J. who wanted
262. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 36A
263. See Mangalbhai v State (1964) 3 Guj. L. R. 329
to incorporate a wide view in Kochunni's case and seemed impliedly to 
accept toe reservations imposed by Sarkar J. in Sithbati’s case, in 
case k appears to have overlooked that the far more restrictive Bhanji
2.G^kunji view was accepted in Somauanti v Punjab o 'Although SomawpmtiJ^ s 
case dealt v;ith a statute before the Amendment, it must not be for­
gotten that the comments in that case made no mention at all of 
ICochunnis co.se. The Amendment was one of the factors responsible for,
but not the main reason for, the Xochunni view, which was in fact
265influenced by the view in Ilarendra v Union that a restriction in 
Article 19 could include a "deprivation1’. All the other judges seem to 
have changed their minds at some stage. Consistency was sought to be 
gained by the misleading statement in A. C. Co ope r * s case that Sit ab a t ik_s 
case was per incuriam as it had not discussed the issue. 'Chile it is 
true that tne judgement in the latter case is only two pa^es, it is 
submitted with respect that oitabati1s case had in fact discussed the 
point at issue and was accepted as having done so in cases 8 and 9i in 
which Shah J*, the author of the H. 0. Cooper ruling, had read the 
judgement of the Court.
.......Cnee again we can sec- -how ■ tue judges by inconsist erfc voting •
patterns had changed the whole basis of constitutional interpretation
in India and expanded the reasonableness test to situations to which
it was not intended to apply. In as much as the Court can freely resort
to any principles to determine the content of reasonableness, this approach
resembles the substantivejdue process approach adopted by American Courts
266at the turn of the century. But we have to wait and see how the Courts
will use reasonableness in the much wider area of applicability granted to it
26k. A.I_.A_._l963 j3._C. lpl.
265. A.I.h. 1960 3.C. k-30.
2oo. Cn substantive due process see Chapter III Section 2 (i) (a).
6. Conclusion
The right to property has become the most controversial of 
the fundamental rights. The citizen and the lawyer have challenged 
every kind of restriction that the Government has imposed on the right 
to property. This has infused and made popular the V/estern belief that 
a man's property is his own and that he can use the provisions of the 
Constitution to protect it. This is at variance with the Indian attitude 
that claims to property must be considered together with the demands of 
others, rather than considered exclusively. The Court seems to have 
considered the problem of agrarian reform and the issues of compensation 
and "public use" as exclusive problems considered in the light of 
western jurisprudence rather than issues where the claims of others 
have to be considered, and adjusted in an Indian context. In a sense 
the Supreme Court seems to perpetuate a colonial, if not foreign, 
legal system unaffected by Independence - the law is not yet independent.
But as we have already soon, the Court has not actively 
invalidated statutes as ultra vires the Constitution's protection of 
property rights. In effect, the Court has used all possible techniques 
to acquire.judicial review in such areas whence Parliament had taken 
away the power of judicial review. It thus made extensive and selective 
use of the doctrine of colourable legislation and of extrinsic aids to 
interpretation to review statutes connected with agrarian reform and 
the compensation provisions of statutes generally. But the voting 
pattern has been inconsistent, which makes it impossible to ascertain 
whether the Court was motivated more by a desire to keep alive the ideas 
of v/estern jurisprudence than to acquire a power of review. The Court’s 
insistence that principles of compensation must be based on "recognised 
principles" suggests an affinity to cosmopolitan principles greater than 
that demanded by a mere desire for judicial review.
b> (5 $
One of the biggest jurisprudential problems concomittant
with underdevelopment is how to adjust the concept of equality to the
problem of economic growth."^ " The problem lies in trying to reconcile
tremendous economic changes, as a result of which the vested interests
of a large number of people are bound to be affected, with the heavy
theoretical interest that western thought places on the need to preserve
equality and fundamental rights. An economist has indeed argued that
adherence to the equality principle is important to decrease the
2
differentials that naturally arise as a result of development, but 
development presupposes a political rearrangement of property rights.
The Supreme Court has strictly adhered to the equality prin­
ciple, even in areas where the Constitution allows positive discrimination 
to be made in favour of backward classes. Its view that the criterion 
of "backwardness" in Article 15 (5) of the Constitution is to be limited 
to economic considerations rather than caste.or social criteria, reflects 
on the Court's, desire to limit the use of principles of political dis­
crimination only to areas of "need", rather than for the extensive 
solution of social problems.^
....... The. Court, seems to have worked on the assumption that funda­
mental rights mmst be protected at all costs, 'without making any attempt 
to consider other claims. As a result they have drawn upon an impressive 
body of western precedent on compensation and other matters, halving 
assumed their validity in the Indian context. This becomes all the 
more important if we remember that the Court was prohibited by the
1. See G.Kyrdal: The challenge to world property:A world anti-poverty 
programme in outline (1971) oee Cnapter ill "The equality Issue" *63-5*9.
2. Ibid.
3. See further Chapter VII infra.
Constitution and a series of Amendments from enhancing its power of 
judicial review.
By using the language of western ideas, the Court has sought 
to protect western "concepts" rather than property rights. Very little 
attempt was made to adjust these concepts to Indian purposes. Instead 
they have utilised western judicial techniques, like the doctrine of 
colourable legislation, to test the statutes intended to be amenable 
to tests based on Indian lav/, Indian experience and Indian hopes.
The v/hole process hss been accompanied by an inconsistent 
voting pattern. In the early years kahajan J.'s influence as a judge- 
ment-writer in cases on agrarian reform was fairly considerable. Das 
and Shastri JJ. played important moderating roles, but they too were 
caught up in v/estern terminology and were responsible for beginning a 
dialogue, using such terminology, which was responsible for the Fourth 
Amendment, fhe advent of Subba Kao J. led to a reconsideration of the 
foie of the Court. It was he who made it possible to by-pass the Fourth 
Amendment and enquire into the compensation provisions of impugned 
statutes, extend the concept of reasonableness to other parts of the 
Constitution.and create the test of agrarian reform. In this he 
received some support from Shall J. who sustained and refined Subba Kao J. 
approach in later cases. But, like Subba Hao J., his voting pattern is 
by no means consistent. He also received partial support from 
Kidayatullah J. who pointed out that Subba Kao J. had in fact made 
selective recourse to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Fourth 
Amendment while trying to establish the agrarian test. Again, he openly 
admitted in Snantilalts case that he did not approve of the application 
of Subba Kao J.’s views on compensation to post-Amendment situations.
But the major opposition to Subba Kao J. came from Sarkar J. who 
dissented on the use of the agrarian reform test, evolved a wide concept
of public use, and limited the move to make extensive use of the 
concept of reasonableness. Again it was oarkar J. who protested 
against the Court’s assuming a reforming garb and doing away with 
tne right to preemption. But Carkar J.’s contribution has been 
generally neglected. In fact, an eminent lawyer has referred to
if
nim as a mediocre judge. It appears that he was one of the only 
judges who considered the matter from an Indian point of view without 
making unnecessary reference to western doctrines and without going 
to the other extreme of following strictly the doctrine of literal 
interpretation, as './anclioo Jo (notably a Civil Service Judge) appears 
to have done in the cases on "public use" and the cases that led to 
the Seventeenth Amendment.
Thus we can sec that although the new powers of review have 
emerged slowly after inconsistent voting and some opposition within 
the Court itself, in the main all the judges appear to have approved 
of the new approach of the Court. In effect the Court, prompted 
partly by Constitutional Amendment, appears to have acquired powers 
of review, and used them to sustain in India the principles of 
western jurisprudence................................... ........
if. Setalvad: My Life (1971) 162,3^3
CHAPTER IV
THE SUPREME COURT AND LAW AND ORDER WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
1. The problem of law and order
The Supreme Court has not only sanctioned the continued
operation of an extremely severe law of preventive detention, but also
approved of large numbers of statutes connected with the maintenance
of public order on the grounds that they do not violate the civil
liberties that the Constitution purports to guarantee. In spite of
this the Court appears to have been involved in very few controversies
arising out of dissatisfaction with the position it has taken. More
recently the present Chief Justice of India (in a personal interview)
recounting the policy of the Court said that it was merely interested
in ensuring that the proper procedure has been followed and that there
was no male fide or excessive use of power. He said :
"We feel constrained not to accept appeals to personal 
liberty, the Constitution clearly gives the Government the 
power. It is right that they should have it. Our concern 
is to ensure that it is used for the purposes for which it 
is given.11 1
This is an accurate description only of the formal attitude of the Court. 
In actual fact the Court has in the past often made appeals to personal
p
liberty, and begun to interfere fairly substantially in broad matters 
of executive discretion. The Table below demonstrates the incidence of 
intervention by the Courts.
TABLE I showing the extent to which the Supreme Court intervened on 
behalf of the petitioner in cases on Preventive Detention and under 
the Defence of India Act I962T
Date Total No. No. of cases in #age of 3 to 1





the A.I.R. on Article 22(4) to (7) of the 
under the Jammu and Kashmir P.D.Act 1964)
1. After his talk at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, 
June 21 1971.
2,. . See analysis of Gopalan v- Madras A.I.R. I960 S.C. 27 (infra);
Mahajan J. in Gopalan^ case at pr.136 p. 82; Hegde J. in Motilal v U.B. 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 150 at pr.12 p.1513i Ramaswami J. in Abdul Karim v W.B. 




Source: The cases reported in 
Constitution (including those
for the years 1950-64, 1968-70 and cases under the Defence of India Act 
1962 for the years 1964-68. Note: The figures relate to the total number 
of reported cases (including multiple appeals and petitions) and not the 
number of petitions.
Even though the incidence of intervention is by no means low, 
the policy of the Court is acceptable to the Government, though not to
3 4Indian academic lawyers and foreign observers.
The reason for this lack of controversy in this area is 
because the Supreme Court’s formal attitude not only follows the Common 
Law approach to the problems of public order, but has responded very 
sympathetically to the administration and society’s view that authority 
cannot be challenged at the expense of public order. In actual fact 
they have silently assumed an unnoticed pattern of review, as we shall 
see later.
An eminent American jurist has observed :
f,_(F)irst place must be given to the social interest in general 
security ... even if we accept the view that it is what shocks the 
general conscience, not what threatens the general security that is 
repressed ... It should be noted how the exigencies of the general 
security outweigh the traditional theory of criminal law.11 5
3. See N.C.Chatterji and Parmeshwa Rao: Emergency and the law (1967);
C.S.Subramaniya Aiyar: Procedural due process and procedural safeguards 
in the Constitution (1959) S.C.J. Jnl.. 156; P.K.Tripathi: Preventive 
detention - the Indian experience (I960) 9 Am.Jnl.of Comp.Law 219; C.A. 
Alexandrowicz: Personal liberty and preventive detention (1961) 3 J.I.L.I. 
445; V.G.Ramachandram: The law of preventive detention A.I.R. 1954 53; 
V.Maya Krishnan: Emergency and personal liberty (1966) 8 J.I.L.I. 428;* 
A.S.Bedi: Freedom of expression and security (1966 Delhi) see conclusions 
after comparisons with the position in the United States and England at 
437-460; B.P.Srivasyava: Right against arbitrary arrest (1969) 11 J.I.L.I.
29 at 43-9; M.C.J.Kagzi: Judicial control of administrative discretion 
under preventive detention laws: An Indian experience (1965) P.L. 49*
4. See particularly D.Bayley: Preventive detention in India (1962 Calcutta) 
supplemented by D.Bayley: The policy of preventive detention (1964) 10 Jnl. 
of Public Administration 235; Grossman: Freedom of expression in India 
(1956-7) 4 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 64; G.O.Koppel: The emergency, the Courts and
the law (1986) 8 J.I.L.I. 428.
5* R.Pound: III Jurisprudence (1959) 291-2 referring to Grotius: De 
Jure Belli Ac JPacis III, 20, 7; Montesquieu: The spirit of the laws Bk.-ifo 
Chapter 23; Gov. v Meredith (1792) 4 T.R. 794 at 7975 Case of the King’s 
Prerogative in Saltpetre 12 Coke 12 (1607 K.B.); Cf.Noy, Maxims (1641)
No.26. See also J.Stone: Social dimensions of law and justice (1964 
Stevens) 294; G.Levasseur: Justice and State security (1964) 5 Jhl. of 
the Int.Comm.of Jurists 234-246.
This emphasis on general security has been repeatedly made in
6 7the Lok Sabha, as well as by the administration in India, A similar
emphasis has been made in the Keraer Commission Report C1968) which
g
enquired into the causes of racial violence in America. The Governments 
in several other countries, whether belonging to the Common Law system
or not, have generally assumed vast powers to deal with public order
9 10 problems, though not without criticism.
6. See generally D. Bayley: Preventive detention in India (1962) Chapter 
II and note the summary at pp. 15-4; Government publication: Communist 
violence in India (1950). Selected speeches of Indira Gandhi (1971) The 
cult of violence pp.lA-17*
7* e.g. S.S.Dhavan, Governor of W.Bengal (formerly a lawyer and a judge) 
states in a letter to the writer, who queried his requ&st for a revival 
of the Preventive Detention Act: ’’Official secrecy prevents me from 
saying much ...(D)o not forget that no administration cam tolerate a 
breakdown in law and order. The powers I asked for are necessary, but we 
must ensure they are not abused.” Letter dated March 3 1971- For a glimpse 
of the problems in Bengal at the time see "Pre-election violence and 
murders threaten to extinguish Parliamentary democracy in India” Times 
Feb.22 1971. Gee generally "New arrest powers sought by Delhi” Times 
Nov.21 1970.
8. Reprinted Bantam Boolis (1968) see e.g. 288. But emphasis is also 
laid on getting to the root of the problem of racial violence.
9. See for example: Spain? Franco Emergency Bill attacked Times March 
10,1971; France: Law and order reply by M.Chaban Dalmas Times Feb.22,1971; 
Turkey: Turkey*s new law against anarchy defended Times Feb.10,1971 P-9; 
Uganda: President Amin revokes emergency Times Feb.22,1971; Georgia,U.S.A. 
Emergency declared in U.S. riot town Times June 23,1971; Washington U.S.A. 
See Fred Emery* s description of the "formidable display of police and 
military action” Times May A-,1971; Bolivia: Emergency proclaimed in 
Bolivia Times June 23,1971; Singapore: Note the controversy about Lee Kuan 
Yew and the ^ress Times leading comment June 10,1971 and news report
June 11,1971. Note also the position in Malaysia where the Sedition Act 
19*18 was amended in August 1969 to prevent any discussion of sensitive 
communal issues. Soviet Union? Soviet Supreme Court criticises judges for 
poor professional standards in "law and order" drive Times Feb.1,1971; 
England: See infra f.n.11,12,13, but see also Hansard: 77& H.C. C0I.IIO89 
(Feb.28,1969) and on violence 229 H.L. Col.*f22 (Feb.12,1969)•
10. See for example Kenya: African lawyers new Bar Association condemns 
detention without trial East African Standard (Nairobi Edn, Aug.1A-,1971).
I am indebted to Miss G. Buckee for sending me this press clipping.
Even in the united Kingdom following an increase in violence, 
12the -^ rime Minister and others have made a general plea for a tightening
up of the law in various areas of public order.Demonstrations are
not objected to, what is criticised is the violent form that they tend 
12.
to take. Still more significant is the fact that in British Ireland, 
the Government has assumed powers of detention without trial. The 
need for this is generally accepted and criticism has concentrated on 
the lack of procedural safeguards.
More recently, in a procedure which has many a parallel in 
India, faced with a Court decision which made impossible the Army’s
11. Criminal Statistics for England and Wales (1970) Cmd. 4708. Violence 
against the person has increased from 37,818 offences in 1969 ^1»088 
in 1970. For a good statistical summary see Times July 29,1971-
12. See Times Feb.21,1972 - Anarchy is theme for Heath Broadcast.
13. On picketing: John Clare: Briig.ng the rule of law to bear on the 
demongtrators Times Feb.26,1972; see also comments following the Aldershot 
bomb outrage Times Feb.23,1972} House of Commons reaction Times Feb.23,1972; 
for a typical reaction see E.Maclennan M.P. Hansard 831 H.C. col. 1355-6; 
Times leader comment Feb.23, 1972 and for reaction in Eire see Times,
Feb.24,1972; for earlier incidents see Times "fard ordered to crush ter­
rorists after new bomb attacks'* June 23 1971-
14. e.g. The Guardian editorial on the Trade Union march in Feb.1971 - 
"The march was in the great tradition of British radical protests. Violence, 
is not. It is also counterproductive." Dated-Feb.23,1971- For the general 
law on demonstration and a review of the controls see D.G.T.Williams: 
Demonstrations in the streets (1968, Cambridge mimeographed). I am grate­
ful to the author for a copy.
15- Detention is made under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Northern Ireland Act 1922. On the revival of the Act see the critical 
comments of Dr. C.Palley: Internment - the need for proper safeguards 
Times Nov.23,1971; The Comton Report (1971) Cmd. *$23 on allegations of 
brutality. Amnesty Report (1972) on the procedures followed generally see 
Times March 13,1972; For the opinion of Parliament on security in 
Ireland see ^ansard 827 H.C. col.32-174; 826 H.C. col. 1572; On internment 
826 H.C. 1572-1678 and for a typ$ical criticism M.Eees M.P. at col.1663- 
See also the exchange of letters on whether the special powers contra­
vene the European C o n v e n t i o n  of Human Eights - Dingle Foot Q.C. ,M.P.,
Times March 3,1972 and J.Saywell, Times March 14,1972. On interrogation 
procedure Bee Letters to the Times on Nov.27,1971; Nov.26,1971; Nov.25,
1971- Ertention is not approved of as a policy of prolonged use (see
H.Wilson M.P. Times March 4,1972) but only until such time as violence 
ends (Government statement Times March 14,1972)
using the powers of preventive detention, the British Parliament has
amended the Irish Constitution to enable the Army to maintain the
l6policy of preventive detention.
Thus it is generally accepted that in Common Law, civil Law
17and Communist Countries alike, the preservation of law and order
is regarded as a priority and it is emphasised that protest must come
l8through prescribed channels. In general the emphasis has been on 
procedure rather than on making general pleas for preserving an un­
defined concept of liberty.
16. The case is that of Hulme and others v R. (1972) Times Feb.24,1972 
(See news report and leading article). See furthei&f.Anderson Times Feb. 
21,1972; the Houses of Parliament passed the Northern Ireland (Amendment) 
Act 1972. For the Debates see Hansard 831 H.C.D. 1363-1433, 1435-1450 
(for a typical reaction to the Act see that of J.Thorpe M.P. at col.1435 
He proposed an amendment that the Act expire after a year, but it was 
defeated). See also Professor C.Palley: Northern Ireland - gaps that a 
one clause Act cannot close Times Feb.25,1972 and letter thereon by 
A.Buck M.P. Feb.26,1972. A well balanced account of the Irish situation 
is the Scarman Report Times April 7,1972,p.1, p.6 and leader at p.15- 
See also a comment by J.Whale Sunday Times April 9,1972 p.16. The Scarman 
Report stresses that police power though necessary must be exercised within 
the power granted to it. The most recent development is the Widgerv Report 
(Times April20,1972, pp.4-5, extracts and comments) on the Army shooting 
13 people fin Jan.30,1972. The Report exonerates the Army, but casts 
doubts on its continued presence th4re.
17- See examples cited f.n. 9 and 10 supra.
18. For the best account of the theoretical Communist position on 
expression through the right channels see Lenin; Letter to G.Myasnikov 
August 5,1921; 32 Collected Works 504 at 508.
.n: r•? «J' ^
2. The Common Lav Tradition
i. The position in England
The Common Law has evolved an extremely strict attitude to
sedition as well as other aspects of public order like holding meetings
and processions.
The law of sedition was calculated to give the State maximum
protection. Thus a 1275 statute prohibited the publication of :
"False views or tales whereby discord or occasion of discord or 
slander may grow between the king and his people and the great 
men of the realm.11 1
In 1615 a clergyman was convicted of treason because of material in an
2
unpreached sermon lying in his study. Blackstone, who generally approved
3 4of the strict law of sedition, disapproved of this decision. In
John Udall’s case the jury was told :
"not to enquire whether he (the defendant) be guilty of the felony, 
but whether he be the author of the book.” 5
Judg§§, tSOj were severe, and in Tutchin's case (1704) Holt C.J. observed:
"... nothing can be worse to any government, than to endeavour to 
produce animosities as to the management of it; this has always 
been looked upon as a crime and no government is safe without it 
being punished." 6
In sedition cases, "truth" was not permitted as a defence,
even after Lord Campbell’s Act 1843 permitted such a defence to be made
1. Ill Edw. 1 c.34.
2. R v Peacham (1615) 2 State Trials 869.
3- See Volume IV Commentaries on the Laws of England (1854 Edn. here­
after Volume No. and Comm.) 151-2.
4. See IV Comm. 80. He disapproved of it on the grounds th^t it permitted 
precensorship. See also the case of R v Winterbotham (1793 ) 22 State Trials 
823 where a clergyman was convicted for preaching that the King did not 
observe all the laws of the realm. His lawyer seems to have accepted the 
need for severe laws (p.858-^8) and was content with the argument that
his client did not overstep them.
5. (1590) 1 State Trials 1271 at 1283-
6. (1704) 14 State Trials 1095 at 1128.
7
in cases of defamation. As late as 1909 Coleridge J. thought that 
prosecution for sedition, howsoever rare, was ,!a necessary accompani-
g
ment to every civilised government.” Gradually the law of sedition
9
came to be used to control a breach of peace. But the law of sedition
is not the same thing as preventive detention, which was imposed in
Britain during the First and Second World Wars, and more recently in
Ulster. Despite notable dissents the Courts have accepted the need
for preventive detention and refused to interfere with the subjective
satisfaction of the Executive in this regard.^
There is a marked general reluctance even to take risks as
regards offences relating to public order. Thus both the Common law
and statute lay down that there is no unrestricted right to hold a
public meeting. The highway (defined very widely^) is meant for 
12
passage only and the citizen who wants to use it for any other purpose
at once finds himself caught in a maze of statutory regulations on the
13use of highways and parks, and illdefined powers like the sessional
7. See Coke on the Case de Libellius Famosis Institutes Volume III 254;
R v Almon (1770) 20 State Trials 803; Lord Campbell’s statute see Section 
4 of 6 and 7 Viet. c. 96. For cases after the statute see R v Duffy (l8*t6)
2 Cox.C.C. 45; R v M’Hugh (1900) 2 I.E. 569; parte O’Brien (lb&3)
15 Cox.C.C. 180.
R v Aldred (1909) 22 Cox.C.C. 1 at 3 -k .
9. On the law of sedition generally see 7 Halsbury (3d) 569-570; A.S.
Bedi (supra f.n.3) 26-73; Brownlie: Law relating to Public Order (1968) 
(hereafter Brownlie) 85-90.
10. R v Halliday Ex partel&p^H^ (1917) A.C. 260; Liversidge v Anderson 
(1942) A.C. 206 (note the dissent of Atkin L.J.). On this area see gene­
rally Schwaife: Law and Executive in Britain ( )  Chapter IX.
11. See 19 Halsbury (3d) 12; S.294 Highways Act 1959; see generally 
Brownlie (1968) 159 H.Street: Freedom, the individual and the law (1971 
3d) Chapter 2 pp.47 ff.
12. See however Harrison v Duke of Rutland (1893) 1 Q.B. 142; Hickman v 
Maisey (1900) 1 Q.B. 752 and Brownlie (1968) 131-7-
13. See Section 121 Highways Act 1959; S.28 Town Police Clauses Act 1847; 
S.54(6) Metropolitan Police Act 1959; ^arks Regulation Act 1872 (as amen­
ded in 1926); Trafalgar Square Act 1844 and S.I.1952 No.776 made thereunder 
S.82 London Government Act 1963 which gives powers to make bye-laws to the 




orders of Parliament. For the offence of "obstruction" under Section
15121 of the Highways Act there is some doubt as to whether actual
obstruction is even necessary and the Courts have held thqt partial
obstruction is sufficient to secure a conviction.^ In addition to
17this the Police can invoke the Common Law of "Public Nuisance".
l8
Here the obstruction must be substantial but that is a question of
19fact and it follows that the procession must be small.
The powers to control a breach of peace are very wide and
20 21 under this broad caption binding orders can be made or the person
22 23charged punished for unlawful assembly, assault, or battery. In
2kDuncan v Jones the Courts widened considerably the offence of obstruc
ting a policeman in the execution of his duty so that almost anything
could be considered an obstruction, and even today *uch a wide inter-
25pretation cannot be altogether precluded. In 1957» the Courts even
14. See Parkhurst v Jarvis (1910) 101 L.T. 946; May’s Parliamentary 
procedure (l7d) 237> But more recently Papworth v Coventry (1967) 2 All. 
E.R. 41 at 45 suggests that Parliamentary orders may not be effective 
outside the House.
15* 39 Stat. 402. See also S.28 Town Police Clauses Act 1847; S.54(6) 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839*
16. For an earlier case see Gill v Carson and Nield (1917) 2 K.B. 74; 
now see Arrowsmith v Jenkins (1963) 2 Q.B. 561; Nagy v Weston (1966)
2 Q.B. 633^
17* On its background see Brownlie and Williams (1964) 42 Can.Bar Rev.
561; Smith aid Hogan: Criminal Law (1969* 3^) 561-5•
18. e.g. per Denning L.J. (as he then was) in A-.G-. v P.T.A.Quarries 
Ltd. (1957) 2 Q.B. 169.
19. See R v Clark (1964) 2 Q.B. 315.
20. See G. Williams: (1954) Cr.L.R. 583 suggesting that this may itself 
be an offence, relying on Davies v Griffith (1937) 2 All.E.R. 671.
21. e.g. Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308; Wise v Dunning (1902)
1 K.B. 167.
22. R v Clarkson (1892) 17 Cox.C.C. 435-
23. O’Kelly v Harvey (I883) 15 Cox.C.C. 435-
24. (1936) 1 K.B. 218 relying on R v Prebble (1858).
25. See R_ v_ Waterfield and Lynn (1964) 1 Q.B. 164; Rice v Connolly (1966)
2 Q.B. 414.
accepted the revival of the offence of "affray" - an extremely wide
26 27offence - which had fallen into disuse since 1845*
A large number of controls on the conduct of a public meeting
28 29also exist and in the remarkable case of Jordan v Burgoyne the Court
held that a person addressing a meeting shall be responsible (in public.
terms) for any effect that he may have on them, for he must take his
audience as he finds them. Thus it appears that Courts have in the past
sought to preserve the need to preserve public order giving wide powers
to the police to enable them to do so.
More recently, there have been a large number of reports on
the activities of the police and the exercise of police powers written?^
31and a new statute for their organisation has been enacted. But this 
has in no way changed the position that public order is a priority.
Emphasis has been shifted on to procedure. It is notable that the
32activities of the police fall outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
In addition to all these powers, the Home Secretary had been 
given wide powers during war time to deal with problems of security.
26. R v Sharp and Johnson 1 Q.B. 552. See Smith and Hogan (supra f.n.17) 
539 ff* It is not necessary that the offence be committed in a public 
place (see Buttons v P.P.P. (1966) A.C. 591 at 626) nor is it necessary 
that there be reciprocity of violence (see Scarrow (1968) Cr.App.Rep. 591)-
27. The 1845 case is R v Hunt and Swanton (1845) 1 Cox.C.C. 177*
28. e.g. S.5 Public Order Act 1936; S.54(13) Metropolitan Police Act 1839; 
S.6 Rqce Relations Act 1965; S.l Public Meetings Act 1908 (as amended)
S.84 Representation of the People Act 1949*
29. Jordan v Burgoyne (1963) 2 Q.B. 744 (per Parker L.J.) See the incisive 
note by D.G.T.Williams (1963) 26 M.L.R. 425.
30. e.g. Mars Jones Enquiry (1963) Cmd. 2526; Skelhorn Enquiry (1964)
Cmd. 2319 (on searches and seizures).
31. The Police Act I964 -(44 Stats. 889)
32. The procedure is governed by the Police Act 1964 S.49 - but the wide 
powers of the Ombudsman are clearly lacking. On the exclusion of the police 
from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman see the Parliamentary Commissioner 
Act. 1967 S.4(1).read with Schedule. II annexed to the -Act.................
3 Z 0
While it is true that the citizen can challenge these powers by a writ
of Habeas Corpus^it was held in Liversidge v Anderson^ (which we shall
discuss later) that the Courts will not interfere with the subjective
satisfaction of the Home Secretary. Even today the Home Secretary has
35
almost unlimited powers to deport aliens.
ii. The position in the United States of America
In America the Courts have tried to protect free speech but
~zC "zrt
not at the expense of public order. In Cantwell v Connecticut the
Court set aside the conviction (under a Municipal Ordinance) of a
Jehovah’s witness who stopped Catholics to make them listen to a
phonograph record attacking the established Church, but in Chaplinsky 
38v New Hampshire a person who called the City Marshall a ’’racketeer”
and ’’fascist” was convicted for creating a public disturbance. In
39Terminello v Chicago the Supreme Court, in contrast to the position
in Jordan v Burgoyne (supra) set aside the conviction of a person who
40harangued his audience, but in Fiener v N.Y. two years later the Court
33• See O.Hood-Phillips: Constitutional and Administrative Law (1967) 
44-9-38 for a brief survey of the scope of the Court.
34. (1942) A.C. 206. For a brief account of the war time controls see
O.Hood-Phillips supra f.n.33 pp.439-81.
■5c Ex. p. Soblen (1963) 2 Q.B. 243 (C.A.) and comment P.O’Higgins (1964)
27 Mod.L.R. 321; C.Thornberry (1963) 12 I.C.L«> 414. This case referred
to the Indian case of Hans Muller v Suptd. uail A.I.R. 1933 H.C. 367*
36. I am indebted to D.A.Wyatt B.A.(Cantab.) S.J.D. (Chicago) for allowing 
be to refer to his unpublished paper: The street speaker and a British 
Bill of Rights (19711 Chicago - in part fulfillment of the requirement 
for the S.J.D. 499 Course). I am also indebted for .the help given me 
personally. See also A.S.Bedi: Freedom of security and expression (1966) 
93-100; L.A.Stein: Municipal controls over freedom of assembly in Canada
and the United States (1971) P.L. 113-140.
37* (1940) 310 U.S. 296.
38. (1942) 313 u .s . 368.
39. (1949) 337 U.S. 1.
40. (1951) 340 U.S. 315.
upheld the conviction of a Uhiversity student who urged negroes to stand
up for their rights. The Court has generally to prevent even excessive
41delegation of power in this area, but has stressed the need for pre­
serving public order and has even approved of a policy of prior restraint 
of activities liable to cause a disturbance. ^ h e  Court has followed the 
policy that it will go into the facts of each case to see if there was 
a threat to public order. This is exactly the policy that the Indian
43Supreme Court appears to have adopted under the Preventive Detention Act.
The closest equivalent to emergency detention can be traced to
the Espionage Act 1917 and the Sedition Act 1918. In the first of the 
44cases under the former Act, Holmes J. for a unanimous Court upheld the
conviction of a man who had written letters through the mail to obstruct
the recruitment of members of the Armed Forces. Holmes J., formulating
what has been called the ’’clear and present danger test”, observed :
’’The question in every case is whether the words are used in 
euch circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that the Congress has the right to prevent. It is a question 
of proximity and degree.”
The Indian Court as we shall see later seems also to have adopted a
similar test. But this test is much too ambiguous and both Holmes and
BrandeisJJ. found difficulty in persuading their colleagues on the Court
to accept the test in three cases involving two anarchists and a
45syndicalist.
41. See Kunz v N.Y. (1950) 3^0 U.S. 290.
42. See Hague v Commr. for Industrial Organisation (1937 ) 307 H»S. 496.
See T.I.Emerson: The doctrine of prior restraint (1955) 20 Law and Con­
temporary Problems 648.
43• See Hidayatullah J. in Arun Ghosh v W.B. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228.
44. Schneck v U.S. (1918 ) 249JKS. 47-
45. Abrams v U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 6l6; Gitlow v New York (1925 ) 268 U.S. 
654; Whitney v California (1927 ) 274 U.S. 357*
But even though the Court has not sanctioned the clear and
present danger test completely it has taken care to ensure that no
person is convicted on the basis of guilt by association and in three
cases reversed the conviction of three persons who were arrested merely
46because they were Communists, The important thing to remember is 
that the Court has assumed an overall arbitral role in determining 
when a conviction is justified.
In 1940 the Alien Registration (Smith) Act was passed. S.2 
made it unlawful knowingly to advocate or teach the overthrow of the 
Government, to print and distribute written matter to that end or 
become a member of a group that so advocates. S.3 made punishable a 
conspiracy to accomplish these ends. The Government, a little doubt­
ful about S.2, used S.3 extensively. In two early cases, the Court
refused to accept the view that the person could be convicted under the
47 v 48act on a guilt by association basis. But in Dennis v *ates by a
6 : 2 decision the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of 11 Communist
Party leaders. This attempt not to interfere with the administrations
49powers was however short lived and in Yates v U.S. the Court by 6 : 2 
ordered the retrial of 5 and released 5 Communists. The majority 
stressed the need to examine the facts of each case while the minority 
was prepared to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Court thus 
arrived at a position whereby it was willing to go into the facts to 
see for itself whether the conviction of the accused was justified. The 
constitutionality of S.2 had not been tested. In 1957 the Government
46. Strombeirg v California (1931) 283 U.S. 359; De Jonge v Oregon (1937) 
299 U.S. 353; Hendon v Lowry (1937) 301 U.S. 242.
47. Schneiderman v U.S. (1943) 320 U.S. 118; Bridges y Nixon (1945) 326
U.S. 135.
48. (1951) 341 U.S. 494.
49* (1957) 354 U.S. 298; see A.S.Bedi (1966 supra f.n.36) 296-346.
conceded to procedural errors in two cases resulting in a reversal of
convictions.^But in Scales v U.S. (1961)'^’the Court approved of the
conviction of an active member of a subversive group and who had a
personal intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the Government,
52though in Noto v U.S., decided on the same day, they let the appellant
go free because there was insufficient information. The Court has
approved as constitutional the Internal Security Act 1950 which allows
53forms of preventive detention.
Thus it appears that the American Supreme Court has taken the
view that though it will not interfere with Municipal and National laws
calculated to preserve order and the security of th& State, it will
examine the facts; for itself to determine whether the order is needed.
This is important because without referring to any dase law, the Indian
Supreme Court following the English system of administrative law rather
than the broad American system of Constitutional review seems to have
placed itselfjkn a similar position to the American Courts, as we shall
see later. This is in spite of the fact that the Constituent Assembly
took care to ensure that the Court was not given powers similar to those
54-in the United States.
More recently several American States have passes statutes of
a preventive detention nature (not granting pre-trial bail) to preserve
55law and order, but no cases on their constitutionality have arisen.
50* Scales v U.S. (1957) 355 U.S. 1; Lightfoot v U.S. (1957) 355 U-S.2.
51. (1961) 367 u.s* 290;
52. (1961) 367 U.S. 290
53. Communist Party of U.S. v Subversive Activities Control Board (I96I) 
567 U.S. 1.
54. See infra . The Constituent Assembly was considerably in­
fluenced by B.N.Rau, whom G.Austin (The Indian Constitution (1966)
has shown took particular care not to adopt the American position.
55*. In this see the article (writer anonymous) Constitutional limits on 
the conditions of pretrial detention (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 941-960.
3. The Indian Tradition
i. The right to revolt in Ancient India^
Unlike the Y/est, Indian political theory does not provide a
general recognition of a right to revolution or protest. As a result of
the freedom movement, Indian writers began to search the ancient texts to
discover a right to revolution and put forward the theory that sovereignty
2
ultimately resides with the people. One writer has even suggested the exis­
tence of a social contract theory which gives to the people a limited right
■5
to revolt. It is certainly true that Indian political theory fears anarchy.
The doctrine of matsya nyaya (big fish eating little fish) was an impor- 
if
tant theory justifying kingship, but there is little indication that a
right to revolt acrued on a failure to preserve law and order. It is
however laid down that if the ruler does something which violates the terms
of his office, the elements of the State on which he is dependant might
5
indulge m  subversion for they have a right to be consulted. Again royal 
orders have been declared invalid by sastris in principle if they conflict 
with dharma.^
1. For a good account see J. P..Spellman: Political theory in Ancient India 
(1964) Chapter IX pp.225-243-
2. A.S.Altekar: State and Government in Ancient India (1958); Beni Prashad 
Theory of Government in Ancient India (Po 3 t^edXcT” Allahabad 1927). U.K. 
Gupta: Political thought in Smriti Literature (1970 Delhi). See 32. See 
further K. Lingat: The Classical Lav/ irp_India (translated Derrett) Berkeley 
University of California Press (1972) 213-4, 220, 249-
3. M.C.Bandhopadhaya: Development of Hindu polity and political theories 
(1927-33; two parts: Calcutta) 234; B.Saletore: Ancient Indian political 
theories and institutions (1963) =
4. See Manu VII, 14-20, and J.'/.Spellman (1964) 4-8.
5. See Visvarupa's Balkrida (a commentary on Yajnavalaka Smriti)l,337
(corresponding to Yajnavalaka Smriti I, 340). See also Bharuci on Manu VII 
(I am grateful to Professor J.D.M.Derrett who is editing and translating 
this work for having given me a gist of the material contained in this v/ork) 
See i-ianu VII, 111-112. See generally Kane III H.D. 193-9. Note also the 
Aitareya Banmana VIII, 15 (cited Spellman (op.cit.f.n.1.) 233- See generally
D.I-I.Ingalls: Authority and law in Ancient India (1954) Supp. 17 Jnl. of
the Am. Oriental Soc.
6. See Derrett N.L.S.I. (1968) I 67.
■) ,-j tj.
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of the Anusasana parva of the Mahahharata to justify a theory of revolt :
‘'That king who tells his people he is their protector but who 
does not and is unable to protect them should be slain by his com­
bined subjects like a mad dog.” 8
A sceptical foreign observer accepts that this justifies a theory of
9
revolt, although he is unable to see it justifying popular sovereignty.
In effect, however, such passages are rare and allow the people to revolt 
only when the King is unable to protect his subjects (failure of law 
and order) or plunders their wealth.^ In actual fact of course even 
this theoretical right to revolt is not conceded.
12Kevolts did occur in distant provinces, and even closer home,
but they were usually put down with severity, without crediting to the
rebel or a nuisance (as the case may be) the status of a revolutionary,
even though it is true that during Mughal days regional heroes like 
13Shivaji did emerge. The need for an army was always stressed - it was
14one of the 7 elements that constitute a State in Kautilya‘s Arthashatra.
7. S.S.Dhavan : Unpublished lectures at the National Academy Mussorie ^ 
1960-1.
8. Mahabharata Anushasana Parva LXI,. 31»33; See also Shanti Parva LVII 
4^ -5* I am grateful to Shree S.S.Dhavan for sending me these references.
See also references cited Spellman (supra f.$.l) 236-8.
9. J.W.Spellman (supra f.n.l) 235*
10. See Apararka on Yajnavalkya 1,340. I am indebted to Prof. Derrett 
for this reference. See also Yajnavalkya I 339-41; Kautilya I,VI,259;
Manu VII, 111-2.
11. For a good general survey see Derrett: Rulers and ruled in Ancient 
India (1969) fecueils de Societe Jean Bodin XXII Gouvernes et Gouvernants4l7*
12. An analysis of Bengal’s rebellious background has recently been made 
by Ian Martin: East Bengal - a background study. This was an administra­
tive report for the Ford Foundation. I am grateful to Ian Martin for 
sending me a copy and for permission to refer to it.
13* A revolutionary “myth” seems to have emerged around rebellious 
princes like Dana Pratap of Rajputana and Shivaji of Maharashtra, but it 
should be noted that these myths have a regional flavour about them and 
cannot sustain any break in the traditional attitude to revolt.
1.4-.- . C . l) . ./ l.\y. x............
The Ancient texts, much as they might have frowned upon an adharmic 
king, look with horror at the prospect of a breakdown in law and order,
because that would lead to matsya nyaya or the law of the fish. Treason
15 1
was defined very widely so as not to exclude even Brahmins. No theory
like the Western theory of revolution^ exists.
The freedom movement in India, directed against British rule,
made Indians criticise the vast police powers that the British Govern-
17
ment possessed and demanded rights similar to those of Englishmen.
The emphasis was not on revolution but on equality. In fadt the advent
of M. K: Gandhi brings out a significant Indian characteristic of the
National Movement. The authority of the British was challenged but only
because their government was not representative. Gandhi’s theory of 
13revolution may well have been based on the idea of people’s rule; it
19was certainly not accepted by the Constituent Assembly which was
content with achieving political independence from the British! What is
more significant is the fact that even after 19^ 7 the extremely strict
20
British laws relating to public order were continued. Post-Independence
21
comments upon the laws under the British having been oppressive tend 
to ignore the fact that India's vast public order problems are such that 
even the present day Government hasjused them to justify the need for 
extensive powers.
15- See Arthashastra IV,XI,221. See generally J.W.Spellman (supra f.n.1)227-9
16. The theory emerged as a result of the Social contract theory, see for
example John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government (Laslett Edn.1960) 372;
For recent developments on the concept of a legitimate revolution see 
W.C.McWilliamsi Civil disobedience and contemporary Constitutionalism (1969)
1 Comp.Pol. 211; Ibid Violence and legitimacy (1970) 79 Yale L.Jnl. 623*
17 • e.g. S.N.Banerjea: referred to in I History of the Indian National 
Congress 37» C.R.Das (1922) ^ongress Presidential Addresses(Ilnd Series
1935)5^ 5,
18. On this see Erik Erikson: Gandhi’s Truth (1970). A psychological 
theory which seems to suggest that even Gandhi did not evolve a consistent 
theory of revolution.
19. See G. Austin: The Indian Constitution (1966) 39-^1*
20* See later f.n. 35".....................................................
21. e.g.J.K.Mittal: Right to equqlity under the Indian Constitution (1970) 
P»L. 36 v--------------------------------------------------------
ii. The British attitude to law and order problems in India
From the start, the British assumed wide powers to deal with 
India’s public order problems. As early at 1773 the Governor General 
of Fort William had the power to detain peremptorily anyone carrying
22on correspondence dangerous to the safety of the English settlements.
The formal policy of preventive detention was authorised by the Bengal
State Prisoners Regulation ctUi of) 1819?^ In 1908 the Criminal Law
Amendment Act (14 Of) 1908 allowed speedier trials for special classes
24of offences. This policy has continued, and has even been approved
25of by the Supreme Court as Constitutional. There were also certain
special statutes to give the Government wide powers of arrest and
detention for public order and other purposes (including silencing
26opposition to the Government). "Sedition" was very widely interpreted
by Courts in India and the relevant provision in the Indian Penal Code
27i860 has been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of India.
In 1939 the Defence of India Act (33 Of) 1939 gave wide powers 
of detention, the valid exercise of which depended on the subjective 
satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Courts accepted the fact
22. East India Company Act 1773 discussed V.Bose: Preventive detention 
in India (I96I) 3 Jnl.of Int. Comm, of Jurists 87 at 87-88.
23• See also State Prisoners Act (34 Of) I85O (Bengal)p (3 Of) 1858 
(Madras and Bombay). For earlier enactments see Bengal State Offences 
Act 1804; Madras Regulation VII of 1808; Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827.
24. See also the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance 1942 which was declared 
ultra vires the Government of India Act 1935 in K.E. v Benoarilal Sharma 
A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 36 but it was reversed on appeal~A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 48.
25. See infra.
2£. e.g. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1915; Anarchy and Revolutionary 
Crimes Act (XI of) 1919*
27. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code i860. For a wide interpretation 
see Balgangadhar Tilak v Q.E. (1898) 22 Bom. 112 at 135* For the Supreme 
Court case on the subject see Kedar Nath v Bihar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955- 
The Indian Law Institute has recently published a study on the Law of 
Sedition in IndiaQq 6L4)
0that such powers were justified and took the view that their powers
28were limited to preventing a mala fide exercise of powers,
^t must be understood that all these powers were in addition 
to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code i860 which contains a Chapter
pQ
on "Offences against Publi#c Tranquility11 and the Criminal Procedure
30Code I898 which empowers arrests for certain purposes without a warrant,
gives a wide rule making power to Magistrates to enable them to preserve
public order,and sanctions the practice of getting certain persons
32to execute a bond for good behaviour. But it is apparent that India’s
vast public order problems cannot be dealt with on the strength of these 
33provisions. In i960, the Minister for Home Affairs told the Parliament
that the Preventive Detention Act 1950 was in fact being used to solve
day to day law and order problems.
"(The bulk) of detenus have been detailed for entirely 
unpolitical reasons and it (the Act) was mainly (used) in order 
to curb the activities of habitual goondas in the cities of 
Bombay and Calcutta." 34
Even after 1947, there have been a large number of statutes other than
the Preventive Detention Act to facilitate the preservation of law
28. See Keshav Talpade v Emp. A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 1; E v Shibnath Banerjee 
A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 75; E v Keshav Gokhale A.I.R. 1945 Bom.212; Emp. v Iqbal
Krishna A.I.R. 1942 All. 253J Emp. v Purshottam Trikkamdas A.I.R. 1946 
Bom. 333? Hari Krishan Das v Emp. A.I.R. 1944 Lah.33; Kamla Kant v Emp. 
A.I.R. 1944 Pat. 355.




33* See D.Bayley: Preventive Detention in India (1962) 69-75 for a dis­
cussion of this.
34. L.S.D. Dec.1,1960 col. 3410 quoted Bayley: The policy of preventive 
detention 1950-63 (1964) 10 Jnl. of Public Administration 235 at 251.
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35and order.
35 • Assam Maintenance of Order Act (11 Of) 1947; Assam Maintenance of 
Public Order (“Autonomous Districts) Act (16 Of) 1953; Bengal Criminal 
Law Amendment Ordinance (2 Of) 1947; Bengal State Prisoner’s Regulation 
(Adaptation) Order 1947; Bihar Maintenance of Publid Order (Ordinance 
(^ Of)) 1949 as amended by Ordinance 5 of 1949; Bihar Maintainance of 
Public Order Act (1 of) 1950; Bihar Preventive Detention Ordinance (2 of) 
1950; Bombay Public Security Measures Act (6 of) 1947; C.P. and Berar 
Goondas Act (10 of) ; C.P. and Berqr Maintainence and Restoration
of Public Order and Collection of Fines (Indemnity) Act (2 of) 1945;
C.P. and Berar Public Safety Act (62 of) 1943; Cochin Criminal Law 
Amendment Act (27 of 1124 M.E.) Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance (29 of) 
1948; East Punjab Public Safety Act (5 of) 1948; Hyderabad Public Safety 
and Public Interest Regulation (8 of 1358 F); and 12 of 1358 F); Hyderabad 
Public Security Act (12 of 1348 F); Hyderabad Special Tribunals Regula­
tion (1 of 1358 F); Hyderabad Special tribunals (Validation of Proceedings) 
Regulation (1 of 1359 P); Indore Public Safety Act 1947; J and K Preventive 
Detention Act 4 of 2611 Samvat; J and K Public Security Act (14 of 2003 
Samvat); Madhya Bharat Maintenance of Public Order Act (7 of) 1947;
Madhya Bharat Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (5 of) 1948; Madhya 
Bharat Public Security Act (12 of) 1953; Madhya Bharat Public Security 
Act (23 of) 1959; Madhya Bharat Public Security Measures Act (23 of) 1950; 
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (1 of) 1947; Madras Maintenance 
of Public Order Act (23 of) 1949; Madras Maintenance of Public Order Or­
dinance (23 of) 1949; Madras Maintenance of Public Order (Removal of Doubts 
and AmendmentO Ordinance (1 of) 1949; Mysore Public Safety Act (12 of)
1949; Orissa Maintenance of Public Order Act (4 of)1948; Orissa Maintenance 
of Public Order Act (10 of) 1950; Patiala St^te Public Safety Ordinance 
(11 of 2003 Samvat); Pepsu Public Safety Ordinance (7 of 2006 Samvat); 
Punjab Distmzbed Areas Act (1 of) 1947; Punjab Public Safety Act (2 of) 
1947; Punjab Security of the State Act (12 of) 1953; Punjab Criminal Law 
Amendment Act (30 of) I96O; Rajasthan Public Safety Ordinance (9 of)
1948; Rajasthan Public Safety Ordinance (26 of) 1949; Saurashtra State 
Public Safety Measure Ordinance (9 of) 1949; Saurashtra State Public 
Safety Measures (^hird Amendment) Ordinance (66 of) 1949; Travacore 
Cochin Public Safety Measures Act (5 of) 1950; Travacore Emergency 
Powers Act (1 of 1122 M.E.); U.P. Maintenance of Public Order Act ...
(11 of) 1949; U.P. Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance ... (2 of) 1949; 
U.P. Maintenance of Public Order Act (Temporary)Act54 of) 1947; V.P. 
Prevention of Crimes (Special Powers Act, Temporary) Act (3 of) 1949;
V.P. Criminal Law Amendment Act (Special Courts) Ordinance (5 of) 1949;
W.B. Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts Act (21 of) 1949; as amended 
by A£t 12 of 1952; Act 24 of i960; West Bengal Security Act (3 of 1943); 
West Bengal Security Act (19 of) 1950; >fest Bengal Security Ordinance 
(2 of 1949); West Bengal Security (Second Amendment) Ordinance (2 of) 1949; 
West Bengal Special Courts Act (10 of 1950); West Bengal Tribunal of 
Criminal Jurisdiction Act (14 of) 1942.
iii. The Constituent Assembly and Judicial Review of Preventive 
Detention. 38
The Constituent Assembly was faced with the problem whether 
they should incorporate the due process concept, which would allow the 
Court to enquire whether the law is justified and a proper procedure 
followed or simply allow the legislature to enact a law, providing such 
conditions as it saw fit. At first some attempt was made to follow the 
American concept of due process, and B. N. Rau's Draft Constitution of 
1947 (clause 16) contained a due process clause. But B. N. Rau was a 
little alarmed at the prospect of giving wide powers of review to the 
Courts and by 1948 the Drafting Committee accepted the elimination of 
the due process clause. This wa^done without the approval of the 
Constituent Assembly and several Amendments (principally that of 
K. M. Munshi) were tabled asking for a reintroduction of a due process 
provision. Munshi urged that due process in America had been misused 
in the context of property and the liberty to contract, whereas in India 
it would he used only in a civil liberties context. But despite these 
protests, the Assembly accepted the view that Parliament must be allowed 
such procedure as it thought fit. The Assembly did however secure the 
enactment in the Constitution of provisions (amongst others) whereby 
detenus under a measure of preventive detention would have the right to
36. I have based this account on G.Austin: The Indian Constitution (1966). 
The reason for this is that most of the decisions on this area took place 
outside the floor of the Assembly. Austin contains in fact the only com­
pact account that we have, of the process. The Assembly debates themselves 
are more in the nature of protests at being faced with a fait accompli. 
Austin does not in fact indicate when the Constituent Assembly Debates 
took place. Discussion on this will be found at IX C.A.D. 1496-1570;
XI C.A.D. 521-2; 531-6, 575-8 (3. S. Ambedk(xr'S reply to criticisms).
See also the article of K.M.Munshi: Preventive Detention (1967) 2 All. 
Univ.L. Jnl. 12. Dr. Munshi was a member of the Constituent Assembly 
and portrays the tensions that existed in it.
receive grounds stating reasons for their arrest so as to enable them
to make a representation against the detention (Article 22 (5) (6)).
The Constituent Assembly thus accepted the view that in
preventive detention matters at least the Courts in India would plqy
an extremely limited role. It will be seen later that the Supreme Court
at first accepted the view that the American conceptsj'not be introduced, 
tutu
but^used English administrative law techniques and assumed an extremely 
important role in determining whether a detention is justified or not.
We now turn to the Supreme CourtTs attitude to law and order 
generally and to the specific problem of preventive detention.
4. The Supreme Court and Law and Order generally
We will see later that the Supreme Court took the view that 
where an "arrest” or ’’detention" takes place the Court will only ensure 
that the procedural safeguards of Article 22^ have been followed. But 
where a Statute connected with a person does not arrest the person 
but merely restricts his freedom of speech by censorship or his freedom 
of movement by passing'an extemment order, the Court will examine the 
statute or the extemment order to see if it is a reasonable restric­
tion within the meaning of Article 19- Again, if the impugned statute 
prescribes a special procedure in certain cases or classes of criminal 
offences, the Court may enquire whether the statute violates the 
equality provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.
In these cases the Court has not in fact evolved a substqntive 
theory like that evolved by the American Supreme Court. It has not in 
fact asked questions like - is the restriction reasonable ? but has 
concentrated on applying English administrative law techniques e.g. 
has the statute delegated arbitrary and uncanalised power ? It seems 
to have concentrated not on trying to check the actual exercise of power 
or trying to discover whether that particular exercise of power was 
justified; instead it began with the attitude very popular in the 
1930’s that uncanalised power should not be delegated at all. Gradually, 
like the rest of the Common Law world it gave up this stand and began 
to trust the executive more.
L. Article 22 (1 and 2) lays down the procedure in cases or normal 
arrests; Article 22 (3 to 7) lays down the procedure in preventive 
detention cases.
2. ^his can be traced back to Dicey*s rule of law (Law and the Con­
stitution (10d)). This was taken up by Lord ^ewart in his The New 
Despotism (1929) and prompted the Doughmore Committee Report (1932) 
Cmd. 4060.
3 kIn Romesh Thappar v Madras and Brij Bhushan v Delhi a majority
of the Court held that Madras and Punjab statutes which imposed precensor­
ship in the interests of public order in order to ease communal tension, 
were ultra vires Article 19 (2) which allowed reasonable restrictions in 
the interests of the security of State but not in the interests of public 
order, introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 > which
they alleged was a much wider concept. The majority quoted Blackstone on
5the liberty of the Press and concentrated their attack on precensorship.
Fazl Ali J., the minority judge, referred to the Rnglish law of sedition to 
show that it was a wide concept and tried to show that public order was in 
fact connected with security of State,^but both the majority and the minority 
avoided making any mention of the problems of communal tension which had 
prompted the need for the statute in the first place. The distinction bet­
ween public order and security of State was approved by the High Courts.^
rwT'V'"'
Fazl Ali (the minority judge) did however warn the majorityjjto
"ignore the fact that public safety is the dominant purpose of the 
Act(s) and therefore ... not to be confused with an Act which is 
applicable ... to any and every breach of public order." 8
As a result of these cases, the First Amendment Act was passed, and Article
19 (2), to enable reasonable restrictions to be made in the interests of . .
public order. Although after the Amendment the Court declared in an obiter
9
that its earlier views had been misconstrued, they used similar distinctions
3. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 12*f.
k. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 129.
5. Ibid at pr.25 p.l3*t.
6. Ibid at 130.
7. Re Bharati Press A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 12; orinivalfe v Madras A.I.R. 1951
Mad. 705 Indu Kumar v State A.I.R. 1951 Cau. 70.
8. At p.131 col.2.
9. Mahajan J.in Bihar v Shaibala Devi A.I.R.1952S.C.329 at pr.A p.330 col.2,
10. e.g. see the discussion on the Preventive Detention Act (infra) - the
Court managed to procure wide powers to review on the basis of a distinction 
between lav/ and order and public order..................................
*j > A
The Court’s initial hostility to the statute was prompted 
by English law notions about precensorship and distrust of delegating 
to the executive too much power. These English notions about the 
delegation of pov/er can also be traced in the Court’s attitude while 
considering whether Acts providing for special procedures for the 
trials of certain offences were intra vires Article I k  of the Consti­
tution. In V. B. v Anwar Ali Sarkar^the majority declared that Section 
3 (l) of the West Bengal Special Criminal Courts Act 1950, whose object 
was the "speedier trial of certain offences",was ultra vires the 
equality provisions because it gave to the Government too wide a power 
to direct by general or special order thqt certain offences or classes
of offences be tried by the procedure prescribed in the Act. The Court
12relied on American precedent on "equality" and stressed that the
Government could’not be trusted with such wide discretionary powers,^
w&ich vtkre inherent in the Act. Das J. (one of the majority judges) took
the narrower view in that the Section was bad only because it gave the
Government the power to refer individual cases for trial by this pro- 
1Acedure. Shastri J. in a powerful dissent argued that what should be
invalidated was specific cases of discrimination and not the power
15itself. But in Kathi Banning v Saurashtra the same bench of the Court 
approved a similar provision (S.11) of the Saurashtra Public Safety 
Act 1949. Shastri and Das JJ. approved of the statute because it met
11. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75-
12. Fazl Ali J. at pr.21 p.83 col.l; Mahajan J. at pr.36 p.85-6; Mukerjea J. 
at pr.*f2-3 p.88 and at p.92; Das J. at pr.56 p.9^» Aiyar J. at pp.100-1.
13. Fazl Ali J. at pr.27 p.84; Mahajan J. at pr.39 p.87.; Mukerjea J. at 
pr.4-6 pp.91-3; Aiyar J. at p.100.
Ik * Das J. at p.97 col.2 "This power must inevitably result in discrimi­
nation ...(which is) incorporated in this part of the section itself".
15. A.I.R. 1952 S.C.IXS
w i t h  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h e y  l a i d  d o w n  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  c a s e .  B u t  M u k e r j e a
and Ali JJ. validated it on the ground that unlike the Bengal statute the
object of this statute was not to provide for "speedier trials" but "to
provide for public safety, the maintenance of public order and the
16preservation of peace and tranquility in the State". The other judges
17
considered the statute to fall within the reasoning of the Bengal case.
Jurists are divided whether Kathi Hanning’s case overruled 
l8Anwar Ali's and it does seem a little strange that the Court should 
emphasise so greatly the differences in the objects of the statutes 
impugned in the two cases. It must however be accepted that the Court 
had come to realise that it could not in fact apply the Common Law atti­
tude against excessive delegation to reduce the Government's powers in 
statutes connected with public order. This is further reinforced by the 
fact that in later cases the Court approved of similar statutes even 
thought their object was to provide for "speedier trials for certain 
offences.
16. Fazl Ali J. at p.128; Mukerjea J. at pr.35 p-132-3-
17. Mahajan J. at pr.23 p. 129; N.C.Aiyar J. at pr.51 p.l37»; Bose J. at 
pr.57 p.138.
18. The following think that Anwar Ali was in fact overruled : Alladi 
K.Aiyar: The Court and fundamental rights (1955) 38; M.P.Jain: Adminis­
trative discretion and fundamental rights (1959) 1 J.I.L.I. 223 at 245; 
J.K.Mittal: Special Criminal Courts and the Supreme Court of India (1965) 
9 J.I.L.I. 46 at 63-4; says it was not citing in support W.Douglas:
From Marshall to Mukerjea (1956 T.L.L.) 311 • Mittal's main argument 
appears to be based on the fact that the Objects of the Statutes were 
different. This ignores the rule that the Preamble to a Statute is after 
all only an extrinsic aid to interpretation. See G.P.Singh: Principles 
of Statutory Interpretation (1966) 78-85 and Supreme Court rulings 
cited th&re.
19» Kedar Nath v W.B. A.I.R. 1953 404 (Shastri J. for the majority,
Bose J. in dissent); Kangshari Haidar v W.B. A.I.R. i960 S.C. 457 (but 
note the dissent of Sarkar J. for Subba Rao J. and himself); Gopi Chand 
v Delhi Adm. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 609 (per Gajendragadkar J.).
2 0
M. C. Setalvad in his Kashinath Trimbak Telang Lectures on
the Indian Constitution considers it anomalous that the Court did not
apply the test of reasonableness in Article 19 (6) to preventive
detention cases but did apply the test in cases in which an externment
order had been passed against the petitionerf-even though such orders
21
also deprive a petitioner of his liberty in the same way. But if we 
look at the cases themselves we will see that the Court in fact approved 
of the powers of extemment in all but one of the cases brought before 
it.^ In the remaining case^he Court invalidated S .k and kA of the 
C. P. and Berar Goondas Act, because they gave a wide uncanalised power 
to the executive.
thus appears that the Court seems to have approved generally 
of public order statutes and the only reservation it appears to have 
made is on tvnd^f administrative law viz. that the powers given must 
not be too widely expressed.
This "pro-Government" stand is continued in procedural matters. 
Article 22 (1 and 2) of the Constitution lays down that if a person is 
arrested he has a right to be informed as soon as may be of the grounds
20. The Indian Constitution (1967)1; on externments orders generally see 
a contributed article in 11 J.I.D.l. 1-28.
21. There is however a difference between being deprived of one’s liberty 
totally (which comes under Article 21) and merely losing one’s freedom
of movement whidh is specifically covered by Article 19(1) (d) .There is 
therefore textual justification for the Court taking the view that it did.
22. See N.B.Khare v Delhi A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211; Gurbachan Singh v Bombay 
A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 221; Hari Khemu Gawali v Dty Co m r. A.I.R. 1956 S.C.559 
(but note the dissent of Jaganadhdas J.); Bhagubha Dullabhai v D.M.Thana 
A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 585 (see pr.17 p.592). See also the comments of U.P. v 
Kaushailya A.I.R. 196^ S.C. Al6 (on the externment of prostitutesT;
Seervai (I967) 34-9-51 •
23. M.P. v Baldeo Prashad A.I.R. I96I S.C. 293- ^he Act allowed the 
externment of ugoondas" but failed to define what a "goonda" was.
^ - ■>
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of his detention and consult a legal practitioner of his choice (Article 
22 (l)), and be taken v/ithin 2k hours to a Magistrate, without whose con­
sent he cannot be further detained (Article 22 (2)). The Supreme Court
was at first reluctant to give a wide interpretation to these procedural
m 2.kprovisions. Thus in Punjab v Ajaib Singh the Court held that a deten­
tion under the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act 19^9 was 
not an arrest within the meaning of Article 22 (1) which does not define
arrest and therefore leaves the matter within the discretion of the
2 5Court. This was followed in Purshottam v B.M.Desai with respect to 
arrests under the Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 and in Collector of
26Malabar v Ebraim for arrests under the Madras Recovery of Revenue
2 7Act (2 of) 1864. Again in M. S. M. Sharma v Sri Krishna Sharma the 
Court ruled that Article 22 (1 and 2) did not apply to arrests for con­
tempt of Parliament. But this case was dissented from in an Advisory
28 29
Opinion in 19&5* Pam Sarup v Union the Court held that the right
to counsel did not include the right to see relatives through whom 
counsel could be obtained, ^t appears therefore that the Court inter­
preted the provisions of the Constitution so as not to give them or the 
petitioner an extra leverage to question the powers of the Government.
More recently, however, the Court has softened its attitude,
2k. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10 The judgement was delivered by Das J. The same
attitude was followed in Malaysia, Chiakhinsze v Mentri Besar, Selangor
(1958) 2k Mal.L.Jnl. 105.
25. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20 (per Das A.C.J.).
26. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 688 (per Imam J.).
27. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 595- This case overruled Ganpati v Nafisul Hasan 
A.I.R. 195^ - S.C. 63& which Das J. (who delivered the judgement in this 
case) overruled because it proceeded on a concession.
28* Re. Article 145 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 7^5.
29. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 2*f7.
. ry*ji
and in N. {j. v Shobharam^the Court ruled that a person could ask for 
legal counsel in an arrest under the M. P. Panchayat Act 1949- Hidayatullah 
J. (for the majority) quoted from old English sources to present a general 
policy for ensuring that procedural safeguards exist against any form 
of arrest. He took the view that any other view would be going back to
the "middle ages".^ The minority thought that the Act provided adequate
32 33
procedural safeguards. In Maharashtra v Prabhakar the Court took the
view that a detenu should not be denied the right to publish a book on
the "Atom". The Court felt that arrest and detention did not mean the




In Re Madhu Limaye Grover J. referred to the importance of 
36procedure in other countries and observed :
M(T)hose who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their
liberty in the discharge of what they consider to be their duty,
must strictly and scrupulously follow the forms and rules of law."
Apart from the more recent attempt to extend the procedural
requirements of Article 22 (1) and (2), it appears that the Court has
not really made an effort to try to evolve a concept of reasonableness
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1910.
31. See generally prs. 24-7 pp-1917 citing De Republica Anglorum Bk.II
c.23 quoted Holdsworth IX li.E.L. 223; Stephen: I Histbry of the Criminal
Law 3231 330-1; R. v Holmes' (1964) 1 l/.L.R. 576- Gideon v hainwright (T963)
3B3 TJ.s. 463.
32. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1910 at pr.3 p.1913-
33. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 424
34. Ibid at pr.8 pp.427-8.
33. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1014.
36. Ibid at pr.10-11 p.1018 referring to the Japanese Constitution Article
34, the American Constitution, the 6th Amendment, and the English case of 
Christie v Leachinsky (1947) 1 All.E.R. 387*
\i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  s t a t u t e s  r e l a t e d  t o  p u b l i c  o r d e r ,  w h e n  p i t t e d  a g a i n s t
the Constitutional provisions in Article 19 and Article l*f. Instead
until recently they have fallen back on English concepts of administrative
law to ensure that a large amount of pow&r is not delegated at all.
The concept of distrust of power was made very popular in the late
1920's and the early 1930's when these issues were raised by Lord
^ewart in his book The New Despotism and examined in detail by the
37Donoughmore Committee. It is feasible that the Judges of the Supreme 
Court, then either students of law or young lawyers, were influenced by 
this development. This attempt to treat law and order problems as 
merely an exercise of administrative power, and losing sight of the 
purposes for which the statute was enacted is yet another instance 
where foreign techniques were followed in preference to an analysis of 
the typically Indian situation before them.
At the same time it must not be forgotten that some effort was 
made by Las and Shastri JJ. to ensure that a wider view of the issues 
was taken. But they too did not in fact go much beyond giving a liberal 
interpretation of the administrative law techniques before them rather 
than attempting to discover whether the Constitution gave any scope for 
discussing the matter from an indigenous point of view, whereby in . 
applying the concept of reasonableness they could look at the Indian 
situation comparing Indian and British attitudes to problems of law 
qnd order, rather thanwerely question the desirability of the delegation 
of power.
37* For a detailed analysis see Seervai: The position of the .judiciary 
under the Constitution of India (1970) Chapter IV "The Supreme Court of 
India and the shadow of Dicey" p.78 ff.
5» The Supreme Court and Preventive Detention in India* 
i . The Policy of Preventive Detention.
The Constitution empowers Parliament to make laws relating to
preventive detention^ and lays down the procedure that must be followed
2
in such cases. Under these provisions Parliament passed the Preventive
1. These are provided in List I Entry 9 • "Preventive detention for 
reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs or the security of India; 
persons subjected!to such detention." List III Entry 3 * "Preventive 
detention connected with the security of a State, the maintenance of 
public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to 
the community; persons subjected to detention "
2. These are contained in Articles 21 and 22 (4-7) which are reproduced 
below:
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty. No person shall be
deprived of his liberty except according to procedure established by law.
Article 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. ...
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the deten­
tion of a person for a longer period than three months unless:-
(a) An advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, 
or are qualified to be appointed as, judges of a Hifeh Court, have repor­
ted before the expiration of the said period of three months that there 
is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention, provided that 
nothing in this clause shall he detention of any person beyond
the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub­
clause (7), or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of 
any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (a) and (b) of clause 7-
(5) When a person is detained in pursuance of an order under any law
providing for preventivei.detention, the authority making the order shall, 
as soon as may be, communicate -to such person the grounds on which the 
order has been made ^nd shall afford him the earliest opportunity of 
making a representation against that order.
(6) Nothing in clause (3) shall require the authority making any such 
order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such 
authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe :-
(a) the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases 
in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months 
under any law providing for preventive, detention, without obtaining the 
permission of the Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of 
sub-clause (a) of clause (4).
(b) the maximum period for which a person may in any class or classes 
of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
(c) the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in an enquiry 
under sub-clause (a) of clause (4). ...
Detention Act 1950 as a short term measure. The Courts were taken in
by the short term duration of the Preventive Detention Act and in S. Krish-
■2
nan v Madras the Supreme Court held valid S.11 (of the Act) which 
provided for detention beyond the period of three months without pro­
viding for the maximum mentioned in Article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution.
Zf
Again In Dattaraya v Bombay the Court did not invalidate an order which 
did not provide for a maximum period of detention on the grounds that 
the Act was due to expire after a year, ^he same attitude was accepted
5
in Shamrao v D. M. But the statute soon became a permanent feature 
in the statute book.
Preventive detention has in the main been used to control 
normal public order offences, apart from the years 1950-1 when it was 
used to combat Communist activity in Telengana and Hyderabad and 1952 
and 1957 when it was used to control large scale mass agitation in the 
^unjab. Nor can it be said that the Act has been used discriminatingly 
against Communists, who after 1951 ceased to account for a majority of 
the detentions under the Act. The extent of the operation of the 
Preventive Detention Act is shown in three tables (Tables 1, .11 and III) 
below.
3. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 301; but note the dissent of Bose J. that speci­
fication of the maximum was necessary. In 1952 Parliament added S.11 A 
to the Adt whereby a maximum of 12 months was specified.
4. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. l8l at pr.14 p.l86; but note the dissenting opinion
of Mahajan J. at pr.35 pp.191-2.
5. See the judgement of Bose J. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 324 at pr.23 p.328.
Note that Bose J. led the dissent questioning this approach in the case
cited f.n. 3
TABLE 1 showing the number of detentions under the Act.
Date Number of detenus Special comments
1950 10,962 6,000 in Telengana (rebellious area)
1951 2,326 726 in Hyderabad (rebellious area)





1957 292 101 in Punjab
1958 177





TABLE II showing decline in numbers of Communists detained.
Date Number of Communist detenus Total number of detenus
1953 (till Sept) 112 126
1956 3 292
On Oct.31,1957 11
TABLE I I I  showing the kinds of activities for which detention wqis 
deemed necessary.
Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Oct.1,1953
to 259 106 126 7 25
Sept.30,1954
1954-5 325 106
On Dec.31,1955 131 122
1957 to
Oct. 1,1960 369 500 k5. 22
Key to Table XII
1 = total number detained
2 = for security of state and maintenance of public order
3 = maintenance of supplies essential to the community
4 = defence of India and relations with foreign states
5 = violent activities
6 = harbouring dacoits, goondaism, terrorism, inciting strikes
7 = espionage
8 = communal activities
9 zz being a bad character
Source of all three Tables: D.H.Bayley: Preventive Detention in India 
(19o2) Chapter II, supplemented by D. H. Bayley: The policy of preven­
tive detention (1950-62) (1964) 10 Journal of Public Administration.
It will thus be clear that preventive detention has become a 
peace-time measure to solve peace-time law and order problems- The Act 
has concentrated on providing its own remedies rather than concentrate 
on judicial review- Advisory Boards which have to be consulted before 
a person can be detained for a period of three months have played a 
major role and set aside 28 per cent of the orders referred to them. 
Between the years 1952 and 1953 the Supreme Court upheld 74 and set 
aside 83 orders. But in this the Government itself played a greater 
role by suo motu revoking detention orders in 158 of the cases pending 
before the Court. By 1954-5 the Courts intervened in only 34 cases, 
among which the Supreme Court accounted for only one.^ In the early 
years the Court was not expected to and did not §lay an important role. 
Gradually it seems to have accumulated powers of review of its own 
making, as we shall see later.
6. D.Bayley: Preventive Detention in India (1962) Chapter II.
3 4 4
ii. The Supreme Court : Choice of Techniques.
The 3u reme Court could follow three techniques in dealing
with the law of preventive detention. Firstly, it could follow the
American technique of imposing a broad pattern of review based on the
concept of due process. The Court rejected this and preferred to
respect the Constituent Assembly's taboo on the use of such techniques;
but at the same time, in an effort to show that they were not out of
kvv i/, f*
tune with cosmopolitan ideas, first c and then discredited
the American system as inadequate. Secondly, the Court could use the 
English administrative law techniques, whereby it could follow a policy 
of non-interference and concentrate on the third avenue open to them 
and stress that the Constitutional procedural requirements in Article 
22 (5) and (6) are not violated. What the Court has done is extremely 
ingenious. It relied upon the Constitutional requirements (the grounds 
supplied to the detenue in Article 22 (5)) and then introduced a broad 
policy of review on the basis of the English administrative law doctrine 
of ultra vires in a manner which is totally inconsistent with English 
attitudes to the exercise of the powers of preventive detention which 
it professed to follow. In this way the Court has maintained the 
appearance of respecting the subjective satisfaction of the detaining 
authority but at the same time reviewing the exercise of such powers 
on broad grounds of review which were never deemed applicable in this 
area. I the Judges of the Court have altered fundamentally
the whole concept of preventive detention and the Court’s powers in 
relation to it, even though they themselves firmly believed that they 
were merely following a self-denying policy of non-interference.
ii. a. Rejection of broad based American patterns of review.
The Supreme Court first considered the policy of preventive 
detention in Gopalan v Madras. The majority rejected all attempts by 
counsel to accord to the Supreme Court a broad constitutional power of 
review to examine if the statute or the prder passed under it was 
reasonable or whether it lays down a "proper procedure". The Court
g
summarily rejected an argument, based on the doctrine of colourable
legislation (which had formed so important a part of their juristic
techniques in protecting property rights), that they could enquire
whether the Preventive Detention Act fulfilled the purposes laid down
9
in the legislative lists. Again, it was argued that the test of
"reasonableness" in Article 19 should be applied to preventive detention
cases because a detention is a restriction on the freedom of movement
guaranteed in Article 19 (1) (d). The majority of the Court did not
accept this argument and took the view that Article 19 deals with the
freedom of a free man and that once a person had been detained under
Articles 21 and 22, the test in Article 19 had no application.^ The
majority also refused to accept the construction that law in Article 21
meant "natural law" or that "procedure established by law" meant "due
process". They thought that the former construction was not warranted
by the text of the Constitution^and that "due process" was too vague
12a concept to merit incorporation into the Indian Constitution.
7. A.I.R. 1930 S.C. 27.
8. Kania C.J. at pr.22 p.41; Mukerjea J. at pr.l63 p.91-2(even though he 
stresses preventive detention is a drastic measure); Mahajan J. at pr.140 
p.84 col.2; Das J. at pr.244-5 pp.121-2. Fazl Ali J. does not use the argu­
ment either but mentions it in passing at p.62.
9. See f.n.l infra.
10. See Kania C.J. at pr.12 p.37i pr*9 p06; Shastri J. at pr.102 pp.69-70;
Mahajan J. at pr.137 pp.82-3; Mukerjea J. at pr.171 pp*93» Das J. in summary 
pr.225 at 113-4. Note that Mahajan J. took the view that Art.22 was a code 
to itself and therefore took the view that arguments connecting Art.19 to
21 were not applicable to Art.22 in any case.
11. Kania C.J. at pr.l8(a)p.39p Shastri J. at pr.107 p.71-2; Mukerjea J. 
at' ph. 193 p.102; Das J. at pr.2’28' p.ll4-5«
12. Kania C.J. at pp.37-9; Shastri J. at pr.110-111 pp72-3; Mukerjea J. 
at pp,98-lo2; Das J. at pp.114-8.
^ f.1Cj o
The reason for their lordships taking this view we^ s that they
wanted to follow the views of the Constituent Assembly without any fuss
and without any reference to American concepts. This is borne out by
the fact that after admitting that recourse to Constituent Assembly
13debates was not warranted by the rules of interpretation, the
majority referred to the views of the Drafting Committee to show
that they tried to avoid incorporating "due process" in the area of
lh
arrest and detention. Even Fazl Ali J., who adopted both the "due
15
process" and the "reasonableness" construction, while protesting against
the majority’s reference to the Drafting Committee’s opinion, admitted
that the Committee had tried to avoid American concepts.
^he majority judgements may also have been motivated by the
facts that the judges realised the need for preserving law and order,
and that the Government must be given full powers to deal with the
problems that a breakdown of law and order would create. Shastri J. for
example talked of the need to check
"an abuse of freedom by anti-social and subversive elements which 
might imperil the natural welfare of an infant republic." 17
But in trying to achieve the construction that they wanted,
the majority gave a misleading picture of the American concept of "due
—
13* Kania J. at p.39 col.l.; Shastri J. at pr.111-2 p.73; Mukerjea J. 
at pr.190 p.101.
14. Kania C.J. at pr.17 p.39 on the grounds that it was permissible to 
refer to them to resolve an ambiguity (referring to Craies: Statute Law 
(M) 122; Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes (9d) 28-9; Crawford: Statu­
tory Construction (194D)Edn) 379) though it is submitted with respect
that his lordship did not in fact show that an ambiguity existed. Shastri J. 
at pr.lll p.73; Mukerjea J. at pr.190 pp.101; Das J. at pr.209 p.107*
15. at pr. 68 p.97 col. 1.
16. At pr.58 pp.33-4.
17. At pr.119 p.76. See also the catalogue of offences in the list by 
Mahajan J. at pr.148 pp.87-88 and by Fazl Ali J. at pr.87 p.6^5-
process". The allegation that due process is vague is unjustified if we
18remember that "due process" is a "fact value" concept like negligence, the
content of which is determined by the specific situation it is applied to.
Elasticity and varied application must not be confused with vagueness.
19While it is true that in 1950 the American Supreme Court had rejected the 
incorporation theory which gives due process a specific content by incor­
porating the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it cannot be shown that due 
process was at that time regarded as a vague concept.
In drawing their conclusion about "vagueness" the majority rely
20
either upon secondary material, or on cases which form a part of the
21 22 incorporation controversy, or cases on property rights. "Due process"
23was m  fact imported from the provisions of Magna Carta and haa come
to mean a process which ensures a fair trial and an opportunity to be 
2 A
heard. There is a long line of case law which shov/s that the American 
Supreme Court, even though not prepared to incorporate the Bill of Rights 
freedoms in the fourteenth Amendment, used the jfcue process concept to
18. See J. Stone : Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1964) 737*
19. See Adamson v California (1947) 332 U S .  46. The incorporation theory
was later accepted in Mapp.v Ohio U.S. 643* . . ..
20. e.g. Kania C.J. referring generally to Cooley & Willis (without makipg 
any quotations or making page references). In fact Willis (p.662) appears 
to accept that "due process" has a definite content.
21. e.g. Mukerjea J. referring to an isolated reference in Twining v New
Jersey (1908) 211 U.S. 79 (a case on self discrimination), at pp.99 col.l.
22. e.g. Mukerjea J. referring to Lochner v N.Y. (1905) 19& U.S. 45 at 
p . 100 col.l.
23. See Story: Constitution of the U.S. (1873 pr.1789 pp.5^7; Mott:
Due Process of law (1926)1-5: Hazeltine: The influence of the Magna Carta 
on American Constitutional Development (1917) 17 Yale Law Jnl.1•
24. This is made clear in the Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 16A S.569(4) 
pp.571-9. See also J.H.Wildman: The Supreme Court and fundamental rights - 
A prohlem of Judicial method (1970) 23 VanoL.Rev. 792.
Q. u
25 m  ,
ensure that a proper trial had in fact been granted. The American
Supreme Court had always in the past stressed the need to give a
person an opportunity to be heard as regards decisions which affect 
26them. More recently, an eminent writer has shown how a large number
2 7of day to day decisions fulfil "the requirement of a trial type hearing”.
28In fact, Fazl Ali J. (the dissenting judge) quoting from Willis was 
right in pointing out that due process had come to mean the following 
rights
”;(l) Notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an impartial tribunal 
and (4) (an) orderly course of procedure.” 29
The majority could, instead of going into the problem of ”due
process”, have followed Mahajan J.*s example (he quoted only one Indian
case), and come to the same conclusion as he did, without showing their
scholarship. What they did (if one may venture a witticism) was to
demonstrate that they had not failed contemporary jurisprudence, but
contemporary jurisprudence had failed them. It is for this reason that
they find solace in the fact that during war in England, English Courts
25. See Murray1 s Lessee v Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (1856) 18 How. 
272 (on distress warrant levies); Hurtado v California (1884) 110 U.S.
316 at 531-2 (not providing a grand jury did not violate due process); 
Moore v Dempsey (1923) 26l U.S. 86 (per Holmes J.)(a lynch law case); 
Powell v Alabama (1932)~"~287 U.S. 45 (on the right to counsel); Brown v
Mississippi (1937 ) 297 U«S. 2?8 (coerced confessions); Palko v Connec­
ticut (1937) 302 U.S. 319 (double jeopardy); De Jonge v Oregon (1937)
299 U.S. 353* The emphasis was on whether there was any injustice done 
or not. See also the obiter in Morgan v U.S. (1938) 304 U.S. 1 at 19 
(obiter) and comment on the case (1939) 32 Har.L.Rev. 509-515• See also 
Bodenheimer: Jurisprudence (1962) 299-300; Scwarz: Law and executive in 
Britain (1949) 216 (citing the first Case cited in this note).
26. e.g. Londoner v Denver (1903) 210 U.S. 373 at 386; Bi-Metallic Inv. 
Co. v State Board ... (1915) 239 U.S. 441 at 445*
27. K.C.Davis: The requirement of trial type hearing (1956) 70 Har.L.Rev. 
193-280. Though the essay is by no means based on concepts of due process.
28. Willis: Constitutional Law 662
29. See pp.58-60.
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had sanctioned the detention of persons under a regulation which 
merely required the subjective satisfaction of the Home Secretary for 
an order to be made under it.^ In England the power of judicial review 
was at its lowest ebb^and the Eourt simply adopted the position that 
existed in England. Like the English Court sy the majority were reluctant 
to apply the rules of natural justice to what they considered to be a 
purity administrative procedure. Fazl Ali J. alone appeared to want
to introduce natural justice into the area, and he tbo preferred to
32
rely on an old 1915 case rather than the more recent decision of
33Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning (1948).
The Court's technique consists of following the preference 
expressed in the Constituent Assembly, but at the same time referring 
to Anglo-American case law to show that they had not abdicated their 
responsibilities in the light of universal experience. This 
•?i l.  ^ ; . -• , may have
prevented the Court from examining some of the real problems of preven­
tive detention and the role that the Court ought to play. In fact 22 
years later, the Court has still not clearly laid down its role (see 
below) even though it has assumed considerable powers of review despite 
its claim of maintaining a policy of non-interference.
The advent of Subba Kao J. to the Supreme Court led to a 
reconsideration of the basic soundness of the Gopalan decision. In
30. Liversidge v Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 cited Kania C.J. at pr.24 pp. 
41-2; pr.27 pp.42-3; P.Shastri J. cited the First World War case of R v 
Halliday exparte Zadig (1917) A.C. 260 at pr.74- col.l, p.78 col.l; 
Mukerjea J. cites both R v Halliday and Liversidge v Anderson at pr.164- 
p.91-2.
31. C>n the right to a hearing see De Smith: Judicial review of adminis­
trative action (1968) The path of deviation pp. 144-154-.
32. Local Government Board v Arlidge (1915) A.C. 120.
33. (1948) A.C. 87.
K o c h u n n i  v  M a d r a s  S u b b a  R a o  J . p r o n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h a t  c a s e
was willing to accept the dissenting view of Fazl Ali J. in Gopalan’ s
case as correct. But when the matter came to be reconsidered in Kharak
Singh v U. P.^ Subba Rao J. found himself in a minority. But the
learned judge was able eventually to overrule at least one part of
36Gopalan’s case in Maharashtra v Prabhakar where Subba Roa J. reading
the judgement for a unanimous Court held that detention under the
Defence of India Rules did not mean that the detenu lost all his rights
under Article 19 and there was no reason why te detenu could not
exercise his right to speech to publish a scientific work on the atom,
which he had written while he was detained.
But this does away with only an extremely small part of the
logic of the Gopalan ruling. Soon after the retirement of Subba Rao
J., Shah J., who had supported his judgements in all the three cases
. 37referred to above, wrote the judgement in R. C. Cooper v Union in 
which he made the following observation :
"In our judgement the assumption in A. K. Gopalan’s *
that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with 
specific matters and in determining whether there is an infringe­
ment of the individual’s guaranteed rights, the object and form
of State action alone need (to) be considered and the effect of
the laws on fundamental rights of the individual &&& be ignored 
cannot be accepted as correct." 38
Sikri in an extrajudicial statement said that this observation in
39fact amounted to an overruling of Gopalan*sScase. If this is so, the
3*f. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 1080 at pr.25 1093
35. A.I.R. I963 S.C. 1293 per Ayyangar J. (for the majority) at pr.15
pp.1301. But note the dissent of Subba Rao J. (for Shah J. and himself) 
at pr.31 pp.1303-6.
36. A.I.R. I966 S.C. b2.k at pr.2 p. 2^6; pr.7 p.^27.
37. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 56*f.
38. Ibid at pr.6*f p-597 • note the dissent of Ray J. who saw no reason 
why Gopalan* s case be overruled(aJt“ ^  bAO-l)
39* Talk at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, June 21,1971*
Court has taken a very daring step in overruling by a mere obiter 
dictum (unsupported by much discussion on the point) a case which has 
been accepted as correct since 1950* *
4oThe implications of this new development could be far-reaching 
because the Court could insist that the concept of reasonableness which 
is found in Article 19 should be introduced in the area of preventive 
detention so that the Court can enquire whether a particular order is 
justified. If this happens, the Court will be forced to evolve Indian 
principles of review rather than following English principles of review 
or avoiding American concepts of due process.
Although more than two years have elapsed since the R. C. Cooper 
decision, no broad patterns of review have emerged following the over­
ruling of Gopalan’s case. In fact there has been only one reference to 
Article 19 by Sikri J. in Mohd. Sabir v J. and K. (1971)^ where the 
Court merely used Article 19 to justify preventive detention. The 
Court observed :
’’The petitioner further submitted that the words security of 
state do not exist in the Constitution. We referred him to Article 
19 (2) of the Constitution in that connection.”
Whether ay broad patterns of a ’’due process” nature will emerge or not
is difficult to say. Years ago Shastri J. said that procedure established
by law
’’may be taken to mean (...)1 ordinary and well established criminal 
procedure’that is to say those settled usages and normal modes 
of proceeding sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code which is 
the general law of criminal procedure in the country.” 42
JjO. As can be seen in the Pakistan case West Pakistan v Begum Agha Abdul 
Shorish Kashimiri P.L.D. 1962 S.C. 14, where the Pakistan Courts have 
assumed wide powers of review.
41. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1713.
42. Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 at pr.ll6 p.74.
If the Court adopts such a construction, it will adopt a theory which 
will give to the Court wide powers of review and make redundant a
large part of the theory which underlay the special provisions of
43Article 22. The Court has however relied in the main on the rules of 
Statutory Interpretation and English administrative law techniques.
ii. b. The use of the English administrative law techniques.
Having rejected until recently all attempts to introduce
concepts of reasonableness or due process into the area of preventive 
detention, the Courts have fallen back upon the adminstrative law to 
procure for itself fairly sizeable powers of review, while interpreting
S. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. S. 3 lays down :
,f(l) The Central or ... State government may
(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to
(i) the defence of India,the relations of India with foreign 
powers, the security of India, or
(ii) the security of State or the maintenance of public order; 
or
(iii) the maintenance of supplies essential to the community ...
it is necessary to do so, make an order directing that such person 
be detained.”
The Supreme Court took the view that S. 3 grants a subjective 
44discretion to the executive. But at the same time it seems to have
45adopted by implication Greene M.R.’s test in Associated Provincial
43« See Das J. in Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 at pr.236 p.ll8.
44. e. g. Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 at pr.27 p«43 (per Kania
C.J.); at pr.92 p.66 (per Fazl Ali J.) at pr.123 p-71 col.2. (per Shastri 
J.) at pr.143 p.84 (per Mahajan J.) at pr.203 p.105 col.2 (per Mukerjea J.).
45. The case has never been cited by the Supreme Court.
Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation (hereafter the Wednesbury
46case), that even though the Court cannot interfere with the discretion
of the executive, the Court can still apply the broad ultra vires test
and enquire whether the particular exercise of power falls within the
£our corners of the Act.^ In fact the Court has gone one step further
and suggested that an order which does not satisfy the broad ultra
48vires test is in fact a mala fide exercise of power. This approach
enables the Court to say that though the discretion is subjective,
(i.e. the Court will not interfere with the executive’s view that the
fact that ”X" beat up his wife was a reasonable ground for preventively
detaining him in the interests of the maintenance of public order) the
Court can interfere on the broad ground that the action taken cannot be
reasonably connected with the purposes for which the statute was enacted
(i.e. the fact that ,rXM was beating up his wife could not conceivably
4-9be connected with the maintenance of public order). In this way the 
Court has gradually built up a theory of review. It is submitted with 
respect that the Supreme Court has in fact done away with the concept 
of subjective satisfaction altogether and regards S. 3 as giving a
normal discretionary power rather than an exceptional power of subjec-
5 0
tive discretion, even though unlike the Pakistan Supreme Court it has 
<?(/s tx^pV'ovcTb cr^ r
not ■' Liversidge v Anderson.
46. (1947) 1 K.B. 223.
4?. See Atma Ram v Bombay A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 157 at pr-5 p.l60 col.2;
Shibban Lai Saxena v U.P. A.I.R. 1934 S.C. 179 at pr.8 p.180-1.
48. See Rameshwa v P.M. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 at pr.8 p.337 (per Gajend- 
ragadkar J.); P.Mukerjea v W.B. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 852 at pr.7 p.855*
49. Instances of this will be cited infra.
50. Ghularn Hhilapi v West Pakistan P.L.D. 1969 S.C. 373•
51. (1942) A.C. 206.
While it is true that the broad ultra vires test is appli-
5 2
cable to cases of normal discretionary power, it does not apply to 
areas where the satisfaction of the executive is accepted as subjec­
tive, where the only allegation that can be made is that the order is 
mala fide. Professor de Smith, discussing the subjective satisfaction 
cases, says :
"The burden of establishing that the competent authority did 
not honestly believe its conduct was directed to the furtherance 
of any of the comprehensive purposes (of the statute) but was 
acting in pursuance of an ulterior motive would be impossible 
to discharge. And dicta to the effect that the regulations pur­
porting to be made in virtue of similar powers had to be capable 
of being related to the prescribed purposes failed to give any 
substance to judicial review." 53
The reason for this was explained by Viscount Maugham in Liversidge v
Anderson (the leading case on the subject):^
/ \ |?Vx.C€^
"(T)he Secretary of State must in the first ^believe that the
person ... (did something objected to by the regulations).(55)Any 
one of the various circumstances (mentioned in the regulations) 
is sufficient to satisfy the first faiSt that the Secretary of 
State must believe and I do not doubt that a Court could inves­
tigate the question whether there were reasonable grounds for a 
reasonable man to believe some of those facts if they could be 
put before the Court. But then he must at the same time also 
believe something very different in its nature, namely that by
52. The test was laid down by Greene M.R. also in Carltona Ltd. v Commr.... 
(1943) 2 AII.E.R.56Q (does it come within "the four corners of the Act" — 
Lord Badcliff^Att.Gen. for Canada v Hallet & Carey Ltd. (1952) A.C.427 
at 450 (is it -"capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes"). 
This test has been extensively used. On its use see generally D.G.T. 
Williams: (1968) A.S.C.L.I58 at 165-7; (1969) A.S.C.L. 115 at 125-9;
D.G.T.Williams and M.Mathews (1970) A.S.C.L. 92 at 98-9• See also Markose: 
Judicial control of administrative action (1956) 417-23; Indian Law Insti­
tution publication: Cases and Material on Administrative Law (1964) Vol.I, 
pp.637-697- For a good survey see M.Fazal: Judicial -Review of administrative 
action (1969 O.U.P.) ijO-43-
53- Judicial review of administrative action (1968 3d) 276 citing Att.Gen. 
for Canada v Hallet and Carey Ltd. (supra f.n.52) at 450; Ross Clunis v 
Papadopoullos (1958) 1 W.L.R. 549 at 559 (P.C.) c.f. Lipton Ltd. v Lord 
(1917) 2 KJ37 647 at W T .
54. (1942) A.C. 206 at 220-1. For favourable comments on the case see
Holdsworth (1942) 58 L.Q.R. 1-3. See also Keeton (1942 ) 5 Mod.L.R. 162 -73; 
Allen: Law and order (2d) 333-342 (reprinted from Volume 59 L.Q.R.)
55« He cited the objectives of the regulation, which is similar to S.3 
of the Preventive Detention Act cited above.
reason of the first fact ”it is necessary to exercise control 
over" the person in question, ^o my mind this is too clearly 
a matter of executive discretion (and) ... not subject to the 
control of a judge in a Court of law. If then the second re­
quisite, as to the grounds on which the Secretary of State can 
make this order for detention, is left to his sole discretion 
without appeal to a Court of law, it necessarily follows that 
the same is true as to all the facts, which he has a reasonable 
cause to believe.”
More recently in a similar case from Ireland, McEldowney v 
Forde (1970) two judges in the majority in the House of Lords stressed 
that the Court was in duty bound to accept the Minister1 s view even
as to whether the impugned regulations would achieve the statutory
56 ' .
objectives while the remaining majority judge tried to show that
57a nedus between the regulations and the statute existed. That this 
is implied by the subjective satisfaction test has been generally 
accepted. A jurist commenting on Liversidege v Anderson in the con­
text of public corporations has observed :
”Th(e) judgement of the majority might well preclude the 
judiciary from examining the capacity of the public corporation 
in relation to (its) ... general functions.” 5$
59It is true that the emphasis is changing, but as Professor 
de Smith has observed, wherever the formula of subjective satisfaction
56. (1969) 5 W.L.R. 179; Hodson L.J. at 188; Guest L.J. at 192. See
P.Sills: Case comment (1970) 55 Hod.L.R. 527 at 528-9. Williams & Mathews 
(1970) A.S.C.L. 92 lay emphasis on the dissenting view of Diplock L.J.
But it should be remembered that this case did not involve an executive 
order, but delegated legislation, where the Court is entitled to apply 
the ultra vires test.
57. Ibid, Pearson J. at 198.
58. W. Friedman: The new public corporations and the law (19^7) 10 Mod. 
L.Rev. 255, 577 at 581.
59. See Customs & Excise Commrs. v Cure & Deeley Ltd. (1962) 1 Q.B. 5*t0; 
Webb v Min, of Housing and Local Govt. (1965) 1 W.lTr. 755; Padfield v 
Min, of Agriculture Fisheries (1968) A.C. 997 (and comment thereon by 
Wade: 84 L.Q.R. l66j; (1968) Mod.L.RT"TOSt»i3.
has been used
Mthe emphasis has been laid on the amplitude of the discretionary 
power rather than on the need to relate it to the purposes of the 
Act." 60
The Supreme Court of India, however, has taken the view that 
it can apply the broad ultra vires test and thus eat into the subject­
ive satisfaction rule which otherwise necessarily precludes judicial 
review. At first the Court was cautious and in Atma Earn v Bombay^ 
merely suggested that they could enquire whether
Mthe grounds on which the government was satisfied are such that 
a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with 
(the) objects which were to be prevented from being attained ..."
But at the same time the Court added :
”As has been generally observed this is a subjective decision 
of the government and that cannot be substituted by an objective 
test in a court of law.” 62
63
In Shibban Lai v U.P. (195*0 the Court again said by way of
obiter dictum that the grounds must have
"a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope 
or purpose of the legislative provision ... ,f 6k
65But in Sodhi Shamsher v P.E.P.S.U. the Court set aside the detention 
order on the basis of the broad ultra vires test, and ruled that speeches
60. De Smith: Statutory re s tr ic tio n  of ju d ic ia l review (1955) 18 Kod.L.R. 
575 at 590 c itin g  Min, of Agriculture 8c Fisheries v Price (19*fl) 2 K.B.
116 (directions in respect of land ); Robinson v Min, of Town & Country 
Planning (l9*f7) K.B. 702; Taylor v Brighton Cprpn. (1947) K.B. 73& (order 
relating to Town Planning scheme) ; Swindon CorpnT v Pearce (l9*t8) 2 All.
E.R. 119. Be Smith makes the same point in Judicial review of administra­
tive action (1968) 2?2 read with f.n. 6l.
61. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157.
62. Ibid at pr. 5 p*l62 col.2.
65. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 179• Tke case was decided on a concession that one 
of the grounds was outside the purview of the Act.
6k. Ibid at pr.8 pp.l80-l.
65. A.I.R. \9 5 k S.C. 276.
made by the detenu to the effect that the Chief Justice of the State 
was communally biased, were not related to the general purpose of the 
maintenance of law and order. B. K. Mukerjea J. observed :
"The utmost that can be said is that the allegations in the 
pamphlets are calculated to undermine the Confidence of the people 
in the proper administration of justice in the State. But it is 
too remote a thing to say, that the security of state or the main­
tenance of law and order in it would be endangered thereby.
After all, we must judge facts by the ordinary standards of 
common sense and probability and it is no answer to say that 
strange and unexpected things sometimes happen in this world.” 66
After this the Court considered for itself whether the broad ultra
67
vires test should apply in three cases^ «Even though it did not declare
the particular orders in question invalid for this reason except, in
one case, where the argument proceeded on a concession by the Government,
the Court ruled that the order wqs defective because it bore no relation-
68
ship to the statutory purposes.
6 9
In Rameshwar v D. M. the Court set aside the order of a
detenu who was served with a detention order after he had already been
in jail for 21 days, on the grounds that since he had been in jail his
7 0detention could not have been connected with the purposes of the Act.
66. Ibid at pr. 5 p.277-8.
67. Dwarka Das v J.K. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 164 at p.l66 Col.l; pr.5 p. 168
(the smuggling of commodities not mentioned in the Essential Supplies
ordinance of the State was not connected with the maintenance of supplies 
essential to the community - but the argument appears to have proceeded 
on a concession by the Government at p.l6l col.l, last 8 lines); Naresh 
Chandra v W.B. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1335 at pr.14 p.1341 (instigations to 
violate the personal safety of the Prime Plinister was connected with the 
maintenance of law and order); Jagan Nath v Union A.I.R. I960 S.C. 625
at pr.12 p.628 (bringing the Governments of India and Jammu and Kashmir 
into contempt was connected with the security of India).
68. Dwarka Das v J.K. A.ISR. 1957 S.C. 164 (see comment supra f.n.67).
69. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334.
70. Ibid at pr.13 p.338-9.
It described as mala fide an order not satisfying the broad ultra vires
test, which it defined as follows :
" ... The grounds must rationally support the conclusion drawn 
against him by the detaining authority.” 71
72Again, in Rameshwar Lai v Bihar the Court enquired for itself whether
the alleged black marketing activities were in fact prejudicial to the
maintenance of supplies to the community, and found that they were .
But the most extensive use of the broad ultra vires test is to be found 
73in Sushanta v W. B. where the Court went into the grounds of several 
connected petitions and ruled that :
7b(a) nuisance and allegations of offences in the Indian Penal Code
n c  r)£\ rjrj rpQ
threats of murder, assault, robbery, burglary( indecent behaviour 
79 80towards women, mischief, removal of rice bags in a clandestine 
manner,8^ theft,8^hindering an investigation,85running away from a 
police hospital,8Zfand several other cases,85 
were not connected with the maintenance of public order (although they
may be relevant to the maintenance of law and order); and
86(b) operating a husking machine without a licence, was not 
connected with the maintenance of supplies essential to the community.
71» Ibid at pr.8 p.337«
72. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1303 at pfi7 p.j30 6 .
73. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1004.
7b. Ibid at pr.8 p.1006-7; pr.10 p.1007; pr.49 p.1013.
73. Ibid at pr.12 p.1007.
76. Ibid at pr.14 p.1007; pr.13 p.1007; pr.27 p.1009.
77* Ibid at pr.17 p.1008.
78. Ibid at pr.18-19 p.1008; pr.37 pp.1011-2.
79* Ibid at pr.21 p.1008.
80. Ibid at pr.22 p.1009*
81. Ibid at pr.23 p.1009.
82. Ibid at pr.29 pllOlO; pr.39 p.1012 (theft of rice); pr.^ iO p.1012
(theft of overhead traction wire).
83. Ibid,at p.30 p.IQIQ. .......................................
84. Ibid at pr.4l p.1012.
83. Ibid at pr.50,51 p.1013. 86. Ibid at pr.35 p.1011.
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This distinction between "public order" and "law and order" was based
on two earlier decisions of the Court, which were not concerned with
87
the Preventive Detention Act.
But the Court seems to have adopted the test and thus acquired
a tremendous say as to what kind of offences preventive detention could
be made applicable.
But what is the difference between the two terms "law and
88order" and "public order" ? In P. Hukerjea v W. B. Ramaswami J.,
89relying on the observations of an eminent English jurist, felt that
the difference was similar to the difference between private and public
90crimes in England. But more recently in Arun Ghosh v W. B. Hidayatullah J.,
91setting aside this distinction, made the following observations 1
"Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community 
taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Dis­
turbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed 
against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent 
of causing general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the 
d§gr@G of disturbance and its effect on the life of a community in 
a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only 
to a breach of law and order ... The question to ask is : Does it 
lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as 
to amount to a disturbance of public order or does it affedt merely 
an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed.
This question is to be faced on facts. There is no case in which 
one case can be distinguished from another." $2
The learned judge then explained that a man forcibly kissing a "chamber
maid" (his phrase) in a hotel may not disturb public order, but doing
87. Supdt. Central Jail v R.M.Lohia A.I.R. i960 S.C. 633 at pr.12 pp.639-^ 
(on Section 3 of the U.P.Special Power Act 1932); R.M.Lohia v
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 7 ^  (a case of detention under the Defence of India Rules
1962. But here there was a technical defect in the order i.e. the order
instead of using the words "public order" used the words "law and order".
(Note the dissent of Dayal J.)
88. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 832 at pr.9.
89. C. &. Allen : Legal duties/l<lSl
90* A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228.
91. Ibid at
92. Ibid at pr.3 pp.1229-3^•
■O' ; *«J O  'J
the same in the street might be a menace to working women and school
girls and therefore offend public order. We will see that the learned
judge’s superficial anglicisation contrasts with his basic Indianness.
In this the Court has invented another "fact value" concept,
to acquire a substantive say in matters of preventive detention and to
what kind of offences preventive detention will apply, although they
still pay lip service to the rule of. subjective satisfaction which
93purports to oust their power of review.
Q if
The Court has used this "public order" test in particular
95and the broad ultra vires test in general on several occasions and 
this promises to be an accepted part of the Court’s techniques in con­
trolling the Government’s powers. The Court has justified its intrusion
on the basis of notions of liberty. As Hegde J. put it in Sudhir Kumar 
96v Police Commr. :
"The freedom of the individual is of utmost importance in 
any civilized society. It is a human right. Under our Constitution 
it is a guaranteed right. It can be deprived only by due process 
of law. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under 
exceptional circumstances. It is wrong to consider the same as the 
executive appears to have done as a convenient substitute for the 
ordinary process of law."
Thus we can see that although the Court had given the appearance 
of not interfering with matters of preventive detention in fact they have 
gradually acquired the techniques to interfere with almost every deten­
tion order on the basis of the broad ultra vires test, which has been
93• P.Hukerjea v W.3. A.I.R. 197Q S.C. 852 at pr.8 pp.8^7-8 (assault on 
private individuals is not connected with public order); Shyamlal v Commr. 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 269 at pr.10 p.1072 (causing q£iot in a tense area was 
connected with the maintenance of public order); Sudhir Kumar v Police 
Commr. A.I.R. 197Q S.C. 8l*f (causing a disturbance by knifing people was 
not.connected withjthemaintenance of public order).
9*f. Bhrigunath v Orissa AII.R. 1970 S.C. 67I at pr.3 p«672 (stealing 
serviceable parts of railway equipment was connected with the maintenance 
of supplies essential to th^ervice of the community.
95. See supra generally.
■ 96. A.I.R.' 1970 S.C. ' 814'at pr.7 p- 8 1 5 <^ vv^ ) *...............
interpreted by the Supreme Court as not being totally excluded by 
the rule that the Court shall not reconsider the subjective satis­
faction of the detaining authority. What has happened, in effect, 
is that the Court has rejected the broad powers of review as affor­
ded by American due process techniques, but acquired virtually the 
same powers of review as those afforded by the American techniques 
by using the broad ultra vires test and English administrative law 
techniques. Moreover, it has interpreted these English law techniques 
to give them wide powers of review while retaining the theoretical 
stance of non-interference.
The concept of "mala fide".
The Supreme Court has also given a wide meaning to the
concept of a mala fide exercise of power. "Mala fide" strictly
97speaking means "imputation of bad faith". Y/hile it is true that
in English administrative law the term has been "applied to almost any
98abuse of power" it is applied in areas of "subjective satisfaction" 
in the former rather than in the latter sense. As Professor de Smith 
has observed :
"Because of the difficulty of proving bad faith, it must 
be conceded that where such a ’subjective’ discretionary power 
is vested in a Minister of the Crown, the reservation for the 
case of bad faith is hardly more than a formality ." 99
But the Supreme Court of India appears to have taken a different view
of the matter. Accusations of bad faith are more readily made and
97- See Lord Somervell in Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council 
(1956) A.C. 736 quoted Wade:Administrative Law (1968) 75i see also 
de Smith:Judicial review of administrative action (1968) 315-6.
98. See Wade (supra f.n.97) 75-6; de Smith fsupra f.n.97) 315-6; see 
generally 301 ff.
99- de Smith (ibid) 315-6.
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entertained in India. As early as 1950 in Ashutosh Lahiri v Delhi
the minority (Mukerjea and Mahajan JJ.) took the view
"there can be no better proof of 'mala fide' on the part of the 
executive authorities than a use of the extraordinary provisions 
contained in the Act for purposes for which the ordinary law is 
quite sufficient." 101
This wide view was partly accepted by the majority, who made an effort
to make "mala fide" mean both "imputation of bad faith" (a narrow
concept) as well as an "abuse of discretionary power" (a wide concept).
Kania C.J. (for the majority) observed :
"The recourse to the drastic order for detention rather 
than a preventive order under Section 144 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code lends some colour to the petitioner’s conten­
tion. Suspicion, however, is not enough and I am not convinced 
that the act of the District Magistrate was actuated by any 
improper or indirect motive." 102
But this broad view was soon abandoned in favour of the narrow
103view and m  Tarapadey.De v W. B. the Court held that the detention 
of a large number of detenus overnight did not disclose bad faith (in
10 if
the narrow sense). In Ujagir Singh v Punjab the Court held thqt 
a fresh order of detention on someone who had alreqdy been detained
105was no proof of mala fide. Finally, in Thakur Prashad Barua v Bihar
105
the Court impliedly set aside any possibilities of review on on the
100. Reported 3 years late in A.I.R. 1955 5.C. 451, but it was referred 
to earlier in A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 270 at pr.3 p. 277 in another context.
101. Ibid at pr.8 p.452-3-
102. Ibid at pr.4 p.452.
103. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 174 at pr.ll p.177.
104. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 350 at pr.8 p.352.
105. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 631 at pp.631 col.2.
106. Ashutosh Lahiri's case (supra f.n. 100) was not cited by the Court. 
One reason why the view expressed in that case did not at tact support can 
be the fact that the case was reported late with the result that the 
Court did not really get a chance to re-examine it, since the chances
of it being referred to them is considerably lessened.
basis of Ashutosh Lahiri1 s case, by ruling that even if the grounds
of detention were the same as those of a criminal prosecution, the 
allegation of mala fide was not made out.
It has generally been assumed that this narrow view of
Irw (A l<y-
ultra- vija&s has been accepted by the Court. But m  Rameshwar v 
10§
D. M . Gajendragadkar J. made the following observation :
"It is however necessary to emphasise in this connection 
that though the satisfaction of the detaining authority ... 
is subjective •.. cases may arise where the detenuo may challenge 
the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides and 
in support of the said plea urge that along with other facts 
which show mala fides, the Court may also consider his grievance 
that the grounds served on him cannot possibly or rationally 
support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining 
authority. It is only in this incidental manner and in support 
of a plea of mala fides that this question can become justiciable; 
otherwise the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction 
... cannot be questioned."
Identical remarks were made by Ramaswami J. 6 years later 
109m  P. Mukerjea v W. B. and a broad view of mala fides seems to have 
taken root, although more recently Sikri C.J. made an attempt to put 
forward a narrow view, his comments can be liihited to the facts of the 
case before him.110
107. See : Seervai (1967) 453 ff.
108. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 at pr.8 p.357-
109. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 852 at pr.*7 ^ 3?S&"Here the remarks are identical but 
no reference is made on this point to earlier case law.
110. Mohd. Sabir v J.K. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1713 at pr.2 p.1715 col.l.
"We cannot go into the merits, whether the facts stated in the affidavits 
are correct or not, but we can see that on the facts, no charge of mala 
fides can be made out." But it appears that in this case counsel tried 
only to prove that mala fid^ s)in the narrow sense existed and failed to 
do so, because it is very difficult to prove actual malice. But the 
Court appears to have accepted the broad interpretation of "mala fidej’. 




It thus appears that the Court still appears to pay formal 
homage to the subjective satisfaction test but at the same time it has 
enlarged the meaning of mala fides so that it is synonymous with the 
broad ultra vires test.^^
To conclude, we can see that although in theory the Court 
pretends to have limited powers of review ad concern itself only with 
procedural requirements, in actual fact it has been able to get past 
the "subjective satisfaction" rule by making full use of the broad 
ultra vires test and interpreting mala fides as being nothing more
that a simple excess of power. „__
We have already shown that the use of such techniques in the 
area of preventive detention is misconceived. The Court has made a 
deliberate attempt to acquire powers of review, without analysing the 
Indian context in which these powers were deemed necessary. It has 
laid down the broad rule that the power of preventive detention cannot 
be used to solve normal "law and order" problems, while ignoring the 
fact that preventive detention as a peace-time measure was designed to 
deal with just such situations. It has thus forced upon the Government 
the need to make a major policy decision without an adequate discussion, 
and has precluded the possibility of discussion by insisting that it is 
really enquiring into mala fides or an abuse of discretionary power.
The extended use of English law techniques which stems from a broad 
desire to protect the individual and retain the power of review has been 
misused in a contest which has no parallel in England.
111. For a strict and technically proper consideration of mala fides in 
this area : Aminah v Supdt. Prison, Kelantan (1968) I Mal.L.Jnl. 92.
i i *  c .  T h e  u s e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t e x t  a n d  t h e  e m p h a s i s
on Procedure.
The right to make a representation.
Article 22 (5) and (6) of the Constitution provide that a
detenu has a right to be told of the grounds of his detention so as
to enable him to make a ^representation (Article 22 (5)) unless the
detaining authority does not consider it in the public interest to
disclose certain facts.
The Court has used this provision to ensure thqt the right
to representation is not defeated. But the Court has made clear that
its powers of review do not extend to discussing whether the detention
was justified but merely to see whether the grounds given are too "vague
or irrelevant” to prevent any representation from being made at all.
112As N. C. Aiyar J. put it in Ujagir Singh v Punjab
" ... mere vagueness of grounds by itself without leading to an 
inference of mala fides or lack of good faith ... is not a justi­
ciable issue in this Court *.* n
But the Court has acquired a considerable power of review on the basis
of the grounds supplied. In the first place it is these grounds which
have enabled the Court to apply the broad ultra vires test as suggested
above. Secondly, over the years it has begun to take a fairly wide
view of that it considers "vague”.
113In the early unreported case of Ishwar Das v State the 
Court emphasised that preventive detention was a very special law and 
that the detenu should be supplied with particulars about and not just
114
grounds relating to detention. But we know very little about this
115judgement except that the judgement was very brief, and the matter
112. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 350 at pr.ll p.352.
113. Ptn. 30 of 1950 referred to in A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 30 at pr.ll p.355
col.l and in Bombay v Atma Ram A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 137*
114. Das J. in Bombay v Atma Ram A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157 at pr.4l p. 174.
115. Shastri J.- in A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157 at pr.32 p.l69. But note the
observations of Das J. at pr.4l p.174 in the same case where he suggests
that a lot of High Court case law was distinguished.
disposed of on a prima facie view^^ In Ujagir Singh v State^^the
n SCourt expressed the view that if Bombay v Atma Ram had not been
decided the court would have extremely wide powers of review on the
basis of Ishwar Pas’s case.
The leading case on the subject is Bombay v Atma Ram, where
the question was considered more fully. Kania C.J. (for the majority)
took the limited view of the term "vague", which he defined as follows:
"If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being
intelligently understood ad is Sufficiently definite to furnish 
n^erials to enable the detenu to make a representation against 
the order of detention, it cannot be called vague." 119
Specific details were not deemed necessary, though Kania C.J. admitted
that :
"if the detenu was told about details of facts besides the grounds 
he will certainly be in a better position to put forward his 
representation." 120
In order to facilitate the administration's desire to be given time to
convey material facts, the Court reversed the decision of Chagla C.J. 
121in the Court below and took the view that supplementary facts can be
given to the detenu after the irirtial grounds have been given, if they
do not amount to fresh grounds but merely lead to the same
"inference of fact ••• (as) the ground furnished in the first 
instance." 122
116. See A.I.R. 1951 S»C* 157 at pr.32 p.169.
117. A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 350 at pr.ll p.352.
H 8. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157
119. Ibid at p.164 col.l.
120. Ibid at p.164 col.2.
121. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 266 quoted in A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157 at pp.159-60.
The minority went one step further, Shastri and Das JJ. in 
two separate judgements felt that the majority was inconsistent with
1 2 3the Court’s view that the satisfaction of the Government was subjective,
and that it was not up to the Courts to insist upon the production of
proper grounds as the Government could always refrain from disclosing
124 m
them in the public interest. The Court voted similarly in the
125companion case of Tarpada De v W: B. but Shastri and Das JJ. abandoned
126their position of dissent in Ujagir Singh v Punjab where they con­
curred in the order proposed by the majority.
After this the controversy shifted onto the contents of the
127details to be supplied to the detenu. In Ham Singh v Delhi Shastri
C.J. for the majority felt that giving the detenu grounds did not
necessitate giving details of time and place, or even the gist of the
123
offending passages of a speech. ^e distinguished cases on pre-censorship 
129of speech as relevant only to Article 19 and not to preventive de ten- 
130tion. ^he minority (consisting of Mahajan and Bose JJ.) gave two 
separate judgements. Mahajan J. felt that details ought to be given in
123. Shastri J. at p.l66 (citing R v Halliday (1917) A.C. 260 at 269; 
Machindar Shivaji v K. (1949) F.C.R. 827 at 031,832) and at pr.27 p.l68 
(citing Liversidge v Anderson (1942) A.C. 206); Das J. at .Bfe , ^*111 
(citing ^ achindar Sivaji v K. (1949))* An attitude similar though slightly 
more liberal than that of th^inority has been followed in Karam Singh
v Mentre Hal. Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia (1969) 2 Mal.L.Jnl. 129
124. Das J. at pp.172-3; Shastri J. at pr.26 pp.167-8. See generally 
pp.167-8. *
123. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 174.
126. A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 350 at 354.
3.27. A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 270.
128. Ibid at pr.9 p.273*
129. Romesh Thappar v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124; Brij Bhushan v Delhi 
A.I.E. 1950 S.C. 129.
130. Ibid at p.272 citing Gopalan v Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
S VJ s
the same way as details are given for offences under S.124 A (sedition)
131
and S.153 A under the Indian Penal Code i860, and Bose J. felt that
details were necessary to ensure that the authority had not made a bona 
132fide mistake. He thought that though fundamental rights were not
absolute the Court ought to remember that
"in every case, it is the rights which are fundamental not the
limitations and (that) it is the duty of this Court and of all
Courts in the land to guard and defend these rights jealously." 133
What makes this case more important is the fact that as time
went by, the Court gradually abandoned the majority position and began
to emphasise the importance of supplying details. The majority view
was however followed by two judgements by Jaganadhadas J. where he
excused the lack of particulars by not "furnishing every meticulous detail*^
135on the grounds that in Thakur Prashad v Bihar the Government was
dealing with a tense communal situation, and in Lawrence D1Souza v
136 137Bombay the appellant was suspected of espionage even though in
the latter case he admitted that the grounds w4re not as "specific as
might be desired.
But there is a line of authority which suggests that the Court
can look to see if detailed information was in fact given. In Bjagir v 
139Punjab the Court held that allegations of motivating a strike and
131. Ibid at pr.l8 p.275 £ol.2.
132. Ibid at pr.31 p.277*
133« Ibid at pr.22 p.276. Note that Seervai (1967) 457 supports the
minority view.
134. Thakur Prashad v Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 631 at pr.4 p.632.
135. Ibid at 632.
136. A.I.P. 1956 B.C. 531
137* Ibid at pr.4 p.535 (but note that the detenu had not asked for details).
138. Ibid at pr. 4 p.535 col.l.
139. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 350.
being found with Communist literature were vague, although the Court
appears to have been greatly influenced by the fact that there was
11(0
considerable delay in providing the detenu with the grounds. In 
Ram Krishnan v Delhi~*~ ^ “Shastri (now) C.J., the author of the majority 
judgement in Ram Singh’s case, held that details about private meetings 
and the fact that volunteers were being recruited for the petitioner’s
political party, without showing how the petitioner was personally
142 143
implicated, amounted to vague grounds, and that since one of the
grounds was vague the others could not support the detention because
the subjective satisfaction of the executive may have depended on this
144vague ground rather than on the other valid ones. The Court seems to
have adopted, at least to some extent, the views of Bose J. in Ram
Singh’s case, when it observed :
"Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal 
liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has 
provided against the improper exercise of the power must be 
jealously guarded ... by this Court." 143
After this the Court decided a number of cases where it examined for
itself whether sufficient details existed, but did not interfere because
146the details given were sufficient.
1*K). Ibid at pr.13-4 pp.353 col.2.
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 318.
142. Ibid at p.319 col.l.
143. Ibid at 320.
144. Ibid at p.320 col.l.
145* Ibid at pr.5 p»320 col.2.
146. S.V.Parulekar v D.M.,Thana A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 23 at 25 col.l (details 
of dates and incidents were given); ^aresh Chandra v W.B. A.I.R. i960 S.C 
1337 at 1337-8 (details of time and place where speeches made were given 
But the Court said (at pr.13 p. 1341) that the Government could not be ex­
pected to give details of time and place about suspected future events); 
^agannath v Union A.I.R. i960 S.C. 625 at pr.626-7 read with pr.6 p.626. 
See also K.N.Joglekar v Commr. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 28 at 33-4.
By 1968 the emphasis had changed and in Rameshwar Lai v
147Bihar Hidayatullah J. (for a unanimous Court) held that the fol­
lowing grounds alleging smuggling, without providing details of time
and place, were irrelevant:
” ... (1) ... his trucks always take to wicked routes (sic) to 
... (Place X) and he himself pilots them. (2) ... A businessman 
disclosed that he (the petitioner) ... visited Barihiya on 
several occasions and purchased gram and gram dal under various 
names and smuggled them into West Bengal.” 148
149Again in Motilal v Bihar (a case of alleged black marketing) Hegde J. 
talked of
”(t)he futility of making (a) representation against an unknown 
man in respect of an unspecified price.” 150.
Be added :
"Individual liberty is a cherished right; one of the most 
valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution ...
We are not unaware of the fact that the interest of the
society is no less important than that of the individual. Our
Constitution (contains) ... provisions (which) harmonise the 
liberty of the individual with social interests. The authorities 
have to act solely on the basis of these provisions. They cannot 
deal with the liberty of the individual in a casual manner ... 
such an approach does not advance the social interest. Continued 
indifference to individual liberty is bound to erode the structure 
of our democratic society.” 151
152In Chaju Ram v J. K. (1971) the petitioner was charged with 
conspiring with the leaders of the democratic conference to incite
landless people to violence. Hidayatullah J. observed :
"No details of the leaders of the Conference or of the 
persons incited or the dates on which he conspired or incited 
the squatters or the time and place when such conferences took 
p&ace are mentioned. It would be impossible for anyone to make Co 
a -jTepresentation on these grounds.” 153-
147. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1303.
148. Ibid at pr.8 p.1307 col.2.
149. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 309.
150. Ibid at pr.6 p.508.
151. Ibid at pr.12 p.1513.
152. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 263.
'153- Ibid, at pr,lQ p.266.. , .
154In the recent case K. I. Singh v Manipur the Supreme
Court held that a delay of 17 days in supplying grounds wqs excessive.
155In 1962 in Hari Kishan v Maharashtra the Court also ruled
that supplying a petitioner who does know English with grounds which
are not in that language is not complying with the constitutional
requirements, even though it was admitted that English was a national
language. This case has been generally followed. But the Court
has not allowed this to become a technical loophole and in Abdul 
158Rehman v J. K. the Court stressed that the detenu cannot demand
the grounds in the vernacular, if he understands English. Again, the ,!
159judgement in Bidya Deb v D. M. seems to suggest that tfre onus of 
making a request is on the detenu.
We can see thqt the Court has used the Constitutional pro­
visions to acquire a considerable say about the nature of the grounds 
supplied to the detenu, but in the main the real power of review comes 
from the biroad ultra vires test rather than insistence on the 
Constitutional requirements.
The emphasis on procedure.
The Court has also played an important tole in ensuring that 
the procedural requirements have been maintained. In the early years t 
the Court allowed some latitude to the Government. It did not invalidate
154. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. k39 at pr.19 p.443-
155. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 911.
156. Ibid at pr.8 p.914.
157. H&flibandhu Das v D.M. A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 43 at 46-7; Chaju ^am v J.K. 
A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 263 at pr.9 p.'263-6.
153. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 266 at 267.
159. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 323 at pr.21 pp.328-9.
a statutory section or an order because it did not lay down the
maximum period of detention.Nor did the Court create any problems
about detention orders which might have lapsed between the expiry of
l6lone Act and the promulgation of another. Again, in Bhim Singh v 
162Punjab the Court refused to invalidate an order because the 
District Magistrate had not formally stated that he wqts satisfied 
that he thought the order justified, or refer to the section of the
statute. More recently the Court has taken a similar stand and not
Ig-z
allowed thh detenu to be let off on a mere technicality. In SfryamI 
v C o m m r . t h e  Court did not interfere where the Government had not
I65dealt with the representation and hoped that it would, even though 
the representation had been mislaid by the Government and was not 
traceable.
167Nor did the Court interfere in Latif Hussain v J. K. where
the State Government confirmed the order of detention before the detenu
l68was arrested. In Abdul Ghani v J. K. the Court did not invalidate
an order on the ground that the District Magistrate who passed the order
169did not state that the order be served on the detenu. Nor has the
160. See S.Krishnan v Madras A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 301; Dattraya v Bombay 
A.I.R. 1932 S.C. l8l; Shamrao v P.M. A-.I.R. 1932 S.C. 32*f.
161. Godavri v Bombay A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 32; Contrast Venkateshwarlu v 
Smpdt. Central Jail A.I.R. 1933 S.C. k9»
162. A.I.R. 1931 S.C. l&l at 483-^.
163. See sarkat Ali v J.K. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 217 (but the defect was 
remedied by a statutory provision).
I6^ f. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 269.
165. Ibid at pp.271-2.
166. Ibid at pr.2 p.271. Note the comments of Ray J. on this in Jaynarayan 
v W.B. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 673 at pr.14 p.677.
167. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 122.
168. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1217. ...........................................
169. Ibid at pr.4 p.1220.
Court questioned the reasons for which the detaining authority has
170witheld disclosure of grounds in the public interest, except where
the orders in this regard have not been passed within the specified 
171time limit, or a reasonable limit.
But the Court has interfered in matters which it has con-
173sidered substantial. Thus in Makhan Singh v Punjab the Court ruled
that the detaining authority could not specify a maximum period of
174detention. Again in Bombay v Purshottam the Court criticised the
Government for the "slipshod verifications" in their affidavit which
should have been modelled on Or.19 r. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code
1908. The Court has also not allowed the detenu to be punished for 
173offences in jail.
But three rights that the Court has secured must be pointed
out. Firstly it ruled by a 4 : 1 decision in P. L. Lakhanpal v Union ,
177in violence to the text of the Constitution, that the Advisory Board 
must consider not just whether the detention before it should be
continued beyond three months, but whether it is justified in the first
170• Saifuddin Sood v J.K. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1529; Abdul Ghani v J.K. A.I.R. 
I97I S.C. 1217; see also Bombay v Purshottam A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 317 at pr.19 
p.319.
171. e.g. Fazal Hussain v J.K. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1870
172. See the judgement of the Court on the meaning of the words "as soon 
as may be" in Abdul Jabar v State A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 28l. See also K.N. 
Joglekar v Commr. Police A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 28 and~~note the citing of 
irrelevant English case law on the meaning of the word "forthwith".
173* A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 27.
174. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 317.
175- See Jag.jit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 325 from 330, 331-2.
176• A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 163.
177. Note the dissent of ~Sarkar J. which is supported by Seervai (1^67) USX > 
'JOfjr~ ic? c - l t " p / V c ’t  Jo. ^  4 ~ o  y\ , r2j
place. In this it has superimposed on the Constitutional requirements
V
a substantive quasi-judicial enquiry into the merits of the detention.
178Secondly, in a series of cases it has ruled that the detenu has two 
rights of representation, one to the Advisory Board and another to the 
Government, and the latter cannot abandon the representation after 
receiving the report of the former and thus imposed on the Government 
the need to reconsider the decision. Thirdly, the Court has upset
though not overruled a long line of authority of both the Federal
179 l80Court and the Supreme Court by holding tfyat the Government
cannot make a fresh order of detention to substitute unless a fresh
iSlground of detention exists. In this way the Court has kept the 
Government on its toes by impliedly laying down that the authorities 
must not make a mistake the first time because they may not be given 
an opportunity to correct their error.
ii. d. Implications of the Court’s choice of techniques.
The Court’s use of techniques reflects on its ability to use 
and even distort English and American techniques to suit its own pur­
poses. It rejected the American concepts for to accept them would be 
openly to defy the wishes of the Constituent Assembly. At the same 
time it readily complied with thfe English pattern of not interfering
3.78. Abdul Karim v W.B. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1028; Pankaj v W.B. A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 97? Jaynarayan v W.B. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 673 at 6771 Re "Durga Show 
71969) 2 S.C.W.R. 439-
179. Basanta v K. A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 18.
180. Note the early cases.Naranjan Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 106
at pr.9-10 = 107-8; Ram Singh v Delhi A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 270 at pr.ll p.270. 
The cases of Rameshwar v D.M. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 at'T?r.5 and Makhan Singh
v Punjab A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1120 at 1123 were interpreted in Godavari v 
Maharashtra A.I.R. 19'64~S.C. 1228 to mean that an order of detention can­
not be passed where the petitioner is imprisoned for having committed an 
offence or under trial for one. f
181. Hadidbandhu v D.M. A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 43 at pr.7 p-47* Mohd. Shafi v 
J.K. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 688 at pr.3 p»691 col.l; Kshetra Gogoi v Assam 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1664 at pp.1666-7.
with the discretion of the Court when dealing with the issue of 
preventive detention. But having made all these concessions it has 
gradually amassed a tremendous power of review, the effect of which 
may well be that the Government cannot in future be able to detain 
preventively a person unless they can show to the Court that his 
detention is clearly associated with what the Court considers can be 
described as a threat to "public order". In achieving this result 
very little or no case law is quoted at all. The Court has merely relied 
on the techniques of English administrative law, which it is most fami­
liar with. In effect it managed to secure a vital say in matters of 
preventive detention while retaining the fagade of judicial restraint.
But they have done this at the expense of distorting the English 
administrative law doctrines that they have used, fthus while the Court 
appears to pay lip service to the subjective satisfaction rule, it has 
taken the unusual step of simultaneously introducing the broad ultra 
vires test which as we have seen was not intended to be used in areas 
to which the subjective satisfaction rule applies. At the bottom of 
this lies the need of the Court to assert that neither the length of the 
Constitution, nor the fact that their jurisdiction has been specifically
ousted from this area, will(^ »si) prevent them from acquiring the power to 
\
question unreasonable decisions of the Government. The Court does not,
like its American counterpart, wish to question openly the decisions
of the Government for this would involve them in a major controversy
which, given its still undetermined position in Indian society, might
well undermine the prestige of the Court itself. But the Court has
not by any means given up the quest to be an independent institution,
which has the right to comment freely on governmental p oli c y A t  present
it has chosen to do this on the basis of ostensibly innocuous English
L<r>v1*"
law method's," until such time as it can,£out in the open, make the same 
decisions on an independent.basis. ...................................
There is a disadvantage in all this. The limited adminis­
trative law techniques preclude any real and substantive discussion 
of the issues involved. The Court cannot for example go into problems 
of administrative need, consider the problems of law and order or 
question the need to break official secrecy; all of which they would 
be forced to consider if they adopted a broader policy of review.
But it will be seen that this policy has developed gradually,
covering many judges and many years. We therefore turn to the voting
and judgement writing patterns (in these cases) which are tabulated in
Tables appended at the end of this Chapter. Judges who took a different
approach gradually abandoned it later. Thus Fazl Ali J. who wanted
a broad American-type policy of review in Case 1 abandoned it later
(Cases 2 and 3)• Again Das and Shastri JTJ. who had objected to the 
*
Court’s acquiring a broad policy of review on the basis of Article 22 (3) 
of the Constitution, abandoned their dissent in later cases and Shastri J. 
actually wrote a judgement which in effect emphasised the need for more 
detail. Again Sinha C.J. who had concurred in an obiter demanding 
that Gopalan's case be overruled, wrote a majority judgement which 
affirmed it.
More recently a more consistent attitude has been followed.
The use of the broad ultra vires test has been generally approved 
unanimously by the Court, though it owes its extended use to the 
judgements of Grover J., Ramaswami, Hegde and Hidayatulla JJ., the 
last of whom was able to sharpen more clearly the meaning of the term 
’’public order". T^© judges seem to have operated on the premise that 
where the liberty of the individual,is not be be trifled with, and they 
have taken it upon themselves to use their limited powers of review to 
reassess how the wide discretionary powers of the administration ought 
to be used. This can also be seen in their attitude to the exercise of 
powers of detention during the national, emergency, to.which .we now turn.. .
6. The Supreme Court and Detention during the National Emergency (1962-8).
The Constitution empowers the President to declare an
emergency.^ As a result of the Chinese invasion the President declared
2
such an emergency on the 26th October, 1962. Such a declaration
3
automatically suspends the limitations on State action in Article 19•
But the President also has the power to suspend the operation of such
fundamental rights as he may specify. The President suspended the
5 6operation of Articles 14, 21 and 22, and promulgated an Ordinance
n
giving the Government powers of detention.
1. Article 352: '’Proclamation of emergency (1) If the President is 
satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India 
or a part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or by 
external aggression, or internal disturbance, he may by proclamation, 
make a declaration to that effect.” Contrary to the opinion of K. Subba 
Rao: Our Constitutional Problems (1970) 299-300 that the President has 
to act independent of the Cabinet, and that he must be satisfied that 
an emergency exists (see his judgements in Ghulam Sarwar v J.K. A.I.R. 
1967 S.C. 1335)i this power is virtually uncontrolled, apart from the 
Parliamentary control in Art. 352(2). In fact Professor P.K.Tripathi: 
Martial law in India A.I.R. 19^3 Jnl. 67, has compared^with a state of 
martial law (he fails to gauge the importance of the fact that the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has not been totally ousted). See also 
V.D.Sebastian: Emergency and Indemnity (1968) II S.C.J. 93; J.Minattur: 
Martial law in India, Pakistan and CeyVon'vIague 19^3) and a review of 
it at A.I.R. 1963 10-11. I am also inafebted to Mr. Chowdhry who is
about to submit a Ph.D thesis to the London University on Martial law 
in Pakistan (1972) and Mr. J.Srivas$tay4; who is also about to submit
a Ph.D. dissertation to the London University on Emergency powers under 
the Indian Constitution (1972), for clarifying my ideas on the subject.
2. G.S.R. 1415 Gazette of India Oct.26 1962 Pt.ll S.3(1) Ext.p.544.
3- Article 358. On the scope of this Article see V.K.Thiruvenkaktachari: 
Scope of Article 358 (1966) I S.C.J. 1.
4. Article 359•
5* G.S.R. 1510 dated 11th November 1962.
6. G.S.R. 1464 dated 3rd November 1962. , .
7. Defence of India Ordinance 1962.
These powers have been extensively used though not without
g
criticism. Between 1962 (October 26) and 1964 (March 6) 1,323 persons
Q
were arrested out of which only 282 remained in custody. Again, at 
the end of 1964 thes& powers were used to arrest an estimated 700 
Communists in an attempt to quell a Communist uprising.^ Further, 
these powers have also been used to solve law and order problems.^
The Court has once again managed to convey the impression 
that they do not wish to establish a system of judicial review but have 
managed to impose a fairly impressive control on the exercise of the 
power of detention. We will discuss the Court’s techniques under the 
following heads :
i. Refusal to interfere on broad substantive grounds of review.
ii. Use of English administrative law techniques.
i. Refusal to interfere on broad substantive grounds of review.
12In Mohan Chowdhry v Chief Commr., one of the first cases that 
came before the Court, it made it clear that it would not ir®*ke it upon 
itself to question the validity of the Presidential order. B. P. Sinha 
C.J. observed :
8. See generally Setalvad: Grave emergency and emergency arising out 
of the failure of the Constitutional machinery of a State (Sir A.K.Ayyar 
lectures I965). See also the editorial on this Hindustan Times Aug.20 1983; 
Setalvad: My Life (1971) 333-4; N.C.Chatterjee? Emergency Legislation
and Fundamental Rights A.I.R. 1963 Jnl. 1; N.C.Chatterjee: Emergency 
Legislation and Fundamental Rights A.I.R. 1963 Jul. 30; N.C.Chatterjee 
and P.Rao: Emergency and Law (1966 Calcutta) and the review A.I.R. 1967
80; V.Maya Krishnan: Emergency and Personal Liberty (1966) 5 J.I.L.I. 
429. For an extremely well documented account of public opinion at the 
time see G.O.Koppel: The Emergency the Court and Indian Democracy (1966)
8 J.I.L.I. 287 (hereafter cited as Koppel (1966)).
9. See the Debate in the Lok Sabha (1964) 26 L.S.D. 4296 ff. See also 
Koppel (1966) 292.
10. See the Debate in the Lok Sabha (1965) 38 L.S.D. 489 ff. and also 
Koppel (1966) 293-
11. e.g. the Madras riots .(1,965). 3.9 L.S.D.. 3462 ff. and also .Koppel . . . 
(1966) 293.
12. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 173.
"-*-t was contended that the President ... is subject to the 
condition precedent that ... (it) is valid ... (and) it is open 
to the petitioner to canvass its validity ... This is arguing 
in a circle. In order that a Court may investigate the validity 
of a particular ordinance ... the person moving the Court should 
have locus standi ... (Under) the President’s order the petitioner 
has lost his locus standi." 13
3ut Subba Rao J. who was party to the judgement in this case was not
14-content and writing the majority judgement in Ghulam Sarwar v J. K. 
ruled that the Court could examine whether a grave emergency justifying 
the necessity of promulgating the order also existed. He observed :
"The expression 'grave emergency1 in Article 352 (1) and 
the expression 'imminent danger' in Article 352 (3) show that 
the existence of a ’grave emergency’ or ’imminent danger’ is a 
precondition for the declaration of emergency ... "15
But he added :
"As the material facts are not before us, we shall not in 
this case express an opinion one way or another on this all too 
important question, which is at present agitating the public 
mind ... But there is the correlative danger of the abuse of 
such extraordinary power leading to t(o)talitarianism. Indeed 
the perversions of the ideal democratic constitution i.e.
Weimar Constitution of Germany, brought about the autocratic 
rule of Hitler and the consequent disastrous World War." 16
The Court was also of the opinion that there was a difference 
between Constitutional provisions suspending fundamental rights and 
those giving a power to suspend fundamental rights. In the latter 
case, the Court could review the exercise of power and examine it
17under the provisions of the very rights which it purports to suspend.
His lordship then examined the order and ruled that the order with
respect to foreigners was not invalid as violating the equality pro-
18
visions of Article 14, but it mjgit be so if the order was "confined
19
to an area or a period". His Lordship justified this wide power of 
review on the basis of the need to protect fundamental liberty.
13- Ibid at pr.8 p.177*
3.4. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335. 
15- Ibid pr.ll p.1338.
16. Ibid at 1338 j- ■
■17.' Ibid' pr.13 p.1339. '
18. Ibid at ; \ p.1339-
19. Ibid pr.14 p.1339*
’’Our Constitution seeks to usher in a welfare State where 
there is prosperity, equality, liberty and social justice. It 
accepts three concepts (1) Federalism, (2) Democracy, (3) Rule 
of law in which fundamental rights and social justice are 
inextricably integrated ... Part XVIII (on the emergency) appears 
to bring down the grand edifice of our Constitution at one stroke, 
but a little reflexion discloses that the temporary 
of the scheme of our Constitution is really intended to preserve 
its substance ... ” 20
Bachawat J., who wrote a separate judgenmt, agreed that the
• , 21impugned order did not violate Article 14, but added in obiter that
to treat the Presidential proclamation just like any other law to be
tested by the very fundamental rights which it suspends, was a ’’reductio
22ad aBsurdum” ... an ’’impossible conclusion”.
23But this case was soon overruled in Mohd. Yaqub v J. K. 
when it was considered by a differently constituted Bench (including 
Bachawat J. and HidayatullahJ. of the ealier Bench). In this case 
Wanchoo J. observed :
’’There is*^ no scope ... for enquiring into the question olkdtWf 
the fundamental rights the enforcements of which the President 
has suspended under Article 359* has anything to do with the 
security of India which is ijljireatened by war or external aggression 
or internal disturbance ... (If) ... an order passed under 
Article 359 (1) suspending the enforcement of fundamental right 
has still to be tested unfer the very rights which it suspends 
... (this) would, in our opinion, be arguing in a circle and 
make Article 359 completely nugatory.” 25-.......................
Hidayatullaft J., who as we have seen once before had been
2.(0
misled into subscribing to a judgement by Subba Rao J.
ajD,Ibid at pr.ll p.1333.
21. Ibid at pr. 29 p.1342.
22. Ibid at p.1342.
23. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 765.
24. Ibid at pr.6 p.768. See also pr.10 p.769-70.
25. Ibid at pr.9 p.769*
26. See Gujerat v Shantilal A.I.R. 19&9 B.C. 634 at pr.l.
wrote a separate judgement in which he partly supported th& earlier
judgement where
"(r)oom was, however, to be left for the play of Art. l*f for those 
theoretically possible (and fortunately only theoretically possible) 
cases in which the exercise of the power itself may be a claak for 
discrimination, in other words £ases of mala fide action and clear 
abuse of the power for some collateral purpose.” 27
Explaining his assent to the earlier judgement his lordship said :
”This strict reservation only was intended to go into the judgement 
in Ghulams Sarwar1s case ... but if a wider meaning can be spelled 
out from that judgement I dissent from it and say that I never in­
tended to be a party to such a wide statement. The examination under 
Article it*f of the suspension of the article itself, as expressed 
• in the judgement of Subba Eao C.J., gives a very different impression. 
For the same reason I cannot subscribe to the width of language in 
the judgement just delivered which apparently does not make any 
reservation at all." 23
In Kakhan Singh v Punjab^ the Court also rejected the argument
that though the Emergency Order had suspended the right to move the Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution, the High Courts could still issue
the writ of Habeas Corpus under the provisions of Section *f$)l of the
Criminal Procedure Code 1893. It realised that the powers of detention
30were very wide, but it felt that the executive ought to be trusted and
that the answer was "ultimately to be found in the existence of enligh-
31tened, vigilant and vocal opinion." . ........................
Once again we can see that the Court, apart from the brief 
interlude when Subba Eao J.’s judgements were accepted, refused to 
accept broad Constitutional powers and resorted to limited powers of review 
under the rules of English administrative law, emphasising procedure.
27. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 763 at p.771.
.
C
OOJ Ibid at pr.21 p.771.




30. Ibid at pr.^6 p. 0^ 3.
31. Ibid at pr.if6 P. ^03 -^ .
ii. The use of English Administrative Law techniques.
y\ cy
(b)■ (Judicial .1 - _ . the review procedure.
'A "
The most important contribution that the Supreme Court has
made is to^judicial the procedure for reviewing the detention of
32
the petitioner. This first came up in Biren Datta v Chief Cpmmr.
where the Court speaking through Gajendragadkar J. held that when a
decision to confirm a detention is made it is
"desirable ... and just that such detention decision should
be communicated ... (further) the appropriate authority should 
record its decision clearly and unambiguously. After all the 
liberty of the citizen is in question and ... the detention of 
the detenu is intended to be continued as a result of the decision.n34
35This attitude was confirmed in a later decision.
36But at about the same time the decision of Ridge v Baldwin
was decided in England, which overruled earlier case law on the subject,
37and ruled that the rules of natural justice should apply increasingly
to all decisions where the liberty of the subject is affected. In
38Sadhu Singh v Delhi Administaation counsel therefore argued that the
rules of natural justice should also apply to the decision to review
39detention. Shah J. relied on two earlier English cases, the rationale
32. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 596.
5^ . Ibid at pr.18 p.600.
34. Ibid at pr.14. See also pr.12 p.598 that the decision must be in 
writing.
35• Balmukund v P.M. A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 877 at pr.14 p.88l. See also the 
reference to Biren Datta1s case in Jaichand v V/.B. A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 483.
36. (1964) A.C. 40. See case comments V/ade: Administrative Law (1971)201-9.
37- These are that a person must be given an opportunity to be heard; 
and the adjudicating authority must not be biased. See de Smith; Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action (1967) £$**4"
38. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 91
39- Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne (1951) A.C. 66; Exparte Haynes (1928) 1 K.B. 
171. He also relied on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in 
Bombay v Khushaldas A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222 at 226, 239, 250.
of which had been criticised in Ridge v Baldwin, ruled that natural
justice should not apply and made the following observation :
"I am not concerned with the validity of the criticism of 
Lord Reid of the two decisions. It is sufficient to state for 
the purpose of this case that there is no principle or binding 
authority in support of the view that, wherever a public autho­
rity is invested with power to make an order which prejudicially 
affects the rights of an individual, whatever may be the nature 
of the power exercised, whatever may be the procedure prescribed 
and whatever may be the nature of the authority conferred, the 
proceedings of the public authority must be regulated by the analogy 
of rules governing judicial determination." 0^
But meanwhile the rules of natural justice were being applied on the
basis of the Ridge v Baldwin decision in other areas,^and in
42
P. L. Lakhanpal v Union, leaving open the question whether Sadhu 
Singh’s case should be overruled Shelat J. observed :
it does not appear to have been argued that assuming the 
power to continue the detention was ministerial, the condition 
precedent to the exercise of that power was not the subjective 
satisfaction, but a decision from the facts and circumstances 
and that the validity of the exercise of that power is depen­
dent on the existence of circumstances relevant to the purpose 
set out in (the rules)." A3
44In a later case involving the same petitioner, the Court 
overruled the earlier Sadhu Singh decision ancjheld that the rules of 
natural justice do apply to the decision to review a detention. In 
arriving at this decision Shelat J. emphasised that the decision in 
this case became quasi judicial because it was arrived at on the 
evidence and the facts and that the Court could deduce the right to
be heard by analogy from the provisions of Article 22 on Preventive
45
Detention. But the Court appears to have paid no attention to Shah J.’s
ADj A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 91 at pr.l6 p.96.
Al. See Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v P.H.Sharma A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 1595 
Shri Bhagwan v Ram Chand A.I.19&5 S.C. 1^67•
A2. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 908
A3. A.I.R. 3 967 S.C. 908 at pr. 9 p.<?/3-*+
AA. P.L.Lakhanpal v Union A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1509.
warning that the decision in detention was a special case and relied
on case law, which concerned decisions of a totally different nature.
But the rule was applied and has been approved in later decisions of 
47
the Court.
The decision to apply natural justice to detention law has 
been made as a resultjof changes in administrative law in England, 
giving the Court the power to examine the whole record. At the same 
time there was very little discussion on whether the decision was 
appropriate in this area. A rule of English law has been slipped in 
into what is a totally different situation in an attempt to make more 
judicial the administrative procedure of preventive detention and 
increase the Court’s power of review.
(b) Subjective satisfaction and the emphasis on procedure.
The Court had accepted that the decision to detain in the
first instance depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Government.
43
In Makhan Singh v Punjab the Court ruled that the only grounds on
46. Board of Education v Rice (1911) A.C. 179 at 182 (concerning an 
education authority); Local Government 3oard v Arlidge (1915) A.C. 120 
at 132 (a housing matter); Bombay v Khushaldas Advani A.I.R. 1950 S.C.
222 at 2$0 (land requisition matter); Elagendra Math v Commrs. A.I.R.
1958 S.C. 398 (excise matter); Radhey Shyam v M.P. A.I.R. 1959 B.C. 107 
Tcommittee - a divided decision); Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v A.P.P.5.T. 
A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308 (a divided decision on road transport); Shivji "v" 
Union A.I.R. i960 S.C. 600; Board of High School etc. v Ghanshyam A.IRR. 
19o2 S.C. 1110(determining whether the respondent had used unfair 
means at an examination).
47. See Avtar Singh v J.K. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1797 .(the Court would not 
allow the authorities to pass a fresh order of detention merely to 
evade the implications of the Supreme Court ruling); Jagdev Singh v J.K. 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 327 (where Avtar Singh’s case was partly overruled and 
the Government given another opportunity to bring their review proce­
dure in line with the Supreme Court ruling. This is obviously an instance 
of prospective overruling).
48. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 381.
which the order to detain can be impugned were that there was excessive
k9 50delegation in the making of the rules or that the order was mala fide.
51The Court therefore in Gopalan v Madras stated that it would not
assume that there was no satisfaction merely because 1AO orders of
52detention were passed in one day. Again in Durgadass v Union the Court 
refused to go into the question either that the Communist detenus were
53discriminated against or that this was a case of guilt by association.
5LfIn Jaichand Lai v W. 3. Ramaswami J., relying on Federal
55Court and English cases, held that there was nothihg to prevent the
executive from passing an order which merely recited the terms of the 
56statute. But at the same time the learned judge also tried to intro-
57duce the broad ultra vires test. In Durgadass v Union Ramaswami J. 
said :
n(l)t will be open to the citizen to challenge the order of 
detention on the ground that any of the grounds given in the
order of detention is irrelevant and there is no real and proximate
eonnsction between the ground given and the object which the legis­
lature has in view ...”
This challenge came on the basis of the "mala fide" which he defined in
58Jaichand Lai v V/. B. as follows : 
k9. Ibid at pr.36 p. **00.
50$ Ibid at pr.38 p.JjOO. See also Anand v Chief Secy. A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
657 at pr.6-7 pp.660 (the Court did not also accept the plea of 
Parliamentary privilege).
51. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 8l6.
52. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1078.
53. Ibid at pr.6 p.1080. See also Anand v Chief Secy. A.I.R. 1966 S.C.
657 at pr.26 p.666.
5h. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 8^3.
55* Relying on Liversidge v Anderson (19^2) A.C. 206; K.E. v Shibnath
Banerjee A.I.R. 19k5 F.C. 156 at 161.
56. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 483 at pr.8 p.**86.
"It may be stated in this context that mala fide exercise of 
power does not imply moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only 
means that the statutory power is exercised for purposes foreign 
to those for wnich it is in lav; intended ... In other words the 
power donffctored by the statute has been utilised for some indirect 
purpose, the object of which is not connected with the object of 
the statute or the mischief that it intends to remedy."
But this broad ultra vires test was mentioned only by Ramaswami
59J., and did not become an important part of the techniques used by the 
L1ourt in this area.
In the main the Court emphasised the importance of procedure.
At first it gave the Government considerable leeway. In Godavari v 
Maharashtra^the Court distinguished two decisions on the Preventive 
Detention Act, and ruled that the Government could pass a fresh order
of detention to detain a person who wqs already preventively detained.
6lThis had been followed especially where the Government to pass a 
fresh order of detention because a decision of the Court had necessitated 
the following of a totally new procedure.
But at the same time the Court has insisted that the Government
is dealing with the liberty of the subject and it must not be slipshod
in sticking to the procedural requirements. Thus in Ajaib Singh v
63Gurcharan Singh it set aside an order which had been passed not by a 
District Magistrate as required by the statute but by an officiating
39• See supra p.;, r •
60. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1128 distinghiding the cases of Rameshwar v P.M. 
A.I.R.' 1964 S.C. 3 3 and Makham Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 196^ - S.C. 1120 on 
the grounds that in those cases the detenu was under arrest as an under 
trial prisoner and not under preventive detention.
61. See Gopi Ram v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1967 S.C. *+1 (where the order of 
detention was issued 7 days after his arrest for an offence under the 
Indian Penal Code i860. The Court had some doubts about the authorities 
(see pr.9 p.243)»
62. Jagdev Singh v J.K. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 327 partly overruling the deci­
sion of Bhargave J. in Avtar Singh v J.K. A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. I7&7• Here the 
technical defect arose out of the Court decision in P.L.Lakhanpal v Union 
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1509 where the Court emphasised, the .need, t.o .follow, the. . 
rules of natural justice while reviewing a detention.
63. A*I.R„ 1965 S.C. 1619.
64Additional District Magistrate. Again, in R. M. Lohia v Union the
Court invalidated an order which instead of using the words "public
order" in the statute used the words "law and order". But here the
long discussion on the difference of meaning between the two terms
suggests an application of the broad ultra vires test. There is however
the notable dissent of Dayal J. which suggests that the flaw was only
of a technical nature and that the Court had itsilf made similar mis-
»
65 'takes in the past. The reason for this insistence on procedural
66matters was made clear in Jaganath v Orissa where the Minister had
made an inadequate affidavit. Wanchoo J., speaking foijjthe Court, said:
"Such discrepancy between the grounds mentioned in the 
affidavit and the grounds stated in the affidavit of the 
authority concerned can only show an amount of casualness in 
the passing of the order of detention ... This casualness 
also shows that the mind of the authority concerned was not 
really applied to the detention of the petitioner in the 
present case." 67
This theme of casualness was returned to by Gajendragadkar J.
68in Sadanandan v Kerala where the detenu was locked up merely because
the detaining authority thought he had kerosene oil without a licence
(about which proceedings were under way). The Government affidavit in
fact almost stated that the detention was to prevent the detenu from 
69procuring a licence His lordship criticised the casualness of the
64. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 740. ^his distinction later became very important 
to the application of the ultra vires test in matters of preventive 
detention.
65. Dayal J. quoting from Shiflfbban Lai Saxana v U.P. A.I.R. 1934 S.C.H^
66. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1143.
67. Ibid at pr.6 p.1142.
63. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1925.
69. Ibid at pr.l8 p.1929-
<: 1 } r<LJ U U
authorities and observed :
M ... we have yet to come across an affidavit which shows such 
an amount of casualness as (in) the present case.” 70
He later then spelled out what the attitude of the Courts was '•
"(E)ven during an emergency the freedom ofc Indian citizens 
cannot be taken away without the existence of justifying necessity 
specified by the rules themselves. The tendency to treat these 
matters in a somewhat casual and cavalier manner which may con­
ceivably result from the continued use of such unfettered powers 
may ultimately pose as a serious threat to the basic values on 
which the democratic way of life in this country is based." 71
It is clear that the Courts were beginning to become a little tired
by the continued use of emergency powers and to use the broad ultra vires
test. But fortunately the Government itself revoked the emergency.
The techniques used by the Court are once again similar to 
those that they used while approaching cases arising out of the law 
relating to preventive detention. After the efforts of Subba Eao J., 
who as we have seen preferred to follow the American pattern or broad 
powers of review, the Court had been very careful to retain the fiction 
of subjective satisfaction and rely on English administrative law
ryV\GL f 'l V V > CY<-
techniques, ^ judicial«f $ totally the procedure of review, emphasising 
the importance of procedure in matters of detail and making obiter 
statements, threatening to use the broad ultra vires test. Although 
the Court’s claim to follow the attitude of the English Courts during 
the V/qr it is clear that they have gone far beyond it and followed the 
more recent developments in English law (like in the case of Kidge v 
i^ aldwin^ ) without.even examining the necessity of introducing such 
rules in the areas of preventive detention.
70. Ibid at pr.l8 p.1930.
71. Ibid at pr. 21 p.1930.
72. (1964) A.C. 40.
Table VI in the Appendix gives a summary of the voting and 
judgement writing patterns in the Court.
It will be seen that the major contribution in this area came
from Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Shelat JJ. In was Gajendragadkar J. 
who first insisted in Case 5 that some kind of judiciale pattern 
should be followed in the decision reviewing detention. Later Shelat J. 
in cases 19 and 21 overruled Shah J.'s decision in Case 8 and felt that 
the rules of natural justice ought to apply in this area. But setting 
aside old precedent Wanchoo J.,himself a judge from the Indian Civil 
Service, realised that the administ»ation could not be expected to 
comply with the new natural justice requirements overnight and in 
Case 24 gave the Government an opportunity to pass new orders to re­
adjust their procedures. Again it was Wanchoo J. who wrote the majority 
judgement in Case 23* in which the Court put an end to the efforts of
Subba Rao J. to achieve a broad power of review. The other notable
contribution came from Ramaswami J. who made an attempt to introduce 
the broad ultra vires test in Cases 13 and 18. These four judges 
account for 16 out of 25) or 80^ , of the majority judgements delivered 
in these cases. Of the remaining 9 judgements, three were written by 
Shah, Subba Rao and Bhargava JJ, (Cases 8, 20 and 22 respectively) but 
were overruled by judgements of Shelat and Wanchoo JJ (in Cases 21, 23 
and 24). The rest of the judgements do not make a significant contri­
bution in enlarging the powers of review except the judgement in Case 11 
where the Court appears to have relied upon a dubious distinction 
between "law and order" and "public order", which became an important 
part of the Court's jurisprudence in dealing with preventive detention 
cases. Very few separate and dissenting judgements were delivered in 
these cases. The most important in this regard were Case 11 (discussed 
above), the dissent of Subba Rao J. trying to retain a broad power of 
review, in Case, 2, and the dissent of .Hi.dayatullah. J. on, the. broad.review
problem in Case 24. But apart from this the Court has voted unanimously, 
taking its cue from the leading judgement writers, to achieve an 
unobtrusive but nevertheless a very secure power of review, in this area.
7 -  C o n c l u s i o n
The problem of law and order has been an area where Courts 
of law have chosen not to interfere with the discretion of the exe­
cutive. This is even more true of the Indian tradition, which has 
not in the past justified a theory of revolt and in the days of 
■^ ritish rule vast powers were given to the administration to deal 
with problems of law and order. The American Supreme Court had in 
the past assumed broad powers to review, but has used them sparingly.
The Indian Supreme Court has acquired considerable powers of 
review, but this has not been done on the basis of a broad Constitutional 
power of review. Instead it has followed the techniques afforded by 
English Administrative law and transplanted them without making any 
concession to what has always been regarded as the rather special 
problem of preventive detention. Indeed this position could have been 
arrived at even without the Constitution. The Court has used not its 
Constitutional powers, but merely its Constitutional position to 
acquire a say in matters of preventive detention without really going 
into the question whether the techniques that it has used are adequate 
to deal with the problems which Preventive Detention raises. Even in 
England (as we have seen) doubt has been expressed as to whether normal 
administrative law techniques of the type used by the Supreme Court can 
be used in such areas.
What the Court appears to have done is merely to assert its 
powers of review without evaluating how they ought to be used, although 
some attempt was made by Hidayatullah J. to define the meaning of law 
and order. By and iarge in an attempt to acquire an overall arbitral 
role, the Court has acquired vast powers. It is premature and impos­
sible to predict how later judges will actually use these powers and 
relate them to India’s problems.
The Supreme Court has treated the questions before it as 
simple problems of administuntive law, rather than complicated and 
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CHAPTER V
THE SUPREME COURT AMO THE HINDU JOINT FAMILY ’ * ^
1. The Hindu Joint Family - an anachronism in modern times ?
In the past few years, a great deal of controversy has
centred upon the capacity of the joint family to suit modern needs
and adapt to an industrial age,"^  which favours and in some degree
requires small families with commercial as well as geographic
mobility, tending to depend on wages for their income. It is
popularly believed that the size of the family unit is breaking
down. This myth has been further perpetuated by the 1961 Census
Report which states that the average size of a household in India 
2
is 5*20 persons. To define the smaller one-degree family relation-
3
ship as a household unit is to ignore the existence of the joint 
family outside this unit altogether, and thus neglect the fact that
Ll
the coparcenary is being replaced by an "extended" family which
1 . The best discussion of this is that of M.F.Nimkoff: Is the joint 
family an obstacle to industrialisation (1959) 1 I.J.C.S. 109-118 (a 
comparative account analysing the effect of various levels of indus­
trialisation. on family life); See also M.Singer (in Singer 3 Cohen ed.) 
Structure and Change in Indian Society (1968 Chicago) 423 esp.424-427; 
I^D.DVvanandan (ed. j The changing pattern of family in India (i960 
Bangalore) - an unscholarly account published by the Christian Institute 
suggesting the Christian alternative); Aileen D. Ross: The Hindu Family 
in its urban detting (1961 Toronto) 18-27; Aileen D. Ross:. Symposium on 
Caste and Joint Family : An Analysis (1955) IV Sociological Bulletin 85 
at 98 where she puts forward the view that the joint family will be 
replaced by what she calles the "companionship family"; R.K.Mishra: Some 
questions regarding the Joint Hindu Family (in G.S.Sharma (ed) Property 
Relations in India (1968) Bombay) 2*40-260.
2. See Census of India (1961) Volume I : India Part II C (i) Social 
and Cultural Tables p.4.
3. See the criticism of the 1951 census by I.P.Desai: Symposium on Caste 
and Joint Family (1955) IV Sociological Bulletin 97 at 102-3.
4. See T.Madan: The Joint Family: a terminological classification (1963) 
3 I.J.C.S. 7-16; Css also the comments in his brief biographical note
at (1962) 62_ Man 145-6; H. Gould: Time dimension and structural change 
in an Indian Kinship System : A problem of conceptual refinement (in 
Singer & Cohen (ed) see f.n.l supra) 413-421; F.G.Bayley: The Joint 
Family in India (i960) 12 Ec.Weekly 345-352; R.IV.Nicolas: Economies of 
two family types in two West Bengal villages (I96I) 13 Sc. t/eekly Nos. 
27-9; S.Shahani: The Joint Family - a case study (1961) 12 Ec. Weekly 
No. 49.
5does not differ in spirit or form from the joint family.
Within this ’’extended family” there exists enough cohesion
to emphasise the jointness and yet at the same time enough flexibility
to suit the needs of the business community.^
The joint family is treated as a static institution, because
it is commonly believed that there are no intermediate states of
7
jointness between absolute jointness and partition. The question is : 
must members of the family, the able (coparceners) and the less able 
(non-coparceners), make a choice beteen a fictional complete jointness
m 8and also fictional complete severance ? -“-he answer that they must
imposes too much fiction upon the facts. Courts, too, have tended to 
emphasise the legal state of jointness, rather than take note of the 
fact that families may remain joint in all other respects even though 
legally separate. Again, property acquired by all the coparceners 
jointly would not be treated as joint family property, if there was no
5« Note the comment of I.P. Desai: (supra f.n.3) at 116 ”0n the whole, 
our opinion has been that the joint family is much more common both 
structurally and functionally than is supposed.’1
6. , See 3,R.Agarwala (himself of the business community) in Symposium
on Caste and Joint Family (1955) ^ Sociological Bulletin 138 ff. But 
note at p. 145 his fear that fiscal reform might destroy the joint 
family. On the fiscal aspect see also Derrett: Law and the predicament 
of the joint family (i960) 12 Eco. V/eekly 505 col.l and 2; K.L.S.I.
(196 ) -^19-20; C.H.H.L. (1970) 5^ -» 148-50. See generally on the joint 
family in industry M. Singer : (in Singer & Cohen (ed) Structure and 
Change in Indian Society, Chicago, 1968) The Indian Joint Family in 
modern Industry +^23-52 esp. ^33-^ (Industrial leadership and the Joint 
family in the Madras City). Note, however, that the Frivy Council placed 
great restrictions on the capacity of the Karta to open a new joint 
family business. See Senares d3a.nk: Ltd. v Hari Narain (1932) 59 I.A. 300; 
Sanyasi Charan v Krishnadhan (1922) k9 I.A. 108 (a Jayabhaga case).
See also the dictum of the Supreme 0Ourt in Balmukand v Kamlawati (1965) 
t if)LA- 6 (S.C.) at 9-10 where it is suggested that sons must be con­
sulted before family property is parted with. See comment by Derrett (1965) 
67 Bom. L. P. Jnl. 96-8.
7. See Maine : Ancient law (1891) 228;J,C.Ghosh: Our Joint Family 
Organisation (l88l) Vol LXXIII Calcutta Review No. CXLVI pp.275-300; 
and other writers quoted in R.K.Mishra (supra f.n.l.) pp.2^5-6.
8. See the case of Approvier v Rama Subbayan (1866) 11 M.I.A. 75*
See further' Hayhe' (lid) 325; Derrett: I.M.H.L.' (I963) p.317.
f".- v> l v
"nucleus" of joint family property, which formed the basis of the
9
a c q u i s i t i o n .
Slowly, however, the law has come to recognise that there
are ways in which members of a joint family can claim and exercise
their individual rights without ashing for a formal partition.
Hanu (VIII, hl6) does not let the son even own his self-acquired property.
"A wife, a song, and a slave can never acquire any property 
for themselves; whatever they earn go to him to whom they belong.”
A text attributed to Vyasa states that a father cannot
alienate even his self-acquired property - if immoveable or bipeds -
10"without convening all his sons".
In fact it is possible that where a coparcener dies joint,
. 1 a* n t
his^preperty passed on to the other coparceners by survivorship, 
rather than to his heirs - a custom which seems to have lingered on 
amongst the liambudri Brahmins of the Vest Coast.^
But the ancient texts Cine tQ f.CCept that a person’s self- 
acquired property was, for some purposes and to some extent, his. In 
the twelfth century, Vijnanesvara argued that the son was in fact the 
owner of his father's self-acquireu property, even though he could not
$. ihis is the so-called "nucleus rule"1 stated in Lai Bahadur v 
Kanhaiya Lai (1906) I.A. 65 (approved by the Supreme Court in 
Srinivasa v Narain A.I.h. 1954- B.C. 378 at pr.10 p.333; Iludigowda v 
haachandra. A. I. h. 1969 .3.CL. 1076" at p>r.6 p.1080. What we see here is 
a conclusive presumption (a legal fiction.) employed by Vijnanesvara 
subsequently allowed to get out of hand, for an up to date accoi^ ii^  y  JvnC 
see Derrett: Hindu1 Law: file ■‘■lights of the separated son (1956)^03-111 
who discusses the son’s right in his father's self-acquired property in 
the light of modern decisions and .the Hindu .Succession Act 195&. ^  ■
ih-U.)- O  f L./'cAni X  AvtAClJEiAS',
10. See Hit 1.1.27.
11. Vasudevan v Secy, of State (l83l) 11 Mad. 157 at 167.
12 •restrict any alienations which the father might make. On the other 
hand, the law gradually began to increase the varieties of self- 
acquired property.^
Anglo-Hindu law was responsible for preserving these 
distinctions and also adumbrating, without stystematising, a large 
number of intermediate variations between, partition and absolute 
jointness. Anglo-Hindu lav/ was unable to escape from the textual 
dichotomy between a state of "indivision"1 (avibhaktafcwa) and a state 
of "separation", "division", "having divided" (vibhaktatva); but as 
the case law developed the rich variety of Hindu requirements obtruded 
itself.
These variations are illustrated in a diagram below.
12. See Hit. I.iv.29. See on this F.Sen: Hindu Jurisprudence (1918) 
130-133; d.D.Sontheimer: The concept of D?aya: A comparative study 
(unpublished dissertation for a Post Graduate Diploma SOAS London 
(1962) Thesis No. 1331 Institute of Achran:ced Legal Studies) 131-3- 
For an up to date acpo£nt- aee^Derrett: Hindu Law: The Eights of the 
separated son (1956)^ l03-Ilir, who discu.ssos the son’s right in his 
father’s self-acquired property in the light of modern decisions 
and the Hindu Accession Act 1956.
13- For general accounts of the development of the joint family see 
G.D.Sontheimer: The Joint Family as a len:al Institution (London Ph.D. . 
dissertation (1965) Thesis 215, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies)» 
This supersedes K.K.Bhattacharya: Joint Hindu Family (188*+); R.C.IIitra: 
The joint family and partition (1913 Calcutta); for a brief account 
see N.C.Sen-Gupta: Evolution of Ancient Indian Law (1953 Calcutta) 202- 
226; B.N.Sai^path: The Hindu Joint Family: Retrospect and prospect (1967) 
1 Ban.L.Jnl. 33 at 3^^+; for a good modern account see Derrett: The 
history of the juridical framework of the joint family (1962) VI Con- 




^11 property is jointly owned
The son can challenge alienations not for certain 
prescribed purposes
The co-parcener's share can be attached to meet 
his debts
The son can alienate his share
Financial arrangements within the family 
e.g. maintenance grants to various members
Partial partition (between persons
Partial partition as regards 
property which is impartible 
or not available at the time
Partial partition of only 
some property
Partial partition of 
a notional nature 
imposed by statute
partition by metes 
ind bounds
Levels of individualisation of property
As time went on, the Courts in British India came to recognise
the need to individualise the ownership of property within the family.
. . . .  .........
In Rao Balwant Singh v Rani Kishori the Privy Council held that the 
father could alienate his self-acquired immoveable property, without
15
the consent of his sons. Again, the Hitakshara lays down v e r y  clearly 
that the father cannot make, and consequently the sons can challenge, 
an alienation which is not for the benefit of the family, religious
14. (1898) 25 I.fr. 54, where it is argued that the consent of the son
is a moral requirement not a legal one (at p.67). This is based on a 
misunderstanding of the traditional concept of ownership, which accords 
to the sone ownership in his father's self-acquired property. See further 
on this the references cited in f.n. 12 supra.
15. This ended a long controversy see ^ayne (lid) 449-50 f.n. (e)(f).
purposes, or arising out of distress. In the celebrated case of
17Hunumanpersaud v Mt. Babooee the Privy Council accepted this limi­
tation, but systematise! on the basis of English law the principles
l8
to be applied in this area, concentrating on the alienor’s right to
deal bona fide with the stranger-alienee.
A very important development came when it was held that a
19bona fide creditor of a co-parcener could enforce a partition in
order to have access to his individed assets.
At first some Courts argued that an absolute alienation by
way of auction sale of a co-parcener’s individed interest, without the
consent of the others, where no justification binding on the family
20could be traced, was judicially impossible but a decision of the 
Privy Council in 1873 left no room for doubt but that the interest 
of any co-parcener could be attached by a Court at the instance of
16. See the Hitakshara I.i.27-29. Alienations are allowed in time of 
distress (apatjfficale), for the benefit of the family (kutumbarthe), for 
pious purposes (dharmarthe).
17. (1836) 6 M.I.A. 393- Phe case is technically on the powers of a
mother as guardian for an infant heir. For its application to the joint 
family situation see Mayne (lid) *+59-379; Mulla .(13d.) 273-283; Derrett:
I.H.H.L. 266-2771 CHHL (I97O) 426ff; Kane III HD 449-430.
18. For an account of the effeft of English equity on certain aspects 
of the rule see Derrett: The misty origins of Anglo-Kindu law in CMHL 
(1970) App.II pp.425-432.
19. See Strange : I Elements of Hindu Law . . „
(1825) 179 relying upon the case cited by him at Volume II, 283 (note
Solebrooke's comments at 283-4); letter by Colebrooke: Dated May 18 1812 
(quoted by Strange at Volume II 419 at 421-2) where he says ’’Injury and 
injustice may, however, he prevented by holding him (the co-parcener) 
and his property answerable for the repayment of the money or valuable 
consideration received by him; and equity, perhaps would award partition 
for the purpose of enforcing payment from his share, thus rendered a 
separate one.”
20. See Glover J.'s judgement in Bhyro Pershad v Basisto (1871) 16 17.R. 
31 (a case dealing with the father) where he distinguishes Gour Suran 
Doss v Ram Surun Bhakat (1866) 5 W.H. 54 as not applicable because it 
dealt with the debts of a son. See also Rajaram Tewary v Luchmun Pershad 
(I867) 8 W.R. 13 F.3. This distinction was probably inspired by the
fact that the son is liable to pay the father's debts................
21his creditors. This is technically at variance with the Mitakshara,
22as the rrivy Council admitted. The next step from this was to accord
23
to the son the right to alienate his share in undivided property.
24This accords with the position under Dayabhaga law but it was not
developed on the basis of the traditional law, but rather out of con-
25siderations of equity and convenience, and only operates in South India.
The law also recognised that a particular branch of the 
family could be given maintenance grants out of the joint family 
property. Although this brought about a virtual de facto partition 
of the property it accords with the living habits of certain castes,
21. Deen Dayal v Jugdip Narain (1873) k I.A. 247; Hardi Narain v 
Ruder~Prakash (1883) 11 I.A.~2£.
22. See Suraj Bansi v SheoPer^jaid (1379) 6 I.A. 88 at 99-100.
23. Deen Dayal v Jugdip Narain (1873) 4 I.A. 247; This position is 
followed only in Madras (see Virasvami v Ayyaswami (I863) 1 H.H.C.R. 471) 
3ombay (see Vasudev v Venkatesh (1873) 10 B.H.C.R. 139) Central Provinces 
(Syed Kasam v fforawar (l922) 49 I.A. 35&; Kashinath v Bapurao (19*K)) 
Nagpur 373 (F.B.)) but not in Bengal or the United Provinces (see Madho 
Parshad v Mehrban Khan (I89I) 17 I.A. 194; Balgobind Das v Narain Lai 
(1893) 20 I.A. Il3; Lachman Prashad v Harnam Singh (1917) 44 I.A.' 1&3)•
The Calcutta High Court put up an extremely brave fight to prevent
the operation of this rule in Bengal. For a description of this and 
a resume of the mid-nineteenth century decisions on the subject see 
R.C.Mitra: The law of joint property and partition (1897 Calcutta) 
pp.111-114 where all the case law from Nundram v ^ashee Pande (1823)
Select Reports 232 to Phoolbas Koonwar v Lalla Jogeshwar Sahay (1876)
1 Cal 226 at 228 is shown.
24. See Dayabhaga II, 28. For the reasons why this is so see Kane:
III H.D. 559-60.
25. This is quite evident from the references cited f.n. 19 and 22 supra. 
The traditional law does not accord a separate disposable interest to
any co-parcener. See generally Kane : III H.D. 532-539; G.D.Sontheimer:
The concept of Daya (1962, cited supra f.n.12) for the position in the 
traditional law.
who live separately and do not maintain a common mess.
Another interesting development was the acceptance of ’’family ar­
rangements" which is a technique whereby the members of a joint family can
come to an arrangement whereby the rights of the coparceners and non-copar-
2 7
ceners alike are protected. Equally important was the recognition of various 
kinds of partial partition, which we shall discuss in some detail later.
Thus we can see that Anglo-Hindu law was able to change important 
aspects of the traditional law, in an effort to introduce greater flexi­
bility within the joint family and emphasise the need for giving the members 
of the family a greater power to deal with and safeguard their interests
I
than simply relying on the piety of the Manager. There is in the joint 
family law a constant tussle between the claims of the individual for 
greater freedom to deal with and a greater share of joint family property 
on the one hand and the need to protect joint family property (which forms 
the basis of an economically counter-productive but nevertheless otherwise 
extremely important private social security system) on the other.
26. Ramayya v Kolanda A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 611 at 913 where Ayyangar J. took 
note of the fact that in the Goundan caste members of the family lived 
separately. See comment Derrett: (i960) 62 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 57 at 63; Padmini 
v Samasundram (1965) 2 M.L.J. 65« See also on maintenance grants 
Seshchalapati J . in Lab Chandra v Shinnavadu A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 31 which 
follows Ramayya1s case; Natesan J. in N.Venkata Subramaniya Iyer A.I.R. 
1966 Mad. 26o at pr.^ 7 p.285 (where the allottee's right to be maintained 
is stressed) at pr.47 p.285-6 (duty to account only to the allottee's 
branch not to the whole of the joint family); Ismail J. in Chinappa v 
Valliammal A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 187 at 189-90 (coneerning a daughter-in-law’s 
right to maintenance). See also Derrett* C.M.H.L. (1970) 65-6 quoting at 
66 Ramamurti J.'s observations in Nagayaswami Naidu v Kochabai A.I.R. 1969 
Mad 329 at 3Vh-5.
27* For the best account of this see Derrett: Family arrangements (1968) 
70 Bom.L.R. 1-16; ibid: C.M.H.L. (1970) 281-286. See also the following 
recent cases: Maniav Dty. Director, Consolidation A .I.R . 1971 A11.151 
(per Singh J. at pr.17 p*155 - on the interests of a daughter); Krishna 
Behari Lai v Gulab Chand A .I.R . 1971 S»C. 10^1 (arrangement between a 
widow and the presumptive heir); Shambhoo Prashad v Phool Kumari A .I.R . 
1971 S.C. 1337 (rights of a particular branch of the family);
28. See infra Section 3»
4 C C
In this chapter we will concentrate o© the two main problems
that have come up before the Supreme Court :
(«) Acquisitions through a coparcener.
(b) The problem of partition in the Supreme Court.
Tt will be observed throughout that no light whatever could
be obtained from English or Commonwealth laws and no jurisprudential
writing by non-Indians could offer patterns or solutions. The problems 
are characteristically Indian problems, to be solved by Indians in the 
full light of practical acquaintance with the facts with which they are 
familiar. Yet no Supreme Court case clearly or systematically explains 
the principles (if any) behind the current case law or lays down guide 
lines to assist the High Courts in the solution of numberless problems 
created, and exacerbated, by legislation (to which we shall come).
2. Acquisitions through a coparcener.
i... The juristic approach of the Hindu jurists
Hindu jurists fr.ced with the problem of recognising individuals’ 
right to property followed an ad hoc method of adding to existing cate­
gories of self-acquired property (hereafter S.A.P.) rather than 
evaluating the relative contribution of a particular coparcener in 
relation to a particular acquisition and giving him a share proportion­
ate to his contribution., -^t is characteristic of sastric writers to 
fear and avoid generalisations and principles are frequently to be 
worked out from the detailed rules they supply. This topic is no 
exception. Isolated texts indicate how the wind used to blow.
Our own evaluation of the texts amounts to this : the ancient 
jurists tended to lean in favour of joint family property (hereafter 
J.F.P.) after making a small pocket allowance in favour of S.A.P. The 
controversy has in the past centred upon increasing or decreasing the 
categories that go to make this pocket allowance, rather than following 
a system of proportional entitlement. This position was considerably 
worsened by a Privy Council decision (see below) which refused to make 
a distinction between a coparcener’s direct and indirect use of joi$t
family funds.^ happily this decision has recently been greatly
2
weakened by the Supreme Court. Sut it is uncertain whether the Courts
will now follow the equitable approach of proportional allotment, as
3
a foreign observer hoped they might, or whether they will stick to the 
old either/or approach of increasing or decreasing S.A.P.
1- Gokal Chand v Hukam Chand (1921) 43 I.A. 162 at 172-3.
2. R.K.Singh v Coomr. (1970) II S.C.W.R. 674 at 679-80, 685.
3. See Derrett: Acquisitions of Joint Family Property and recent deci­
sions of the Supreme Court (1969) I S.C.U.R. 19; ibid: Acquisition of 
Joint Family Property through a coparcener: Let sastric and equity prin­
ciples join hands (1969) 71 Bom.L.R. 75-81; Ibid: C.M.H.L. (1970) 62-74; 
ibid: The Supreme Court and the acquisition of property: Some latest 
developments (1971).X ""7 ,
r-
The ancient texts gradually came to accept the need to
fecognise individual property.^ '^ hus it was accepted that acquisitions
obtained without any detriment to the J.F.P., gains of learning,
5 mpresents at one's marriage or from friends, were S.A..P. This was no
mean achievement in itself, for years later Holloway J. complimented the
£
recognition of 'these categories as "well timed and sensible". Later
jurists attempted to increase or decrease the above stated categories.
Thus Vijnanesvara, who favoured J.F.P., insisted that the acquisition
must be made without detriment to the mother's as well as the father's 
7estate. He also went a step further and opined that there was a 
detriment to the estate, where the marriage was in the Asgsra form 
(where the girl was actually or nominally paid for) and that in such
g
cases all marriage presents were J.F.P. Gautama had tried to increase
the categories of S.A.P. by stating that gains of learning were not
9
to be shared with an ignorant coparcener, though this must be read 
with Narada’s text that an ignorant coparcener is entitled to a share, 
if he maintains the acquirer’s family.^
Emphasis was laid on whether there was any detriment to the 
estate rather than a proportional entitlement between the joint family 
and the acquirer. This could only have been the case if the sastris 
has been under the impression that "detriment" is equivalent to an overt 
or covert investment on the family's behalf.
4. See Section 1 of this Chapter and the references cited there.
5. Manu IX, 206, 208; Yajnavalkya II, 116-119.
6. See Kolloway J. in Chalkonda v Katnachalam (l§63) 2 M.H.C.E. 56 at 6l.
7. Hit.I.iv.2; see also the Smriti Chandrika VII,28 which extends thfe 
restriction so as to include brother's estate.
8. Hit.I.14.6.
9. See Colebrooke's Digest (hereafter C.D.) Vol.II, 453-458 commenting 
on the text quoted Book V, text 355-
10. II C.D. 461-3 discussing Book V, text 357-
There are however some examples where a proportionate entitlement
has been advocated. Thus while the normal rule was that property
acquired jointly, through joint funds or with the aid of
was J.F.P. Vasishtha lays down :
"He among them who singly acquires wealth, shall take a 
double share of it." 12
Again, a text attributed to Sankha lays down
’t$)ut land which had formerly been lost, and which a siggle heir 
shall recover by his own exertion, his co-heirs kay divide accor­
ding to their allotments, having first given him a fourth part 
of it." 13
Jagannatha approves of both these texts and lays down principles for
14a proportionate distribution. Other writers also relied on these and 
similar texts.^
There is also an old text attributed to Katyayana which
states
"the father gets two shares or half the wealth acquired by 
the son." 16
The various proportionate allotments possible under this text have
1 7
been discussed by the Dayabhaga.
11. Hanu IX 204; Brihaspati XXV,14; Hit.I.lv.l5»
12. II C.D. 458 Text 336. The property must be acquired with the help 
of J.F.P., otherwise it would be S.A.P. See the comments at II C.D. 336.
II C.D. 464 V Text 339. Note the opinion of Yajnavalkya (11,119) 
that this is J.F.P.
14. See his comments at II C.D. 438 on the Vasishtha text and on
464-3 on the text by Sankha.
%
13. Vasishtha is relied on in the Vyavahara Mayukha IV.7»8. (Borradftlla-
Trans 1879? 67).
16. Katyayana (Kane’s collection 831).
17. Dee the comments in the Dayabhaga (11,66-72) and the objections of 
Mitra Mishra in the Vyvahara Prakash of the Viramitroda.ya. These are
discussed by Kane III H.D. 578. The relative importance of all these
texts is also discussed by Derrett: Acquisitions of Joint Family property 
and recent decisions of the Supreme Court (1969) I S.C.W.R. 29 f.n.6.
Thus we can see that although some rules of proportionale
allotment were laid down, they are left unrefined. The allotment
takes the form of prefixed portions, rather than an analysis of the
actual contributions involved. It is however characteristic of the
sastra to mention fractions when relative proportions are intended.
3.3Jagannatha, presumably, as one writer suggests, under the influence 
of English equity principles, tried to refine these rules, but this
19does not appear to have had any creative impact upon Anglo-Hindu law.
ii. The Anglo-Hindu Experience. 
a. The formal rules.
The best example of the Anglo-Hindu approach can be seen in
the decisions on whether "gains of Hi&rning" are joint family property
2(or not. The sastric texts suggest that gains of learning are S.A.P. 
But a gloss on the texts by the Mitakshara lays down that the gain,
18. Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 7£; R.L.S.I. (1968) 2^5-250.
19. The Katyayana text is relied on by Rarapini and Mookerjea JJ. in 
Pharma Das v Amul^han (1906) 33 Cal.1119 at 1126; they also refer to 
Sreenarain Berah'v Gooro Pershad Berah (1866) 6 W.R. 219 where such a
proportionate allotment was actually made. In this context see also
Sheo Dayal Tewaree v Bishonath (1868) 9 W.R. 6l; Visalatchi Arnmal v 
Annasamy (I869) 3 M.H.C.R. 130 at 132-3 where both the Sardar Amin and 
the High Court refer to the texts but no mention is made of proportion­
ate allotment; Bajaba v Trimbak (1909) 3^ Bom. 106 at 110 where the 
Court refers to the Vyavahara Hayukha IV.7.3; Hit I.v.3. on the quarter 
share rule but addf^ s "If these texts involve the conclusion the result 
would be anything but equitable". Note that under Anglo-Hindu law the 
quarter share rulejdoes not apply where the recovery was solely with 
the use of S.A.P. or where the loss to the family was purely voluntary. 
(See Srinivasan I Hindu Law (1969 Edn) 7SI—3; Mayne (lid.) 338-9) 
G.S.Sastri: A treatise on Hindu law (1910 kd. also 6d. V+7-8) 273 suggests 
that the rule apply at partitions.
20. See Kaftyana cited Hit.I.iv.8; Smpiti Chandrika VII, 2 and k; N5.rada
XIII, 10. Manu IX, 206. see also the Vivad Chintamapi (Jha -^ dn. 19^ -2") 
216-219 or Sections 9^2-9^6. These are discussed by Kane: III H.D. 581- 
385; Mayne (lid) 352-336. For the authorities on the subject see also 
Mulla (13d.) 258-259; Derrett: I.M.H.L. (1963) 336-7.
unless of an exceptional nature, must not have been acquired to the
21detriment of J.F.P. The Dayabhaga tries to soften this approach that
mere maintenance cannot be regarded as a detriment.
MIt does not become common property merely because joint 
property was used for food and other necessaries; since that 
is similar to the sucking of the mother's breast." 22
On a prima facie view it appears that British Courts followed
the strict Mitakshara text.^ Thus in Luximon Rao v Mullar Kao (1831)^
Lord Brougham allowed a nephew of the Peshwa’s Prime Minister to claim
the latter’s assets because the Prime Minister
"maintained a more intimate connection (with his ancestral village 
family) than would be supposed natural to a man placed in a much 
higher position than the rest of the family and separated from it 
by local circumstances."
Years later Melville J. commenting on the strict test used in this case
felt that the judgement
"gives forth an uncertain sound ... for its ratio would be equi­
valent to saying that no member of a united family, who shares 
in an ancestral family, can acquire separate property." 25
Even so this strict test became law and culminated in the proposition
26in the famous case of Gokul Chand v Iiukam Chand (1920) where the Court
21. Mitakshara I.iv.7, 8 , 9-14. Bee'Kane III H.D. 579 and note the com­
ment of Mayne (lid) 354 f.n.(p). "This almost the only question 011 which 
Vijnanesvara is neither logical or progressive." What Vijnanesvara did 
in fact was to state that the words "detriment to the estate" qualify 
also the four exceptions of which "gains of learning" was one.
22. Dayabhaga VI, I, 44-50 quoted by Mayne (lid) 354; see contra Vivada 
Chintami (Jha Edn. Text 942 p.216) quoting Katyayana "Where a man has 
acquired learning from others while living on food supplied by others, 
(viz. strangers) whatever is obtained by him by means of learning is 
called gains of learning." Note the comments of the editor in the foot­
note on p.216.
23. The Mitakshara text is relied upon very heavily in Gokul Chand v 
Hukam Chand (1921) 48 I.A. 162 at 167.
24. (1831) 2 Knapp. 60.
25. In Lakshman Npiyaram v Jamna 3ai (1882) 6 Bom. 225 at 232.
26. (1921) 43 I.A. 162 at 172-3.
rejected the argument that a distinction can be made between a direct
and indirect use of J.F.P. In the meanwhile the Court decided a number
of cases where they ruled that where an undivided person was educated
27at the expense of patrimony, his earnings were J.F.P., unless the
28education was of a merely rudimentary nature since (scilicet) in the
latter case "there was no real and sufficient connection" between the
education and the gain. The formal rule that while considering
"detriment" no distinction can be made between direct and indirect
uses of J.F.P. has been abrogated with respect to gains of learning by 
29statute, but it still applies in relation to all other kinds of 
acquisitions. The formal tests are still "detriment" and "real and 
sufficient connection".
27. Applied in Gokul Chand v Hukam Chand (1921) 48 I.A. 162 (Civil 
Servant); Durvasula Gandhandhu v Narasammah (l872~T~~~j H.H.C.R. 4-7 (D.3.) 
(vakil); Bai Hancbha v ^arotamdas (18^9) 8 Bom. H.C.R. (A.C.J.) 1 ( 
(pleader) Chalkonda Alasani v Chalkonda Katnachalam (1864) 2 H.H.C.R.
56 (dancing girls - not strictly concerned with joint families but it 
was assumed that it was customary to apply the same rules).
28. Metharam v Rewachand (1918) 45 I.A. 4-1 at 45 (banker); Durga Putt 
Joshi v Ganesh Putt Joshi (1910) J>2 All. 305 at 313 (astrologer); 
lachmin Kuar v Debi Psashad (l898T~2Q All. 435 (army contractor);
Krishnajee v Moro Aahadev (I89I) 15 Bom. 32 at 39 (clerk); Lakshman Hay- 
arain V Jamnabai (18H2) 6 Bom. 225 (judge); Boologam v Swornam (1881)
4 Mad. 330 (dancing girls); Pauliem Valloo Chetty v Pauliem Sooryah 
Chetty (1877) 4- I.A. 109 at 117 (obiter statement). See also Jai Dayal 
v Narain Das A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 127 (Civil Servant) - note that
this case was reported after the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930, 
but decided 23rd inarch 1925*).
29. The Hindu 0ains of Learning Act 1930. Reproduced Derrett® I.M.H.L. 
(1983) 625-6. LVen after this Act some cases have arisen on the income 
of hereditary income of priests where the emphasis has been on the 
hereditary nature of the income rather than the gain of learning. See 
the early Bombay cases of Ghulabhai v ^argowan Ramji (1911) 36 Bom.9% 
(where such property was held to be ancestral) and note that it was 
distinguished by Sulaiman and Mookerjee JJ in Hanso Pathak v Harmandhi 
(1934) 56 All. 1026 at 1028, 1031. See also the more recent Ramakrishna 
v Vishnumurti A.I.R. 1957 86.
ii. b. The Informal Techniques.
The social facts which motivated the decisions*
If we have a closer look at the gains of learning decisions,
we will see that while the Courts formally accepted the detriment test,
in actual fact the Courts refer to a complex of facts about the social
and financial state of jointness of the families concerned. Thus in
the I83I case involving the Prime Minister the Court stressed that
the Prime Minister had maintained a strong connection with his ances- 
30tral family.
31Again in Goor Churn Pass v Goluckmoney Dossee, Grant J. took
note of the fact that one brother was blind ind that the family lived
32together. In Bai Mancha v Narottam Das, Couch C.J. (for Newton J.)
while admitting that they had to apply the law strictly, observed
"nor having regard to the usage of native society do we think it 
is a bad law."
In this case the family lived together but kept separate accounts.
Again, in two cases on the income of dancing girls, the Madras ^igh 
Court decided that the income was J.F.P. in one and S.A.P. in the other. 
Although the cases purport to be decided on the grounds that the 
education received was not used in the latter case, the Court was 
influenced by the fact that in the former case the disputed ornaments 
were ancestral property and that the dancing girls lived together, 
whereas in the latter case the girls concerned had ceased to dance and
30. (I83I) 2 Knapp 60.
31. (1843) Fulton 164 at 184-3- He made a distinction between wealth
acquired and wealth "improved" or "augmented" and concluded (at 186-7 ) 
that in this case there was just an improvement.
32. (1869) 6 B.H.C.R. 1 at 6.
33attend nautches. In two cases from Allahabad, the decisions are 
based on the rule that rudimentary education did not provide a real 
and sufficient connection, but it is clear that the Court was influ­
enced by the fact that in the case of the astrologer he lived sepa-
34
rately from the very start. In the case of the army contractor, the
Court emphasised that the brothers
"did not work jointly, each being separately employed and no 
one of them is shown to have any concern with the savings and 
accumulations of the other two brothers, though no doubt funds 
may have been remitted by one or other to the others for 
investment.” 35
Similar references to the social level of jointness can also be shown 
36m  other cases.
ii. c. Two distinct approaches
Thus what we get are two distinct approaches. A formal 
approach stressing the "detriment" and "real and sufficient connection"
33- The two cases are Chalkonda v Ratnachalam (1864) 2 M.3.C.5. 56
where the property was regarded as J.F.P.')""see p. 78; Boologam v Swornam
(l88l) 4 Had. 330 at 333- Holloway J., who decided the former case, 
also held that in Durvalulu v Narasammah (1372) 7 M.H.C.R. 47 the 
learning of a vakil was "ru'dimentary^  ^his caused Sir John Edge to 
remark in the Privy Council in Metharam v Rewachand (I9I0) 45 I.A. 41 
at 30 "Apparently Holloway J. regarded the learning in the law required 
by a vakil of his day as inferior to the science necessary ... (to) 
the life of an Indian dancing girl.". But the real explanation can only 
be found in the difference in social jointness in the two cases.
34. Durga Dutt Joshi v Ganesh Dutt Joshi (1910) 32 All. 305 at 308-9 
(per Stanley C.J. and Banerji J.T.
35- Eachmin Kuar v Debi Prashad (1898) 20 All. 435 at 437 (per Burkitt 
and Dillon JJ.).
36. e.g. Note the difference of opinion between Holloway J. (in the 
Courts below) and the ^rivy Council in Pauliem Valloo v Pauliem Sooryah 
(1377) 4 I.A. 109; In Krishnajee v Moro Mahadev (I89I) 15 Bom. 32 
where the brother obviously maintained a connection with the family. 
Birdwood and Candy JJ. therefore used another legal device to meet the
needs of the situation by remanding the case to see if there had been
a blending. Contrast the approach of Melvill and Kemball JJ. in 
Lakshman v Jamnabai (1882) 6 Bora. 225.
tests and an informal reference to the social state of jointness in 
the family so as to ascertain whether the property could have been 
intended to be treated as J.F.P. If a person in fact lived socially 
and financially joint with his family, the use of the informal approach
become less important in a Court of Appeal, which is concerned solely 
with points of law. This is precisely what happened in the Privy 
Council cases where emphasis was laid on the formal rule rather than 
the informal, but not necessarily extra legal, assumptions that formed 
the rationale of the cases on which the formal rule was based. This
is particularly true of the famous Gokul Chand v Hukam Chand case (1921)
38where the judgement applies the strict Mitakshara text and refers to 
the cases discussed above^ithout making any reference to the social 
facts the judges in those cases relied on.
The result was the emergence of a strict rule unqualified by 
the other circumstances, which had been so important in determining 
its application to a particular case. We have to bear this in mind 
while considering the Supreme Court Cases.
37. ^he blending argument was used in Krishnajee v Moro liahadev (1891) 
15 Bom. 32 where the case was remanded to see if there was a blending. 
On blending see Nuthbehari v Nanilal A.I.P. 1937 P.C. 6l (mere failure 
to keep separate accounts is not blending) and morerecently Chinna v
Eakhsmamma A.I.R. 19&3 S.C. 1601 at 1604; G.Narayana Raju v G.Chamaraju 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1276; Derrett I.H.H.L
38. (1921) 48 I.A. 162 at 167.
ensured that an otherwise joint person could
stating that the property was a gain of learning when in fact he
treated it and used it for joint family purposes, even though it
37might not technically be capable of being declared a blending.
It is only to be expected that the social facts of a case
39- Ibid at 168-9
iii. The Supreme Court - Directors' Fees and Insurance Payments.
We are concerned here with two problems. Firstly, where a 
coparcener invests joint family assets in a company or a firm, should 
the fees given him for the post he is appointed to, as a result of 
the joint family investment, be regarded as J.F.P. or S.A.P. ?
Secondly, where the premiums of a life insurance policy are paid out 
of J.F.P., should the payments paid when the policy materialises be 
regarded as J.F.P. ?
iii. a. The Problem of Directors’ Fees.
1. The background to the Supreme Court cases.
To begin with it must not be forgotten that the Supreme 
Court cases are to be considered from the point of view of tax 
avoidance. Although Hindus in India live in Joint Families, Parliament 
has thought fit not to grant extensive tax concessions to such 
families even though their expenses and financial responsibilities
koare greater than those of a nuclear family. Joint Families have tried 
to meet this problem not by asking Parliament for greater concessions
kO. See the Finance Acts 1962-§8 Schedule I. The 1963 Act made some 
changes but these were not consequential from the joint family point 
of view. For a study of the tax situation see I.S.Gulati & K.S.Gulati:
The undivided Hindu Family; A study of its Tax privileges (1962 A.P.H.). 
For the revenue approach to the whole problem see K.D.Gaur: Crimes 
relating to Income Tax in India (1971 - Thesis No. A00 at the Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies) (hereafter cited as Gaur (1971) Thesis) 88-107. 
But Gaur adopts without discussion Derrett’s view as regards apportion­
ment on the basis of proportionate entitlement. This viev/ is fully 
discussed below. Derrett in his latest article : The Supreme Court and 
the acquisition of Joint Family Property (1971) I S.C.W.R. 7 at 10 
ends the article with the comment ’’These latest decisions are virtually 
in favour of the revenue„ Is that an adequate justification for them ?” 
This is obviously a slip of the pen, because the decisitions are not 
in point of fact in favour of the revenue but in favour of the assessee. 
Iam also grateful to K.C.Tewary of the Revenue Dept. Bombay for his 
help and comments. On losses to the Government due to fictional partition 
see T.V.IIehta: Aspects of Taxation in our developing society (1971)
12 Guj. L.R.Jnl. 2k at 32-33-
•i-i -t ij
but by either partitioning their property for tax purposes or putting 
forward the claim that although they are joint a large part of their 
assets (like directors' fees) are S.A.P. The dilemma that the Supreme 
Court fafes is that if it supports the individualisation of property 
it will also have to support a form of tax avoidance, whereas if they 
seek to prevent tax evasion they will be forced into taking a tradi­
tional attitude in favour of J.F.P., which does not suit the reforming
42attitude they profess to adhere to.
The High Courts when dealing with these problems had taken 
various stands. Some judges applied the Gokul Chand tests strictly^
Cther judges took a doctrinaire viev; that the individual's efforts
44
must be recognised and relied upon English cases where a similar
41. S.25 of the Income Tax Act 1922 and now S.171 of the Income Tax 1961
note the commentof Derrett1 C.M.H.L. (1970) 148-9, and at (1961) 65
Bom.L.R.J. 17 ff. -‘■'he best discussioh of the ddvantages to be gained 
from partial partition are discussed in Gulati 8c Gulati (supra f.n. 40) 
Table 28: Estimated loss of revenue due to avoidance of income tax 
through partial partition ... in 1958-9 at p.78.
42. Hegde J.’s dissenting judgement in V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 
I968 S.C. 685 at pr.31 p.696.
43* The best example of this is Bhandari C.J. in Bhagwan v I.T. Commr.
A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 594 particularly at pr.l6 p.598-9* He also relied 
on Gokul Chand1s case (1921) and I.T.Commr. v Kalu Babu Lai C.A.431 
decided 15.5*1959 which was approved by the Supreme Court A.I.R. 1959
S.C. 1289. See further T.T.Rathnasabapath v
A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 340 discussed Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 67 f.n.10.
44. Typical is the approach of Manohar Lai J. in Indra Singh v I.T. 
Commr. A.I.R. 1943 ^at. 169 (note there was dispute in this case whether 
the property was joint family property - at 176.. But the blending rule 
was applied very strictly.) I.T.Commr. v Darsan Ram A.I.R. 1946 Hat.50 
where he emphasises that the joint family were gathering dividends 
anyway; Rajgopalan J. in K.G.Estates v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1958 Had. 437 
at 489; S.Rao and Shastri JJ. in Murugappa v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 
828 at pr.4 p.829. See also R.H. 8c Son v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1953 Mad.209; 
Mack J. in Harasamma v Venkatanarasi A.I.R. 1954 Mad.2o2 at pr.5 p.284 
where he takes the view that individual initiative must be recognised 
in rural as well as urban areas. Contrast Venkaramnayya v Venkataramappa 
A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 723 where notice is taken of the fact that the acqui­
rers lived separately (at pr.ll p.725)*
result was reached, forgetting that a joint family situation was
45
totally different. ther judges examined the facts of the cases to 
determine if the fees were paid for a coparcener’s personal services 
or merely because he held the necessary qualification shares on the
46joint family’s behalf. In the last mentioned cases the judges tended
to rely more on the wording of the partnership deed or the Articles
of Association of the firm or company respectively rather than the
In (i
intention of the family and their living habits. This, as a foreign
observer had rightly pointed out’f makes the whole issue rest more on
how cleverly, the documents are drafted rather than the facts of 
48the cases.
More recently Professor Derrett has made the suggestion that
the Court should seek to treat the problem as one of equity, apply the
49principles of Section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act 1882 and distribute
45* See the judgement in I.f.C ommr. v Sankaralinga A.I.R. 1950 Had.
610 (citing and following Dover Coalfield Extn. Ltd. (1908) ~I Ch. 63) 
where emphasis was laid on the fact that the Director got his money under 
a contract of service.
46. Particularly the nineteenth century case Jugmoham Mangal Das v Sir 
Mangal Das Nathuboy (1886) 6 Bom. 328 (where the Director refused to 
work further, and was persuaded to do so because of the remuneration);
Chagla J. in Ram Chandra v Chimibhai A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 78; distinghished 
in Re Faridas Purshottam A.I.R. 1947 Bom.299«
47• For a good example see Manickam Chetty v Kamalam (1937) I M.L.J.
93 at 98 where the Court relied upon "the unambiguous declaration at 
the end of the document ... "
*t8. See Derrett (1969) I S.C.V/.RL 29 commenting on I.T.Commr. v D.C.Shah 
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 927« P’his point is also made by Gaur (1971) thesis 104.
49. See Derrett: Acquisition of joint family property through a coparcener: 
Let Gastric and qquity principles join hands (1969) 71 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 73; 
ibid: Acquisition of joint family property and recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court (1969) I S.C.W.R. 29; ibid C.M.H.L. (1970) 67-73; ibid:
The Supreme Court and the acquisition of joint family property - the 
latest developments (1971) I S.C.W.R. 7-10* This plea is accepted 
without criticial examination by Gaur (1971) Thesis 105-7•
proportionately the ’’fees'* on the basis of the relative contribution
50of the joint family and the individual. For this theory of 
proportionate entitlement he relies on the sastric texts (to which
51
we have referred above ) as well as the recent House of Lords decision
52m  Boardman v Phipps. In fact neither of these sources totally 
justify a proportionate allotment of the kind contemplated. We have 
already seen that the sastric texts talk in terms of nominally pre­
fixed proportions and do not in themselves literally lay down principles 
for wider application. Boardman v Phipps was in the main concerned with 
the wider problem of whether a trustee could be made accountable for
profits resulting from ''information” acquired by him in the trust
53business . The Court in view of the honest dealings by the trustee s 
also approved of awarding them generous payments on a liberal scale for
50. Section 88 of the Trusts Act 1882 lays down "Where a trustee, 
executor, partner, agent, director of a company, legal adviser, or other 
person bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interest of another 
person, by availing himself of his character gains for himself any 
pecuniary advantage, or where any person so bound enters into any 
dealings under circumstances in which his own interests are, or may be, 
adverse to those of such other persons and thereby gains for himself
a pecuniary advantage, he must hold for the benefit of such other 
person the advantage so gained." For an affirmation of the general rule 
in which S. 88 has been supplied see C.G.Chetty v C.S.Chetty A.I.R. 1959 S - C, 
190 at p . 197 (partner who rrenews lease accountable; but not applied to 
this case because lease renewed after termination of partnership);
P.Leslie 8c Cp. y V.O.Wapshare A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. 843 (the rule was affirmed 
but again not applied because of the honest dealings in the case). See 
also S.90 of the Trusts Act. Illustration;^) " A villgge belongs to a 
Hindu fami&y. A, one of its members, pays nazrana to Government and there­
by procures his name to be continued as the inamdar of the village. A 
holds the village for the benefit of himself and the other members."
51. See supra Chapter V Section L
52. Boardman v Phipps (1966) All S.R. 721 (1967) 2 A.C. 124. See also 
comment of Gareth Jones: Unjust enrichment and the fiduciary's duty of 
Royalty (I968) 84 L.Q.R. 472 particularly at 478-497 where he takes the 
view that where the trustee has been honest he should not be made 
accountable at all.
53• On this see the way in which the House of Lords deal with Aas v . 
Benham (1891) 2 Ch. 244.W* 6 0 ^) *Vv, , v>
54their work and skill. In such a situation, equity inevitably weight
heavily in favour of the trust (or in our case the joint family) on
55the basis of the well known rule in Keech v Sandford and the allow­
ances made to the trustee are more by way of generous expenses than
S6a relative contribution.
l/e must remember that this is not a simple problem of
evaluating relative contributions - as in the case of distributing
57communal property after the divorce of a husband and wife but a 
problem of "conflict of interests" and t>]je Court has to be careful to 
ensure that the quasi trustee’s interests do not conflict with his 
fiduciary duty to the family. Certainly, this equitable approach 
should be followed, but judges must be prepared to look at the living 
habits of the families before them, and enquire whether in fact the 
Director concerned really made a blending of his property with the 
rest of the joint family funds, or is merely indulging in a tqx 
avoidance manoeuvre, '^ he solution lies in sii£.ng through the evidence,
5lf. This point was first made by V/ilberforce J. at first instance (1964)
2 All.E.R. I87."But in addition to expenditure ... the defendants should 
be given an allowance or credit for their work and skill." (at 208).
But he finds very "scanty" authority for this proposition and cites 
Cohen J. (as he then was) in Re Macamad etc. v Codd (1945) 2 All.E.R.
664. The learned judge's arguments were adopted without much discussion
in the Court of Appeal (per Denning M.R. in (1965) 1 All.E.R. 849 at 
857-8) and the House of Lords (see Cohen L.J. and Hodson L.J. in (1966)
5 All.E.R. 721 at 744 and 749 respectively).
\l. S&Vld
55• Keech^(1726) Cas.Temp.King 6l at 62 per King L.C. This case lays 
down the rule that a trustee’s interest cannot be allowed to conflict
with that of his cestuii que trust even if his dealings were honest.
56. See f.n.54. But note that in Boardman v Phipps (supra) the trustee 
was accountable to the respondent only to the extent of 5 /18 of the 
profit because that amounted to the respondent's share of the trust 
property. But although this is mentioned by Derrett (1969) I S.C.W.R.
29 at pr.7 p.54-51 I.M.H.L. (1970) 74, this is not relevant for our 
analysis of the Supreme Court cases where the family invariably contri­
buted all the money to buy the shares.
57- As an example of this see R. Ehrenpreis: Community property: 
comingled accounts and the family expense presumptions (1967) 19 Stan.L.R. 
661-670.
refining the legal concepts of "jointness", ’’blending” and "maintenance
grants” and considering whether the man in fact treats his property as
S.A.P. or not, whether it is within his power to do so and if not what
rights are reserved to the family. Thus an "undivided director” who
lives and maintains his family separately, should be able to claim that
his fees are S.A.P. for tax purposes, even though his claims under the
Boardman v Phipps rule would be negligible. \Je must now forget that we
are dealing with a problem of tax avoidance. A man must be paid for his
efforst (this is good sense); but whether he should be allowed to gain
tax advantages depends on how his income is used. The important questions
are : can it be treated as figuring as if it were a maintenance grant ?
Can it be assumed that, by continuing to maintain and educate his family
at JT.P.P. expense, he must be taken to have blended his acquis ition  and
thrown it into the hotch potch ? Should a manager be paid for services to 
57athe family ? This last seems quite contrary to Hindu tradition.
iii* b. The Supreme Court Cases.
Between 1959 and 1971 the Supreme Court has considered twelve 
cases on the subject. The voting and judgement-writing pattern in these
cases is shown in the Table below.
58 59Six of these cases are on partnerships, five on companies,
and in one the joint family had provided security for the Karta getting
57a. This point was considered by only Bhargava J. in H/S Jugal Kishore 
v I.T.Commr. A.I.P. 19&7 B.C. 495 (below); the first point was considered 
by Das C.J. in I.T.Commr. v Babu Lai A.I.E. 1959 S.C. 1289.
58. Mathura Prashad v I.T.Commr. (1966) 60 I.T.E. 428; H.D.Dhanwatey v 
I.T.Commr. A.I.E. I96S S.C. 682; V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.E. 1968"
S.C. <0837 I.T.Commr. v G.V. Dhakappa (I^STTl S.C.W.R. 237; Commr. I.T.
v D.C.Shah 0".r7T9^9"'5~.C.‘ "927T 2^rem Nath v Commr. (1970) II S.C.W.R. 545-
59. I.T.Commr. v Babu Lai A.I.E. 1959 S.C. 1289; M/S Jugal Kishore v 
I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 'l 977^7.~C. 495; Palianappa v I.T. Commr . A. I. R 8 1S~8cT~S . C.
8 7 8 P.N.K.Iyer v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 893;"Raj Humar v Commr. (1970) 
II S.C.V/.R. 674.
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Prem Nath v Commr. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 545
Ra.j Kumar v Commr. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 674
a job as Treasurer in a Bank. The fact that the Karta had credited
his fees to the joint family account was taken note of in only one 
61case. .Evidently, a plea for proportionate entitlement was also
made in that case at the tribunal stage of the proceedings but was
abandoned later.
Tt should be noted that all these cases involve the fees to 
63
the Karta of the family, but the question whether a Karta can receive 
payment for his services to the family has been completely ignored in
64all but one case. In M/S Jugal Kishore v I. T. Commr. Bhargava J., 
reading the judgement of the Court, considered an agreement in which 
the Karta was given a fee. His lordship had great difficulty in 
distinguishing an old Madras case which laid down that a Karta was
65not entitled to any remuneration. But he took a very common sense
approach to the whole problem looking at it from the point of view
both of the revenue and (it would seem) the level of jointness of
the family. He laid down the following test :
M(I)f a remuneration is paid to a karta of the family under 
a valid agreement ii/hich is bona fide and in the interest of and 
expedient for the business of the family and the payment is 
genuine and not excessive, such remuneration must be held to be 
an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose 
of the business of the family and must be allowed as an expen­
diture under the ... Act." 66.
60. Pyare Lai v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. i960 S.C. 997*
61. I. T. Commr. v Babu Lai A.I.P. 1999 B.C. 1289 at pr.lf.,
62. Ibid at .
63. There is however a case where fees paid to a junior member of a
family were allowed to be assessed as separate income. See Hidayatullah 
J.’s judgement in Jitmal v I.T.Commr. (1962) 44 I.T.R. 887.
64. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 495.
65 • Ibid at pr.4 p.496 distinguishing Hon the basis that the statements
were vague) Krishnaswami Ayynagar v Rajagopala Ayyangar (1895) 18 Mad. 73-
66. Ibid at pr. 8 p.497 col.2.
\ A
This test allows the Court to consider many factors and perhaps even 
work out a proportional allotment on the basis of the extent to which
67the payment is a bona fide payment.
0 )  Following Gokul Chand's case.
But unfortunately the Court did not look at this problem 
from this common sense point of view. They ignored the revenue issue, 
the qquity issue, and the injury that is done to the family if property 
is assigned to members on the sole basis of their having received it
as their pay. From the beginning they used the strict, technical,
68
Kitakashara approach and followed the Privy Council ruling in
69Gokul Chand1s case. In I. T. Commr. v Babu Lai the Court
specifically disapproved of a Madras case, which had followed English 
70case lav; emphasising that the Karta was personally entitled to fees, 
by observing :
"(T)hey (the judges in that case) overlooked the principles 
laid down by the Judicial Committee (of the Privy Council)
■*-n Gokul Chand v Hukam Chand ... where it was pointed out that 
there could be no valid distinction between the direct use of 
joint family property and the use qualified the member to make 
the gain on his own efforts.” 71
67. See on this Subba Rao J.’s judgement in a "tax partition” matter 
in I.T.Q. v Bachulal Kapoor (1967) I S.C.V/.R. 14 at 20 where he suggests 
that the Court uncover a sham partition by looking at the social state
of ”jointness of the family". See also on the revenue approach Gaur (1971) 
Thesis 93-105 where he discusses the Supreme Court cases.
68. The Mitakshara and Smriti Chandrika are actually referred to in 
V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. &.I.2. 1963 S.C. 683 at pr.4-5 p.689 by
Ramaswami J. But the specific approval of Gokul Chand1s case in various
Supreme Court cases, which purports to rely on the Mitakshara, may be
taken as an implicit acceptance of the Mitakshara itself.
69. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1289
70. I.T.Commr. v Sankaralinga Iyer A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 610 citing and 
approving of Dover Coalfield Extension Ltd. In re. (1908) i Ch. 65.
71. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1289 at 1293 col.2.
This affirmation of Gokul Chand posed problems. Taken to its logical
conclusion it would always make the fees J.F.P. in all but the most
extreme cases. Indeed the Court specifically approved obiter that the
fees of a Treasurer to a Bank where the family had provided the secu-
72rity deposit be treated as J.F.P. This very question came up in Piyare
73Lai v I. T. Commr. where Kapur J. distinguished Gokul Chand1s case on
the grounds that there was a difference between preparing someone for
7ka profession and providing security. He further substantiated his
argument by referring to English case law and arguing that the Treasurer
was a servant of the Bank and not an independent contractor, thus trying
to ®how that although joint family funds were locked up in the process
73the transaction could not be treated as a joint family investment, and
Kapur J.’s judgement was an attempt to by-pass the impact of Gokul Chand1s
case, which, technically, clearly applied in this case, for in the
latter the Court admitted that the Gokul Chand contract was personal,
77Indeed, in Mathura Prashad v I. T. Commr., Shah J. followed
72. Ibid at p.1292 col.l.
73. A.I.R. I960 S.C.997.
7if. Ibid at pr.l6 p.1002. Kapur J. distinguished the present case on 
the grounds that "there was (no) ... detriment to the family property 
within the meaning of the term as used in decided cases." This is 
clearly inconsistent with Gokul Chand * s case.
75* Ibid at pr.ll p.1001 relying on Short v Henderson Ltd. (19^6) 62 
T.L.R. 427 at if29; Dharabgadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v Saurashtra A.I.R. 
1957 S.C. 26k at 260 and also the Tort case of Cassidy v Minister of 
Health (1931) 2 K.B. 3*f3 at 352-3-
76. In Gokul Chand1 s case (1921) I.A. 162 at 172 it was observed 
"No decision attempts to distinguish between the personal and family 
elements in the ultimate gains; it would probably be impracticable to 
do so. There is equally little ground for contending that partibility 
depends on causa proxima, or is negatived by the intervention of the 
personal element of the coparcener's character."
77- (1966) 60 I.'T.R. 428.
Babu Lai* s case and summarily dismissed the argument that Piyare Lai1s
case applied. Shah J.’s view that the latter involved ’’obtaining a
78
benefit which is essentially personal to the manager” ignores that
79this was so even in Gokul Chand’s case.
The affirmation of Gokul Chand created definite problems 
and Ramaswami J. tried to revive the Madras case which has been dis­
approved in Babu Lai’s case on the basis of the Gokul Chand case. In
go
Palianappa v I. T. Commr. he tried to get round the Court’s specific 
approval of Gokul Chand by saying
’’The process of reasoning of the Madras High Court ... may be
open to criticism and may not be sound but in our opinion, the
actual decision in that case is correct and is supported by the 
principle thqt there was no detriment to the family property and 
no part of the family funds had been spent or utilised for 
acquiring and remuneration of the managing director.” 8l
82Hegde J. in a companion case however took a stronger line 
(dissenting) and realised that as long as Gokul Chand was still good law 
all that the Revenue Department had to prove was that the assessee had
been immediately appointed to his post following the acquisition by ,
the family of shares in the firm or company. Pointing out the incon­
sistency in the Supreme Court cases he observed :
"In Piyare Lai’s case ... this Court ignored the fule laid
down by the Judicial Committee in Gokul Chand’s case and this very
bench did not allow itself to be influenced by that rule in
Palaniappa Chettiag1s case ... ”
83In 1970 he had the courage actually to overrule Gokul Chand1s case.
78. Ibid at 433-4.
79* See the quotation in f.n.76.
8°. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 678.
81. Ibid at pr.4 p.68l col.2.
82. V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 683 at pr.26 p.693 col.l.
83. Raj Kumar v I.T.Commr. (1970) II S.C.W.R. 674 at 679-80, 685.
It took the Supreme Court ten years to modify the law as 
stated in Gokul Chandfs case, during which time they had taken evasive 
action to try to soften its full implications.
To revert back to Table I, we will see that the judgement 
of the Privy Council which had been affirmed by a bench of three judges 
in Case I and Case 2. and was itself ..affirmed by several benches of 
three and five judges respectively, was overruled by a bench of only 
three judges. It should also be noted that the voting behaviours of 
Shah and Grover JJ. are quite inconsistent. Shah J. had affirmed 
3abu Lai’s case in his judgements in Cases 3i 8 and 9 in the Table 
but agreed to it being impliedly overruled in Case 12. Again,
Grover J. had subscribed to Shah J.’s judgements in Cases 8 and 9 
and Ramaswami J.’s judgement in Case 10. But both of them happily 
concur in Hegde J.’s judgement in Case 12.
Shah J.’s readiness to accept Hegde J.’s approach can 
perhaps best be explained by the fact that between 196/ anc^  9^70 
the Supreme Court had followed a practical test unhampered by the 
Gokul Chand case (as approved by the Supreme Court in Babu Hal*s case), 
while paying lip service to the strict Mitakshara approach which those 
cases embody.
To this practical approach we now turn.
The practical approach, in the cases between 19&7 and 1970»
Although the Gokul Chand and Baby Lai cases are mentioned 
84
in several cases, if we look at the facts of the decisions in the 
seven cases decided between October 19&7 anc* 1970, we will see that 
the Court has followed a practical approach by deciding that there 
the firm or company in question was completely a joint family concern, 
the Directors’ fees are joint family property. Thus in the two
85Dhanwatey cases the partnership was in fact no more than the joint
family reconstituted as a partnership firm. This is also true of
86 87P. N. K. Iyer v I. T. CQmmr. and Mathura Prashad v I. T. Commr.°
83But in Palaniappa v I. T. Commr. the joint family owned
only 90 of the 300 shares in the company. Again, in I. T. Commr. v
89 90D. C. Shah and Prem Nath v I. T. Commr. the joint family was a
partner with other outsiders to form the partnership. The only excep-
91tion to this approach was Raj Kumar v I. T. Commr. where Hegde J.
84. Gokul Chand1 s case Is referred to in I.T.Commr. v Babu Lai A.I.R.
1959 B.C. 12&9 at pr'.ll p.1293; Piyare Lai v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. i960 S.C. 
997 at pr.l5» 16 p.1002; V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.R." 1968' B.C.683 
at pr.25i 26 p.695 (By Hegde J. the dissenting judge); Raj Kumar v I.T. 
Commr. (1970) II S.C.W.R. 674 at pr.7 p.679-80, pr.16 p.605. Babu Lai1s 
case is referred to in -Piyare Lai v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. i960 S.C.997 at 
pr.13 p. 1001-2; Mathura Prashad v I.T.Commr. (19^6) 60 I.T.R." 428 at 431-3 
Palaniappa v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 678 at p.679-60; M.D.Dhanwatey
v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 682 at 683; V.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.R 
1966 S.C. 683 aV'667-'^ l' ^by the majority judge) and at 694-6 (by the 
minority judge);P.N.K.Iyer v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 893 at pr.9 
p.895; Raj Kumar v I.T.Commr. (I970)Tl sVc.V/.R. 674 at 678-680, 683.
85. M.D.Dhanwatey v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 682; V.D.Dhanwatey v 
I.T.Commr. A.I.R'.' 19&S S.C. 663.
86. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 893 at pr.l--2 pp.893-4, p.68l col.l.




0 A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 678 at pr.2 p. 679.
89. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 927 at pr.l p.927.
90. (1970) II S.C. \"l ■R. 545.
91. (1970) II S.C.1/.R.-674.
took.a wider view, to which we shall return later.
While it is true that the Court had on several occasions 
accepted the argument that the fees in question were paid for the
i 92Director s personal services, it had been arbitrary in recognising
93these claims. Thus the claim was accepted in Palaniappa v I. T. Commr.
94and I. T. Commr. v D. C. Shah (where the concerns were not solely
joint family concerns) but was not accepted in P. N. Krishna Iyer v 
93I. T. Commr. (where the concern was a joint family concern), even 
though in this case the Tribunal below had made the finding of fact 
that
"the shares ... were allotted to the assessee in view of the 
valuable services rendered by him in the promotion of the 
company." 96
The point about personal services was in fact indubitably linked with
the wider consideration whether the firm was a family concern or not,
and even in cases where the Karta rendered valuable personal assistance
by promoting the firm, the Court has not always accepted that his fees
97be treated as S.A.P.
92. Palaniappa v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 67B at 68l; P.N.K.Iyer v
I.T.Commr. A.I*R* 1969 S.C. 893 at Pr*13 P*896; I.T.Commr. v Q.6.Shah 
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 927 at pr.7 P-929; Prem Nath v I.T.Commr. (1970) II
S.C.W.R. 545 at 547.
93. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 678.
9k. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 923.
95. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 893.
96. Ibid at pr.13 p.893.
97. I.T.Commr. v Babu Lai A.I.R. 1939 S.C. 1289 at pr.12 p.1293; Mathura 
Prashad v I.T.Commr. (l966)~~60 I.T.R. 428 at 432-3; P.N.K.Iyer v I.T. 
Commr. A.I.R. X969"S.C. 893 at pr.13 p.893. The promoter’s position is
a little different, see Weavers Mills v Blakis Ammal A.I.R. 1969 Mad.
462 at pr.l8 p.470’
/,
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T 98J-n the latest decision, Raj Kumar v I. T. Commr,, Hegde J,,
99after stating the various descriptions of the test applied in former 
cases, observed :
"In our opinion from these subsidiary principles, the 
broader principle that emerges is whether the remuneration 
received by the coparcener in sub|stance though not in form 
was but one of the modes of return made to the family because 
of the investment of family funds in the business or whether 
it was a compensation made for the services rendered by the 
individual coparcener ... If the income was essentially earned 
as a result of the funds invested, the fact that a coparcener 
has rendered some service would not change the character of 
the receipt. But if on the other hand it is essentially a 
remuneration for the services rendered by the coparcener, the 
circumstances that his services were availed of because of 
the reason that he was a member of the family which had 
invested funds in that business or that he had obtained the 
qualification shares from out of the family funds would not 
make the receipt the income of the Hindu individed family." 100
It is evident from the application of this test to the facts of the
case that the Court was abandoning the simple test i  Is the firm
in fact the family concern ? and actually considering whether the
payment was for personal services. The firm in this case was really
a family firm, but his lordship laid emphasis on the fact that the
appellant was elected Managing Director because of his personal
contribution.'*'^ Having thus for the first time actually found for
the Director of a family concern, the Court has come very far from
its decision in Babu Lai’s case as well as from the practical test it
had followed from 19&7 to 1970* It is possible that in future the
Court will evaluate all these (and other) factors while deciding
cases where the Director’s fees are in question.
98. (1970) II S.C.W.H. 674.
99* ^he tests enumerated by Hegde J. on p . 686 are: "(l)Whether the 
income received by the coparcener of a Hindu individed family as remu­
neration has any real connection with the investment of joint family 
funds; (2 )Whether the income received was directly related to any 
utilisation of family assets; (3)Whether the family has suffered any 
detriment in the process of the realisation of the income (,) and (4) 
Whether the income was received with the aid and assistance of joint 
family funds."
100. Ibid at 686.
101. Ibid at 686.
T h e  C o u r t ’ s  c h o i c e  o f  t e c h n i q u e s .
The Supreme Court could have chosen between several tech­
niques while adjudicating on this problem. It could, as Bhargava J.
102did in H/S Jugal Kishore v I. T. Commr., openly have treated this
problem as a tax avoidance manoeuvre and avoided the complicated Hindu
law propositions involved, by simply asking if the payments were boda
fide or not.^^ Indeed it appears that between 19&7 anc* 1970 in actual
fact it did just that by deciding in favour of the joint family (and
therefore the revenue) whenever the firm in question was merely a
family firm. This revenue law technique (if one call call it that)
has much to comment it and was followed by the Privy Council while
considering the problem of partial partitions under Section 29 A of
10 A
the Income Tax Act 1922. But the main difficulty in such an approach 
is that it may tend to ignore the fact that the Court is dealing with 
the Hindu joint family.
In Babu Lai1s case the Court looked at the matter almost 
solely from the point of view of Gokul Chand1s case - it simply followed 
precedent. This led., to difficulties and forced the Court to try to 
evade the problems attendant on following purely sastric principles 
and led to the clash between Ramaswami J., v/ho adhered mechanically 
to the Hindu law texts, and Hegde J., v/ho felt that the Hindu law 
should be reformed. Indeed, Hegde J.’s judgements are an attempt to 
reform the Hindu law and individualise property relations within the 
family rather than find an equitable solution to the problem. To 
follow traditional law techniques would mean to get an ''either/or"
102• A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 495-
103* ^his passage is quoted and discussed supra.
104. See Sir Sundar Singh v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 37j Lachman Das v 
C.i!t. A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 8 .
approach which, as Professor Derrett has shown, does not really solve 
the problem. The equity approach could be refined (as we have seen 
there is scanty English authority for it) and applied discriminatingly 
to this area. At the same time the Court should seek to use some 
Hindu law techniques other than the simple detriment test which seems 
to have taken so much of the Court's time. The Court should for 
example consider whether a situation where a Director who in fact 
lives joint in all respects with his family can, apart from committing 
a fraud on the revenue, be treated as blending his property with the 
J.F.P. Or qgain if the Director in fact remits the money to a joint 
family account and receives some of it back to maintain his nuclear 
family with whom he lives separately, could the amount he is given 
back be treated as a maintenance grant ?
By using this assortment of revenue, equity and Hindu law 
techniques the Court would be able to consider more fully the state of 
jointness of the family, consider their living habits, and at the same 
time determine the matter satisfactorily from the point of view of the 
revenue authority. What the Court has done in fact is simply to adopt 
one of the Hindu law techniques used by the Privy Council in a different 
context. Moreover that technique, though technically good law, was 
itself discredited and abrogated pro tanto by the Hindu Gains of 
•^ earning Act 1930 i
The Court got bogged in the details of applying, or evading 
the application of, the Gokul Chand case, and was not able to explore 
fully other techniques that were in fact available to them. Obviously 
the Bar lacked originality, and the stimulus to obtain it, and this 
■aft is not unconnected with the moribund condition of Hindu legal 
learning in India and the want of inspiration from English sources to 
which the Bar is accustomed to look.
iii. c. The Problem of Insurance Policies.
This problem first arose at the turn of the century. The 
Madras High Court delivered a series of judgements in which they 
followed the salutary rule that if a policy was taken out with the 
aid of joint family money, the beneficiary under the policy was 
clearly intended to be the joint family; whereas if the premia were 
paid out of S.A.P., the beneficiary was the person whose life was
insured or his assignee or nominee.
In later cases however the High Courts, in a reforming mood,
reversed the presumptions. It will be useful to remember that at that 
period it was not known how far the general and statutory law cut 
across the ancient textual law which did not spell out any concept of
insurance (however much it might have existed in ancient times sub modo).
106Thus in Balamba v Rrishnayya Sankarag. Nair J. observed :
"Prima facie what is paid as premium is a man’s own property."
The reason for this was given by Staples A.J.C. in Sugandhabai v 
Kesarbhai^^:
"A policy of life insurance is usually a personal contract 
between the person v/ho is called the assured and the insurance 
company. It is true no doubt, that an insurance policy could
be taken out for the benefit of the joint family; . but. the.......
presumption would be against that as a rule, and in my opinion 
it would have to be proved that the policy was taken out with 
that intention and that the premia was paid out of joint family 
funds."
105. Mahadeva Pandia v Marayan Pandia (1903) 13 M.L.J. 75 j Rajamma v 
Ram Krishnayya (l90£>) 29 Mad« 21 (per S.Ayyar O.C.J. and Nair J.); 
Srinivas Iyengar v Thriuvengedattathaiyar A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 226 (note 
however that in the last mentioned case the sons v/ere entitled to the 
policy as heirs as v/ell - a point made much of by Rajmannar C.J. in 
Venkata Subbarao v Rakhshminarasu A.I.R. 195*+ Mad.222 at 223); Oriental 
Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd.p£l912) 35 Mad. 1621(per 
Benson and S. Ayyar JJ.) . ^
106. (191*0 37 Mad (F.B.) at p.*+89.
This attitude w§.s continued in a large numbe'r of cases,
109and distinguished in others. What the Courts did was to emphasise 
a point of insurance law (the contract of insurance is a personal 
contract) and merged it with considerations of Hindu law. There is 
in fact no reason why an insurance policy should not be treated as 
a family investment; after all it is clearly laid down that an 
insurance policy is assignable^*^ just like any other valuable 
security. Again the matter can be considered from the point of view 
of the. interest in the joint family to provide maintenance for the 
assured family, should he expire, and treated as a maintenance grant.
The Supreme Court considered this matter in Marbati Kuer v 
111Sarangdhar. In this case five policies were taken out from. J.F.P. 
funds, three in the name of the Karta’s own famiihy and two for his 
step-brothers, llidayatullah J., reading the judgement for S. R. Das 
C.J. (v/ho as we have seen was responsible for introducing the Gokul 
Chand case in the Directors' fees cases) and Das Gupta J., decided
on facts that the family intended these to be J.F.P. But he'went on
to observe :
"(T)here is no proposition of lav/ by which the insurance 
policies must be regarded as the separate property of the Co­
parceners on whose lives the insurance is effected by a
coparcenary and that the proceeds of an insurance policy do 
not belong to the joint family." 112
108. See B..I, & Real Insurance Co. Ltd. v Vellayamal A.I.R. 1957 Mad.371 
at 575- Seethe comments of Derrett: The Supreme Court and the acquisition 
of joint family property (i960) 62 Born.L.R.Jnl.37 at 6l; Venkata Subbarao 
v Lakshminarasu A.I.R. 193*+ Mad. 222 at 22l&\ he Rajambal Bai A.I.R. 1935
II.U.C. 5943 (Madrasi'.
109. Note the obiter remarks of Krishnasv/ami Ayyangar J. in a different 
context in Ramayya v Kolanda A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 911 at 913•
110. See Section 138 of the Insurance Act 1938.
111. A.I.R. I960 S.C. *t03»
112. Ibid at pr.*f p.*+0*f.
Having reversed the presumption his lordship said that the view that 
an insurance policy would always mature in favour of the coparcener 
was too broad but did not overrule the case in which the proposition 
was made on the grounds that the instant case was decided on its facts.
The Supreme Court approach has been generally followed by 
113the High Courts. But this case is important because it gives us a 
clue to the attitude of Das C.J. It could well be argued that his 
judgement in Babu Lai1s case (where he approved of Gokul Ghand15 case) 
was an attempt to prevent tax avoidance, but his concurrence in this 
judgement shows that his lordship was not prepared to follow a line 
of reasoning whereby joint family rights are ignored in an attempt to 
give the individual greater control of joint family property. Secondly, 
the fact that the judgement was read by a Muslim judge, who followed 
the strict Hindu law approach rather than accept references to wider 
arguments based on the nature of the insurance contract, indicates 
that, in 19^0, the Court treated such questions strictly as Hindu law 
questions.
113. See Srinuvasan J. in Karuppa Gounder v Palaniammal A.I.R. 1963 
Mad. 2*f5 at 2*+8; ■ Veeraswarai and Ka$lasam JJ. in Seethalakshmi Ammal v 
Controller, Bstate Duty (1966) 6l I.T.R. 3^7 at 322 (Madras); P.J. " 
Reddy C.J. at Harayanlal v Controller, Bstate Duty, A.I.R. 19&9 A.P.
188 where it was decided on facts that the policy was intended for 
the son (at pr.10 p.191). But on the nature of the presumption that 
the property was J.F.P. see pr. b p.l89 and the comment of Derrett 
C.M.H.L. (1970) 6*f-7» Mote that in the last three cases cited in 
this note the problem was looked at once again from the point of view 
of the revenue law.
iv. Conclusion
To sum up, if we consider the Supreme Court’s performance 
while arbitrating between the individuals and joint family claims to 
property, the Court has preferred to adopt a strict Hindu law approach, 
rather than explore ways and means of balancing equities in the modern 
context, by an extensive use of both traditional and 'cosmopolitan 
techniques in combination. Hegde J. represents a feforming trend in 
the Court but even he seems content with expanding the Privy Council’s 
methods rather than evolving a pattern of his own. This attitude 
contrasts with their general approach in public law matters where, as 
we have seen, they have used (and even distorted) western techniques.
In these personal law matters they have followed, unimaginatively, 
traditional patterns of thinking and even so they have articulated 
them obscurely and without apparent consciousness of the significance 
of what they were doing.
3. The problem of partition in the Supreme Court
i. Resume of the Supreme Court cases
The Supreme Court has decided a large number of cases on
partition; six are on impartible estates^, one on the procedural
2
aspects of the doctrine of pious obligation, one on a problem c£
3 4limitation, two on the communication of intention to sever, two
5
on the minor’s partition, eight on various aspects of revenue law
and partition,^ two on the effects of the recent statutes granting
7
rights to women ad its effects on joint family property, two on the
g
nature of shares allotted, three on various kinds of partial partition,
1. Chinnayathi v Kulasekhara A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 29; Pushavati v Viziaram 
v Pushavati Visweswar" (1964) II S.C.R. 433; Krishna v Sarvagna Krishna 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1793; Rajendra Singh v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1~946 
(strictly on the Government’s recognition of the ruler of an impartible 
estate); Ef.P. v Kumar (1971) I S.C.J. 100;
Dayaram v Paulat Shah A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 68l (pimple problem of the suc­
cession to an impartible" estate).
2. Pannalal v Karaini A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 171.
3. Nani Bhai v Gita Bai A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 706.
4. Raghavamma v Chenchamma A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136; Putt rang amrna v 
Rangamma A.I.R. i960 S.C. lQlo.
3. Peddasubbaya v Ademma A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1042; Venkata Reddi v Rakshaman 
A.I.R. 19^3~S.C. l60i".
6 . Firm Bhagat Ranr v E.P.T. Commr. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 374; Charandass 
Haridass v C.I.T. (i960) 62 Bom.L.R. 635; I.T.Officer v 'Rhimmaya A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 1239; ddayan Chimibhai v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 19^7 S.C. 7^2;
I.T.Q. v Bachu Lai Kapur (1967) I S.C.W.R. 14; for feiaaft cases on whether 
throwing into the hotch potch and subsequently partitioning all the 
property to avoid taxation see Keshavalal v C.I.T. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 866; 
Goli Rswariah v G.T.C. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1722. For the same problem from 
the point of rent control laws see Sarin v Ajit Kumar A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432.
7 . Munnalal v Raj Kumar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493 (on S.14 of the Hindu 
Succession Act 1956T;' Satrushan v Buj Pari A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272 (on the 
Hindu Women,’s Right to Property Act 1937) • Cee also on the rights of 
co-widows of a coparcener to partition property to which they had only 
S.life estate, Karpagathachi v Ragarathinathachi A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1752 
and compare with I.T.Commr. v Indira A.I.R. i960 S.C. 1172.
T.S.Swaminatha v Off. Receiver A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 577 (on the nature 
of the charge where one coparcener has an owelty because he got a lesser 
share at partition); Sunkavilli v Goli Sathiraju A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 342.
ywhether as to persons or property, one on what property is
10 1' divisible, and several on whether there was a partition or not.
In this note we shall concentrate on three problems
(a) The problem of partial partition with particular reference to
the tax situation.
Cb) The question of communicating the intention to sever.
(c^  The minor’s right to partition - a case of overprotection.
ii. The problem of partial partition with particular reference 
to the tax situation.
bliile it is difficult to accept Dr. Jolly’s view that in
12the very ancient days there was no such thing as partition, because
13there are certain texts which encourage it, the commentators were 
quite familiar with the - problem that the whole family did not have 
to partition at once and laid down the rule that sons could not
9. Bhagwan Dayal v Reoti Devi A.I.R. 19&3 S.C. 2o9 (persons of the 
separating branch remain joint inter sej; the remaining two cases in 
this category are on partition of joint family property stages:- 
xvashinath v liarsingh A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1077; Devi Das v Shri Sailappa
• A7i.Pl.' 19o2 '.s7g. 1277 (mortgage debt left undivided)’.
10. Darayanswami v Rama Krishna A.I.R. 19^5 S.C. 289.
11. Bhagwati Prashad v Dameshwari Kuer A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 72 (held there 
was a partition); Gur n a rain Das v Gur ~f?ahal Das A.I.R. 1932 S.C. 223; 
Rukmabai v Laxni Narayan A.I.R. i960 B.C. 333 (held that the partition 
was a sham partition); Gummana v Ragnainiamma A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 1595 
(held there was a family partition not an outright partition);
Iiudigowda v Ram Chandra A.I.R. 19&9 B.C. IO76 (held there was a sham 
partition to prevent the widows of a deceased coparcener from adopting). 
See also Siromani v Hemkumar A.I.R. 1968 S,C. 1299 (on the intention to 
sever and the customary rights about the special positions of certain 
sons).
12. Dr. J. Jolly: Hindu law of inheritance and partition (Tagore Law 
lectures) 90. See Kane III H.D. 565 ff« for comments and criticism.
13« Note particularly the following texts referred to by Derrett : 
C.M.Ii.L. (1970) 1 Manu IX.Ill; Gautama XXVIII.^ also discussed Kane 
III H.D. 571.
partition without the father’s consent and further that the coparcener
v/ho effected a partition was nevertheless still joint with his sons.^
16The former rule is still followed in Bombay and the latter rule has
17been recently approved by the Supreme Court. Equally important was
the fact that all the property was not divisible. The texts lay down
that certain property is impartible even though Jaganatha, quoting
Bpihaspati, laid down the rule :
’’Property held in common would be unemployed, for it fannot 
be given one in exclusion of another: therefore it must be divided 
by some mode deduced from reasoning? else it would be useless.” 18
The fact that a person could remain joint v/ith respect to some property
and separate in regard to some other has been generally followed even
19by the Supreme Court in two recent cases, even though they follow
14. See Kane III H.D. 567-572 stressing that the Mitakshara accepted 
the fact that such a partition was possible in-the life time of the 
father. But contrast the statement of Derrett in (1962) Contributions 
to Indian Sociology VI p.17 at 42 suggesting that this idea was unpopu­
lar amongst the successors of the Mitakshara. He states at f.n.115 
"Unless I am deceived neither the excellent Smriti Chandrika nor the 
Byavahara Mayukh ..• confirms the son’s right to demand partition 
against the father’s will: what the latter says at IV,4-6, on the 
subject amounts to a deposition of the father on the grounds of vice
or senility.” See also Jagannatha II C.D. 257-285 Distribution by a 
father in his life time.
15. See ^ayne (lid) 520-25 for the theoretical and "Anglo-Indian” 
approach to the problem.
16. See the Bombay case of Apaji v Ramchandra 16 Bom.29. But note the 
dissent of Telang J. at 45-51 where he follows the Mitakshara position.
17. See Bhagwan Dayal v Reoti Devi A.I.P. 1965 S.C. 289.
18. Jagannatha II commenting on Text 566 at 472-5- Derrett (I96I) 65 
Bom.L.R.Jnl. 17-25; Kane III H.D. 587 ff.: Mayne: (lid) 5II-515. See 
also in this connection Colebrooke’s Digest II 471-477-
19. See the case of Kashinath v Narsingh A.I.R. I96I S.C. 1077 at pr.14
p.1082 "But in the course of the proceedings effectuating a division of 
all the properties by a single award was apparently found inconvenient 
and a convenient method was applied and the property divided by stages.” 
See also at pr.26 p.1034; Devidas v Shrishailappa A.I.R. I96I S.C. 1277 
(a mortgage bond v/as deemed indivisible) see also at pr.ll p.1282 on the
rule that the partition was also partial as to persons).
Anglo Hindu Lav/ to rule that the property is held by separating 
members as tenants-in-common.^
The problem however was this: can coparceners make a partition 
of some property and remain joint (with all the incidents of a co­
parcenary) with respect to the rest ? The nearest that Anglo Hindu Law 
got to accepting this was in the matter of the impartible estate, where
the estate v/as enjoyed by one person but there was a right of survivor-
21ship in other members and possibly maintenance. Professor Derrett’s 
22view that this idea v/as popularised by the Supreme Court Chinnathayi1s 
23case perhaps arises from dicta appearing there, ignoring the fact
24
that in that case there had not in fact been a partition, and m  any
25






there is a partition the right to survivorship in the impartible estates 
is lost. See the way he distinguishes Vadrevu v Vadrevu (1877) 3 I.A. 6l; 
Tara Kumari v Chaturbhuj (1913) b2 I.A. 192 at pr.20 p.34- relied on by 
Derrett I.K.H.L. 331*
23• See the rrivy Council case of Konamal v Annadada (1927) 33 I.A. 11b 
at 128 where the remarks are quite clearly obiter because the Court 
relied on the fact that there had been a family arrangement in this 
case. But the obiter was later relied on in Bal Ifukundji v Gokaran 
A.I.R. 1938 All. 124 at 126. The idea that in the case of impartible 
estates partition and relinquishment of the right to survivorship are 
necessary v/as evolved by the High Courts independently of the Supreme 
Court (see Gangadhar v Din Dayal A.I.R. 1954- 0r» 14-2; S.P.Chinnathambiar 
v Rama Pandia A.I.R. 1954- Rad. 35 Jitendra v Bhagwati Prashad A.I.R.
1936 Pat. 457; Bal Hukundji v Gokaran A.I.R. 195(T"All• 124) and adopted 
by Text book writers: See Raghavacharia'r (19^5) ^83; Derrett: I.T-I.HAL. 
(1963) pr.84l; Mulla (I2d) 593.
See Devidas v Shrishailappa A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1277 at pr.10 p.1282.
This is a vexed question see generally Hayne (lld).<^~^ ^
pvn . ~9-
See Derrett: C.H.H.L. (1970) 146-7- 
A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 29.
Ibid at pr.28 p.3 6. In fact Mahajan J. tries to show that where
In any event it must be remembered that the impartible estate is
more a creature of custom and is not really J.F.P. as such. The
Supreme Court has however in a recent judgement tried to stamp on it
a joint family character and in a recent case suggested that the
family has a right to maintenance out of the estate ignoring two
27previous Supreme Court dficisions which had ruled the contrary.
'This was clearly an attempt by Ramaswami J. to introduce the joint 
family element whereas Gajendragadkar and Mahajan JJ.’s judgements 
(in the earlier cases) had tried to soften it. It will thus be clear 
from all this that the Courts, and above all the Supreme Court, are 
not wholly unfamiliar with the idea of a partial partition as to proper- 
try, which was introduced by statute in 1928 for tax reasons. We will 
concern ourselves solely with the revenue situation because the Supreme 
Court has not yet dealt with the problem of "notional" partitions under
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Afit 1956 which has created so much
2ucontroversy in the Bombay High Court.
26. See Ramaswami J.'s statement in U.P. v Rajfaumar (1971) 1 S.C.J. 100 
102 "The right to maintenance and the right to survivorship however 
still remain and (it) is by reference to these rights that the property 
though impartible has in the eye of the law to be regarded as joint 
family property."
27. Contrast Mahajan J. in Chinnathayi’s case A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 29 at 
pr.23 p.35 col.2 "The junior members of the family can neither demand 
partition of the estate nor can they claim maintenance as of right 
except on the strength of custom, nor are they entitled to possession 
or enjoyment of the estate." Gajendragadkar J. Pushavati Viziaram v 
Pushiavati Visweswar (1964) II S.C.R. 403 at 416 "Mve'n the right to 
maintenance as a matter of right is not applicable as laid down in 
the Second Pittarur case ... 45 I.A. 148."
2o. Cn this see the famous case of Rangubai v Laxman A.I.R. 1966 Bom.
169 and see the comments of Derrett Tl970)" C.M.H.L. 217 ff. Mrs. Manohar 
(I966) 68 Bom.L.R. 60-62. That case lays down, while considering a 
notional partition under the section, that the female (or someone claiming 
through her) in Sch.I of the Act, under the Act claims as heir and also 
takes absolutely her share at the supposed partition under Hindu law.
The Bombay Court has gone one step further and suggested in Harayan Rao 
v State A.I.R. 1971 Bom. 158 that the said section requires an actual 
partition; see Derrett (1971) 73 Bom.L.R.J. 82-83. But this problem has 
not been directly considered by the Supreme Court.
Tfte> idea that a person could partition all or some of his 
property for tax reasons was introduced by the Income Tax Amendment 
Act (3 of) 192S which introduced Section 25A to the Income Tax Act 
1522, the; relevant portion of which lays down :
"25A (l) Where at the time of making an assessment under 
Section 23 it is claimed by or on behalf of any member of a 
Hindlu family hitherto assessed as Undivided that a partition 
had taken place among the members of such family the Income 
Tax Officer shall make enquiry thereinto as he may think fit, 
and if he is satisfied that the joint family property has 
beem partitioned amongst the various members or groups of 
members in definite portions he shall refiord an order to that 
effect provided that no such order shall be recorded until 
notices of the enquiry have been served on all the members of 
the family."
The Privy Council made it clear that what this section 
required v/as not an actual partition, but merely a division of the 
property into definite portions, and that a partition valid at Hindu
lav; would, be invalid for revenue purposes unless there was an actual
28
division into definite portions. Later the Madras High Court ruled 
that a business may be partitioned by specification of shares in the 
accounts.^
More recently the Income Tax Act 19&1 recognises that joint
families can partition only some of their property. Section 171 (8)
(b) of thee Act defines "partial partition" as
"a partition which is partial as regards the persons constituting 
the Hindu individed family, or the properties belonging to the 
Hindu Undivided family or both."
How has tlhe Supreme Court reacted to these revenue problems 2 iAave
they looked at the problem solely from the revenue point of view or
29. Sir Sundar Singh v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 57 > See also the 
Privy Council decision of Lac'hman Das v C.I.T. A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 8.
For the Income Tax approach see Kanga and Palkivala: ihe lav/ and practice 
of Income Tax (1969 Ldn.) 843-o59»
30. See Heyappa v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 506 (partition by entry 
into books) Daivayya & Sons v I.T.Commr. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 315•
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have they accepted the criteria of Hindu law ? And, if so, to what 
extent have they used traditional concepts to deal with these modern 
problems ?
One of the first problems that the.Supreme Court faced was 
whether when a joint family firm joins a partnership all the co­
parcener's family became members of the partnership. If this argument 
were accepted the joint family would practically cease to exist as a 
business institution and the members would be severally liable to the
extent of their share for the liabilities of the partnership. In
31Firm Bhagat Ram v E. P. T. Comnr. T. L. V. Ayyar J. (himself a
reknowned Hindu lawyer) took up a traditional standpoint and observed :
»tlf members of a coparcenery are to be regarded as partners
in a firm with strangers, they would also become under the part­
nership partners inter se, and it would cut at the very root of 
the notion of the joint undivided family to hold that with 
reference to coparcenery property can at the same time be both 
coparceners as well as partners.” 32
±n this particular case the question was whether tax relief given to a 
joint family firm showing loss could be taken away if there was a par­
tition and the firm reconstituted as a partnership, on the grounds that 
th& persons constituting the firm had changed. The Court held that 
the persons constituting the firm had changed.
But this principle has also worked in favour of the joint
33family. Thus in the recent case of Agarwal & Co. y I.T. Commr.
Hegde J. held that a partnership did not have to register as a company
because the total number of members (including the coparceners in the 
joint family) exceeded the statutory maximum, ^his insistence on Hindu
31. A.I.R. 1936 S.C. 37k. .
32. Ibid at pr.7 p.377-8.
33. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 13 A3 see also C.I.T. v Nand Lai A.I.R. i960 3.C. 
1U7; C.I.T. v Baxalakshmi & Co. A.I.R. 19&3 B.C. 1708.
lav; techniques rather than lifting the veil of the partnership for
3Z1
tax and other purposes ‘ reflects on the capacity of the Court to 
preserve -iindu lav; attitudes in complex secular situations.
This contrasts with the attitude of the ^rivy Council which
had treated the problem of partition under the Income Tax Act 1922
35from the tax rather than the Hindu law point of view. Indeed, this
approach filtered through to the Supreme Court in Charandas' Haridass 
36v I. T. Commr; but here the Court also justified their stand on the
ground that it was consistent with the principles of Hindu law. The
question arose whether partitioning..'certain incomes from certain
partnerships was a sufficient partition to comply with terms of
Section 25A of the Act. The Bombay High Court thought that it did not
but their decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that :
"(t)here is nothing in the Indian Income Tax law or the law of 
partnership which prevents members of a Hindu joint family from 
dividing any asset, ouch division myst, of course, be effective 
so as to bind the members; but Hindu law does not further require 
that the property must in every case be partitioned by metes and 
bounds, if separate enjoyment can otherwise be secured according 
to the shares of the members. Eor an asset of this kind there was 
no other mode of partition open to the parties if they wished to 
retain the property and yet hold it jointly but in severally, and 
the law does not contemplate that a person should do the impossible .A’.n
The Court in an attempt to justify "income tax partition" on traditional
grounds, clearly fused two doctrines into one, i.e. the income tax view
that a person can divide some property for income tax reasons and yet
remain joint as a family with Hindu law :vs hot ions that the law does
not enjoin the partitiop6f what is by its very nature impartible. A
3A. This is a typical technique used in England (see Cower: Principles 
of Modern Company Law (1969 3d.) Chapter 10 pp.189-217- See particularly 
the tax attitude at p.200) as well as in India.
35• See supra f.n.29.
36. (i960) 62 Bom.L.P. 663.
37 • Ibid at 666.
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foreign observer v/as alarmed by this statement and pointed out that :
’’there is a danger that it may be believed that a joint Hindu 
family can partition a business or partnership share or indeed 
any similar single source of profit, like a debenture by merely 
entering into an agreement to receive the income in fixed shares 
... I’he fact is that is impossible ... The sastra is hov/ever 
consistent with common sense, and must therefore be followed.” 3$
We have already seen above that traditional Hindu law accepted 
the need to recognise some kinds of partial partition. But it is also 
true that if the principle were taken beyond the confines of the limits 
set by the sastra (i.e. what is impossible to partition or is not 
available at the time should either not be partitioned by sale and
distribution of proceeds, or should be allotted undivided subject to an
39 1owelty) the joint family itself would be fragmented. ihe Supreme 
Court have clearly made an attempt to introduce a modernising principle 
into the joint family dressed up in traditional notions and at the expense 
of the revenue. Some attempt must be made to determine clearly the 
extent to which we might allow tne principle of tax partition (clearly - 
a form of tax avoidance) to become a permanent feature of Hindu law.
The Court has not displayed a consistent attitude on this and in
4oI. T. 0. v Bachu bal Kapur Subba Bao J. was prepared to accept an 
argument from the revenue that the partition v/as in fact a make-believe 
one.
"The case of the revenue was that the compromise v/as a make 
believe one and the family in f<ct continued to be a joint fa/iily.
If the case of the revenue v/as true and the fact of the continuance 
of the joint Hindu family was kept back from the knowledge of the 
Income tax officer, it would be a clear case of the said family 
escaping assessment during the relevant year." 41
3o. Derrett: Decent Decisions in Hindu Law (1961) 63 Bom.L.B. 1-8,17-23 atl9
39- THe Ilitakshara joint family would then gradually cease to have 
I any assets which would all be held in severalty. This aspect of the
| matter is discussed very well with Derrett with all the ancient texts
[ in the article cited f.n.38 at 17-23.
40. (1967) I S.C.U.K. 14.
| 41. Ibid at p.20.
I "  ■.............
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Some balance must be found between the Income Tax viev; about tax 
evasion, the Hindu law view which discourages partial partition and 
the belief underlying the Act that since partition is constantly alleged 
feo support the non-applicability of provisions discriminating against 
the joint family, feome regular method of proof of partition must be 
laid down. It would have been possible for the Supreme Court to have 
ignored partial partition and insisted that only separation of states 
(and conversion of all assets into tenancies-in-common) would qualify 
for proof of a partition. Though the Supreme Court has made partial 
partitions easier v/ithout going into the complicated sastric rules 
which demand a delicate consideration of the problem, its introduction 
of the impossibility rule (the item must be partitioned in definite 
portions unless it is impossible or inconvenient to do so) is really
a use of Hindu law rule adapted to a tax situation and closer attention
must be paid to it. It is a pity that the judgement is relatively 
free authority.
Extremely clear examples of the Court’s having chosen to 
follow Hindu law rather than revenue techniques have been two important 
cases on whether a ’’blending" of S.A.P. into J.F.P. followed by a 
partition is a transfer for revenue purposes. The situations arose 
because a coparcener blended his S.A.P. into the hotch potch and then 
claimed a partition with the result that he had in fact (though not in
. Z+2lav/) made a transfer of his property to the otner coparceners.
The Supreme Court first considered the problem from the point
of view of Section 16 (3)(a) iii of the Income Tax Act 1922 in
k2m Vallabhdas: Does throwing separate property into hotch potch 
amount to transfer? A.I.P. 19&9 27; V.Seturaman: Theory of
blending and an empty II.U.F. hotch potch A.I.P. 1971 Jnl. 68-73«
3^« See Hanga and Palkivalla (cited f.n.29*)-
C. I. T._j/ Keshnvalal ' Sikri J., reading the judgement on behalf of 
Subba A5.0 and Shah JJ., construed the statute strictly and following 
an early Sigh Court judgement of Subba Rao J. held that,the transaction 
was not a transfer, This view was followed in another case decided
# 46
1ssMj the Supreme Court in the same year, C. I. T. v i-l. K. Stremann.
A similar problem arose in relation to the Gift 2ax ^ct,
where the revenue argument is stronger because even if the transaction
was not a transfer it had all the incidents of an indirect gift by
one coparcener to another. Indeed this was the view taken by the
bn
Allahabad and Andhra Pradesh high Courts even though the majority
of the High Courts had decided the issue from the joint family point
48 g
of view. 1 he matter cane to be considered by Hegde J. in Goli Eswariah 
v C. G. 1 . where his lordship dissented from Andhra Fradesh (from 
where this appeal had originated) and tocj^ the strict Mitakshara view 
that the son was a co-owner of the coparcenery property and thus could 
not be said to receive a gift of property that was, strictly speaking, hi
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 633 where the Court distinguished the earlier case 
C.I.T. v (f.K.Kothari A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 331 where the father and son 
made presents to the daughter-in-law and the mother respectively. It 
was held that this v/as a clear case of transfer and fell.within the 
meaning of the Section. It should he noted that in this case the birth­
right of the son was not involved.
43. The cases relied were K.Subba Rao J. (as he then was) in kadha 
Krishnayya v Gutt Sarasamma A.I.R. 1931 Mad.213; M.K.Stremann v C.I.T. 
A.I.R. I962 Had. 26~
46. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1494.
47* G.V.Krishna Rao v First Addl.Tax Officer A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 126; 
C.G.T.v Satyanarayan Hurthy A.I.R. 19(>3 A.P.' 93; C.G.T. v Jagdish Saran 
(1970)' 73 I.tTr . 329TniahabadT.
43. C.G.T. v P.Rangaswami Naidu A.I.R. 1970 Mad.£)(4 | ; V.R.S.R.M.R. 
Chettiar v C.G.T. Madras Case No. 10 1966 (cited in the Supreme Court 
case cited in f.n.49); Dr. A.R.Shukla v C.G.T. (1969) 74 I.2Z.L. 167 (Ouj. 
F.3.); F.D.Subramaniya A.I.A. i960 Ker.190; Smt.Daxmimai Karayani v 
C . G . (1967) 63 I.T.R. 19 (Hys.)~
But, we must not overlook the fact that the property that came to be
divided was in fact originally the self-acquired property of the father.
Uhat the Supreme Court judgement has done in fact is virtually to give
to the son an ’’ownership” in the self-acquired property of the father.
51
This accords with a clear text of the iiitakshara which was not
accepted by the Privy Council (in a Hindu law context) in the famous
52
case of Kao Balwant v Rani Xishori. It ifc curious that a theory
53
that made no headway whatever in Hindu law contexts should, at this 
late hour, rear its head in order to save the family from paying 
gift tax.
A brief look at the revenue cases in the Supreme Court 
shows that though the Supreme Court has not relied on traditional 
sources alone for their views of the Hindu law, they have not left 
the Hindu joint family at the mercy of the tax law but in fact supported 
a traditional Hindu lav; approach. It has sometimes justified it on 
the basis of the English rule of interpretation of statutes that
5ij. r
revenue statutes must be strictly construed. This is our clearest 
example of an obvious conservatism in the Court, even in the face of 
a revenue situation, which clearly demands something different, if 
only a compromise.
51. See the text of the iiitakshara text discussed in Chapter III 
Section 2.
52. 25 I.A. 5^ . Derrett: E.L.S.I. (1968) Kayne (lid) 450.
53- G. Laxminarasamma v G. Rama Brahman (1950) Had. 1084 (a case 
exploring the iiitakshara birthright thoroughly). Derrett: R.L.S.I.
(1968) 300, 310.
54. See Shah J.’s judgement in C.I.T. v Keshavalal A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 
866 (following P.J.Thomas v C.I.T. A.I.R. 1964 3.C. 587; C.I.T. v ~ 
C.K.Kothari A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 33l)~ at pr.9-10 pp.067-8.
iii. Communication of the intention to sever.
One of the vexed problems of Hindu lav/ has centred upon the
problem of how a coparcener communicates his intention to sever and
55
when it can be deemed to take effect.
The ancient texts, unhampered by the problem of families 
living apart from each other, and not faced with the task of framing 
rules for the contingencies like communication through the post and
telegraph, laid down the extremely simple rule that all that was
56
required was a clearly expressed declaration of intention, and
partition took place from the date of declaration of intention, not
57 'pthe date when partition by metes and bounds was completed. ■Lhus
Nilka^ha says in the Vyavahara Mayukha :
"Even in the absence of any common property, severance does 
indeed result by the mere declaration 11 am separate from thee’ 
because severance is a particular state of mind and the declara­
tion is merely a manifestation of this mental state." 58
55* See ^ane III H.D. 562-3; Mayne (lid) 54^ VV ; Derrett: Severance of 
interest in the Marumakkathayam tarwad1 (1964) K.L.T. Jnl. 49-54; Ibid: 
A dictum of the Supreme Court on restitution and a decision there on 
partition (1964) 66 Bom.L.R. 137-145; Ibid: C.M.K.L. (1970) 154-5; 
K.B.Agrawal: Partition in Hindu lav/: Communication of the intention to 
separate (1964) 5 Jai.D.Jnl. 153-166.
56. See Kane III H.D. 562-3. The important texts are the Mitakshara:
Sarswati Vilas: Placitum 28 (Foulkes Translation l88l); MitramsiraS5 
Vira Mitrodaya: 11.23; Nilkanth: Vyavahra Hayukh: IV.III.1 (All these 
are referred to in the two Supreme Court judgements Raghavamma v . 
Chenchamma A.I.E. 1964 S.C. 136 at pr.27 p.148, pr.28 p.149; 
Puttrangamma v Pangamma A.I.P. 1968 S.C. 1018 pr.4 p.1021.).
57« For an excellent example of this in the early nineteenth century 
case law see Josada Koonwar v Gourie Byjonath Sohae Singh (1866) VI 
W.S. 139 at p.141 where the texts are cited and at 142-3 wher& some
of the earlier case law is cited.
58. For the reference and the places where this was cited by the 
Supreme Court see supra f.n. 56.
/' J ' ^
Anglo Hindu law followed this rule in a large number of
5 9cases and made it clear that the consent of the others was not
necessary to affect a partition. Later the Privy Council introduced
60
the caveat that the intention must in fact be expressed bo someone.
6lIn Narayana Rao v Purushotama Rao Yaradchariar J. (for King J. and
himself) observed :
"It is true that the authorities lay down generally that 
the communication of the intention to become divided to other 
coparceners is necessary, but none of them lays down that 
severance of status does not take place till after communication 
has been received by other coparceners.n
In this cas^the issue was directly in point because the intention to
separate was communicated through the post and the coparcener in
question died before it was received. This case was followed by 
62other decisions. There are also some decisions which lay down that 
af
service^notice, though necessary, is not a condition precedent for an 
effective severance.^
59* The early case la\tf discussed this from a different point of view, 
viz. Is the consent of the other coparceners necessary to effect a 
partition ? On this see Kemp J. in Vato Kuer v Rowshun Singh (1867)
VIII V/.R. 82 at 83 col.2; Hitter J. in Deo Bunsee Kuer v Dwarkanath 
(1868) 10 V/.R. 273; the point was concluded by Ameer Ali's judgement 
in Girja Bai v SadashiV (1916) 43 I.A. 151 at l6l; Haldane J. in Kawal 
Rain vBudh Singh (1917) 44 I.A. 159 at 161.
60. See Ameer Ali J. in Suraj Karain v Iqbal Narain (1913) AO I.A. AO 
at A-5: Gir.ja Bai v Sadashiv (1916) 45 I.A. 151 at 160-I "Once the deci­
sion has been equivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his co­
sharers his right to obtain and possess the share to which he admittedly 
has a title, is unimpeachableSir George Lowndes in 3al Krishna v 4am 
Krishna A.I.2. 1931 P«C. 15A; Sir John Wallis in Babu Eamasray v Radhika 
Devi (1*936 ) 43 Had.L.‘~172 (P.O.). These are relied on by Subba Rao J.
in Raghavamma v Chenchamma A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136 at 148-9.
61. A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 390 at 391 col.2.
62. See Indira Bai v Sivaprashad Rao A.I.R. 1953 Had. 46l at pr.l6 p.464. 
But note that at pr.17 p.464 Rajamrnannar C.J., who read the judgement of 
the High Court, takes care to avoid commenting on the observations in 
Katheesumma v Beechu (1949) II M.L.J. 268, wherb it was said that even 
the despatch of the intention was not necessary.
63. See Rama v Heenakshmi A.I.R. 1931 Had. 278 at 241 and Katheesumma 
v_ Beechu (cited supra f'.'nT 627;:--------- --  '
This approach was upset by the Supreme Court’s decision in
64Raghavamma v Chachamma which laid down that the intention to sever 
must be communicated and that the partition will be valid only on the 
date of receipt of communication, on which date it will be made to 
relate back to the date of declaration of intention; but "relating 
back" will not disturb interests which have vested in the inter­
vening period.
This was a hard case. An unscrupulous woman charged with 
looking after the family estate for the benefit of the minors in the 
family tried to procure the whole estate for herself on the grounds that 
that estate had in fact been partitioned and that the partitioned share 
should come to her because her son had been adopted by one of the co­
parceners. The partition was alleged to have taken place either in 
1895 or in the alternative in 1945 by a coparcener through his will 
in which he was alleged to have made an unambiguous declaration to 
sever, even though it was admitted that it was not communicated to 
the other coparceners. It is clear that neither the trial judge nor
6s
the High Court believed this story. The High Court went further and 
said that the will did not contain an intention to sever.^ ,J-his case 
could have been decided on the short point that the facts do not 
support the intention to sever; The Supreme Court does not interfere 
with the findings of facts by the Courts below except in the most
64. A.I.E. 1964 S.C. 136.
65. Ibid at pr. 3 p-141 (the trial judge)-; at pr.4 p.l4l (the High 
Court)•
66. JJbid at pr.4 p.141. The High Court case is unreported but the 
Supreme'■'Court summing up the High Court judgement observe: "The 
learned judge rejected thfej^ plea (of partition through the will) 
on two grounds namely, (1) that the will did not contain any such 
declaration; and (2) that if it did ... the suit as framed would 
not be maintainable.".
67exceptional cases. Indeed the Court clearly stated this rule and 
refused to interfere on the findings of fact on the issue of
63
adoption. But Subba Rao J. followed the unusual procedure of not
even deciding the question of whether the will contained a clear and
69unambiguous intention to sever, and moved_ ahead to discuss the
wider question of what rules ought to be followed in such cases.
Since the Court did not comment on the factual point about the
intention of the testator, the Court’s remarks on the whole problem
are the ratio decidendi of the case rather than mere obiter dictum.
This is clearly an example of the Court's using a rare opportunity
to reform the law rather than concentrating on the facts of the case.
Subba Rao J. was aware that the wider consideration was not
required by the facts of the case, but considers-, the questions because
he feels that the lav; should be modernised.
"The questions (raised) pose ... difficult problems for a 
fast changing society. What was adequate in a village polity 
when the doctrine was conceived and evolved can no longer meet 
the demands of a modern society." 70
The Court therefore in effect laid down the rules of offer and acceptance
71in the Indian Contract Act 1872 and applied them to a problem of
67. On this see the cases cited in Chapter II Section 6 (supra").
63. A.I.R. 196^ f B.C. 136 at pr. 1^ 3-5- Note also pr.ll p. 1^ 2 where the 
Court cites a lot of case lagp to show that the Privy Council did not as 
a rule interfere with decisions on facts.
69* Ibid at pr.37 p.132. His lordship having discussed the problem from 
a wider point of view observed "...(I)t is not necessary for us to con­
sider the further question whether the will contained a clear and 
unambiguous declaration of intention tlmt on the part of the testator 
to divide himself from the members of joint family." (emphasis mine). 
Surely this was *&£ preliminary and if answered in the negative the only 
question which the Court had to consider.
70. Ibid at pr.33 p.131.
71. See the Indian Contract Act 1872 Sections 3-3 which lay down that
the communication of intention by the promisor does not become binding
on the promisee until it has reached him. Again the acceptance is not 
binding on the promisor until it reaches him. This is really a rule of 
English lav;. See Cheshire 8c Fifoot: The law of contract (1969/7H) 31-^7
and particularly the case of Henthorn v Frazer (1892) 2 C&2. 27.
Hindu law while insisting all the time that the approach was one 
whi ch
"the Hindu law texts suggested and the Courts evolved by a 
process of reasoning as well as by a pragmatic approach ... "72
The Court seems to have envisaged "partition" as if it were
a commercial transaction between two people and treated it in that
light. It seems to have overlooked that a coparcener has the right
to the property in question and he is not in the process of acquiring 
*73
that right. Further, partition, unlike an agreement, does not require
7bthe consent of the coparceners, but is a unilateral declaration 
by which a person translated his communal interest to become purely 
personal. While the Court does not go so far as to demand that the 
partition be by agreement it places on the coparceners the duty to
;, l
follow the formal procedure required by an agreement. ■Lhis, as
Professor Derrett has shown, can work to his disadvantage in as much
as the other members of the family can in the meantime dispose of the
75family property, within the limits of the Hindu law.
72. A.IiR. 196b S.C. Ip6 at pr.32 p.151. Note also a similar statement 
at pr.27" p.'lbTT.
73- Subba Rao J. is aware of this and after quoting from the texts 
(see f.n.56) at pr.27 p. 1*0 says "The Hindu law texts, therefore support 
the proposition that feeverance in status is brought about by unilateral 
declaration."
7b. This was a burning issue in the nineteenth century. See the cases 
cited supra f.n.59* See further iiayne (lid) 5*0> where the Courts 
following this line of reasoning held that an agreement not to parti­
tion was invalid if it extended beyond the lifetimes of those actually 
consenting and bound only them.
75* Cee Derrett: (196*0 K.L.T.Jnl. b9 at 53-*t where he takes the example 
of a father who disposes of his son’s interest to pay for his son's 
debts under the njules relating to the pious obligation of the son. Under 
the Supreme Court’s rule the alienee's vested rights v/ill not be dis­
turbed. In (196*0 66 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 137 at l*i-*t-5 Professor Derrett takes 
7 more examples of how the property can be disposed in the inter­
vening period.
Subba Rao J. claims that he is following a pragmatic
approach suggested by the ancient texts. But the texts, by insisting
that all that was required was a unilateral declaration, had in fact
tried to lay down a rule that the son's right to sever should remain
as far as possible unhampered by any considerations pertaining to
agreement, whereas Subba Rao J. attempts to protect the rights of
the other dopareeners and third parties on the basis of the well known
rule of construction that vested interests should not be divested and
clearly ignoring the fact that the doctrine of "relating back", on
77which he relies in the same paragraph, does precisely that.
It is also submitted with respect that his lordship’s attempt 
to show that his view v/as supported by earlier Courts is not warranted 
by those cases themselves. While it is true that earlier Courts 
insisted that some form of communication should take place it was not 
suggested that partition should take place from the date of communi-
78 _
cation. In an attempt to get as much authority on his side as possible 
his lordship distinghishes even the earlier cases to suit his own argu­
ment even though this is not always warranted by the judgements in
79those cases themselves. Thus Rama v Meenakshi quite clearly lays
76. See cases cited supra f.n.59« Subba Rao J. is aware of this and 
at 1^9 col.l commenting on Rama v Meenakshi A.I.R. 1931 Mad.278 says 
"The learned judge deduced this proposition from the accepted principle 
that the other coparceners had no choice or option in the matter."
77- A.I.R. 196^ f S.C. I36 at pr.3 f^ p.131-2. Note the observation at 
p.152 "Further the principle of retroactivity unless a legislative 
intention is clearly to the contrary, saves vested rights. As the 
doctrine of relating back involves retroactivity by parity of reason­
ing, it cannot affect vested rights." The reference to the doctrine of 
relating back is made at p.1'31. The doctrine is discussed more fully 
in Chapter VI (infra). Note also Subba Rao J.'s attempt to distinguish 
precedent on the grounds that well settled precedent should not be 
easily set aside (pr.29 p.130) conveniently overlooking the fact that 
his own judgement was going to have that effect. O11 the fact that this 
judgement changes the rule see Derrett cited supra(f.n.35»)
78. See the cases cited supra f.n. 60.
79-' A.I.R.- 1931 Nad. - 278 • at 281.
down that notice is not a condition precedent for the validity of a 
partition, but his lordship ignores this and distinguishes the case
80
on the ground that the testator lived till after the date of notice.
8l
Again the fact that Aarayan Rap v Purshotama Rao was followed in
82
Indira Bai v Shivprasada Rao is not emphasised but rather the fact
83
that Mthe real basis of the decision0 was to be found in the fact
that the letter must have been delivered before the testator died -
ignoring the fact that the High Court had not decided that factual
34
question but merely ruled there was no evidence to the contrary and 
relied in the main on Narayana Kao* s case.
Thus although an attempt is made to justify the new approach 
on the basis of the traditional texts and High Court decisions, this 
is clearly a case of hiding the fact that the Court is trying to 
modernise Hindu law. But during the modernising process the Court 
seemgto have overlooked the nature of the transaction that it was 
considering. A partition is really a process by which an owner (in
83
the Indian sense ) of joint family property intimates to other co­
owners his intention to separate, rather than a commercial agreement 
in which, e.g., he sells his birth right for a well defined share.
Happily this strict approach was modified by the Supreme
86
Court itself in Puttrangama v Pangamma where Ramaswami J., reading
•-
0CO A,.1 .R. 1964 S.C. 136 at pr.28 p.149.
31. A..1 .R. 1938 Mad 390.
82. A.,1 .R. 1933 Mad. 243 at pr.l6,, p.464.
83. A.,1 •  R. 1964 S.C. 136 at pr.29 p.130.
84. A,. 1 .  iA . 1953 Mad. 461 at p. 463 col.l.
83. This is discussed in Chapter III. But the best account of this 
may be found in Derrett: The development of the concept of property 
in India c. A.D. 800-1800 (1962) 64 Z.V.R. 16-130.
86. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1018.
the judgement of the Court, converted Subba Kao J.’s strict require­
ments into a common sense rule. He observed :
"It is necessary ... that the member of the joint family 
seeking to separate himself must make known his intention to 
other members of the family from whonihe seeks to separate. The 
process (o)f communication may, however vary in the circumstances 
of each particular case. It is not necessary that there should 
be a formal despatch to or receipt by other members of the 
family ... The proof of such dispatch or receipt of the commu­
nication is not essential nor its absence fatal to the severance 
of the status. It is of course necessary that the declaration 
to be effective should reach the person or persons affected by 
some process appropriate to the given situation and the circum­
stances of the particular case." 87
What is even more significant is the fact that in this case the father
sent a registered letter on the 8th January, requested the post office
to cancel it on the 10th, wrote plairfc demanding partition on the 13th
and died subsequently. The Court held that the intention to partition
had in fact been made on the 8th, because
"there was a unilateral declaration of an intention ... to divide 
from the joint family and there was a sufficient communication of 
this intention to the other coparceners and therefore in law there 
was in consequence a disruption of family status." 8£
The Court has therefore taken note of the fact that partition
89can in fact be inferred from the conduct of the parties and thus
90prevented the parties from'taking advantage of a mere formality.
87. Ibid at pr.4 p.1022.
88. Ibid at pr.3 p.1023•
89. See Karada XIII.36-43: Mit. 11.12. See also Jaganriatha 11,304 where 
he comments on the following text of Brihaspati "They whose income, 
expenses, and wealth are separate, who reciprocally lend money at
interest, and who make commercial bargain with each other, are doubtless
disunited." (Text 389(3))* xhese lay down instances of where the law will 
presume that there was a partition. Bor an early case see Jo soda Kunwar
v Gouree Byjinath Singh (1866) VT V/.R. 139 and note the authorities 
and cases cited at 141-2.
90. The father wanted to separate on 8th January to safeguard the
interests ofjhis daughters and was prevented from doing so because some 
interested parties tried to effect an agreement which was responsible 
for his writing to the post office, but which did not materialise.
Subba Rao J.$s attempt to reform the Hindu lav/ v/as thus short-lived^" 
and preference v/as given to a Hindu law view of the whole problem, 
rather than Subba Rao J.’s all too modern view which is at variance 
with the whole concept of partition and the son’s rights, even though 
it professes to be a natural extension of the traditional law on the 
subject in the interests of hypothetical third parties.
iv. The minor’s partition - a case of overprotection.
There has always been some controversy about the extent of
protection that must be given to a minor where some friend or relative
92
institutes a suit on his behalf. Some Courts ruled that the severance
93v/as effective from the date the suit was decreed, while others held 
that it v/as effective on the date of the institution of the suit,
o/f
provided of course that the Court confirmed the partition.'' Some 
Courts even used the doctrine of relating back and argued that the 
partition v/as effective on the date of decree but it related back to
95 vthe date of the institution of the suit. his matter was discussed by
96 .1
the Supreme Court in Pedasubbhaya v Akkamma. '-lhe Court held that the
91. But note that his idea that separation operates only from receipt 
of the communication (subject to relation back) stands still.
92.See Derrett! A minor's partition - a lapse in the Supreme Court 
A.I.P.. i960 Jnl. 78; reply by B.Dayal A.I.P. I96Q Jnl. 97 and further 
reply by Derrett: A.I.R. 1961 Jnl. 10. For the background to the prob- 
IbM seS Mayne (1 Id.') 55^-55^".
93- See the judgement of Rahim and Oldfield JJ. in Chelim Chetty v 
Subbanna A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 379; Mears C.J. in Lalta Prashad v Shiam 
Singh A.I.R. 1920 All. 116 at 117.col.2; -^ ashid J. in Hari Singh v 
Britain Singh A.I.R. 1938 Lah.
9k» ^angasayi v Wangarathnamma (1937) 57 ^ad. 95 (F.B.)
95* V/asoodew J.’s judgement in Ram Singh v Fakira A.I.R. 1939 Bom.169; 
Bose and Sen JJ. in Handli Prashad v Ram Charan Lai A.I.R. I9A8 Nag.l.
98. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 10^ -2 and note the comments of Derrett and Dayal 
in the articles cited supra f.n.92.
97partition was effective from the date of the institution of the suit 
and following earlier High Court case lav/ also added that the suit
93would not abafle on the death of the minor. The decision has been
QQ
generally followed. ^
But the Supreme Court went one step further and observed :
’’Thus what brings about the severance of status is the 
action of the next friend in instituting the suit, the decree 
of the Court merely rendering it effective by deciding that 
v/hat the next friend has done is for the benefit of the minor.M 100
Professor Derrett has pointed out that implicit in the
Court’s judgement is the view that a minor, unlike any other coparcener,
is not at liberty to separate simply by serving a notice on the
manager "in all cases where, if the matter were to come before a Court,
the latter would approve of the severance of the minor's interest
The Supreme Court adopted an approach based on the theoretical
assumption that the ancient duty of the Soveriegn to protect had
descended on the Court. T. L. V. Aiyar J. (reading the judgement of
97- For the view that the suit abates see Chelimi Ohetty y oubbanna 
A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 379. In Rangasayi v Nagarathnamma A.I.R. 1933 Had.8*90 
there v/as a difference of opinion between Venkatasubha j-^ o J. who 
thought that the suit did not abate (at p.89^  col.l) and Reilly J. who 
thought that it did (at p.8$3)- Ihe matter v/as referred to a full Bench 
who ruled that it did not (see the remarks of Ramesan J. at 910 and 
Cornish J. at p.913 col.l).
A.I.R. 1930 S.E. 10k2 at pr.15 p.10^9-30.
99• See the Supreme Court ruling in Lakkireddi v Lakshmanna A.I.R.
1963 S.C. 1601 at pr.7 p.1603.
100. A.I.R. 1933 S.C. 10A2 at pr.lA p.10h9.
101. Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 133• Prof. Derrett's views have the support 
of several High Court decisions e.g. see the judgement of Leach C.J. and 
Clark J. in 3ubbara*ni Reddy v Chenchuraghava Reddy A.I.R. 19^3 Mad.327
AT p.91 (but see the contrary opinion of the same two judges see
Kottava v Krishna Rao A.I.R. 1945 Mad.290 at pr. S  p.291)
O.Ramakrishnayya v G.Atchutha A . I . R .  1933 Mad. 1^6 (but it is not clear 
whether a suit must be filed"]'; Ramanathan Che'ttiar v liar ay an Chettiar 
A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 629 at pr. p.'634.' None of these cases are cited
by the Supreme Court. But for a contrary opinion allegedly following 
the opinion of the Supreme Court see B.Ayyamrna v K.Kottaya A.I.R. I960 
A .P. 70 discussed Derrett: A . I . R .  i960 Jnl.73.
the Court) observed
"...(T)he theory is that the Sovereign as parens patriae 
has the power, and is indeed under a duty to protect the interests 
of minors and that function has devolved on the Courts. In the 
discharge of that function, therefore, they have the power to , n? 
control all proceedings before them wherein minors are concerned ..
103
Although Aiyar J. quotes only English authority for this proposition, 
it is clear that the position v/as the same in India. Kane, summing
up the situation in India, says :
"As in best era Jurisprudence, so in India the King v/as
looked upon as parens patriae, the protector and guardian of
all minors .Gaut(ama) X.48-9 and lianu VIII.27 prescribe that 
the king shall protect the property of the minor until he 
attains majority or until he returns from his teacher’s house. 
Kedhatithi on I-Ianu VIII.27 says that the minor’s relatives like 
the uncles nay contend that one of them is the guardian of the 
minor's property but it is the king v/ho is to see that the 
minor's property is kept safe ... M 104
While it is true that the King's duties in this quarter 
were exercised by the Court of Chancery in Sngland, it is relatively 
more difficult to show that this was intended in India with respect 
to joint family property, where the law still relies on the mechanism 
of the joint family to achieve the result that the family requires.
The institution of a suit causes unnecessary time wastage and expense 
which may work adversely to the interests of the minor, if we remember 
that the other Coparceners can effect a partition against the minor 
simply by serving a notice, or if all the coparceners consent to 
partition^^
The decision of the Supreme Court is justified on its facts 
but it has generally assumed a theoretical position which overrates the
102. A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 1042 at pr.14 p.1043.
103. Ibid citing Halsbury Laws of England 216 pr.478.
104. Kane III H.D. 165-6.
103. See £enerally Kayne (lid) 544 if; Derrett I.H.H.L. (I963) 320-2.
importance of the Courts. In an attempt to imitate the Court of
Chancery in England it has not paid enough attention to the internal
mechanisms of the joint family and their efficacy in achieving the
desired result. The Court should remember that it is the highest
Court in the land and the High Courts (as we have seen earlier^^)
have taken the view that they are bound by even an obiter dicutm of
the Supreme Court. Its general theoretical approach has rightly
107been called "a lapse in the Supreme Court.M
106. See Chapter II Section i.




-he Cupreine Court seems to hove accepted that the joint 
family is a viable institution ana that the traditional lav/ should 
be applied even in modern revenue situations, '-^ hus we can see that for 
ten years the Cupreine Court took a very practical attitude to the 
problem of directors' fees, even though their technical approach to 
the problem v/as inconsistent, until Hegde J. had the courage to 
overrule the Privy Council obiter dicta which were responsible for 
allthe confusion. Again, while considering problems of tax avoidance 
under the Gift Tax Act, the Court condoned the practice of a father 
gifting uii £ property to his sons by merging his S.A.P. into the 'notch 
potch and then effecting a partition. Ironically the latest judgement 
on this problem was delivered by Hegde J. who had claimed to be a 
reformer of Hindu lav; in his dissent in the Dhanwatey cases. While 
considering the problem of partial partitions the Supreme Court has 
admittedly made such partitions easier, but at the same time its 
approach is not totally unfounded in the traditional law.
But we can also see that the Supreme Court's approach has 
been far from imaginative and the Court does not seem to have made 
full use of the techniques available to it. There are only two real
examples of reform. The first is Hegde J.:s judgement in Raj Kumar's
case where he placed the law on Directors' fees on a different basis. 
But in fact the position will change in only the most extreme cases,
further, as we have already indicated, there were many other techniques
which were available to the Court which it seems to have ignored 
completely. The second attempt to reform cane from Subba Rao J. in 
Raghavamma's case. Here the learned judge tried to up-date the rules 
of Hindu lav/ 011 the communication of the intention to sever to suit 
modern needs, even though he overlooked the fact that his new system
of rules were capable of intruding into some important legal 
principles on which the joint family v/as based. Though this 
judgement v/as in itself considerably modified by a later judge­
ment, it is in itself a remarkable example of judicial decision 
making. In contrast to T. L. V. Aiyar J.’s judgement on the minor's 
partition (where the Court v/as inspired by the practice of Chancery 
Courts in England) Subba Rao J. tries to reform traditional notions 
at least ostensibly in their own terms. As it happens this turns 
out to be merely window dressing because Subba Rao J. cites the 
traditional tests as well as the case lav/ based on them in an uncom­
fortably aeLective way. But what is significant is that unlike 
^amaswami J. (who invariable copiously refers to the original 
Sanskrit texts but in most cases either distorts the traditional 
position‘d or simply follows the Privy Council) Subba Rao J. v/as 
able to think creatively about the traditional law. He virtually 
created the opportunity to reform the law, clearly foresaw all the 
consequences of his decision and by using thb doctrine of relation 
back worked them out to the last detail.
It is clear that apart from these isolated instances of 
reform (if one can call them that) the Court has been content to 
follow the Privy Council view of the joint family, even though 
recent research has indicated that many other techniques could in 
fact have been used. In considering the lav/ relating to the joint 
family the Supreme Court has merely played the role of a third Court 
of appeal, rather than that of a powerful agency responsible for
1. Ror an example of this see Derrett: The want of legal history in 
the Supreme Court (1971) 1 M.L.5. Jnl. 39-^5•
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creatively and sensitively reforming the Hindu lav/. Jurists must 
look to Parliament and not to the Courts for reform in this quarter. 
In the light of this remark the inconsistencies v/e have noticed in 
individual judge’s voting patterns and the lack of comprehensive 
understanding of the problems hardly call for pointed attention.
V2. xhis is the role that Hegde J. assigns to the Court in V.D.Dhanwatey
v. I.T.Commr. A.I.R. i960 ,3.0. 683 at pr.31 p.696.
CHAPT2R VI
Three Selected Areas of Hindu Lav; : "Pious Obligation", "Adoption" 
and "Hindu Women’ s Rights".
In this Chapter we shall concentrate on three areas in 
Hindu law. The underlying unity in the selection is that in each one 
of these areas we see a conflict between the theoretical approach of 
Hindu law (or statutes based on it) - we could call this the "book 
law" - and practical convenience, between what are explicitly or 
virtually legal fictions and the facts they seek to encompass. In 
its decisions on "Pious Obligation and the Antecedency Rule" (Section 1) 
the Court appears to have concentrated solely on practical considerations, 
whereas in its discussion of "Adoption and the doctrine of Relation 
■°ack" (Section 2) practical considerations have been neglected in an 
attempt to secure adequate and fair rights for an adopted son. A lot 
of legislative activity has centred upon the problem of Hindu women’s 
rights. The Supreme Court has had to adjust the reforming attitude 
of the legislature and interpret the statutes so as to suit the needs 
of related areas in Hindu law. This will be considered in Section 3 
(of this Chapter) I "The Supreme Court and the Rights of Hindu Women."
1t is important to remember that in these selected areas, 
the Supreme Court has played a secondary part. In its decisions on 
Public lav; (Chapters III and IV) and the revenue aspects of the joint 
family (Chapter V) the Supreme Court, and not the High Courts, took a 
leading role in deciding the attitude to be adopted and the techniques 
to be relied on; in this Chapter we shall see that the High Courts 
supply the juristic techniques and jurisprudence to be applied to the 
problem in question, and the Supreme Court’s task has consisted of making 
a choice between the competing alternatives put forward by the High
Courts and selecting for emphasis particular points from one or the 
other High Court. As a result its point of view, which must 
inevitably be read in conjunction with the decisions of the High 
Court from which it was adopted, is usually sketchy, incomplete and 
brief without exploring the point at issue before them completely.
1. Pious Obligation and the Antecedency Pule.^ - 
The Prohlem
Anglo-Hindu law converted the son1snliabilityT,to pay his
2
father’s debts after the father died into a ’’power” in the hands of 
the father to alienate the son's interest in the J.F.P. Courts in 
^ritish India did not want this power of alienation to be unlimited 
and therefore introduced the rule that the father could alienate the 
son'fe interest, not to incur fresh debts, but merely to meet already
existing debts v/hich were "antecedent” in point of fact as well as
3 mtime. This limitation is both necessary and proper', for to get rid 
of it (as one ii/riter has suggested**) would be to expose the son’s 
interest to an uncontrolled power in the hands of the father.
But the limitation is responsible for precipitating the 
anomalous situation that a mortgage to meet a non-antecedent debt is 
void, whereas an unsecured debt (which is contractual and therefore, 
not being an alien^ation, does not fall foul of the antecedency rule) 
is binding under the Pious Obligation (hereafter P.O.) rule. In order
1. On Pious Obligation generally see Derrett: Indica Pietas: A current 
rule from remote antiquity (1969) 86 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 
fuer Pechtsgeschichte, Horn.Abt.37-86 Thereafter Derrett: Indica Pietas 
(1989)); on the antededency rule see Derrett: C.H.H.L. (1970) 97-101; 
Ibid: I.H.H.L. (1963) 273-7; Ibid: Hindu law: iiitakshara - the pious 
obligation and the doctrine of antecedency; The end of a prolonged 
controversy (1955) 13 S.C.J. 139-50; Kayne: (lid) A15-^21; K.S.IIathur:
The doctrine of antecedent debt in Hindu law A.I.P. 1951 Jnl. A9;
P.K.Ranadg*. Antecedent Debt (1953) 55 Bom.L.P. Jnl. 9^-102.
2. The words "power” and "liability" are used in the same sense as 
Hohfield: Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1928 reprinted I96A).
3. ^his is the rule laid down in Brij Narain v Hangla Prasad A.I.P.192A- 
P.C. 50 (192^) 51 I.A. 129. The requirement of antecedency was already 
known to Hindu law from Sahu Pamchandra v Bhuo Bingh L.P. !^- I.A. 126 
and Hanomi v Hodun L.P. 131 A.I. It was thus at least as old as 1883.
See also Khalilal Pahman v Govind (1892) 20 Cal. 328, 3^6-7*
f^. Mrs. I. Bhaairaik (1969) 6 Law Quarterly 128$£
i  IT"to deal with this anomaly the Supreme Court in iaqir Chand v Hajiam
j
Kuar^ (in an attempt to protect the secured creditor) rul6d that the 
son cannot complain that an alienation is void at the late hour of 
execution proceedings. In doing this the Court has practically- 
ignored the son’s interests (which are represented only notionally 
by the father, if he is Karta^) and assumed that the P.O. imposes 
upon the son an absolute liability and grants to the father what is 
virtually an absolute pov/er of alienation. The Court observed :
"But this distinction in procedure does not affect the 
pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his father’s debt. As 
in the case of a money decree, under a mortgage decree1 also 
the property is sold for payment of the father’s debt. The 
father could voluntarily sell the property for payment of his 
debt. If there is no voluntary sale by the father, the creditor 
can ask the Court to do compulsorily what the father could have 
done voluntarily. The theory is that as the father may, in 
order to pay a just debt, legally sell the whole estate without 
suit, so his creditor may bring about such a sale by the inter­
vention of a suit." 7
1 - oo much emphasis is Ihaid on tho P.O. of the son, too little
on ti'e view that he is m  the position (though not technically so ; of
a surety, or better still a co-mortgagor and must be accorded rights
concomitant with that position. V/e will attempt to shov; that the P.O.
is more than a spiritual responsibility and that more attention must be .
paid to the nature of the ion1s liability than the Supreme Court in
5- a.i.a. 1967 s.c. 727
6. For the importance of this see P.P.Venkataraniah: Power of repre­
sentation in suits of a Hindu Joint family manager vis-^h-vis the Hindu
Succession Act (I96A) 1 Andhra V/eekly reporter Jnl. 11.
7. A.I.K. 1967 3.C. 727 at pr.5 p.730.
8. Prof. Derrett in ^ Suretyship in India: The classical law and its
aftermath, Xvec.Soc.J.Bodin XXVIII Les ouretes personnelles (1972) Ch.XV, 
pp.237-319 at 293s 302-A observed that Hindu jurists insisted that there 
could be no suretyship without any actual or imputed agreement: and it 
was this that explained their failure to recognise the Pious Obligation 
for what it v/as.
their extremely brief (but nevertheless extremely important) judge­
ment were able to pay. It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s
solution, as well &s that of a foreign observer who suggests that the
9
antecedency rule should be abolished with respect to mortgages, leaves 
too much power in the hands of the father (i.e. gives him too high a 
credit) and seeks to protect the creditor at the expense of the son.
To this we shall return later.
t'«») P. 0. - not just a ’’pious obligation.
a. A problem of vyavahara not prayascitta.
The problem of P.O. has usually been looked at from a
religious point of view. The Supreme Court in Amrit Lai v Jayanti Lai'
observed that :
”(t)he basis of the doctrine is ... spiritual and its sole object 
is to confer spiritual benefit on the father. It is not intended 
in any sense for the creditors."
No one will deny that the son thought it his duty to pay the father’s
debt to ensure that the father was not
Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 99- In his article in 1955 (supra f.n.l) 
he argued (at 149) that a personal decree ought to be obtained and that 
without it the debt was not binding. In C.M.H.L. he attempts a critique 
of the pdsition; in 1955 he criticised a Madras decision from the point 
of view of stare decisis, a more limited objective. In Indica Pietas
(1969) he of the Supreme Court solution (at p.55 - text cor­
responding to f.n.4?) without disapproval, as a practical solution.
10. For comments on Pious Obligation generally, in addition to the 
reference in f.n.l., see V.B.Raju: Avyavaharika debts (1959) 41 Bom.L.P. 
Jnl. 25; R.K.Ranade: Avyavaharika debt - what it means ? A.I.R. 1946' Jnl. 
51; L .S.Manjrekar: Ayyvaharika debt (1947) 49 Bom.L.P. Jnl. 5; R.K.Ranade 
Pious Obligation in Hindbd law (1950) 52 Bom.L.H.Jnl.l.;Ibid: Illegal
and immoral debts in Hindu law (1950) 52 Bom.L.jR.Jnl. 53•
11. Per Gajendragadkar J. in A.I.R. i960 S.C. 964 at pr.7 p.966 relying
on Sat Narain v Sri Kishen A.I.R. 1936 P.C." 277 at 280. See also the 
comments of Derrett: Avyvaharika debts and the decision of the Supreme 
Court in A.I.R. i960 S.C. 964 (1961) K.L.T.Jnl. 21. Oontrast K.S.Mathur: 
(supra f.n.l.) 49 col.2. quoting from Seshagiri Ayyar J. in ^>rinivafe
Aiyangar v Kupnuswami Aiyangar A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 447.
"reborn a slave, a servant, a woman or a quadruped." 12
and prevent the benefit of his father's devotions from being trans-
13ferred to his creditors. But one must not forget that the problem of 
P.O. is a problem of vyavahara not Prayascitta. Debt is the first of 
the eighteen titles of lav; and the debt of the son must be placed in 
its proper legal and proprietary context. The questions we must ask 
are : (l) What were the normal rules about the payment of debts ?
(2) What was the property structure within the joint family and to what 
extent is the doctrine of P.O. simply another way of adjusting the 
normal rules to the fact that a large part of the father's property is 
jointly owned with his sons and passes (until 1956) on to them by 
survivorship ?
b. The normal rules about debts.
14The normal rules about debts are contained in Yajnavalkya,
IJarada,^ Bpihaspati Katyayana,^ and Vishpu,^ and lay down that the
primary liability is that of the man himself, followed by the person
19who inherits his wealth. next comes the person xvho marries the debtor’s
20 (widow for she too, as I-Tarada says, is her husband’s wealth. (This rule
12. Bpihaspati quoted in I Colebrooke’s Digest (hereafter C.D.) 223; 
also quoted by Vasudevamurthy J. in~Thimmegowda v Hyavamma A.I.P. 1954 
I-lys. 93 at 99; I-iukerjea J. in Pannalal v Naraini A.I.P. 1952 5.0. 170 
At pr.5(a) p. 174.
13. As Parada predicts would happen 1,9 (S.B.B.XXXIII p.44).
14. Yajnavalkya 11,51. regards the normal rules of debts see generally 
Kane III H.D. 452-4.
15. IV. 21-4 (see I C.D. 272).
16. V. 52 (S.3.E. XXXIII 329).
17. Kane’s Collection Verses 5^2 and 577 quoted I C.D. 196 and 226.
18. VI. 29-30. See also Gautama XII,140 and Karimuadin v Gobind Krishna
(1909) 36 I.A. 133 at 147.
19* For the earlier case law on the subject see Mayne (lid) 431-2.
20. IV. 22.
about wives was abolished in Bombay as late as 1866 by Section k of
21the Bombay Act VII of that year). A text of Katyayana places the
son between the taker of the v/ealth and the one who marries the widew,
and Kane points out that this refers to
"a son who has separate and independent wealthoof his own and 
is more wealthy than the taker of widow though he himself being 
disqualified did not success to (the) ancestral wealth.” 22
The Vaijayanti on Vishpu (VI.30) quotes Yajnavalkya (II.30) and Narada
(IV.23) and places after the inheritor of the wealth and the taker of
the widow, the son who takes ancestral wealth followed (in order) by
the sons who are married (and one assumes have children) and finally
23
those who are not married and do not own ancestral wealth.
Thus we can see that the general rule is that the primary
responsibility is that of the holder of the man's assets. But there 
are occasional intrusions into joint family wealth and a son who
possesses such wealth can also be held liable. As a last resort
however the son who does not possess such wealth can also be impleaded. 
This intrusion into joint family property seems justified in the 
context of the fact that a son by birth diminishes considerably the
size of a fther’s interest and assets in joint family property - a
point that has been made by I-Iadhavan Pillay J. in Lakshman Perumal
-  * t * ' ■ t r 2kwadar v riayini manna.
21. Text 577-
22. Ill H.D. ^53° A marvellous reconciliation of contradictory texts I
23. For further details see Kane: III H.D. k33~k. Derrett: Indica Pietas 
37 at k7 f.n.24 doubts the authenticity of this passage: M3ut this 
passage is to be found only in the India Office Library IIS.IpA7 ••• and 
is not genuine.” Be that as it may the Vaijayanti is hardly startling 
and merely lays down a logical as well as common sense point of view.
2k. (19^3) T.L.K. 1 at 32 (F.3.)
c. The joint family nature of the property and adjusting the 
rules of debt to this fact.
The father’s interest in J.F.P. is indubitably linked with
that of the son. At partition shares are allotted per stirpes, so
that the father, often the Karta, formed a separate unit with his sons.
As Karta the father is given the power to alienate J.F.P. for the
25
benefit of the family. But one must not forget that the father is
capable of incurring expenditure which is not for the "benefit of the
family" nor "necessity" affecting the estate, but at the same time not
also the result of immoral activity or frivolous expenditure. This
expenditure may conceivably turn out to be for the benefit of the
family for if the father dies intestate the sons will inherit his
wealth; one cannot assume that his debts will always be incurred to
the Advantage of strangers I Thus he was given what may be called a
;'debt-incurring power", which was wider than the limited power of
alienation of the Karta but not so wide as to be unlimited. It is
in this context that P.O. should be considered.
The fact that the power is not just based on Hindu notions
of piety has been impliedly accepted by the Supreme Court in
26
Anthonyswamy v I-i. R. Chinnaswamy where the liability of the sons on 
the basis of P.O. was extended to Tamil Fannia Christians of Chittur 
Talak in the Kerala State. This extension seems logical for wherever 
a son owns property jointly with his father it seems reasonable that 
he should guarantee the father’s debt-incurring power. It is this 
aspect of the matter which Krishna Iyer J. overlooked, when in
25- See the Kitaksha.ra 1.1.27 and the brief discussion in Chapter IV 
supra.
26. (1970) II S.C.P. 648.
27Kuttimulu v Theyyu he rightly did not extend the doctrine to the 
Thiyyas of Ponani but added obiter that he felt that the rule 
relating to the P.O. itself should be abolished. The case raised
23
a controversy the varied aspects of which can be traced elsewhere.
29It will also be noted that in Panna Lai v haraini the
Supreme Court was able to apply the normal rules as regards the pay­
ment of debts to a situation where P.O. applied. The Court, while 
not disagreeing with the position that, if a suit was filed against 
the father after partition for a pre-partition debt, the decree could 
not be executed against the son and a separate suit v/ould have to be 
filed, fuled that where the father dies while the suit was pending 
and the son is brought on the record in his place a separate suit
need not be filed against the son.^ Thus the Court treated the son
as any other heir who possessed the deceased debtor’s property, but 
allowed him to raise the questions he could have raised under the
31doctrine of P.O. before the executing Court.
d. Limitations on the debt incurring power.- -----  - - - -r-----------  --- - —  - -       U. _    (
The power of the father to incur debts is not unlimited.
The sastrakaras exonerated the son from paying the following debts. :-
27- (1969) K.L.T. 963 at pr.15 p.972.
28. Krishna Iyer J.’s judgement v/as ciriticised by Prof. Derrett. The 
pious obligation of the Hindu Con - A propos of a judicial attack on the 
institution (1970) K.L.T.Jnl. 59 (the article v/as truncated by the editor 
who refused to reprint Indica Pietas (1969) which formed part of the 
typescript). Note that the reply to the Professor, while making vague 
allegations about the Professor’s integrity as an Englishman to make 
certain comments that he made, does not meet the main charge that the 
doctrine of P.O. ought to be retained - See K.T.IIarindranath: The pious 
obligation of a Hindu son (1971) K.L.T.Jnl. 8-9.
29- A.I.P. 1952 S.C. 170.
30. The Court disapproved of the majority view in Atul Krishna v Lala 
Nandanji (1935) l*f Pat. 732 (F.3.).
31. ^he controversy may be traced in Nulla (13d.) 325-
(1) Debts for the purchase of spirituous liquors; (2) Debts due to 
lust or (3) gambling; (4) Debts of unpaid fines and (3) tolls; (6) Debts 
for idle promises made without consideration or made under the influence 
of lust or wrath; (7) debts arising out of suretyship; (0) commercial 
and (9) Avyavaharika debts.
be are not at present concerned with categories (1) to (7)
32 o 33which a.re discussed elsewhere. Category (8) is now obsolete and
as Professor Derrett plausibly suggests probably included "only those
debts incurred by a Brahmin in spiritually reprobated commerce.
The category which is capable of an extended interpretation and has
given rise to some controversy is category (9) - Avyavaharika debts.
35The word "avyavaharika" was translated by Colebrooke as
"opposed to good morals". This definition was accepted as accurate by
the Privy Council^ and more recently by the Supreme Court in Amrit 
37Lai v Jayanti Lai. But this definition tends to obscure the fact 
that the son(s obligation is not simply a matter of piety and morals 
but also, inter alia, a problem of commerce. Thus in Chakauri Nahton
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v Ganga Prashad Kookerjea J. defined it simply as "proper"; in
32. On the exclusions see Kane III H.D. 446-51; Kayne (lid) 393 ff. 
Derrett: Tndica Pietas (1969) 37 at 49-50- See also the references 
cited at f.nYlO supra).
33. See Acutaramayya v Patnaji (1926) 49 mad.211; Parthisingh v 
iianichand'~(l935) lB Lah.' 1077; Bhupatiraju v N. Pull am A.I.A. 1963 
A.P. 433 at 435-
34. Derrett: Indica Pietas (1969) 37 at 47•
35. e.g. in I C.D. 211. Note also the comments of Jaganatha.
36. Hemraj v Khem Chand A.I.P. 1943 P.O. 142 =
57- A.I.II. I960 S.C. 964 at pr.8 p.966 and note the comments of 
Derrett (19515 K.L.T. Jnl. 21.
3-3. (1912) 39 Cal. 862 at 063• See also Ilandlik’s translation of the
Vyavahara Nayukh and the Yajnavalkya Smriti Text (i860) 113; 
Bhattacharya: Commentaries on Hindu lav/ (l893/2d.) 247*
39another case Knight J. defined it as "unusual or not sanctioned by
Lq
law"; in enugopal v Pamadhan Sadasiva Iyer J. translated it as "a 
debt which is not supported as valid by legal arguments and on which 
no right can be established in the creditor* s favour in a Court of 
Justice". The merit1 of these alternative definitions is that, though 
linguistically misleading, they treat the son’s liability as a commer­
cial liability and instead of asking the simple question : Is the debt 
immoral ? a^the wider question : Is the debt one for which (given 
the father’s position and the fact that he represents the family) it 
would be reasonable to hold the son liable ? In this way a large 
number of factors can b& brought into play and be raised by the son, 
while challenging the father’s debt.
This is in line with Frofessor Derrett's view that the 
principle underlying the 9 limitations was this :
”IIo debt was which was not a good debt in the dharmasastra 
sense could be extracted by the creditor from the male issue 
under the P.O. Those debts which were written within this list 
were not such that the male issue should be held to have guaranteed 
the ancestor." 41
While he goes on to emphasise the spiritual aspect of the list, it
would not be unreasonable to use the doctrine of "avyavaharika" so
as to extend to only such debts which are unreasonable. Seen in this
light, the question : Did the father try to defraud his son(as part
of the question : "was the debt avyavaharika ?tf) ? does not seem so
unreasonable as Professor Derrett makes it out to be, in his comment
39. Durbar v Khachar (1903) 3P Bom.343 though criticised by other 
Courts see Kayne (lid) 399 f .n.'Co).
4). (1914) 37 had. 45& at 460 criticised by Mayne (lid) 399 f.n.(o).
as not helpful and criticised by other Courts (cited Kayne).
41. Derrett1 Tnflica pietas (1969) 37 at 49-30.
on Hira Lai v Jagdish. Indeed the Supreme Court seem to support a
43wider view of avyavaharika. in Jakati v Borkar where they held that 
a son was liable for the debt incurred by his father owing to the 
latter1s negligence while discharging his duties as Hanaging Director 
of a Bank. Though the decision does extend the son's liability as a 
surety considerably, it can be justified on the basis of the 
theoretical as well as practical interest that a son has in the father’s 
earnings.
After all one must not forget that historically avyavaharika 
meant what the Court would not admit, i.e. a court advised by a 
paddit. This included even debts recognized by the dharmasastra in 
general terms but regarded by a dharraa-trained legal adviser as unfit 
for enforcement in the case in question. However we are in fact bound 
by the tradition of Anglo-Hindu law, derived as it was from an imperfect 
understanding of the sastra, which converted the son's position as 
surety to one where he has no protection against the father's caprice 
in general.
While the above view of avyavaharika is speculative, its 
chief merit lies in the fact that the joint family is not as closely 
knit as it used to be and some protection must be given to the son 
who would still be forced to stand guarantee for his father even though 
he may live separately from him while remaining technically joint.
But there is also a danger that this extended interpretation might 
make unwholesome intrusions into the nature of the obligation itself.
It should not be used to put the Hindu pickpocket in the same position
42. A.I.P. 1939 Daj. 234 and Derrett’s article: Hisdeeds of a manager 
and Pioous Obligation A.I.P. i960 Jnl. 2-5 at pr.9 p«3«
43. A.I.P. 1959 B.C. 232.
as a Muslim or Christian one (except from the point of view of
44criminality) for one must not forget that the Hindu father unlike 
his Muslim or Christian counterpart owns joint family property.
To sum up the argument so far : P. 0. is really another
way in which the sons tell the father :
"Go ahead father and incur your debts; we will stand by
you and pay them off provided they are not too unacceptable 
in terms of the traditional norms. Cur shares are hound up 
with yours and since you are the head of the family, this is 
the only way in which we can stand surety for the risks that 
you take indirectly on our behalf. Our birthrights are of 
contingent value - the residue after the payment of your debts."
d'O The son's liability converted into a father1s power. 
a. The position under Anglo-Hindu law.
The son’s liability to pay off his father's debts soon became
a power in the father to alienate his son's interest to pay the father's
debts. It may have been, as Professor Derrett suggest, because of
"a pandit's incorrect explanation of dharmarthe (for purposes of 
dharma) at I lit.1.1.27 as including the purposes of releasing the 
living father from his debts." 45
But the jump from the son paying the father's debts on his death to
the son becoming a standing guarantor for his father's debt incurring
power during his father's lifetime, is not a very big jump. The 6astra
in making the son and grandson more liable than the great-grandson
throws a vague pointer in this direction. The sastric position was
that the son paid the capital as well as the interest on the debt,
the grandson only the capital and the great-grandson only the capital
46if he acquired any assets. Though as rrofessor Derrett suggests,
44. This point is made by Derrett: Indica Pietas (1969) 37 at 50; Ibid 
C.M.H.L. (1970) 103. He would like to see all pickpockets in the same 
position.
45. Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 93 f.n.10. The Mitakshara text referred to 
is the one which defines the Karta(s power to alienate joint family 
property for the distress of the family, its benefit or for religious
uurpose s.
46.. Gee Kane ,111 ,H.D„ 442-3-; DerrettIndica Pietas -(1969)’ 37 at’46 
f.n.22.
47these are probably only rules of limitation, they stress th& 
decreasing liability of the issue as they get more and more remote 
from the debt. Anglo-Hindu law extends the same principle in the 
opposite direction and lays down the procedural rule that all male 
issue are liable for the debts of the father during their father's 
lifetime and a decree against him would be binding against them, but
that after partition or the father’s death a separate suit would
48 49
have to be filed against the son. This, as Kane ‘ has shown, is
opposed to the latter of the sastra, but it is not an altogether 
unhappy result' if we remember that the shares of the various copar­
ceners fluctuate considerably with every birth and death. Since a 
large part of property in India is J.F.P., the Courts invented two 
rules to enable such property to become liable for the payment of 
debts. The first was that the individual share of a coparcener 
could be attached in the execution of a decree for the debts owed by 
that coparcener. The second was that the shares of a male issue could 
be attached for the debts of the father. This latter rule was at 
first merely limited to attachments by the Court,^ but later became
a power in the father to alienate property for antecedent debts all
51over India except in Mysore till 1954.
47- Derrett: Indica Pietas (1969) 57 at 47•
48. For a resume of the rules see Panna Lai v Haraini A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 170.
49. Kane III H.D. 450.
5». For the use of this rule by the Court see Kayne (lid) 415-5• See 
also the first two cases in which the Privy Council explained the Court’s 
power to attache Girdharee Lai v Kant00 Lai (1874) 1 I.A. 521; Nanomi 
Babuasin v Nadan Mohun (I685) 15 I»A~. 1.
51. For the old position see Channabaseva Gowda v Range Gov/da A.I.R. 195i 
Mys. 58. This position was later abandoned under the pressure for uni­
formity in Thimmegowda v Dyamma A.I.R. 1954 Mys. 95 at 101. Vasudevamurthy J. 
wrongly thought that he was bound by Article 141 of the Constitution to 
follow the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Article applies only 
when the local lav; is in fact similar. For the position in Cochin see 
Virdhachalam v Chaldean Syrian Bank A . I .R .  1964 S.C. 1425°
The father's power to incur debts was thus considerably
reinforced by this power to alienate. The father could thus borrow
money from A, bide his time and then borrow again from A or B to repay
the earlier debt, using the J.F.P. either as a security or simply
selling it off. '^ his is precisely what happened in the famous case
52of Brij ITarain v Hangla Prashad. This tremendous increase in the
father's powers is well beyond either what the Smritikara imagined
or even any modern contractual relationship. In Brij Narain's case
the Privy Council laid down five propositions, the following three
of which are important for our purposes S5
"(1) The managing coparcener of a joint undivided estate cannot 
alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for the pur­
pose of necessity*
(2) If he is the father and the other members are the sons, he 
may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral 
purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding 
upon a decree for the payment of the debt.
(3) If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless 
that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not 
bind more than his own interest." 55
The problem is whether Proposition 2 can apply to mortgages for non­
antecedent debts qua debts. Some of the Courts ruled that mortgages
were governed by proposition 3 and that in order to make Proposition 2
.................................................    ■ 5^
applicable a personal decree would have to be made against the father,
whereas other Courts laid emphasis on the fact that the mortgage was a
52- A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50 = (1923) 51 I.A. 129.
53- Ibid at 56 col.l. (1923) 51 I.A. 129 at 139-
54. e.g. Beaumont J. in Bharmappa v Hanmantappa A.I.R. 1945 Bom.4-51 
(this is approved by Derrett (1955) l4A-.S-.tC. J. 139 at 149, but the 
Professor (as we have shown in f.n.8) appears to have changed his 
mind); Ganpati v Rameshwar A.I.R. 1947 Nag. 69- Both these cases are 
not approved of by the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand 
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 727 at pr.5 p-730 f,b’e are not inclined to confine 
the second proposition within such narrow limits."
security and not to apply Proposition 2 in such cases would make the
secured creditor in a less advantageous position than the unsecured
53creditor- The Supreme Court has with minor variations followed the 
latter aooroach.'''
(iV) Is the mortgage a debt or an alienation ?
The Supreme Court’s attempt to treat & mortgage as a debt 
57
rather than an alienation merits further examination. For this one 
must look at the lav; of mortgages.
Before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act 1832
(hereafter T.'P.A.) various kinds of local mortgages existed :
A simple mortgage in S. 58 (b) of the Act was called nBandha 
kikhat" in U.P.; "Dhrista Bhandaka", "Adaimanna Fattran" or 
"Tanaka" in I-Iadras; and "Taran gahan" or "Nazar gahan" in 
Bombay. A mortgage by conditional sale as defined in S.58(c) 
of the T.P.A. was called "Khat Kabala" in Bengal; "Bye-bil-wafa" 
in U.P. and parts of Bengal; "Gahan lagan" in Bombay and 
"Muddata Kriyam" or "Peruarthum" in Madras. The names given 
to the various kinds of usufructary mortgages were "Khai Khalasi" 
"Bhagbandhak" or "Bandhak nama" in Bengal; "Digyabhogam", 
"Swadhin", "Adhamanam", "Kanan" or "Otti" in Madras.
But how did these in fact operate ? In most cases they were 
not valuable as securities and were invariably accompanied fay a 
personal covenant. A description of the position before lSo2 was 
given by Sir Griffith Bvans while introducing the T.P.A.:
"Mortgages were legislated for in Bengal as early as 1793 
but as the old regulations gave a somewhat cumbrous and unsatis­
factory procedure and did not cover every class of mortgage, 
money lenders had resorted to a simple mortgage bond consisting
53- This is the approach taken by the Allahabad and Madras High Courts 
which we shall discuss later.
56. In Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand A.I.P. 1967 B.C. 727 at 730-1 the 
Supreme Court adopts the same approach as the Allahabad and Madras 
High Courts to Proposition 2 generally though they differ as regards 
its actual application.
57- ^his is implied in their judgement in Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand 
A.I.2M 1967 3.C. 727- But there is dicta to the contrary in Amritla^ v 
Jayant Lai A.I.R. i960 S.C. yGk at pr.21 p.971 col.2.
5o. For details and case law on the early equivalents see D.F.Hulla: 
The Transfer of .Property. A.ct. 1882 (1933 Bln.). 301...................
of a covenant to pay and a pledge of the property. This form 
of mortgage nevetf having been legislated for, there was no 
protection to the debtor. The practice was for the creditor 
to get a money decree and sell the mortgaged property without 
allowing for time for redemption. The sale being an ordinary 
execution sale of the right title and interest of thfe debtor ... "39
This resort to personal covenant also became necessary because the
Hindu law tended to produce insistence that in order that a pledge be
valid there either be an acceptance or possession of the pledge by
the pledgee. It was with great reluctance that the judges in Sib
60Chunder Ghose v Russick Chander Heogy held that a pledge unaccompanied
by possession was valid in Hindu lav;, though both Grant and Seton JJ.
admitted that such mortgages were prevalent in the country.^ Further
the Courts were also reluctant to allow the creditor to sell the
property in question unless the Court superintended the sale, as
becomes clear from the judgement in Bhowani Churan Hitter v Joy Kishen 
62Hitter in 1347* Sir 2. B. Ghose justifies this decision because of 
local conditions in India :
"The mass of mortgages in this country consists of mortgages 
of ancestral fields by ignorant peasants to a class of people not 
remarkable for their scrupulousness and everyone with any experi­
ence of Inai&n litigation must admit the danger of arming our 
money lenders v/ith a power of sale without the intervention of 
the Courts." 63 .............
This too persuaded money lenders to emphasise their personal covenants
rather than their securities.
59• Quoted in H.S.Gour: The law of transfer in India (6d) p.841 pr.1339
and also referred to but not quoted by rladhavan Pillay J. in Vishwanatha
Iyer v Subrananiya Iyer (1943) 30 T.L.J. 1053 at 1090.
60. (1842) Fulton 38 (for the position in the ancient Hindu lav; see H.B.
Ghose: The law relating to mortgages (Tagore Law Lectures - hereafter 
Ghose) 43 and note his criticism of this case).
61. Geton J. at 39-43 and Grant J. at 68.
62. (1847) 2 S.D. 429.
63. Ghose at 19-21*
After the passing of the T.P.A. there was no doubt that a 
mortgage was really a contingent alienation, egen though Section 69 
of the Act made the Courts' intervention necessary in all cases. The 
Courts worked on the assumption that in actual fact a mortgage was a 
tremendous power of alien|ation on the hands of the father with con­
comitant advantages to the creditor. Stanley C.J. observed in
64Chandra Deo Singh v Ilata Prashad :
"The greed which exists for the acquisition of landed property 
is well known. liondy lenders are ever ready to advance money to 
thriftless and extravagant landowners on the security of their 
landed property with a view to the ultimate acquisition of Ijtheir) 
property. Interest is allowed to accumulate until the mortgage 
debt has reached such dimensions that it is unlikely to redeem.
Then a suit is instituted on the foot of the security, the mort­
gagee gets leave to bid and buys and the family loses its ancestral 
property. liondy lenders are chary of making large advances to 
landowners on personal security."
In the same case Banerji and Richards J«J., however, treated the land
65merely as a collateral security. Indeed most of the Courts, instead
of emphasising that a mortgage was another wray in which the family
lost its property, chose to point out the rather obvious fact that
66the mortgage was nevertneless a debt. This can be very misleading
67for, as Irrrr^ i Mukerji J. pointed out in Gajadhar Pande v Jadubir,
"(t)he pure'Hindu'law did not regard a loan secured on a mortgage 
as different from a loan without such security. It prohibited a 
sale or gift without justification. Under Anglo-Indian lav/, a 
mortgage came to be regarded as an alienation and hence the rule 
of .Hindu law against an alienation by the father was applied."
64. (1909) $1 All. 176 at 203.
65. See Banerji J. at 216. The judges also felt that an analogy with a
sale was not called for - Banerji J. at 217-8; Richards J. at 233-4.
66. See for example Chidanbara Hudaliar v Koothaperumal (1903) 27 Mad.
326 at 327-8 (per Boddam and Bhashyam Ayyangar JJ.); Jagdish Prashad v 
Hoshyar Singh (1923) 51 All. 136 at 139 (per Sulaiman A. C 33777"
67. (1924) if? All. 122 at 126.
The fact that, after 1832, a mortgage was really an alienation is the 
reason why the Courts of Travancore Cochin took a different line. They 
were not subject to the T.P.A. But the reasons given by those Courts
are far from uniform. Four bases were decided by them and no less thqn
63three distinct approaches emerge. In S. Pillai v S. Pillai S. Ayyar J. 
(for G. Pillay and 1-1. Pillay JJ.) thought that such mortgages were in
Tr 6 9fact antecedent. In venkiteshwar Iyer v Chidambara Iyer K. Pillai J. 
(for Chatfield and Thaliath JJ.) based their decision on the fact that 
the mortgage decree had in fact been executed (thus following the 
approach of the Supreme Court, though not in point of details). The
70approach of the Supreme Court was foreshadowed in Sanakar v Azhakappa 
where the mortgage for non-antecedent debts could not be challenged 
even though the decree had not been executed. 3ut a somewhat broader
71line of reasoning was followed in Vishwanatha Iyer v Subramaniya Iyer. 
Here the hypothecation bond had in fact been executed for family neces­
sity but Sankara Subha Iyer J. went on to explain that the law in 
Travancore Cochin was different because they did not follow the law 
of mortgages prevalent in the rest of India. He observed :
"After the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, the 
element of transfer has gone into the conception of a simple 
mortgage, the transfer being a transfer of the right of sale 
but for which the transaction will only be a charge and not a 
mortgage. It is this basic idea which seems to be responsible 
for treating a mortgage on par with a sale while considering 
pious obligation on the part of the son. In this country there 
is no provision made in the Civil Procedure Code corresponding 
to 0.34 of the ... Civil Procedure Code of 1908 ... and there­
fore no warrant for approximating a mortgage or hypothecation 
to a sale ... "
How that the Siyil Procedure Code applies to Travancore Cochin, the 
Courts in Kerala should follow the rest of India, but the Supreme
68. (1902) 23 T.L.P. 8 .
69. (1924) 18 T.L.J. 490 at 500.
70. (1932) 22 T.L.J. at 84 and 85-6 (per Rao and Pillai JJ.).
71. (1940) 30 T.L.J. 1053 at 1090.
Court appears to have accepted that State’s position as anomalous
72but final in Virdhachalam v Chaldean Bank. This is acceptable in
the context of the background of the Travancore Cochin cases.
Thus we can see that in Indian High Courts the view that 
mortgages can amount to alienations has been inadvertently overlooked 
while considering the problem,
[v) The Supreme Court’s complete neglect of the procedural protection 
which should be given to the son.
But even if we treat the mortgage as a contingent alienation 
we will see that Statute affords some protection to a co-owaer (and the 
son must inevitably be treated as a co-owner). In 1882 this protection 
was to be found in Section 85 of the T,P,A. which, subject to the pro­
visions of the Act, laid down :
’’all persons having an interest in the property comprised in a 
mortgage must be joined as parties in any suit under this chapter, 
provided the plaintiff had notice of such interest,”
In 1908, the proviso was dropped, the word ’’shall” substituted for
"must” and the section re-enacted as Order r,l of the Civil
Procedure Code 1908. That section lays down :
"Subject to the provisions of this Code, all persons having 
an interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of 
redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to 
the mortgage.”
The only other relevant provision is Order 1 r. 9 which lays down :
"No suit shall be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or 
non-joinder and the Court may in every suit deal with the 
matter in controversy so far as it regards the rights and 
interests of the parties actually before it."
These provisions were relied upon by a Full bench of the
73Allahabad High Court in Bhawani Prasad v Kalu where it was held that 
even a mortgage decree for an antecedent debt was not binding on the
son who was not made a party to it. But later this approach was
7k 73abandoned by all but the Calcutta High Court, and the Allahabad,
76 77Bombay and the Madras High Courts took the view that such decrees
were binding on the son if the decree was executed. Some courts even
78went a step further and ignored these rules altogether. The reason
given by one of the Allahabad decisions for the disuse of the rule by
79the Allahabad High Court in Hori Lai v Hunman was that the substantive 
rule in Section 85 of the T.P.A. was replaced by Order 3k f.l - a mere 
rule of procedure I
These cases are interesting because of three reasons. The 
first is that the use of Order 3k r.l to protect the son's interest is
73- (1893) 17 All.537 (F.3.). It was followed in Kausilla v Chandini
(1900) 22 All. 377
7A. Note the case: Brijnandan v Bidya Prashad (1915) k2 Cal.1068 ending 
a long controversy.
75- See Debi Prashad v Jia Pam (1903) 25 All. 21A; Hori Lai v Hunman 
(1912) 3k All. 5^9 at 55k (per Hichards C.J.7.
Chimma v Sada (1910) 12 Bom;L.R. 8ll.
77• Ramasamayyan v Viraswami Ayyar (1898) 21 Mad.222 foil.in Palani 
Goundan v Rangayya Sound an (1899) 22 Had. 207- But see the later decision 
that a decree was binding anyway: Sheik Ibrahim v Pama Iyer (1912)
35 Mad. 683.
78. See the decisions of the Patna High Court in Sarda ffrasad v 
Umeshwar Prashad A.I.a. 1963 Pat. 27A
(but note that the sale in execution had taken place in this case). See 
also Ishar Singh v Gajadhar Prashad A.I.P. 1957 Pat. 17A (D.3.); 
Purmeshwar v Kishan Prashad A.I.P. 1925 Pat. 59 Tper Jwala Prashad J.); 
Sital Prashad v Asho Singh ii • I.R. 1922 Pat. 651; Hit Lai v Joboo A.I.R. 
192A Pat. 458; Jagdish v Ramchandra A.I.R. 1921 Pat. 377; Sheik Abdul v 
Shib Lai A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 252. (The last two decisions were by Jwala 
Prashad J T ) . .
79- (1912) 3k All. 5A9-
now dwindling, and the second is that all these cases can only be 
justified on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that the father 
can be said to represent the son’s interest. Thirdly the distinction 
between a decree which had been executed and one which has not is
precisely the kind of distinction which was made by the Supreme Court
80ip. Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand. It is submitted with respect that the 
Supreme Court have completely ignored the provisions of Order 3** r.l 
(read with Order 1 r.9) and thus ignored also the protection that must 
be given to the son’s interest in J.F.P.
(vO The practical approach chosen by the Supreme Court and its limitations.
Instead of trying to give the son and the creditor adequate
protection, some Courts took the path of least resistance. They
brought in the pragmatic argument :”It is now too late” and refused to
allow the son to complain about the non-antecedent nature of the mortgage
after some part of the proceedings were over.
Three different approaches have been found by the Courts.
The approach of Suleiman J. (against the dissent of Banerji J.) that
if an auction sale has taken place it is too late from the po£nt of 
8lview of the son. The approach of Subba Rao J. in the Madras High
Court(which view was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v 
82Hukam Chand ) that once execution proceedings were complete, the son 
was bound. Lastly we have the approach of the Supreme Court in
80. A.I.R, 1967 S.C. 727.
81. Jagdish Prashad v Hashyar Singh A.I.R. 1928 All. 598. The rule was 
not applied to a case where an auction sale had not taken place: Jahan
Singh v Hardat Singh (193**) 57 All. 357; Hira Lai v Puran Chand A.I.R.
19**9 All. 6o5 (F.3.).
82. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 727 at pr.6 p.730-1.
Abdul Hameed v Provident Investment Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 195** Mad. 961 (F.B.).
Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand°  ^ (followed by the Punjab High Court^^) that 
it is too late to impugn the alienation (i.e. the mortgage without 
antecedency) at the execution proceedings themselves. In following 
this approach the Supreme Court have corked on the assumption that 
the Proposition 2 in Brij Narain*s case applies to all debts,
85including mortgage debts.
What the Supreme Court has therefore done is in fact to apply 
the second proposition after making slight variations in the inter­
pret ation given to it by the Allahabad and the Madras High Courts. 
Instead of examining the nature of pious obligation itself the Court 
has treated the propositions of the Privy Council as ex cathedra and 
limited its techniques to interpreting its provisions. But it has 
not even worked out fully the approach of the Privy Council. The Court 
should have regarded mortgages as alienations and given full effect
to the Proposition 3 and given full effect to the antecedency rule.
86Alternatively they could have argued, as Professor Derrett does, 
that antecedency should not be applied to mortgages and given to the 
father a virtually uncontrolled power of contingent alienation. But * 
the Court attempted to have it both ways - by pass the clear provisions . 
of Proposition 3 and at the same time justify their decision on the 
basis of Proposition 2.
We should remember that in actual fact the Supreme Court,
83. A.I.H. 1967 S.C. ,727 at 731. , 1 -..
84. Hindustan Commercial Bank v Sohan Lai A.I.R. 1970 P & H. 67 (per 
D.K.Hahajan J.).
83. Supra f.n. 83.
86. Derrett C.M.H.L. (1970) 99» This argument 011 the basis of precedent 
is noted supra f.n.9»
•" o  rv,t «.> O’
87taking an unusual step of deciding an issue of fact, found that the
mortgage. in dispute was partly antecedent and partly justified by
88family necessity. '^ his therefore is another one of those occasions 
where the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to reform the law by 
obiter observations. Should not the Court have examined the nature 
of the pious obligation itself instead of trying to juggle with the
propositions contained in Bri.i Narain’ s case ? I’hey have assumed the
negative role of trying to avoid the absurdity of a secured creditor
lA>v
being in a worse position than ehjsecuredi, rather than work out the 
rights of the parties.
The best solution is to follow strictly the antecedency rule 
in all cases. If the creditor wants to enforce his mortgage he must
follow strictly the provisions of Order r.l. In effect this moans
that a mortgage decree should not be binding against the son unless he 
is joined in as party and, at that stage, has the opportunity to plead 
the invalidity of the mortgage so far as touches his interest. The
Court may however deviate from this rule under the terms of Order 1 r.9»
paying due regard to the facts of the particular case before it.
he must not overlook the fact that the village money lender is
still as much an institution as he was in the nineteenth century and
89indebtedness is rampant in the villages. Any attempt to protect the 
creditor is in fact an attempt to protect that kind of money lender.
For the son. to act as guarantee for the father is one thing, to hand 
over his birth right to an unscrupulous money lender quite another. The
i
| Supreme Court’s hastily considered obiter dicta need reconsideration.
j
87. Faqir Chand v Hukam Chand A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 727 at pr.ll p.731-2.
| But the Court justified this on the ground that the case had carried on
' for 1A years and that to remand it to the trial Court to decide an issue
j of fact would prolong it even further.
88. Ibid at pr.ll p.732.
89. See G. Myrdal: II Asian Drama 1039-^7* See also K.Subba Rao: Han and 
..........  Society (1971) 69* ...........................................
I
ii) A nother example of bias in the creditor’s favour.
The Supreme Court's attempt to protect the creditor can also
90be seen in their decision in Amrit Lai v Jayanti Lai wher&
Gajendragadkar J., reading the judgement of the Court, held that not
only must the son, alleging that a debt was avyavaharika, prove that
the debt was tainted, but also that it was tainted to the knowledge of 
91the creditor. In achieving this result the Court assumed that-the 
basis of P.O.
"is spiritual and its sole object is to confer spiritual benefit 
on the father." 92
The Court reached their conclusion on the basis of an obiter dictum
w n 93 94of the irivy Council and the extrajudicial comments of a Hindu jurist,
but ignored the fact that juristic opinion in general went another 
95say, and overruled in most general terms considered Madras and Allahabad 
decisions on the subject. The Court justified their new view on the
90. A.I.R. i960 S.C. 964. See the very incisive comment on this by 
Derrett: Avyavaharika debts and the decision of the Supreme Court in 
A.I.R. i960 S.C. 964 (1961) K.L.T. 21. His criticism gets slightly modi­
fied in C.M.H.L. (1970) 106-u where he suggests that the Supreme Court 
view was a slip.
91. Ibid at pr.15 p . 969 col.2.
92. Ibid at pr.7 p.966 dol. 2.
93* Ibid at pr.12 p.968. The Privy Council decision was Suraj Eansi Koer 
v Sheo Persad Singh (1878) 6 I.A. 88.
94. Ibid at pr.l4 p. 969 relying on K.K.Bhattacharya: The law relating 
to the Hindu joint family (Tagore Law Lectures) 549-50. See also H.S.Gour: 
Hindu Code (4d) 500.
95• See Raghavachariar (19oO;4d) 320; Ilulla (12d) 437- Hut see Hulla (13d) 
329 f.n.(p.) where the editor assumes that the Supreme Court had not over­
ruled the Madras case (infra, f.n.96) and that it was "not necessary for 
the son to show that the immoral purpose was known to the lender. " 
Obviously an error by Hulla's editor.
96. A.I.R. I960 S.C. 964 at pp.970-1. -‘-he High Court cases are: P.Lak- 
shmanaswami v T.P.T.Raghavacharyulu A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 292 (per Shastri J.). 
The Supreme Court distinguishes this case on the grounds that it did not 
apply; Ilafcaraj Singh v Balwant Singh (1906) 2o All.508.
97 ~basis of J.E.G.C., and a text of Yajnavalkya, which states that the
98sources of Hindu law are wide enough to include ’’approved usage” - thus
dressing up the doctrine of stare decisis in traditional terms. But
the usage in this case was by no means proven. The Court freely admit
that they want to protect the bona fide alienor and suggested that the
99path of change lay with the legislature.
Once again the Court has assumed that the basis of F.O. is 
religious virtue, merely followed an obiter of the Privy Council and 
assumed the veneer of reformism while not paying due attention to the 
real nature of P.O.
If the Supreme Court goes out of its way to reform the law, 
it should be able to take a wider view than merely to try to slot their 
views in a category created by the Privy Council and at the samfe time 
exonerate itself by suggesting that their view was progressive.
viii) Conclusion
To sura up: The Supreme Court’s decisions in Anthonyswamy v
II. P. Chinnasv/amy^^(which applies P.O. to a Christian community),
Panna Lai v ITaraini^ ^  (which applies the normal rule of debts to P.O.)
102 —  and Virdhachalam v Chaldean Bank (where the Court preserves the j*-’'-*-- I05o
.a: 1 law in Travancore Cochin) are quite right. Their decision
in Jakati v Borkar^^is not unacceptable, even though it does tend to
97 Ibid at pr.19 p.970.
98. Ibid at pr.lS p.970 relying on Yajnavalkya 1.7;
99. Ibid at pr.19 p.970
100. (1970) II S.C.P. 6^3 discussed supra p.
101. A.I.P. 195XS.C. 170 discussed supra p.
102. A.I.P. 1964- S.C. 1^25 • Though one must admit they did not specifically 
consider this aspect of the matter.
103- A.I.R. ■ 1939 S.O. '232'discussed Supra p.........................
stretch the son’s liability. But its decision in Faqir Chand v Hukan
IqL 105
Chand 'and Arnrit Lai v Jayanti Lai stress too much the "piety” of
of the pious obligation and do not recognise P.O. for what it really
is - a system of suretyship. All these decisions derive their
inspiration not from an understanding of the institution of P.O. itself
but rather from the obiter of Privy Council and the assumption that the
son is in an indefensible position. All the judgements are very brief
and overrule conflicting Iligh Court dicta fairly casually. It is
hardly surprising that all the Supreme Court decisions are in favour
of the creditor. This fact alone hardly justifies them.
10k. A.I.R. 1967 B.C. 727 discussed supra generally. 
105. A.I.R. i960 S.C. 96k discussed supra generally.
2. Adoption and the doctrine of relation back.
i, The problem.
The basic problem centres upon the extent to which an adopted 
son is adopted into the receiving family. To what extent can he inherit 
from all his new relatives, become a coparcener in the adopted joint 
family and if adopted after (and in some cases considerably after) the 
death of his adopted father divest persons who inherited from his 
parents and their relatives on the grounds that he is a preferential 
heir, reopen partitions and by the use of a legal fiction (the doctrine 
of relation back) ’’relate back” his adoption to the date of his father’s 
death so as to enable him to participate in (and even question) all 
that happened in the intervening period.
Our primary concern is not with the prejudice against adopted
2
children but only with the legal problems that this prejudice feives 
rise to and in particular to the conflict between the desire to protect 
the adopted son’s interests by the doctrine of relation back and the 
practical rule that ”an estate once vested cannot be divested". Before
we examine the nature of tha€ conflict and the effect it had on the
Hindu lav/ of adoption, let us examine the sastric position and the 
early nineteenth century positions to show that there was a fair 
amount of prejudice against the adopted son and juristic ox^ inion v/as 
not even in favour of his inheriting where there was no question of 
an estate being divested.
1. Ihe best account of the Hindu law of adoption is given in Derrett: 
Adoption in Hindu lav; (195^ 3 ) 60 2.V.H. 3^-90. For general accounts in 
Hindu law text books see liayne (lid) lol ff.; Hulla (13d) ff; Derrett
I.Ii.Ii.L. (1963) 92-ff.; Ibid C.ii.I-I.L. (1970) 122 ff. Articles on the 
doctrine of relation back are referred to later (infra f.n. <?7 ).
2. As an example of this see the letter of Shree K.L.Kapoor, President 
of the Indian Centre of Publicity for National Adoptions, complaining 
bitterly that Indians are prejudiced against adopting Indian children, 
who are being adopted by foreigners. Amrifca Bazar Patrika Aug.29 1971
ii. The prejudice against the adopted son as demonstrated in the 
jfestra and in the early nineteenth* century decisions.
The sastric texts divide sons into those who were rikthabhaja
(those who take the wealth of the father as well as his gotra) and
those who were gotrabhajah (those who merely took the gotra). This
3
distinction is made by Gautama and Baudhyayana. Again Manu, Narada,
4
Vasish£ha divide sons into two lots of six; Dayada-bandhava (those 
who inherit the wealth of the father and his collaterals) and adayada- 
bandhava (those who inherit the wealth of the father only). Manu, 
Baudhyayana, Gautama, Brihaspati and the BrahraapurarLa^  place the 
adopted son in the first six. The Mitakshara^ qhotes Manu and
rn g
Yajnavalkya, but like the Smriti Chandrika prefers to follow Manu
in this matter. But the rest of the Smritikaras place the adopted
son very low. Apastamba^ prefers to recognise only the aurasa (natural)
son. Vasish^ha and Vishnu place him eighth, Yajnavalkya and Harita
place him seventh,^Kau^ilya, Narada, ^afikka-and-Likhita, Devala and
12Yama, put him ninth and the Dayabhaga relies on Devala to put him in
3. Gautama XXX, 30-1; Baudhyayana 11.2.36-7.
4. Manu IX, 158-9; Narada (quoted) on Dayabhaga X,7-8; Vasishfcha XVII-3S.
5* See the Chart in Kane III H.D. 645; Mayne (lid) 107. Gautama:XXVI1.32-3;
Baudhyayana II.2.10-23; Brihaspati (quoted) II C.D. Text 337; Brahmapurapa 
(quoted) II C.D. Text 334.
6 . I.XI.30-1 .
7* On Yajnavalkya II,12$-32.
8 . Chapter X.
9- 11.6.13.
10. Vasish-fcha: XVII.9-12; Vishnu: XV.1-27.
11. Yajnavalkya: 11.128-32; Harita (quoted) II C.D. Text 331.
12. Kautilya:III.7; Narada:XIII.45-6; .^ankka-and-Likhita: (quoted)
II C.D. Text 332(c); Yana: II.Text 332.
13 lif.the second category. In Puddo Kumaree Debee v Juggut hishore the
Court quoted £ri-Kpishna Tarkalankara on the Dayabhaga and placed him
fifth, where no Smritikara places him.
Thus we can see that a lot of smriti writers were not prepared
to allow him to inherit from his father’s kinsmen. Jagannatha sug-
I 15
gested that he couldjinherit from his paternal uncle : the Mitakshara)
16and Kullukabha££a on lianu allow him to inherit from his uncle only if
'i1he has good qualities. hus the first problem on Anglo-IIindu law was
whether the son could inherit from his adopted relatives at all.
The nineteenth century decisions found it very difficult to
get past this wall of prejudice in the texts. At first they allowed
the adopted son to inherit from his f ther’s relatives. Thus two early
17cases allow him to inherit from his adopted paternal uncle. Later
l8decisions allowed him to inherit from his grandfather’s second cousin, and
his father's third cousin,~^In Puddo Kumaree Debee v Juggut Kishore^
Hitter J. (reading the judgement for Jackson and Hacdonald JJ.) held
that an adoptee uhuld even inherit from his adopted sister's son, who
belonged to another gotra. That these decisions were a little forced
in the context of the texts, can be seen from the judgement of Parke J.
21in Suiqbhoo Chunder - v Naraini Deb fa. where their lordships in
13. X,7.
14. (1879) 3 Cal. 613.
3.5. II C.D. 280.
16. Mitakshara I, ii.28-34-; Kullukabha£ta on Manu IX.I58.
17. See Gooroo Pershad Bose v Pashbehary Ghose (i860) 1 S.D.A. 4-11; 
Lukhee Nath Hoy v Shama Gundaree (1838) S.D.A. Hep. 1863 =
18. Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v Kripa Hoyee Debia (I068) 9 W.P. 423 
(Lock J. for himself and Eobhouse J. had difficulty in explaining the 
contrary position taken by the clear text of the Dayabhaga X,7-9)«
19. Hokundo Lall. Hoy v Bykunt Nath Roy (i860) 6 Cal.2,89.
20. (1879) 3 Cal. 613 at 627 (examining the textual position).
21. (1884) 3 V/.R. 100 (P.C.) Ht 101 col.l, his lordship admits that 
there is a difference of opinion amongst the pundits.
the Privy Council held that an adopted son of a full brother was to be
preferred to a natural son of a half brother and relied on the
22Dayabhaga for this proposition I Again in Gowrbullub v Juggernath Hitter
it took 51 pundits to overrule the opinion of one of.the pandits
attached to the Court that an adoptee could inherit from his adopted 
23grandfather.
\
A great controversy hentred on the question whether an
2kadoptee can inherit from his adopted mother’s relatives. In the
25
early case of Gunga Maya v Kishem Kishore (1821) the pundits, com­
menting on a hypothetical problem,stated (in what must be taken as 
obiter dictum) that he could not. This observation however came to 
be considered as authoritative and in a series of decisions of the 
Calcutta and Madras High Court it was generally held that an adoptee 
cannot inherit from his mother’s relatives and that they could not
pfH
inherit from him. This attitude was however done away with by a
22. On the Dayabhaga position see f.n.lB and text corresponding to f.n.13
23. Tor a detailed account of the "case see Macnaghten: Considerations 
on Hindoo lav/ (1029) 159-166.
2k» For an analysis of the problems in this area see Derrett: The 
relationship of a married woman to her husband’s adopted son in Hindu 
theory and practice:A correction (1959) 6l Z V.R. 1 to be read with the 
article cited f.n.l (1958 ) 60 Z.V.R. 3^~at• 86."
25. (1821) 3 Beng. Gel. Hep. 170; Macnaghten (supra f.n.23) 76;
Barkar: Adoption in Hindu lav; (1888 2d 1916) 395-
26. Mo run lioee v Be joy KiC£KHv._____ Gossamee (1865) W.R.Sp.No.121 (F.3.)
per Roberts and Sumbhoonath JJ. Mote the latter1s judgement trying to 
distinguish the earlier case law (particularly the case cited f.n.27)
at 12k col.%  But see Teen Cowree 1g, Chatterjee v Deonath Banerjee 
(1883) 5 H«R« k9 where Loch J. (for Seton-Karr J. and himself) that the 
1321 case was obiter (at p.49)« For the Madras view see the judgement 
of Innes and Kernan JJ. in Chinnaramakristna v Minatchi Ammal (1873)
7 M.H.C.R. 2^5 (relying on the Dattaka Himamsa at p.24-7)•
27. Gunga Pershad Roy v Brijesswaree Chowdhry (1859) Beng. S.D.A.Rep.1091
judgement of Loch J. which held that he could inherit his mother's
2ostridhan and where he explained that the 1821 decision was obiter.
This was followed by a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High
2°  30 Court  ^and Hitter J.’s judgement in Una Sunkar Iioitro v Kali Komul
in both of which it was held that the adoptee could inherit from his 
maternal relatives.
Thus we can see that prejudice has existed against the son 
being fully incorporated into the adopting farn iiy and inheriting 
from his new relatives, even though the question of divesting an 
already vested estate did not arise in any of the situations des­
cribed above, and in spite of the fact that the sastric texts emphasise 
that Mg sonless man goes to hell", thus emphasising the religious 
merit in adoption.^
28. Bee Teen Cpwree's case cited f.n.26.
29. Cham Kuar v ^angadin (1876) 1 All. 235 at 256-7 suggesting that 
the maternal grandfather got spiritual advantage from the adoptee.
All the earlier case law is reviewed. The 1821 decision treated as 
obiter and the others as merely following it. Loch J.’s timely inter­
vention is noted and approved.
30. Uma Sunkar v Kali Komul (l88l) 6 Cal. 257 (F.3.) approved by 
the Privy Council (1865) 10 I.A. 138. All the easlier case lav/ is 
reviewed in the High Court decision.
31. See ^ayne (lid) 106; Derrett: (supra f.n.l.) (1958) 60 Z.V.2. 3^ 
at see also Ibid: C.M.H.L. (1970) 123-^ f for a modern discussion 
of the subject.
32iii. The rule against divestin';; and the widow’s power of adoption.
a.fo The development of the lav/ until 195^°
Anglo-Hindu lav;, faced with the problem of inventing a
fiction which would make the adoptee the son of his adopted father even
if the former had been adopted after the latter’s death, tried several
alternatives. Thus the Pundits pretended that the adoptee was in
fact en ventre sa mbre and used the fiction that the mother had been
33pregnant all ~c the time. Alternatively the Courts suggested the fiction
34
of a suspension of inheritance. But the first solution could not be
upheld because often years elapsed betv/een the father's death and the
son's adoption. The second solution militated against the rule that
an estate once vested cannot be divested - a rule so strong that the
Courts d.id not even allow a natural son to divest an estate which his
36.
father could not inherit because of the latter’s blindness.
To leave the adoptee without any rights would be unjust and 
therefore the Courts allowed the adoptee to divest his adopting
32. For the literature on this subject see : G.B.Dabke: Divesting an 
estate on adoption (1939) Al Bom.L.B.Jnl. 41; o.Venkatararaan: Theory of 
relation back in adoption and prior surrender (19^ -9) I M.L.IT.Jnl. 315 
G.B.Dabke: 'Termination of the widow’s power to adopt "(1*933)^ 5" Bom° L.B.Jnl. 
37; K.V.V.L.Narasimhachari: Adoptive Bother (1953) II H.L.J.ilnl. 23;
Derrett: Some troublesome-cases in Adaption (1953) 55 BomL.B.Jnl 1; Ibid:
An important development in the law of adoption (1955) 57 Bom.L.B.Jnl. 73; 
Ibid: Hindu Lawf Adoptive Mothers: Another difficult problem for the 
Supreme Court (1955) lo S.C.J. 217; Ibid: Two difficult Bombay cases in 
Hindu lav; (1956) 58 Bom.L.P.Jnl. 9$ at 102-4; Ibid: Divesting: An 
important full Bench decision 011 adoption (1956) 58 Bom.L.B.Jnl. 1. 
Literature on divesting after the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 
1956 is cited infra.
33• See Banee Kishenmunee v Baja Oddwunt Singh (1824) 3 Beng.Sel.Bep. J>0b.
34. See Karuna Mai v Jai Chunder Chose (1841) 5 Beng.Sel.Bep.46.
35• Kalidos Das v Krishna Chunder Das (1869) 11 V/.R.(Q.T.) 11 Peackock C.J. 
reading the judgement of the Court reversed the judgement of Norman J.
C G 0
mother^ and her junior co-widows.
But as time went on the rule against divesting took firm 
root and it was stated in a series of Privy Council decisions that 
the widow's power to adopt itself came to an end, if there were 
estates apart from her own, which would be divested as a result of
38her adoption. it was discovered much later that the observations
in these cases were really obiter dicta, because the decisions could
have been reached on the prior point that in each one of these cases
in question the widow was precluded from adopting because of the
39existence of another widow lower down the line.
The second breakthrough came with the decisions which ruled 
that the divesting rule did not apply with respect to J.F.P. or certain 
impartible estates which tech.nica.lly did not vest in anyone else
36. Bee the cases cited f.n.33 and 34 supr; Dhurn Das Pandey v list.
Bhama Boondurri Debiah (1883) 3 h.H. 43 (P.C.Tj Tco^ frA-sr ' " ’ ‘u 
Mst. Buhna Bebia v ■‘•'tirladh Dobe^ "(T8g4) 7 A.M. 430. It was alleged in 
Paid Sooder Bingh v Burbanee Posse (1883) 22 I/.P. 121 that a widow could 
be divested even from her predeceased natural unmarried son, but this has 
been doubted in Bykant Hoy v Kisto Bundaree hoy (1834) 7 Vkh. 392 011 the 
grounds that in Bengal the mother was a preferential heir to the brother.
37* Bee Sup Chand v kakmabai (1371) 3 B.H.C.P. (A.C.J.) 114; kakmabai' 
v Hadhabai (lo6u")"5^  B.II.C.k. l8l at 192; Mondakini Besi v Adinath Dey
TlS9in3~Oal. 69.
38. See Mst. Bhoobun I-Ioyee v Pam hi shore (1863) 10 M.I:A. 279 (hut note 
that the estate had vested in a predeceased son's widow); Pudma Coomari 
v Court of V/ards (l88l) 8 I.A. 231. But the facts are a little compliaated 
because the other heirs had relinquished in favour of the adoptee even 
though his,adoption was found invalid because the power of adoption had 
come to an end); Thayammal v Venkatarammaya (1387) 14 I.A. 69 at 70 
(same facts as Mst. Bhoobun Moyee's case as also in Tara Churn Chatterjee 
v Suresh Chunder" Hooker jee ( 1889) 16 I.A. 166 at 173")"
39- Note the observation of the Privy Council in Karendra v Sanatan 
A.I.P. 1933 P.O. 135 at 159 Mit is at least material that in each of 
the other cases it. was the existence of the son's widow that stood in 
the way of the adoption ... "
n.
\J Kj
Z|0because they passed on by survivorship. That this distinction, 
though valid, is thin can be shown in the case of the estate of the 
sole surviving coparcener, as we shall see later.
41
This was followed by three decisions of the Privy Council
where it was made clear that the widow’s power of adoption could not
be defeated by the rule against divesting and that what was important
was the religious motive in adopting a son to her husband, the
inheritance of property being only secondary. The Irivy Council
42therefore went one step further and in Anant v Shankar held that 
the adoptee could divest even a collateral’s heir. This came to be 
reconsidered by the Supreme Court in 1954.
■ (yft •^ ie Supreme Court’s decision in Srinivas v ijarayan.
43v harayan the Supreme Court was called upon 
to decide the extent to which the doctrine of relation back would 
apply. T. L. V. Ayyar J., reading the judgement of the Court, 
observed :
n(T)he scope of relating back is clear. It applies only 
when the claim made by the adopted son relates to the estate of 
his adoptive father. This estate may be definite and ascer- . .
tained as when he is absolute and sole owner of the properties 
or it may be fluctuating as when he is a member of a joint 
Hindu family in which the interest of the coparceners is
40. .See Haghunanda v -’rojo Hi shore (1075) 3 I. A. 154 (an impartible 
aamindarij; Bachoo v Aankorebai (190?) 34- I.A, 107 (but note that the 
Court did not interfere with tne dispositions made in the will of the 
sole surviving coparcener); Yadao v Namdeo (l^ fcj)AS I.A. 513* hote the 
statement in Amarendra v Sanatan A.I.A. 1933 P.O. 153 dealing with 
succession in a joint family that it is clear under the decisions of 
the Board that the vesting in another coparcener.does not put an end 
to the power of adoption.
41. Ameer Ali J.’s judgement in Pratan Singhji v Agar Singhji (191o) 
46 I.A. 97 at 106; Amarendra v Sanatan A.I.A. 1933 P.C. 155 at 153; 
Anant v Shankar A.I.A. 1943 P.O. 196 at 199-200.
42. See supra f.n. 41.
43. A.I.E. 1954 3.C. 379.
liable to increase by death and decrease by birth. ... The point 
for determination now is whether the doctrine ... can be applied 
(to) ... a claim made by the adopted son to the estate of a 
collateral. The theory on which this doctrine is based is that
there should be no hiatus in the continuity of the line of the
adoptive father. That, by its very nature, can apply only to 
him and not his collaterals.” 44
This is clearly a policy decision made more necessary by the fact that
in this case the adoption in question had been made 47 years after the
45death of the father. Instead of merely stating that the Court would
not allow ’’relation back” to cut so deeply into the rule against 
46divesting, the Court took the wider argument that the adopted son
is in effect related only to the father and not to the collaterals.
It must not be forgotten that a large part of the nineteenth century
47decisions that we have discussed above rested on the fact that the
43son conferred spiritual benefit on relatives other than the father.
49This is particularly true of the judgement in Sham ICuar v Gangadin 
where it was specially made clear that the adoptee could inherit from 
his maternal grandfather because of the spiritual benefit he con­
ferred on him. Thus while the actual - decision of the Supreme Court 
is defensible, the approach of the Supreme Court is considerably 
wider and jeopardises the adopted son’s position. Consider the 
following statement made by the Court :
’’The point for determination now is whether this doctrine of 
relation back can be apx^ lied when the claim made by the adopted 
son relates not to the estate of his adopted father but of a 
collateral. The theory on which this doctrine is based is that
44. Ibid at pr.17 p.335 col. 1.
45. Ibid at 381. See also pr.25 p.3o7 col.2 where the Court takes note 
of this fact.
46. Ibid at pr.25 p.387-3 where they clearly state this.
47* See supra Chapter VI Section 2 (Si)
43. This is seldom of high relevance in Mitakshara cases.
49. (l*7fe) 1 All. 2§5.
there should be no hiatus in the continuity of the line of the 
adoptive father. That, by its very nature, can apply to him 
and not to his collaterals." 50
51
It has been argued that this reading of Srinivas v iJarayan
is unjustified and there is nothing to suggest that the Courts will pre­
vent an adopted son from inheriting from his father's relatives if 
adopted during his f-other's lifetime. This is unexceptionable; but 
the judgement can be interpreted so as to have a restrictive effect 
as can be seen from the latest judgement of the Allahabad High Court
which has taken the Supreme Court’s view even further and made an
obiter observation in a recent decision that a collateral includes
52a paternal grandfather.
The Supreme Court's treatment of earlier case law also
deserves comment. The Court was faced with an 1835 Privy Council
decision which affirmed their view and a 19^3 Privy Council decision
which o.ffirmed the 1885 decision but at the same time made a decision
53
the ratio of which was contrary to it. Ayyar J. took a very bold 
5L.
step of overruling the 19^3 decision and maintained the consistent
50. A.I.P. 199A- S.C. 379 at pr.17 p«383 col.l (emphasis mine).
51. By Professor Derrett commenting on the draft of this Chapter.
52. See Arjun Singh v Virendranath A.I.P. 1971 All.129 at pr„21 p.33
6h Krishnanurthy v Dhravraj A.I.P.. 1962 sTc. 59 which had sum­
marised the propositions contained in Srinivas v Narayan A.I.P. 193^ - S.C. 
379- The Allahabad decision is obviously incorrect.
53• ^he cases are Bhubaneshv/ari v Kilkomul (I085) 12 I.A. 137j Anant v
Shankar A.I.P. 19^3 P.O. 19^
5A. See Ilayne (lid) 257-8 who in fact assumes that the 19^3 decision 
was not in fact per incuriam but affirmed the 1835 decision. The passage 
relied upon by Ilayne's editor (at 253) is quoted by the Supreme Court 
A.I.P. 195A S.C. 379 at pr.22 p.3o7 but the Court did not use the 
technique used by ilayne of trying to find a continuity but clearly
dissented from the 19^3 decision.
position that the Court wovld not allow relation back generally to
defeat the rule against divesting, and sbressed t£ie Court's power to
reconsider a decision of the Privy Council on merits.
"This Court, however, is not hampered by any such limitation 
(of being bound by the decision of the Privy Council) and is free 
to consider the question on its merits. ... It is not in conson­
ance with the principle well established in Indian jurisprudence 
that an inheritance could not be in abeyance and that the relation 
back of the right of an adopted son ... is only quoad the estate 
of the father." 55
This case is one of the rare examples of decision-making where the
Cour6 has made a clear policy decision in favour of a particular
rule (in this case the rule against divesting) not trying to conceal
the fact by pretending to take an equivocal position. This decision
is a practical one and takes implied notice of the fact that a large
number of adoptions are in fact made with a view to divesting.
’lore recently the Supreme Court has gone (in principle) even
further than Srinivas v Ilarayanh and held in two important decisions
that the adoptee sannot divest a statutory heir, even as regards
property to which he was entitled through his deceased adoptive father.
5uThe more significant of these decisions is Punithavalli v.Ramalingham 
where Hegde J. reading the judgement for a unanimous Court'-held that 
the adoptee could not even divest his own mother if her estate had 
become an absolute estate under Section-tk (1) of the Hindu Succession 
Act 1956. Although the actual decision in this case will affect only 
the small number of cases where the adoption was made between June 17, 
1956 (when the Hundu Succession Act took effect) and December 21, 1956
5b. A.I.R. 195A S.C. 579 at pr.25 p.587 col.2.
56. A.I.R. I95*r o.c. 579
57* Mohan Singh v Pasupatinath A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 155 S-t pr.l8-9 pp.lA5~A.
58. 1970 S.C. 1750. The judgement is very brief and covers only
four columns. It reversed Ramalingam v Punithavalli (I96A) 2 I-I.L.J. 571 
on which see Derrett (1966) 63 Dom.L.R. Jnl.. A3*.......................
(when the Hindu Maintenance Act took effect), it makes deep intrusions 
into the doctrine of relation back. From these decisions it might 
appear that the doctrine was being abandoned by the Supreme Court.
This, however, is not so, and the Supreme Court appears to have 
restored the doctrine in its application to sole surviving coparceners 
and revived it even after the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 
despite the fact that that statute specifically contains a clause 
embodying a rule against divesting 1
b. (i). The problem of the sole surviving coparceiier^hereafter S.S.C.)
*
The S.S.C. poses a problem because although he has ostensibly 
unlimited power to alienate the property and the property passes from 
him by succession and not by survivorship, the property is nevertheless 
joint family property to which the adoptee is entitled through his 
father.
To understand the problem we have to go back to Telang J.’s 
decision in Chandra v Gojarabai (1090).^ His lordship felt that 
property in the hands of a S.S.C. was really his own property and if 
an adoption was made the property could not in fact be divested. The 
decision must be read with great caution because, as the Privy Council 
pointed out,^* Telang J* was trying to reconcile two different lines 
of authority, one of which had laid down that the widow1s power to
59. For a good review of ths problem see Derrett: Divesting by an 
adopted son: A pressing problem for the Supreme Court (i960 ) I M.L.J. 27.
60. (1890) 1A Bom,
61. A.I.P. 1943 p.C. 196 at 199.
adoot was itself contingent on whether an estate was divested, or not. 
The most important point res.lly is, when does a joint family come to 
an end ? Three alternative conclusions are forthcoming :
(a) when the penultimate coparcener dies;
(b) when the 3.S.C. dies;
(c) when all, or any, widows capable of exercising the power of 
adoption die 'without doing so.
62Telang J., and the general drift of opinion in the Bombay High Court, 
suggested that it came to an end at (a). But to this there was a 
murmur of dissent from the Madras nigh Court which accused the Bombay
. 6 3High Court of treating the joint family as t!a quasi corporation."
64The controversy was closed by the Privy Council in Anant v Shankar
where it was held that - adoption after the death of the coparcener
v/ould in fact divest.
After 1943 the Bombay High Court tried to circumvent the
decision of the Privy Council. Two approaches w&re found. The first
. 65bit of legal acrobatics came from Chagla C.J. in uani Chandra v Balaji 
where it was held that although the adoptee could divest a S.S.C.’s 
heir he could not divest property in the hands of an heir’s heir.
The Mysore High o^urt went a step further and extended this limitation
62. See Vasudeo v ham Chandra (1896) 22 Pom.521. £?ive judges expressed 
their opinion but note Kanade J. following Bhoobun Moyee1 s case (see 
supra f.n.3'3); Copal v Vishnu (1393) 23 Bon.230 (but it is not clear 
that the property was J.P.P.); Payappa v Appana (1393) 23 Bom.327; Shah 
A.C.J. in Shivbassappa v Hilaya (193d")' 47 Bom. 110 at 113; Shivappa v 
Pudrappa (1955T~57 Bom.l (a complicated case the judgements in which 
last 43 pages, but which affirms the Bombay cases in the light of the 
new Privy Council decision on which see supra f.n.4l).
63. See S.Ayyar J.’s judgement in Madama Mohana v Purushottana (1915) 
32^ 1 lad. 1105 (a case on an impartible estate); Panyam v Avadhanam (1932) 
33 x-ad. 531 (obiter at p.590-1 that the family v/ould be in existence 
even if the coparceners held a partition. But note that Madras followed 
the Bombay position in ddivi v Hinamarty (1910) 33 Mad. 223.
d-I-B. 1945 P.C. 196.
65. A.I.B. 1955 Bom. 291.
66to property in tlie hands of an heir’s vendee- This trend has been 
heavily criticised by Professor Derrett
The second and more important breakthrough came as a result
68of a Privy Council decision in 1927* It was argued that for a
limited period of time the S.S.C. had complete powers of alien$ation
without having to justify it as family necessity, and that a gift or
69alienation made by him could not be impugned by the S.S.C. In 1950
Chagla C.J. extended this to include cases of alien^ation by will so
that we reach the anomalous situation that the adopted son can divest
the heir but not the legatee 1 Ihis rather interesting piece of
judicial unorthodoxy has been exposed by Professor Derrett who rightly
argues that since relation back introduces the fiction that the son
was alive at the time of the S.S.C.’s death, the alienation by will is 
70invalid. This second approach, suggesting that alienations by a S.S.C.
cannot be questioned has been followed by the Nagpur, Mysore and,
- 71 72reluctantly, by the Addhra ^radesh High Courts. 'Chile Mysore
66. Somasekharappa v Basappa A.I.R. I96I Mys. 141.
67. See the comments of Derrett:(supra. f.n. 32)(1956) 58 Bom.L.R.Jnl.1-13*
68. Krishnamurti v Krishnarnurti (1927) 29 Bom.L.R. 969 (P.C.). For the 
best analysis of the case lav/ relied upon in this case see Derrett 
(supra f.n.32) (1953) 55 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 1 at 2-4.
69. Carayan v ^admanabh (1950) 52 Bom.L.R. 313; -
70. (Supra f;n.32) (1953) 55 Bom.L.P. Jnl. 1-6.
71. See Parashram v Shriram A.I.R. 1929 ^ag. 321; Udhao v Bhaskar (1946) 
Nag. 425 Twhere 3ose J. thought that the will v/ould he in operative only 
if the adoptee was alive when the S.S.C. died); Potharaju v Potharaju 
A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 512 v/here relation back is given full effect (at prV4
p.513d but precedent followed on this particular point (pr-6 p.513); 
for the Mysore dicta see the case cited supra f.n. 66.
72. See the decisions in IPParamma v S.ITigappa A.I.R. 1964 Mys.217 foil, 
the supreme Court and overruling the Mysore decision cited supra f.n.66
as having been superseded by the Supreme Court’s view; Mahadevappa v Chana 
Basappa A.I.Pl. 1966 My s. 15 • But Kalagate J. who wrote the judgement on the
last mentioned case appears to have changed his mind in Ramchandra v
. Anasuyabai A.I.R. -1969 Mys.64 - (v/here the' alienation wa.s by’willf.
L^mJ \ J  i
(*7 “7
and Andhra rradesh ' have changed their view under pressure from dicta
by the Supreme Court, the Bombay High Court has stuck to its view that
75such alienations cannot be cnallenged.
b. (ii). The decisions of the Supreme Court.
-! 76In Srinivas v ^arayan the Supreme Court emphasised that an 
already vested estate cannot be divest&d, but it also accepted that the 
adopted son was to be fully accepted as the son of his deceased 
adopted father though not capable of divesting heirs of his father's 
collaterals. In the case of the S.G.C. these two principles conflict a 
and as we have already seen the Bombay High Court has chosen to 
emphasise the former rather than the latter. The Supreme Court too had 
emphasised the former principle in 1954 but by I96I the new judges 
who had been appointed to the Supreme Court were determined to give 
the latter principle full effect.
77In Krishnamurti v Dhruvaraj Dayal J. (for Subba Eao J. and
78himself) overruled Chagla C.J.'s judgement in Hamchandra v Balaji
and held that an adoptee could divest the S.S.C.'s heir's heir, even
though in effect this amounted to divesting a collateral's (the first
79*heir) heir in respect of the former’s J.F.P. * It must also be noted
73* S.P.Subbaya v Ademma (1967) 2 And.W. 314 at 313 (per P.J.ueddy J. - 
now of the Supreme o^urt)'. Note that the main question was one of limitation.
74. See infra.
75- See Sahadeo v Kameshwar (1967) 70 Bom.L.B. 89; Babgonda v Namgonda 
A.I.A. 19^8 BornTK~.
$6* A.I.A. 1954 S.C. 379 discussed supra iii.a.(ii).
77- A.I.A. 1962 B.C. 59; see comment S.E.Kulkara (1965) 67 Bom.L.R.Jnl.4.
78. A,I.E. 1955 Born. 291; see A.I.E. 1962 S.C. 59 at 62-3.
79* A.I.E. 1962 S.C. 59 at pr.8 p.62.
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that the adoptive father died in 1882 whereas the adoptee v/as taken 
in adoption in 1943«^ The Court, following Srinivas v Harayan, made 
it abundantly clear that the coparcenery was in existence as long as
Qi
a widow existed v;ith an unexercised power to adopt, and that
"the estate continues to be the estate of the adoptive father 
in whosoever’s hands it may be, that is whether in the hands 
of one who is the absolute owner or one who is a limited owner." 82
83But it is evident from the decisions of the High Courts that the
Supreme Court did not explore the situation fully and consider the
problem of the alienees of a S.S.C. This question v/as touched upon
obiter by Subba Hao J. (for Dayal aid Mudholkar JJ.) in Guranma v 
34Hallappa where the Court v/as considering relation back in the 
context of a posthumously born son. Subba Hao J. relying solely on 
decisions relating to posthumously born sons said :
"The sole surviving member of a coparcenery has an absolute 
power to alienate the family property, as at the time of aliena­
tion there is no other member who has (a) joint interest in the 
family ... If another member v/as conceived in the family or 
inducted therein by adoption, his right to avoid the alienation 
Will not be affected." 83
While this was relied upon by the Ilysore High Court, the Bombay High
06Court has not paid any attention to it.
8ffi. Ibid at pr.2 p.60. But the Court do not make much of this fact.
81. Ibid at pr.5 p.6l col.l v/here the earlier case is summarised see
Proposition (iii).
82. Ibid at pr.3 p.6l.
83. See for example Patel J. in Mahadeo' v Eameshv/ar (1967) 7Q Bom.L.R.89
at 92-3 v/here both the Supreme Court decisions are construed strictly; 
^esai J. in Babgonda v Nflmgonda A.I.P. i960 Bom.8 at 10 which deals with 
the Supreme Court judgements in the same way.
84. A.I.P. 1964 S.C. 510.
83. Ibid at pr.13 p.318 col.l relying on Avadesh Kumar v Zakaul Hasnain 
A.I.P. 1944 All. 243; Chandramani v 3ambeswara A.I.E. 1931 Had. 330; 
Bhagwat Trashad v Debi Chand A.I.E. 1942 Pat. 99• vwAwe) .
86. See the judgement of Kalagate J. in Hahadevappa v Chana Basappa 
A. I.E. 1966 My s. 13 at 16-7 v/here he refuses to refer to the earlier 
decision of the Ilysore High Court in N.2gramma v S.ITijappa A.I.E. 1964 
Mys. 217 (to which he v/as a party and which had taken a contrary view) 
bees,use of the obiter of the Supreme Court.
This was followed by the obiter of Ilegde J. in Punithavalli v
o7har,ialingam.° he observed :
"In fact, under the Benares School of iiitakshara rule ... 
the alienation effected by a sole surviving coparcener can be 
successfully challenged by a person adopted subsequently to the 
alienation. The fiction of relation back has to be given full 
effect by CoorH and (the) consequences spelled out as if
the fiction v/as a fact." 8S
But once agaip. the consequences of this are not fully worked out and
we are not told v/hether this v/ould apply v/here the adoptee v/as adopted
after the death of the S.B.C. or where the alienation v/as made by the
S.o.C.'s heir.
To add to, if not increase, the confusion already created by
the Supreme Court we have the latest pronouncement in ^itabai v
39 .•Pamchandra. Aiere the adoptee v/as adopted in the lifetime of the S.S.C.
and no question of alienation arose. But Bamaswami J. reading the 
judgement of the Court went into an extended discussion on v/hether a
coparcenary came to an end at the death of the panultimate coparcener
90or not. In holding that it did not his lordship relied on a Privy
Council case (from Ceylon)'^ and a Supreme Court decision (on a 
02
revenue point)y both of which strongly suggest that property in the 
hands of the' 3.9.C. ceases to’ be J.F.P. as soon as the 3.S.C. dies.
If this is so, the Supreme Court has inadvertently overruled sub 
silentio the view that the property retains its character as J.F.P.
A.I.h. 1970 .3.Co 1730 
38. Ibid at pr.p p.1731*
89. A.I.P.. 1970 ScC. 3k3°
90. Ibid at pr.p p.38-5-6
9T* Att.Gen. of Ceylon fi^ rurxvchrlam Chettiar (1957) A.C. 580, on v/hich 
see Derrett at (19585 65 Bon.L.B.JnY. 161-172 and C.I.T.Madras v Veerappa 
Chettiar (1970) 1 S.. C.b'.D. 31) on the question of estate duty, v/hich v/ould 
not be payable v/here the property passed by survivorship.
92. Cowli Buddana v C.I.T. A.I.P. i960 B.C. 1523.
as Ions as there is a widow of a predeceased coparcener in existence
93with an unexercised power of adoption* This would have the effect
of going further than even the Bombay High Court in limiting the doctrine
of legation back even though the decision purports to be in favour of
the adoptee's rights.
More recently in an excellent analysis by Sheth J. (for
Desai J. and himself)in Bai Chanchal v Manishanker^ We are informed
» 95that there was an obiter in Sawan Sam s case which suggests that 
property in the hands of the S.S.C. becomes his own. ^his conflicts 
with the view in Sitabai*s case and may explain why the latter does 
not cite the former.
The confusion v/as caused because in Mrishnamurthy's case the 
Court adopted a different point of emphasis from that taken in Srinivas' 
case and tried to weave a consistent pattern between the two cases, 
l/hile this v/as technically possible, it had the effect of leaving 
unresolved vast areas of controversy, which as we have seen grom the 
decisions of the High Courts, could .have been decided one way on the 
basis of Srinivas1 case and another way 011 the basis of Krishnamurthy's 
case. The latest pronouncement is yet another example of a decision­
making habit which does not consider fully the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. The Court, it is submitted with respect, 
should have considered the whole question completely in Kri shnamurthy's 
ca.se. It is ironical that the Court, v/hich on many an occasion had 
gone on to reform the Hindu lav; even though the case before them did 
not demand a wholesale overhaul, should have neglected to reconsider
93. See Shah J.'s judgement in C.I.T. Madras v Verrappa Chettiar (1970)
I S.C.W.B. pi v/hich states that a joint family can continue without a 
male member.
9A. (1971) 12 Guj. L.d. 576.
95. A.I.H. I9S7 S.C. 1731 .
every acpe t of their decisions in an area whicLi was notoriously 
controversial and v/here the Bombay high Court had for long openly 
obscured and avoided the rationale of the superior courts’ decisions. 
The decisions are at their best untidy and indicate that in personal 
lav: matters the Court is less thorough in dealing with its earlier 
decisions than they are in public law matters.
Years ago Professor Derrett hoped that the Supreme Court 
would straighten out the law relating to the 3.S.C. and destfflry the 
mistaken notion that the 3.S.C. is an absolute owner of the J.B.P. in 
his hands, ^he recent Supreme Court decisions can hardly be considered 
satisfying and have added confusion with stray obiter dicta.
96. Derrett (i960) I M.L.J. Jnl. 27
iv . Section 12 (c) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 
1956 and the problems created by that s tatu te . 97*
a . The background to the problem.
Before going any fu rther we should consider the following
provisions of the Hindu Adaptions and Maintenance Act 1956 (hereafter
H.A.M.A.) (w ith my emphasis added) :
"S.5 (1) flNo adoption shall be made a fte r  the commencement of 
th is  Act by or to a Hindu, except in  accordance with the pro­
visions contained in  th is  Chapter . . .  "
S.12. "An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his  
adoptive fa ther or mother fo r a l l  purposes with e ffec t from the 
date of adoption and from such date a l l  the tie s  of the child  
in  the fam ily of his or her b irth  shall be deemed to be severed 
and replaced by those created by the adoption in  the adoptive 
fam ily: provided that :
• • •
(c) the adopted child  shall not divest any person of any estate 
which vested in  him or her before the adoption*"
These provisions have given rise  to a great deal of controversy.
Qg
The Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that since the adoption 
took e ffec t from the date of adoption (Section 12) the adoption would 
not even "divest" J .F .P . which had passed on to other coparceners by
97* For comments on th is  see: D errett: Divesting by ad. adopted son: A 
pressing problem fo r the Supreme Court ( i960) 1 M.L.J* J n l* 27; S.R.Kulkarmi: 
The doctrine of re la tio n  back in  adoption and its  v a lid ity  (1963) 6$ Bom.
L.R* Jn l* 4; N.Das: d e s ira b ility  of amendments in  the present law of 
adoption A .I.R * 1965 J n l* 127 referred to in  Subhash M is ir v ^hagi M is ir
A .I.R . 1967 A ll. 148 aF~p.!50 c o l.l;  D errett: Adoption, Succession and 
the present state of Hindu law (1966) 68 Bom.L.R. J n l. 41; Ib id : Adoption 
in  the Joint Family: A recent decision of the Supreme Court and its  
lim its  (1968) 70 Bom.L.R. J n l. 51; G.K.Dabke: Divesting on adoption
(1968) 70 Bom.L.R* J n l. 143; Ib id : The l i t t l e  word "to" in  S.5(1) of the 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 (1969) 71 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 13;
B.N.Sampath: The doctrine of re la tio n  back (1970 I I  S .C .J. J n l. 1;
D errett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 135-144; Ib id : Adoption and re la tio n  back:
The position in  1971 (1971) 75 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 31.
98. Hanumantha v Ffanumayya (1964) 1 And.W.R. 156 at 160-1 discussed 
D errett: (1966) 68 Bom.L.R. Jn l. 41 at 44-45 (where he submits with 
regret that i t  is  correct); Ib id : (1968) 70 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 51 at 52-3;
Ib id : C.M.H.L. (1970) 138-9; Contrast Dabke: (1968) 70 Bom.L.R.Jnl.
143 at l47 (suggesting that Dr. D errett had changed his mind). In  
Sawan Ram v Kalawanti A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 1761 at prs.7-8 p .1764-5 the 
Supreme Court disapproved of the Andhra view and overruled i t .
99 100survivorship. In  contrast the Bombay High Court took the view
that the adoptee’ s tie s  with his natural fam ily were replaced by
tie s  with his adopted fam ily (Section 2)2) and he could divest his
mother of an estate absolutely vested in  her by s ta tu te . The Court
ignored the proviso (Section 12 (c )) and claimed that the adoptee
even became a coparcener'}'^ '*" The Madras High Court however re lied
102on the proviso (Section 12 (c )) and gave fu ll e ffect to i t .
Before we go any further we should also note Professor
D errett1s theory that "re la tio n  back" should apply only to a case
of sacramental adoption (where i t  can be shown that the widow has in
103fact adopted both to herself and to her husband) and even then its  
effect should be lim ited  to cases where the adoptee claims coparcenary
99. See Hanumantha v Hanumayya (supra f.p .9 8 ) generally.
100. Ankush Narayan v Janabai (1965) 67 Bom.L.R. 864. Note the comments 
of H.Gujerathi; A .I.R . 1986 J n l. 19-20; D errett; (1966) 68 Bom.L.R. Jn l. 
41 at 44; Ib id ; (1968) 70 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 51 at 53; Ib id ; C.M.H.L. (1970) 
138, 144. ^his decision was approved per incuriam by the Supreme Court 
in  Sitabai v Ramchandra A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 343 at p r.6 p.3^8.
101. Ib id  at p .868. On the proviso see the comments at p .866. This also 
appears to be the view of the Allahabad High Court in  Subhash M is ir v 
Thagi M is ir A .I.R . 1967 A ll. 1*$ (per Singh J .) .
102. See Ramamurti J .'s  judgement in  Armugha Udayar v Valliammal A .I.R . 
1969 Mad. 72.
103. While th is  aspect of the matter had been obliquely emphasised by 
the Supreme Court in  Sawan Ram v Kalawanti A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 1761 at 
pr.7 p .1764-5 relying on S.5 (1 ) of H.A.M.A. P rof. D errett; C.M.H.L. 
(1970) 134 re lie s  on the Supreme Court decision in  Mohan Singh v 
Pasupathinath A .I.R . 1969 S.C. 135* But there is  nothing in  that case 
which suggests that d is tin c tio n . I t  was merely pointed out that the 
Oudh Estates Act 1869 applied to  persons of any re lig io n  and that the 
adoption (which could w ell have been sacramental) could not divest an 
estate vested by a statute which had secular e ffec t (a t pr.18 p.143)* I t  
was the statute that was secular (a "se lf contained Code") not the 
adoption.
property (even i f  in  the hands of an S.S.C. or his h e ir or alienee)
which is  capable of passing by survivorship and cannot therefore be
considered a case of vesting w ithin the meansing of Section 12 (c ) .’*’^
This has been vigorously opposed by Shree Dabke, who in s is ts  the proviso
105be given its  fu l l  e ffe c t, presumably in  a l l  types of adoption, 
e .g . of hoys of d iffe re n t caste, not contemplated by the sSLstra.
b. The Supreme Court decisions.
We now come to the Supreme Court’ s decision in  Sawan Ram v 
106Kalawanti. In  th is  case A, a presumptive reversioner, challenged
an a lienation  made by a widow, B, who had a lim ited  estate . B adopted
C during the proceedings and subsequently died. The question therefore
was whether A or C was the p re fe ren tia l reversioner. I t  would certa in ly
have been C i f  i t  could he shown that he was also adopted to his
adoptive mother's husband. The Supreme Court, relying on the provisions 
107of Section 5 ( l ) » suggested that the word "to" in  that Section meant
that the adoption was both by and to Hindus and observed :
"The most common instance of adoption w ill n a tu ra lly  be 
that of (an) adoption by a female Hindu who is  married and 
whose husband is  dead or has . . .  renounced the world, or has 
been declared . . .  to be of unsound mind. In  such a case, 
the actual adoption would be by the female Hindu . . .  not only 
to h erself, but also to her husband . . .  " 108
Bhargava J . who read the judgement of the Court then stressed that the
child would have to give up a l l  the tie s  w ith its  natural fam ily and
observed :
"A question natura lly  arises (s ic ) what is  the adoptive 
fam ily of a child who is  adopted by the widow . . .  I t  is  w ell
104. This was f ir s t  put forward in  ( i960) 1 M .L.J. J n l. 27. For a latfer 
statement see D errett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 135-144; Ib id : (1971) 73 Bom.L.RR. 
J n l. 31.
105* See the a rtic le s  by him cited supra f .n . 97*
106. A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 1761.
107. Ib id  at p r.7  p .1764-5*
108. Ib id  at p r.7  p.1765.
recognised th a t, a fte r  a female is  married she belongs to the 
fam ily o f her husband. The child adopted by her must also, 
therefore, belong to the same fam ily . . .  Further s t i l l ,  he 
loses a l l  his rights in  the fam ily of his b irth  and those 
rights are replaced by the rights created by the adoption in  
the adoptive fam ily. The righ t which the child had to  
succeed to property by v irtu e  of being the son of his  
natural father in  the fam ily of his b irth  is  replaced by 
sim ilar rights in  the adoptive fam ily and, consequently 
he would certa in ly  obtain those righ ts in  the capacity of 
a member of that fam ily as an adopted son of the deceased 
husband of the widow taking him in  adoption." 109
Later the Court while discussing the Andhra Pradesh case,^^
went on to observe that the decision in  that case wqs rig h t (though
not fo r the same reasons) befause the provisions of Section 12 (c)
would have prevented the adoptee from divesting an estate which had
vested absolutely in  a S . S . C . t h o u g h  i t  had e a rlie r  hinted that
112the son was a member of the deceased adopted fa th er's  coparcenary.
This approach has been followed by the Delhi High Court in
113another case involving a presumptive reversioner (even though th is
case was not sp ec ifica lly  referred to ) and was generally taken by
n L
ju ris ts  to have restored the doctrine of re la tio n  back. But le t  us
109* Ib id  a t p r.8  p .1765*
110. See supra f .n . 98.
1 H . A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 1761 at p r. 9 p.1765.
112. Ib id  at pr.7  p. 1764. Note the opening words of p r.7  contradicting 
the Andhra Pradesh Court's suggestion that he was not a member of the 
coparcenary. See D errett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 141.
113. See Duni Chand v ^aras Ram A .I.R . 1970 Delhi 202 (per Khanna J . 
Who tqkes the w ider'’re la tio n  back'7 view c itin g  S itabai v Ramchandra 
A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 343.
114. See D errett: (1968) 70 Bom.L.R. Jn l. 51; Ib id : C.M.H.L. 138 f f . ;  
Ib id : (1971) 73_Bom.L.R. J n l. 31; B.N.Sampath: (1970) I I  sTc.J. 1 . But 
note Dabke: (1968) 70 Boct.lTr. J n l. 143; Ib id : (1969) 71 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 13 
who argues (especially in  the f ir s t  a rtic le  at p.147) that the decision 
is  not an authority fo r that proposition at a l l  and p r.9  of the judge­
ment in  Sawan Ram's case gives fu ll  e ffec t to S .12(c).
assume that the son can be treated as the son of his deceased adoptive 
fa th er, with respect to J .F .P . Wet are s t i l l  faced with two problems s 
F irs tly , what happens about estates that are affected by the operation 
of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 whereby the in terest of 
a coparcener may in  certain  circumstances pass on to certain  statutory  
heirs ? Can the adoptee (a) divest his adopting mother of the estate 
she received under that section ? (b) divest a p o rtio n  of the estate 
from successors to any other coparcener who may have died in  the 
meanwhile ? (c) claim to be a member of the coparcenary ? and (d)
reopen a p a rtitio n  ?
Secondly, the problem of the S.S.C. remains. Can the adoptee divest
donees, alienees, h e irs , and legatees of the S.S.C. ?
* t  would appear from the two Supreme Court judgements in
Punithavalli v Ramalingam^"^ and Mohan Singh v ^asupathinath^  ^ that
even before the passing of H.A.M.A. the adoptee could not divest an
estate which had been vested absolutely by a s ta tu te . I t  would not
be unnatural to assume that a fte r  the passing of Section 12 (c) of
H.A.M.A. sin estate vested by Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act
1956 is  as incapable of being divested as an estate vested by Section 
11714 of the same Act and an estate vested by the Oudh Estates Act
llS1869. But the Supreme Court decisions in  those cases can easily  be 
confined to the statutes before them. Be that as i t  may, the problems 
of the S.S.C. and of reTopening p artitio n s  remain.
115. A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1730.
n 6 . a .i.r. 1969 s.c. 135.
117* Supra f .n . 115.
I l 8 • Supra f .n . 116.
We can now turn to the decision of the Supreme Court in  
119Sitabai v Ramchandra where Ramaswami J. held that an adoptee of
a pre-deceased coparcener’ s widow could succeed to the J .F .P . in  the
hands of the S.S.C. following the death of the S .S .C ., having been
adopted just before. This decision, which does not re fe r to Sawan Ram’ s
case, could easily be confined to its  facts on the grounds that no
question of divesting in  fact arose and a l l  that the Supreme Court had
done was to say that the adoptee was adopted to  the widow’ s husband
and could from the date of his adoption receive the advantages of
120being a member of that fam ily. No mention was made of challenging
alienations made by the S.C.C. At f ir s t  sight i t  appears that a l l  his
lordship was trying to do was to make clear that the Court would not
to lerate a situation where the adoptee loses h is old fam ily tie s
without gaining new ones. But his lordship's statement on th is  matter
is  very widely phrased :
MIn  other words the child adopted is  tie d  with the re la tio n ­
ship of sonship with the deceased husband of the widow. The other 
c o lla te ra l relations of the husband would be connected with the 
child . . .  the husband’ s brother would necessarily be the uncle of 
the adopted child . . .  (t)he daughter . . .  the s is te r of the adopted 
son . . .  (A )ll the tie s  of the child in  the fam ily of his or her 
b irth  become'.completely severed and these are a l l  replaced by 
those created by the adoption in  the adoptive fa m ily .” 121
This ob iter, which has the e ffect of e ffecting  a relationship
(would i t  not operate fo r property as w ell as sentiment ?) between the
122adoptee and his adopted fa ther1s c o lla te ra ls l was followed by a 
H 9 . A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 343.
120. Ib id  at pr.6  p .347-8 which can be in terpreted to mean just th is  and 
n<o more i f  there were no p ecu lia rities  about the case, which we have 
mentioned below.
121. Ib id  at pr.6  p .347 -8 (<e*^W sis.
122. This, as we have seen, was emphatically denied in  Srinivas v Narayan 
A..I.R. 1954 S.C. 379 and Krishnamurthy v Dhruvraj A .I.R . 1961 S.C. 59«
123specific  approval of the Bombay decision in  Ankush Narayan v Janabai
which had la id  down that the adoptee could divest the adoptive mother
of an estate which had vested in  her absolutely under the terms of
\&r
the Hindu Succession Act 1956. Secondly, the Court did not c ite  
Sawan Ram* s case where there was an ob iter dictum which c learly  
indicated that the adoptee would not divest a S.S.C. whose estate 
had become absolute. The decision of the Supreme Court is  c learly  
unsatisfactory. What i t  appears to have done is  th is  : i t  invented
a concept o f f1complete incorporation11 (in to  the adopting fam ily) and 
threw out vague hints that that complete incorporation may include a 
rev iva l of the doctrine of re la tio n  back. None of the d eta ils  are 
examined, even though a l l  Courts in  Ind ia  are bound by these decisions 
and the e ffec t may w ell be to n u llify  the in tention  of Parliament to  
do away w ith the doctrine o f re la tio n  back and it s  divesting e ffe c t.
Too much emphasis has been la id  on the fic tio n  of "complete incorporation" 
and no consideration has been paid to the p rac tica l problems created.
In  fact apart from Srinivas v Narayan, where the d e ta ils  were c learly  
stated, a l l  the subsequent decisions proceed on theoretica l assumptions 
(sometimes expressed and sometimes implied) the im plications of which 
are never re a lly  explained.
123. A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 3k3 at p r.6  p.3*»8. See supra f.n .1 0 0 .
12*f. See fo r example D errett; Hindu Law: Past and Present (1957» Calcutta) 
66-7 which describes the considerations which weighed with the drafters  
of the Hindu Code (as the JFour statutes on Hindu law passed in  1955-6 
are c a lle d ).
TABLE J Showing voting judgement w riting pattern in  the cases on 
adoption.- 195^ -  1970















1 = Srinivas v Narayan A .I.R . 195*f S.C. 379-
2 = Krishnamurthy v Dhruvraj A .I.R . 1962 S.C. 59*
3 = Guramma v Mallappa A .I.R . 196*f S.C. 510.
k = Sawan Ram v Kalawant A .I.R . 196? S.C. 1760.
5 = Mohan Singh v Pasupathihath A .I.R . 1969 S.C. 135
6 = S itabai v Ramachandra A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 3^3»
7 = Punithavalli v Ramalingam A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1730.
v indicates p artic ip a tio n  
* indicates judgement w riting
One of the reasons fo r the d iffe ren t point o f emphasis in  the 
various Cases decided by the Supreme Court can be found in  the fact 
that the bench structure of the Court in  most of the cases was d iffe re n t. 
Thus a fragmented bench structure was responsible fo r the varying 
approaches in  the various cases. Case 1 is  separated from the other 
cases. Cases 2 and 3 form a separate group hy themselves. The 
complete incorporation theory emanates from the judgements of Bhargava J . 
in  Case k and Ramaswami J . in  Case 6 . Bhargava J . did not partic ipate  
in  any other case but Ramaswami J . also participated in  Cases 5 and 7 
which held that even before the H.A.M.A. 1956 the doctrine of re la tio n  
back would not appl^ where an estate had been vested by s tatu te . I t  
is  Clear that he did not attempt to influence the extension of the 
incorporation theory in  such cases. I t  w ill also be noticed that 
Shah J . who wrote the judgement in  Case 5 and partic ipated in  Case 7 
assented to Ramaswami J . in  Case 6. Again M itte r J . participated in  
Cases k and 3* I t  is  not by any means suggested that there is  an 
inconsistency in  a l l  these cases or that Cases 3 and 7 are opposed to  
the re s t. There is  anly a difference in  the theoretica l approach of 
the various judgement w riters  -  those in  Cases 3 and 7 emphasise the 
ru le against divesting, those in  Cases if and 6 stress the importance 
of incorporating the adoptee to the adopting fam ily as completely as 
possible. In  spite of the fact that these cases are governed by the
H.A.MaA. 1956. The actual contribution of the judges cannot be read ily  
explained on the basis of the voting pattern . But we can see that once 
again a fragmented bench structure and d iffe re n t judgement w riters have 
created a s ituation  where Supreme Court judgements have not paid adequate 
atten tion  to precedent and consistency and created a lin e  of authority  
which w ill create more problems than they have solved.
3» The Supreme Court and the Eights of Hindu Women*
i. The Problem
A lot has been written on the rights and status of women in
Ancient India.'1' One writer has even claimed that
”(t)he laws of Ancient India were so catholic in spirit and all
embracing, (that) if they were taken in their true spirit, they
can cover the entire needs of humanity.'’ 2
While it is true that Hindu law recognised the separate property rights
3 4of women (called Stridhanam ) long before any other civilization, the
actual rights given were meagre, although the Mitakshara tried to give
an extended interpretation to them.
Despite Manu’s injunction that a woman was not capable of
5
owing property, it is clear that the ancient texts allowed women to 
retain possession of ornaments and gifts,^ which because of their very
1. See D errett: The leg a l status of women in  India from the most ancient 
times to the present day (1959) X I Recueiles de la  Societe Jean Bodin 237- 
67» Shakuntala Rao Shastri: Women in  Sacred Laws (1950); A.L.Basham:
The wonder that was India (1954 London) Chapter V; J.R.Gharpure: Rights 
of Women under the Hindu law (1943 Bombay); C.Badet: Women in  Ancient 
India (1925 London); A .S.A ltekar: The position of women in  Hindu c iv i l i ­
sation (1938) Benares -  2nd edn. 1956); Goroodas Banerjee: The law of 
marriage and Stridhan (1923 C alcutta).
2. Shakuntala Rao Shastri (supra f .n . l . )  193.
3« The best discussion is  in  Kane I I I  H.D. Chapter XXX; See G.Banerjee:
(supra f .n . l ) ;  P.W.Rege: The Law of Stridhana . . .  (SQAS No.327 unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation London i 960); Mayne ( lid )  "Chapter XVI.
4-. See Kane I I I  H.D. 770 (quoting G.Banerjee supra f .n . l ) ;  S ir H. Mai ne: 
Early History of In stitu tio n s  (l875i John Murray, London) 321-4.
5. See Manu VIII 4l6 .
6. See generally Manu: IX ,194;IX ,200; Narada X I I I ,8; Vishnu: X V II,18;
X V II,22; Katyayana: quoted I I  C.D. 462, 464-6, 468, 470, 475? and also 
see the Comments on Katyayana’ s te x t: Mitakshara; I I .x i .5 ;  KullUkabha£-fca 
on Manu IX ,194; Smyiti Chandrika.: IX ,1-2; Vyavahara Mayukh IV ,X .3; but 
note also the re s tric tiv e  in terpretation  of Diiyabhaga IV .1 .3 -6 ; Daya 
Krishna Sangrah I I . I I . 8-9 giving a re s tric tiv e  in terp reta tio n  to?the 
texts re la tin g  to the presents that a bride received when she leaves her 
fa th er’ s house; Devala: Quoted I I  C.D. 478 (p .597); Vyasa: quoted I I  C.D. 
471 (a t p .592); Yajnavalkya: 11.43-4. See generally Kane I I I  H.D. 770-778; 
Mayne ( lid )  723-728.
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nature passed on to females after their death. The Mitakshara tried to
extend the categories of stridhanam by ingeniously suggesting that the
property which a woman acquired by inheritance or as a share at par-
8tit io n  should also be her own property. But th is  in terp re ta tio n  was
not accepted by the Privy Council.^
This in  turn led to a number o f statutes in  favour of women,
lik e  the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929 (which placed
10women in  a better position to in h erit from th e ir re la tives^ , the
Hindu Women’ s Rights to Property Act 1937 (hereafter H.W.R.P.A. -  which
Co'feXe-'
gave them a lim ited y^ i.e . in  effect a l i f e  estqte in  th e ir  husband’ s
share in  J .F .P . with a righ t to demand p a r tit io n ^ ), the Hnndu Succession
Act 1956 (hereafter H.S.A. -  whida made any property ’’possessed" by a
12female at the commencement of the Act hers absolutely and by Section 6 
of the Act enforced a notional p a rtitio n  on the death o f a coparcener 
and gave to women and certain persons claiming through them his share 
of the J.F.P . ) .  Courts have been given the task of try ing  to
7 . See Kane I I I  H.D. 771 ”I t  appears from these ancient passages that 
the properties, which in  early days were held to women presents a t the 
time of marriage (such as ornaments and costly dresses) and household 
artic les  that are generally under the control of women and that the 
la te r Smpiti rules about the devolution of stridhana in  the female lin e  
arose from the peculiar nature of the a rtic le s  over which dominion was 
conceded to women. ”
8. See the MitSksharS. on YSjfiavalkya I I , X I , 9*26. See the comments of 
Kane I I I  H.D. 780-782? Mayne (U d ) 728- 9.
9. On inheritance see Sheo Shandar Dayal v Debi Sahai (1903) 30 I.A . 
202; but note that the position in  the Bombay presidency was that such 
property was her stridhana in  certain cases; Balwantral v Bajirao (1920)
k? I.A . 213; on p a rtitio n  see Debi Mangal Prasad v Mahadeo Prasad (1912)
39 I.A . 121. See Mayne ( lid )  729-33-
10. See S.2 of the Act 1929*
11. See S. 3(3) of the Act.
12. See S.14- o f the Act (discussed in fra ).
iU t
13. here is  a lo t of case law and ex tra ju d ic ia l comment on th is  (see 
supra, 43 f .n . £-9 ) .  But since the problem has not reached the 
Supreme Court i t  is  not necessary for us to consider i t  fu rth er.
protect women's rights and a t the same time ensure that the rights of 
others affected thereby are not adversely affected . The basic problem: 
to what extent can th^Courts, relying on the s p ir it of reform and the 
desire to protect the righ ts  of women, extend these righ ts  ? Bearing 
in  mind the fact that these reforms represent, in  s p ir it i f  not in  
form, the MitaksharS a ttitu d e , le t  us turn to the performance of the 
Supreme Court.
i i .  A resume of the Supreme Court cases on the subject.
The Supreme Court has decided forty-tw o important decisions
on the rights of Hindu women. Two were on the righ ts o f women to
l*fin h e rit a shebaitship, two on the construction of maintenance and
15 16g if t  deeds, three on alienations by a widow, three on the power
of the Karta-manager to make g ifts  of J .F .P . to female members of the
17 l8fam ily, one on accretions to a widow*s estate, fiv e  on the widow
19surrendering her widow's estate to the reversioner, one on the
20customary rights of a Jain widow to her share on p a rtitio n , three
l*t. %ngurbala v Debabrata A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 295? followed in  Kalipada v 
Palani B ali A .I.R . 1953 S.C. 125 (the main Question on a point of lim i­
ta tio n ). On what a "Shebaiti" is  see D errett: I.M .H .L . (1963) ^99-501.
15• Ram Gopal v Rand Lai A .I.R . 1951 B.C. 139* See also the construction 
of a g if t  deed in  Nathulal v Doorga Prashad A .I.R . 195 -^ S.C. 3f>5-
16. Kalishqnker Das v Dhirendra A .I.R . 1954- S.C. 505; T.V .R .S .C .F.
C harities v Raghava A .I.R . 19&1~~S.C. 797; J a is ri v Raj Dewan A .I.R . 1963 
S.C. 83.
17. Kamala Devi v Bachulal Gupta A .I.R . 1957 S.C. Guramma v Mallappa 
A.I.RT~196*f S.C. 510; A.Perumalakkal v Kumarsen A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 569*
18. S ita ji v Bijendra Narain A .I.R . 195^ S.C. 601.
19. N atvarlal v Dadubhai A .I.R . 195^ S.C. 6 l; Gopal Singh v U jag ir Singh 
A .I.R . 1954- S.C. 579; Kamlabai v Sheo Shankar Dayal A .I:R . 195& S.C. 91*+; 
Jai Kuar v Sher Singh A .I.R . I960 S.C. 1118; Mallesappa v foallappa A .I.R . 
1961 S.C. 1258T
20. Phoolchand v Gopal Lai A .I.R . 1967 S.C. l*+70.
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21 22 on the 1929 Act, three on the H.W .R.P.A., eight on Section 14 of
23 24the H S .A ., four on various other statu tes, one on p a rtitio n  by
25co-widows, and one on whether a widow can be a Karta of a jo in t fam ily.
In  the main the Court has supported the righ ts o f women.
27S ignificant amongst its  decisions are: the cases recognising the
28shebaiti righ ts of women, the cases which held that grants to women
29w ill be treated as absolute unless shown to be lim ited , the decision
30in  S ita ji v Bijendra Harain where i t  was held that accretions to a 
widow*s lim ited  estate belong to her unless blended with the rest of the 
property; the decisions on the 1929 Act and in  p a rtic u la r the decision
21. U jag ir Singh v Mst. Jeo A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 1041; C.Sethurayar v Aruma- 
nayakam A .I.R . 19&9 S.C. 5^9 (note that this* case follows Angurbala v 
Debarata (supra f .n .14) which was also on the 1929 A ct); Fateh B ibi v 
Charan Das A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 789*
22. Lakshmi Perumallu v Krishna A .I.R . 1965 S.C. 825; Satrughan ▼ 
Sabujpari A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 272~Tboth of these are on the rig h t of 
p a rtitio n  in  S .3(2) of the Act; Sham Lai v Amar Nath A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1643*
23* Kotturuswami v Veerawa A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 577; Munnalal v Rajkumar 
A .I.R T ‘ l9&2 S.C. 1493; Eraimria v Veerupana A .I.R . 19&6 S.C. 1879; Sukh kam 
v Gauri Shankar A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 365; Rani Bai v Yadunandan A .I.R . 19^9 
S.C. 1118; Punithavalli Ammal v Ramalingam A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 173°; Din 
Dayal v Rajaram A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1019; Badri Pershad v Kanso Devi A .I.R .
19g0 S.C. 19&3; Karni v Amru A .I.R . 1971 S.C. 745* _ —
24. Nagendra Prashad v Kempanam Jamma A .I.R . 1969 S.C. 209 (on the
Mysore Act 10 of 1933); Giani Ram v Rqmji Lai A .I.R . 1969 S.C. 1144 (on
S .4 of the H .S .A .); Gopal Rao v Satharamma A .I.R . 19^5 S.C. 1970 (on 
the rig h t of a concubine to claim maintenance under S .23(2) of H.A.M.A.); 
Kulbhushan v Raj Kumari A .I.R . 1971 B.C. 234 (on S .23(2) of H .A .M .A .).
25* Karpagathachi v Nagarthinathachi A .I.R . 1965 S.C. 1752.
26. C .I.T . v G .S .M ills A .I.R . 1966 S.C. 24.
27. We have not included in  th is  l is t  the decisions which we are going
to  discuss below.
28. See f .n . 14 (supra).
29. See f .n . 15 (supra).
30. A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 601.
in Fateh Bibi v Charan Das; where the Supreme Court approved of the
Act applying to the estates of males who had died before the Act but
whose widows died a fte r the Act, thereby giving the Act retrospective
e ffe c t; the decision in  Nagendra Prashad v Kempanam  ^ where Bhargava J .
(fo r Bachawat J . , Shelat J . Dissenting) granted the step grandmother
of a S.S.C. a share in  the J .F .P .; and the decision in  Gopal Rao v
Satharamma^ where the Court gave a concubine the rig h t of maintenance.
under Section 23 (2) of H.A.M.A. At the same time the Court has been
careful not to give the widow powers under the H.W .R.P.A., which would
3kundermine the in terests of the coparceners and reversioners. An
exception to th is  is  Sukh Bam v Gauri Shankar^  when Shah J . held that
a widow who held an in terest in  J .F .P . was not bound by the same
restric tio ns  qua a lienation  as other coparceners.
But though the Court has been quick to recognise the property
righ ts  of women, the Court has not to ta lly  reconciled its e lf  to
recognising th at women should be trusted in  positions of resp o n s ib ility .
36Thus in  C .I.T . v G. S. M ills  the Court made an ob iter dictum that a
woman cannot be the Karta of a jo in t fam ily. This decision seems
strange i f  we remember that women in  Ind ia  occupy extremely high positions
31* A .I.R . 1970 B.C. 789* For the other decisions on the Act see 
supra f .n . 21.
32. A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 209. Shelat J .1 s judgement shows thqt the m atter 
was not free from doubt.
33- A .I.R . 1963 S.C. 1970.
3*f. See p a rtic u la rly  the decisions cited supra f.n .1 9  laying down that 
surrender must be complete not p a rtia l and the decisions cited supra f .n . 
22 on the widow’ s rig h t to p a rtitio n  under the H.W.R.P.A.
35- A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 363 at pr.5 p.366.
36. A .I.R . I966 S.C. Zk» Subba Rao J . reading the judgement o f the Court
fo r Shah and S ik ri JJ.
37of responsib ility  including the post of the Prime M in ister. The 
Court has once again applied an a ll  too lo g ica l Hindu law position  
and re lie d  in  the main on the arguments of the judges of the Madras 
High Court (the judgement w rite r K. Subba Rao having come from the
neighbouring state of Addhra Pradesh) and distinguished very casually
39the contrary view from the Nagpur and Calcutta High Courts. The 
Courtis position (borrowed from the Madras High Court) was P In  order 
to be a kart a one must be a coparcener; since the widow is  not a 
coparcener she cannot be the Karta. Once again the Court has taken 
a s tr ic t ly  lo g ic a l position without going in to  e ith er the theoretical 
. presuppositions of th e ir  decision or the p rac tica l consequences which 
i t  gives rise  to . Professor D errett commenting on the decision has
37* This was also true at the time the decision was made. For a recent 
b rie f survey about the role of women in  modern in d u s tria l India see the 
a rtic le  HA woman's pice is  no longer in  the home1' in  In d ia  Weekly, (Vol. 
V II I  No.19) May 11,1972 p .8. The a rtic le  b r ie fly  reviews the development 
of women's emancipation from the nineteenth century to the present day.
38. See the Madras decision; Radha Animal v I.T.Commr. A .I.R . 1930 Mad. 
538 at 539» 5*t0» see also the Orissa decision in  Maguni Padhano v 
Lokananidhi A .I.R . 1936 Orissa 1 . The Supreme Court re fers  to both 
these in  A .I.R . 1966 S.C. 24 at pr.10 p .28 relying heavily on the 
judgements of Viswanatha S astri and Satyanarayana Rao J . in  the former 
case.
39* The Nagpur cases; C .I.T . v -^ axmi ^arayan A .I.R . 1949 Nag. 128 and 
Pandurang Vithoba v Pandurang Ramchandra A .I.R . 1947 3.28 are men­
tioned by the Court a t A .I.R . 19&6 S.C. 24 at pr.10 p.2o but no comment 
is  made on them. The Court does however try  to distinguish the Calcutta 
decisions (Sushilla Devi v C .I.T . A .I.R . 1939 Cal. 697; Smfc. Champa 
Kumari v Add. Member, Board of Rev. (1961) 46 I.T .R . 8 l (Cal) on the 
grounds that they merely held that the widow could be karta  only fo r 
revenue purposes. Surely i f  the widow can represent the sons fo r 
revenue purposes shw can also continue a partnership contract (as was the 
problem before the Supreme Court) between two jo in t fam ilies . For a 
useful c r it ic a l account o f the Madras and Nagpur decisions see R. 
Banatwala; Whether a female member of a jo in t Hindu fam ily can become 
Karta or manager of the fam ily A .I.R . 1931 J n l. 66.
shown that the circumstance of an absent husband was familiar to
dharmasastra w riters , who agreed that in  the absence of the senior
members of the fam ily lia b ili t ie s  incurred by the widow had to be
40honoured by her husband. An approach considering the mother as
guardian has been fu lly  considered in  a recent Madras case.
Again the decision creates the absurd practical resu lt that junior members
of a fam ily are inadequately represented when they could easily  be
represented by th e ir mother. Indeed in  the case before the Supreme
Court the Court suggested that the partnership become v a lid  only when
the son of the deceased Karta came of age and that his mother could
42not represent his in terest as Karta in  the intervening years.
Once again in  an important branch of Hindu law the Court relying on 
s tr ic t logic and the jurisprudence of the High Courts appeqrs to have 
lo s t sight of the p ractica l situation  that the rules of Hindu law were 
to cater to .
Bearihg in  mind some of these facts about the Supreme Court’ s 
views on women’ s rights we w ill concentrate on two problems before 
the Court :
(a) The rights of the daughter and the g if t  making power of the father 
($) The in terpretation  of Section 2>4 of the H.S.A.
40. D errett: May a Hindu woman be the manager of a jo in t fam ily ? (1966)
68 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 1 at 3-9 where a l l  the texts are set out. In  addition  
see the comments at C.M.H.L. (1970) 117-121. More texts are cited at
118 f .n .6.
41. SeeRamamiJjan J .’ s care fu lly  thought out judgement in  Venkata Krishna 
Reddy v Amarababa (1971) 2 M .L.J. 466.
42. A .I.R . 1966 S.C. 24 at pr.10 p .28.
i i i .  The rights of the daughter and the g if t  making power o f 
the fa th e r.
k3Guramma ▼ Mallappa is  an admirable piece of ju d ic ia l
Vi
le g is la tio n  in  which Subba Rao J . (reading the judgement fo r Dayal
and Mudholkar J J .) re lie d  on certain obsolete texts guaranteeing the
daughter a lim ited  share in  J .F .P . and extended the Karta’ s power to
make g ifts  of immoveable property to the daughter. This decision
gives the appearance of legalis ing  large "dowries" which have been
k5o ff ic ia lly  abolished by s ta tu te . But such a simple explanation would
ignore both the sastric  knowledge on the subject as w ell as the fact
that the problem of a single daughter, whether married, separated, or
LSdivorced, is  as much a problem in  India as i t  is  elsewhere.
The basis of the decision is  the ancient texts which guarantee 
to the s is te r a fourth share ih  the event of a p a rtitio n  between the 
brothers. His lordship, re ferring  to the tex t of Manu (IX .118) 
observed :
"These and s im ilar other texts indicate that the Hindu law 
texts not only sanction the giving of property to daughters at
43.A .I.R . 1964- S.C. 510.
D errett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 92 (see generally the whole discussion on 
the case at pp.90-93* For other comments on the case see D erre tt: Teaching 
Hindu law in  th is  decade (1965) 5 J a i.L .J n l. 18; Ib id : Guramma v
>as A recent re in terpretatio n  of the Mitakshara by the Supreme
Court ( I96AO 66 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 129* Prof. D erre tt1 s view that the judgement 
is  to be welcomed even though i t  did not accord with the s p ir it  of the 
Mitakshara law was commented on by S.R.Baj: G ift of ancestral immoveable 
property to daughters (1965) 5 J a i.L .J n l. H 0  where i t  was suggested that 
the decision accords with the tra d itio n a l law. But sde the reply by 
D errett? G ifts  of affection : The Supreme Court revises the Mitakshara 
law A .I.R . 1965 J n l.
k3» See the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 and the comments o f D erre tt:
I.M .H .L . (1963)
k6. See fo r example the recent report: The Single Woman keeping a job 
and caring fo r the old (National Council fo r the Single Woman and her 
Dependants, London, 1971)* See the report and comments in  The Times June 
26,1971« The report in  b rie f urges the State to perform the functions 
which in  our context are performed by the jo in t fam ily.
the time of p a rtitio n  or qt the time of marriage, as the case 
may be, but also condemn the dere lic tio n  of the said duty in  
unequivocal terms. I t  is  true that these Hindu law texts  have 
now become obsolete. The daughter has lo st her rig h t to share 
in  the fam ily property. But . . .  the righ t has been crysta llised  
in to  a moral obligation on the part of the father to provide 
fo r the daughter e ith er by way of marriage provision or 
subsequently." 47
m hg
The texts on the rights of the daughter are quite clear and they
were re lied  on and applied by S ir B. PL Bose in  Mt. Lochan v Dabai (1909),
which fo r a l l  intents and purposes is  s t i l l  a va lid  authority  in
Kagpur, having been approved in  an ob iter dictum in  two recent cases,
But in  the early  nineteenth century i t  was pointed out that the s is te r
could not herself demand a p a rtitio n  and that therefore what she
51 Tposssessed was a claim and not a rig h t. t  was therefore argued that
47. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510 at prll6 p.518 col.l.
48. See ^anu: IX.118; Vishpu: XVIII.34-5; Narada XIII.2.13; YUjnavalkya:
11.124; Brihaspati: XXV.64; MitSksharS I.vii.10-11; Jaganatha: I C.D. I85. 
Some of these are cited by the Supreme Court at A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 310 at 
pr.16 p.517* See also V.N.Kapoor: Rights of an unmarried daughter in 
father’s property under the Hindu law A.I.R. 1966 Jnl. 63 (but Mr. Kapoor, 
though writing after the Supreme Court judgement does not mention eithei? 
the judgement or the case law it is based on.). H.S.Gaug: Hindu Code (1938 
4d) 608-11; J.Jolly: History of the Hindu law of partition, inheritance 
and adoption (T.L.L. 1883) 103-4. Kane: III H.D. 619-20.
49* (1909) 3 Nag. L.R. 161 at 170-1. The fact that H.S.Gaur argued the
case might explain why he relies on it in his book (supra f.n.43) while 
the decision "is ignored by Kane, Mayne, Mulla, ^revelyan, Gupta and 
Raghavachariar i" (per Derrett (1970) 91 f.n.7*)_*
50. Shamrao v Nagpur (1948) Nag. 678 at 686 (per Bose J.); Bhae; want rao 
v Punjarafl (1938) "ag. 235 at 263-4 (per Stone C.J. and Bose J.) Note 
that the decision is on illegimate sons and the argument of daughters 
is being relied upon by analogy in both these cases.
51. See Strange: I Hindu law 109; Macnaghten: Principles of Hindu Law 
50-51. Note the slightly different point of view expressed in the case 
from the Zilla of Chingleput (1804) reported at Strange: II Hindu law 
299-301 (note the opinion of the pundit - T.Kistnamacharee - at p.299 
and the opinion of Ellis (p.300)aand of Sutherland at 310); see also 
the case of Kylapa Counden v Nallaya Counden (1808) reported Staange:
II Hindu law 360 and the opinion of Oolebroke and Ellis at 361. In this 
case an actual division giving the daughter a share was suggested by 
the pundit. F.W.Macnaghten: Considerations on Hindu law as it is current 
in Bengal (1824) 98-105 suggesting that the rule had become obsolete.
A fter th is  the question tended to be academic: See K.K.Bhattacharya:
The law relating to the Hindu joint family (1885) 64-66; 143-8; S.G.Grady: 
Manual of Hindu law (1871 London) 197* 205; Gooroodass Banerjee: The 
Hindu law of marriage and stridhana (1878) 222 where only the texts are 
mentioned. Kane: III H.D. 619-20 assumes that the rule had become obsolete
her right was really given in lieu of marriage expenses, as was
accepted by Mitter J. (for Maclean J. and himself) in Damoodur v 
52Senabutty (1882). This view was reinforced by several decisions
53in the Madras High Court,and relied upon by the Supreme Court ,
which recognise the father1s right to give a present of immoveable
property to the daughter at the time of her marriage. These decisions,
which must be read in the context of the Madras custom ubhTldSnamM)
54which enjoins that the father give land to the son-in-law, were
55dissented from by the Bombay High Court in  Jinnappa v Chimmava.
It should also be noted that the Privy Council delivered two decisions 
which accepted the father’s right to make gifts to his daughter and
52. (1882) 8 Cal. 537 at 541.
53- See Ramasami Ayyar v Vengidisani Ayyar (1898) 22 Mad.113 at 115 
(relied upon by the Supreme ^ourt in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510 at pr.l6 p.518 
col.20; Kudutamma v ^arasimhancharyalu (1907) 17 M.L.J. 528; Sundarammaya 
v Seethamma (l91l) 21 M .L.J. 695 (relied upon by the Supreme Court at 
pr.l6 p.518 col.2); Vettor Ammal v Pooch Animal (1912) 22 M .L.J. 521; 
Sithalahalakshmamma v Kottayya A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 825 (relied upon by the 
Supreme Court at pr.16 p.519col.l). The Supreme Court also rely on two 
other cases (at pr.16 p.519) viz. Churaman Sahu v Gopi Sahu (1909) 37 Cal 
1; Annamalai v Sundarathammal A.I.R. 1953 Mad.404 at 406. Note that 
Subba Rao J . does not cite some of the more recent judgements which 
take a slighly limited view of the problem: Sivagnama Thevar v Udayar 
Thevar A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 356 (gift to wife); Palwana Nadar v Annamalai 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 330 which did not agree with judgement in Annamalai v 
Sundarathammal A.I.R. 1953 Mad 404 (relied upon by Subba Rao J .);
Karuppa Goundan v Paliannamal A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 245; Hari Shankar v Ram 
Sarup A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 113; Dhondiram v Bhagubjai A.I.R. 1956 Hyd. II8; 
Tara v Raghunath A.I.R. 1965 Orissa 50 (but here the gift was held valid 
even though not connected with the marriage.).
54. Srinivasa v ^arvathiammal (1969) 2 M.L.J. 597• I am indebted to Prof 
Derrett for this point and this reference. It is also cited in C.M.H.L. 
(1970) 91.
55* A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 324; See also the earlier case of Haridas v 
Devkuvarbai A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 408 where Macleod J. suggests (at p.^09 
col.l) that such a gift can be made. But note the fact (at **09-10) that 
the son did not complain for two years after the father’s death; 
Vyascharya v Venkubai (1912) 57 Bom. 251 (F.B.). Here the natural father 
of an adoptee consented to the alienation by the widow. But the point 
was decided on the basis of the question whether such consent can be 
given.
in one of the decisions even suggested that a give of immoveable
56property could be made.
But let us go bafik to Guramma1s case. Unlike the earlier 
Supreme Court case, Kamala Devi v Bachulal Gupta,^  where the gift was 
definitely connected with the daughter’s marriage, in Guramma’s case 
the gift had been made to a widowed daughter. Thus the former can 
be justified as an alienation for religious purposes (the marriage 
of a daughter being a religious purpose) but the latter is difficult 
to justify in the face of the clear text of the Mitakshara (I.i.25) 
which expressly prohibits the gift of immoveable property as a token 
of affection. The reason for the rule is easy to understand if we 
remember that even now a large part of the family wealth of the great 
mass of Hindu joint families is concentrated on the land and it is 
imprudent to allow the Karta to have the power to dispose of the 
property as a gift of affection. Indeed this can be seen in Subba 
Rao J.’s difficulty in dealing with the restrictions in the MitaksharS. 
Subba Rao J. tries to suggest that the power of granting gi£ts to the 
daughter must be independently construed and says :
MAt the outset it would be convenient to clear the ground. 
Verses 27*28 and 29 in Ch.I Mitakshara describe the limitations 
placed on a father in making gifts of (the*) ancestral estate.
56. The leading judgement is Bachoo v Mankorebai (I907) 31 Bom.373 at 
379 (relied upon by Subba Rao J. at p.518-9). Note no question of 
alienating immoveable property arose in this case, even though S.R.Baj 
(supra f.n.44) 144 assumes it did; Ramalinga v Annavi A.I.R. 1922 P.C.
201 at 209 where Ammeer Ali J. refers to a judgement of the Board where 
such a gift was allowed. But that judgement was not traceable and is 
not mentioned in the judgement. In this case the father assigned to his 
daughters some money and a usufructary mortgage. This case is also 
relied upon by Subba Roa J. who quotes the passage mentioning the ’’earlier 
judgement of the Board” at pr.16 p.519 col.l.
57* A.I.R. 1957 B.C. 434 but note that at 443 S.K.Das J. (reading the 
judgement of the Court) leaves open the question whether gifts can be 
given after marriage.
They do not expressly deal with the right of a father to make 
provision for his daughter by giving her some family property 
at the time of her marriage or subsequently. The right is 
defined separately by Hindu law texts and evolved by (a) long 
catena of decisions based on the said texts.” 58
Thus as one foreign observer has shown one important aspect
59of the cane was not even considered by the Court. But there are
some reservations on the power to make such gifts in the judgement
itself, and it is clearly stated that
”(t)he father or his representative can make a valid gift, by 
way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of the daughter, 
regard being had to the financial and other relevant circum­
stances of the family.” 60
Happily, more recently the Court has raqde it clear that this power of
the father’s extends only to making gifts to his daughter and cannot
6lbe extended to making gifts to his wife.
Thus we see that although the Court had neglected to consider 
one very important aspect of the problem, the decision in Guramma1 s case 
is a creative judgement. It considers the problems of the daughter 
and the s&stdc position and uses the techniques of Anglo-Hindu law to 
solve the problem. To insist on the right of a share at partition 
would now be inconceivable. Indeed to the eitent to which it was 
possible this has already been done to some extent by Section 6 of the 
H.S.A. The only way to make that right real and capable of being 
exercised in the father’s lifttime and independently of the daughter’s
58. A .I.R . 1964 S.C. 510 at pr.l6 p.517*
59. Derrett: see references cited supra f.n. 44.
60. A .I.R . 1964 S.C. 510 at pr.l8 p.519- This is the summary paragraph
where the “legal position” is summarised.
61 • A Perumalakkal v Kumaasen A .I.R . 1967 B.C. 569 (per Wanchoo J. reading
the judgement of the Court.
marriage was to introduce it not as a right in the daughter’s hands 
(which even the sSstric texts did not intend it to be) but as a power 
in the hands of the father. The judgement is a rare example of cc 
creative interpretation of the sastric texts in a modern context.
iv. The interpretation of Section of the H.S.A.
62The Supreme Court has decided nine cases on this section.
Before we examine them it would be convenient to reproduce the terms 
of the Section itself :
Section 14 (1) ”Any property possessed by a female Hindu, 
whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, 
shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited 
owner.”
Explanation : ”In this subsection ’property’ includes both 
moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by 
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of mainten­
ance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, 
whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or 
by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or prescription, or 
in any other manner whatsoever, also any such property held by 
her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.”
(2) "Nothihg contained in subsection (1) shall apply to 
any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any 
other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court 
or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other 
instrument or the defiree, order prescribe a restricted estate 
in such property.”
A great deal of controversy has arisen about the interpretation 
63of this section. In the main it has centred upon the interpretation
62. See supra f.n. 23.
63* For an up to date review of the problem see Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970)
Chapter7; See further Derrett: Some problems arising under the Hindu 
Succession Act (1959) Bom.L.R.Jnl.331 Ibid: Recent decisions and some 
queries in Hindu law (1957) 59 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 178 at 187-8; S.R.Gohkale: A 
note on Munnalal versus Rankumar (A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1493) and Sec.
14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 A.I.R. 1962 Jnl. 83; Derrett: Section 
14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act? A disturbing decision from Andhra Pradesh
(1969) 71 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 62; Ibid: A note on Kun.ii Thomman v Meenakshi A.I.R. 
1970 Ker.284 (1971) kTl.I. Jnl. 25-6; Ibid: Section 14 of the Hindu Succes­
sion Act 1956 and a recent Supreme Court decision (1971) 73 Bom.L.R.Jnl.30; 
M.S.Vaidya: Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act: A plea for its amend­
ment (1971) 73 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 42(not directly in point); Derrett: A Hindu 
law miscellany (19720 1 used a photocopy of the draft, kindly given to me
by the author. A.V.Krishna Murti: Effect of mode of acquisition of the
property possessed by a family Hindu on Section 14(1) (1971) And.W.R.Jnl. 
13-16. ..................................
of "possessed” in Section 14(1), and on the inter-relation between
Section 14(1) and (2). The latter section was inserted to ensure
that a woman is not in a better position than men and states quite
clearly that it is still possible to make a limited grant in favour
of women. But a conflict can easily arise where the woman claims
that she has a right to the property and is therefore "possessed”
of it and the grantor (or for that matter donor or testator) inserts
a limitation which is narrower than the right she claims. The
problem is: Does her right take precedence over the limitation ?
Let us examine these problems in the light of the Supreme Court cases.
The Supreme Court first considered Section 14 in Kotturuswami 
64v Veerawa where the widow had used the well-tried tactics of
65adopting a son to defeat the claims of her reversioners. Imam J.
(a Muslim judge^) reading the judgement of the Court held that
67
Section 1^—had not abolished reversioners but merely sought to
64. A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 577-
65* Ibid at pr.2 p.578-9* Two attempts to adopt were made. The legality 
of the first adoption was questioned but this was abandoned because the 
adoptee died. Note the father died in 1920; the adoptions were made in 
1939 and 1942 respectively.
66. One cannot make much of this point and indeed as M.H.Beg in a letter 
to the present writer (dated Jan.6,1972) suggested, this wrongly suggests 
that judicial decision is an overtly conscious affair. But such deci­
sions are rare and must be highlighted. Other significant examples 
include Hidayatullah J.’s outstanding and painstaking judgement in 
Narayan v Gopal A.I.R. i960 S.C. 100 (on the construction of the deeds 
of a religious endowment) and the same judge1 s judgement in Parbati Kuer 
v Sarangdhar (see supra Chapter V Section 3 ii) A.I.R. I960 S.C. 403*
All these belong to the same period, i.e. when there was no Hindu law 
expert in the Court. Before this the judgements were written by Mukerjea 
and T.L.V.Ayyar JJ. and after this by Ramaswami, Subba Rqa* and Hegde JJ.
67* A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 at pr.10 p.581. The Court approved of Lukai v 
Niranjan A.I.R. 1958 Pat.l60; Harak Singh v Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1959 ^at. 
581 and "disapproved of the earlier Pdna decisions (Rqma v i^agunath A.I.rT 
1937 Pat. 480; Janki v Chhathu Prashad A.I.R. 1937 Pat.674) which had 
taken the contrary view. Note that Imam J. was himself from the Patna 
High Court.
flL*'
68increase the rights of women. His lordship did not go as far as
the Andhra High Court by suggesting that a widow-trespasser was also
69in "possession" of her estate under Section l*t-(l), but decided
70that the word must be interpreted as widely as possible and held
that the widow was still in possession of the estate - the possession
71of the adopted son being purely permissive.
72This case has been generally followed. In two important
73 7bcases, Eramma v Veerupana and Din Dayal v Rajaram, the Court
however made it clear that Section lA-(l) did not apply in the case
of a trespasser, even though in neither of the cases did the Supreme
Qourt go into the question of constructive possession, which was so
important a part of Kotturuswami1s case where the Court held that the
widow was in "possession" of an estate actually in the hands of her
adopted son with her permission. Nor did the Court explore the various
68. Ibid at pr.10 - 11 pp.581-2.
69* Ibid at pr.ll p.581 col.2. See the wider suggestion in the judgement 
of Satyanarayana Raju J. in Venkayamma v Veerayya A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280.
A position subsequently fesiled from.
70. Ibid at pr.ll p.581-2.
71• Ibid at pr.ll p.582 col.l. It appears that though not directly in 
point the rights of the adoptee have been completely ignored. Contrast 
the case of Sawan Ram v Kalawanti A.I.R. 1967 S.C. l?6l where had the 
widows not died the Court would have followed the line taken by the 
Courts below that the adopted son’s rights precluded the reversioners 
from making a challenge.
72. Apart from the High Court cases see Munnalal v Rajkumar A.I.R. 1962 
S.C. 1^93 at pr.15 p.1^99; Badri Pershad v Kanso Devi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
1963 at pr.6 p.965 col.l.
73. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879.
lb * A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1019.
L-S * 1 /"I*
si vj
75facts fully But we can see that the Court has taken a very sensible
view of the subsection and, unlike the Patna and Addhra Pradesh High
Courts, has safeguarded the rights of reversioners and at the same time
given full effect to the claims of the women in the cases before them.
Equally important, and perhaps more influential, is the
76judgement in Munnalal v Rajhumar where Shah J. (for S. K. Das and
Hidayatullah J.) reading the judgement held that a female who died
after a preliminary decree for partition had been passed granting her
a fourth share (her husband1s share which passed on to her under
Section 3(2) of the H.W.R.P.A.) was “possessed" of that share within
the meaning of Section l*f(l) of the H.S.A. ^his judgement has been
criticised partly on the ground of the rule of statutory construction
that a statute must not be construed as having taken away already
existing rights but largely on the ground that the words "and not as
limited" owner at the end of Section 14- (1) imply that the rights
intended to be made absolute were limited rights and not a share at 
77partition. But let us get back to the arguments of the Mitakshara.
75- In the former £ase two widows of the father of the S.S.C. kppt the
S.S.C.'s estate using two adoptions found to be invalid. The Court did 
not consider either the right of maintenance of the two co-widows or 
discuss the very important question whether the co-widows could them­
selves succeed to the S.S.C. by virtue of the H.W.R.P.A. (if it applied - 
the father died in 1936-7)1 On this latter question see Derrett: The 
Hindu Women’s right to Property Act 1937; A sting in the tall (1965)
67 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 35; Ibid: The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act 1937;
A change of direction in Madras and an apology (1965) I M.L.J. Jnl.13*
In the latter case thb estate passed from the widow to the daughter, 
whose rights are not considered.
76* A.I.R. 1962 S.C. Iif93 at pr.16 p-1499-
77* S.R.Gokhale: (supra f.n.63) A.I.R. 1962 Jnl. 85 at pr.8 p.86 where 
he takes up the argument about the rule of construction and makes a 
strange analogy with Article 31 of the Constitution hinting that com­
pensation must be paid where rights are taken away in this way 1 ; at 
pr.10 p.87 where he suggests that the Court ignore the last phrase in 
S.lMl). His article was praised by Derrett: C.M.H.L. (1970) 217 f.n.9*
78which, though not accepted by the Privy Council/ clearly postulate
that the share on partition was clearly intended to be part of a 
79woman* s stridhana. What the Court appeafs to have done is to
instinctively follow the MitaksharS. view. It certainly eats into
J.F.P. but a situation wherein a widow who got a share at an actual
partition at Hindu law is able to claim under Section 1^ (1) whereas
a widow who was merely awarded a share at a preliminary decree is not,
would clearly be anomalous. Far more important is the decision in
go
Sukh Ram v Gauri Shankar where the widow had not asked for a partition, 
but had (after the passing of the H.S.A.) alienated her share to a 
stranger. Shah J. (for Sikri and Shelat JJ.) held that she could 
alienate the property irrespective of the limitations which the 
MitaksharS. placed on the other coparceners, whereby they could not effect 
such an alienation without each other's consent. His lordship was 
prepared to dismiss the circumstance that this in fact gave her wider 
powers than the other male coparceners and argued that since the 
interest given by the H.W.R.P.A. was property, it followed that under 
Section l*t
"she became full owner of th(e) property (;) she acquired a right
unlimited in point of user and duration and uninhibited in point
of disposition." 8l 
*
Apart from using these Blackstonian terms to describe the rights of the
g-p
owner, the Court justified its decision on the grounds that the
78. See supra f.n. 8 and 9 and the texts corresponding to them.
79* Mayne (lid) 728 (referring to Dr. Jolly) rightly points out that 
Vijn&nesvara made a share at partition part of a woman's stridhana, but 
it was nowhere suggested that it would be at her absolute disposal.
80. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365.
81. Ibid at pr.4 p.366.
82. For a description of Blackstone's views on property as contrasted 
with the Indian approach to the subject see supra Chapter III Section 2.
53> p >
restrictions were unimportant "because in schools other than the 
Benares school (to which this case belonged) this limitation had been 
dispensed with. This is taking the principles too far and must be 
reconsidered and all the more so because the Court went out of its 
way to say :
“We are unable to agree ... that restrictions on the right 
of the male members of the Hindu joint family form the bed-rock 
on which the law relating to joint family property is founded.11 83
As we have already shown, the rights of a coparcener to alienate his
share is in spirit opposed to the joint family principle and really a
concession to convenient®?^
But the most controversial area has been on the inter-relation
85between Seetion 14 (1) and (2). In Badri Pershad v Kanso Devi the 
Court observed :
"Subsection (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a 
proviso or an exception to subsection (1). It can dome into 
operation only if acquisition is made in any of the methods 
indicated therein is made for the first time without there 
being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in 
possession Of the property.11
The question that gave rise to a great deal of controversy was whether
a right to maintenance was property "possessed" within the meaning of
the subsection so as to create a pre-existing right in the widow and
preclude the operation of Section 14 (2). Before we proceed any
further we should take not of a few matters. Firstly, we must get
86rid of the notion popularised by Gopisetti v Subbarayudu that a 
right to maintenance is not a right to property because this clearly
83. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365 at pr.5p.366.
84. See supra Chapter V Section 1. This has also been hinted at in 
Chapter VI Section 1 (iii)(a). See Derrett! R.L.S.I. Ch.12, esp.p.427*
85. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. I963 pr.7 p.1966.
86. (1968) 2 And.W.R. 455* See the comments of Derrett: (1969) 71 Bom. 
L.R. Jnl. 62 at 67.
ignores the fact that in India, ownership rights often merely consist 
87of "claims”. Secondly, we should remember that well before the passing
88of the H.S.A., the Supreme Court had made clear that there was no reason 
for supposing that a grant to a widow whether of maintenance or other­
wise, was limited. Thirdly, we should remember that Section 22 of 
H.A.M.A. clearly lays down that the heirs of a deceased person are
8q t
bound to maintain dependants of the deceased person. astly, one 
must not overlook the fact that a majority of the High Courts in India
held that the right to maintenance was not a pre-existing right
90 91within the meaning of Section 14 (1). But in Rami Bai v Yadunandan
Grover J. (for Shah and Ramaswami JJ.) held that a widow of a pre­
deceased son who had a right to be maintained out of the estate of the
S.S.C. (the father) could keep the property she possessed in liew of 
maintenance with respect to any claims made by the S.S.C.’s donee, even 
though her claim was not specifically a charge on the estate. The Court 
observed in passing :
87* See the decisions cited f.n.15 supra. This point is also made by 
Derrett1 C.M.H.L. (1970) 302.
88. See supra f.n.15.
89« S.22(2) and (4). For a general comment on the operation of this sub­
section see Il.S.Vaidya (supra f.n.63) (1971) 73 Bom.L.B. Jnl. 41.
90. The following judgements hold that maintenance grants fall within 
the reach of Section 14(1): Sumeshwar v Swemi Nath A.I.R. 1970 Pat.348; 
Bindbashni Singh v Sheorati Kuer A.I.R. 1971 Pat. 104; for examples of 
the opposite view see Gopisetti v Subbarayudu (supra f.n.86); Santhanam 
v Subramania (1967) 1 Mad.68; P.Pattabhiraman v ^arijatham A.I.R. 1970 
Mad. 257; Narayan v Tara A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 131; Likhrai uhand v Sukhdevi 
A.I.R. 1970 Raj. 285"TBasdeo v Dir.Consolidation (1969) All.L.R. 1027.
See also K.'-i-homman v Meenakshi A.I.R. 1970 Ker. 284 where M.Nair and 
Krishnamoorthy Iyer JJ. held (at pr.17) that the daughter-in-law had a 
right of maintenance in her father-in-law’s estate but that the grant to 
her under a family arrangement fell within S.14(2) (see also the comments 
of Derrett (1971) K.L.T. Jnl. 25.).
”^t is  clear from provisions of the Explanation appearing 
in  Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that a s ituation was 
contemplated where a female Hindu could be in  possession of 
jo in t family properties in  lie u  of maintenance.” 92
Now le t  us turn to the Supreme Court decision in  Badri Pershad
v Kanso Devi?  ^ Grover J. relying on an e a rlie r  judgement of the Court
held that a widow who had acquired her husband’ s coparcenery rights
under the H.W.R.P.A. and was given a defin ite  share as a resu lt of
arb itra tio n , was ’'possessed” of that share within the meaning of
Section 14 (1 ), even though the award c learly  stated that she had
94"a woman’ s lim ited estate” . The Court accepted that
’’sub-section (2) made i t  clear that the object of Section 3>4 was 
only to remove the tHi**bility on women imposed by law and not to 
in terfere  with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of 
which a woman’ s right was re s tric ted .” 95
But Grover J. also made i t  clear that
” (t)he word 'acquired* in  sub-section (1) should be given the 
widest in terpretation , ^his would be so because of the language 
of the explanation which.makes sub-section (1) applicable to 
acquisition of property by inheritance or devise or at p a rtitio n  
or in  lie u  of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by g if t  
or by a female’ s s k i l l  or exertion or by purchase or prescrip­
tion  or in  any manner whatsoever.” 96
97In  spite of these clear d icta , in  Kami v Amru Hegde J. (fo r Shah J. -  
who had participated in  both Rani Bai's case as w ell as Badri Pershad’ s 
case -  and Grover J. -  who wrote the judgement in  the la t te r  case),
92. Ib id  at p r.4  p .1121 c o l. l .
95. A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1963.
94. Ib id  at pr.6  p.1965-6 where the Court re lie s  on Kotturuswami v 
Verrawa A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 577> Munnalal v Rajkumar A .I.R . 1962 S.c7 1493 
pr.7 p .1966 where the Court re lied  on Sukh Ram v Gauri Shankar A .I.R .
1968.5,C. 365.
95* Ib id  at p r.7 p .1966, referring to Rangaswami Naicker v Chinnamal 
A .I.R . 1964 Mad. 387.
#
96. Ib id  at pr.6  p .1966.
97. A .I.R . 1971 S.C. 745.
held :
"The l i f e  estate given to her under the w i l l  cannot become 
an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession 
Act. Therefore the appellant cannot claim any t i t l e  to the suit 
properties on the basis of the w il l  executed . . .  in  her favour." 98
His lordship, in  his extremely short judgement (barely two columns
long) did not even examine whether she had a subsisting or antecedent
right to maintenance and we are le f t  to suppose (as Professor Derrett 
99does ) that i f  the judgement is  right (and we must assume i t  is )  i t  
was one of those one-in-a-thousand cases (e .g . where the woman is  
crim inally responsible fo r the death of the owner of the estate from 
which maintenance is  claimed) where the widow could not claim main­
tenance or had, e .g ., su ffic ien t means of her own and her claim 
could be ignored.
Once again the Court has not decided an important point on 
which there is  such a lo t of controversy, and on which uniform rule 
of the Supreme Court was d e fin ite ly  called fo r.
To sum up : we w il l  see therefore that on the whol^he
Supreme Court has taken a fa ir ly  lib e ra l view of women's rights taking 
care (except in  SukhJRara*s case) however not to encroach upon jo int 
family in teres t. But the decisions usually follow the lead taken by 
the High Courts and the conservatism of the Court is  brought out into  
the open in  th e ir  decision that women are not allowed to be Kartas of 
a jo in t family. But i t  is  iron ica l that the author of that ruling  
(Subba Rao J .)  should also have w ritten the judgement in  Guramma v 
Mallappa, where the Court carelessly overlooked the very important 
point about the father's  power to g if t  immoveable property, but was at
98. Ib id  at pr.2  p.
99. Derrett; A Hindu law Miscellany (1971 -  d ra ft copy) p .4.
the time able to blend delicately sSstric learning with the prevalent
Indian situation which clearly demands that the daughter be afforded
protection. The Court did not reverse established case law and accord
the daughter the ancient rights accorded to her, but gave Hindu fathers
the power to give her those rights and left it to Hindu society to take
advantage of, or to ignore, these new powers.
We cannot attfcibute any doctrinaire attitude to the Court(s
interpretation of Section Ik of the H.S.A., even though one can say
that apart from the new trend started in Kami v Amru (assuming that
the decision is wrongly decided and the widow did have a right to
maintenance) that the Court has leaned in favour of women’s rights.
But once again we are confronted with a pattern of inconsequentiality.
^his is a serious flaw in the judgements if we remember that by
0\ Y'tiU-e. p }-/^  tutio, 
virtue of the status accorded to Supreme Court decisions under l^ fly the
Supreme Court occupies an important position in making the law in the
country uniform and is not merely a third Court of appeal.
k» Conclusion*
We can see at the very outset that in  dealing with problems 
of Hindu law the Supreme Court has very rare ly  considered concepts, ideas 
and institu tions  on the basis of the trad itio n a l texts , which though 
technically obsolete s t i l l  represent in  theory and practice the basis 
of the liv in g  law of the Hindus. Instead the Court has tr ie d  to 
refine (or avoid, or simply follow) the categories created by the 
f*rivy Council. This becomes very clear when we consider the Court’ s 
attitude to P.O. There is  no hint that the Court considered that 
in s titu tio n  for the kind of financial arrangement i t  re a lly  was. Nor 
can th is  be implied from i ts  judgements, '^ he ultimate result may well 
be practical and neat, but i t  ignores the rights of the son and can 
hardly he considered ah attempt to up-date the old law. In  ra q ir  Chand1s 
case the Court claims to have applied Occam*s razor and done away with 
procedural cobwebs. This is  an improvement in  i t s e l f .  But we must 
not forget that the basic jurisprudence in  th is  area came from the 
High Courts even though they differed on the details  of a p p lic ab ility .
This approach can also be sensed in  the area of adoption 
where even in  cases to which H.A.M.A. does not apply the Court has 
not consistently tr ie d  to protect the rights of the adoptee, which 
has created a great deal of confusion in  the area of applying ’’re lation  
back” to the legal s ituation of the S.S.C. or where the doctrine can 
only apply at the expense of divesting a statutory h e ir . We can see 
that the High Courts have been able to ignore the clear dicta of the 
Supreme Court because of the inconsistency. The Court seems to have 
forgotten that one of i t s  tasks is  to make the law a l l  over India  
uniform. But yet when considering the H.A.M.A., they seem to have 
invented a concept of ’’complete incorporation” without working out the 
details  and even vaguely endorsing the suggestion that the apparently
clear terms of Section 12 (c) were intended to take somehow a lim ited  
e ffec t. I ts  attitude to ’’adoption'1 as well as "the rule against 
divesting" have been largely theoretical. No-one w il l  deny that the 
son should be adopted into the family as fu lly  as possible and that 
th is adoption should not create havoc by divesting t i t le s .  But what 
are required axe clear deta ils  on how these two rules are to be 
adjusted. The inconsistent (even though technically reconcilable) 
attitudes that have emerged may well have been the product of a frag­
mented Bench structure, but i f  the judges of the Supreme Court cannot 
be expected to present a clear policy, i t  is  in f in ite ly  more d if f ic u lt  
for the unnumerable judges of the various High Courts to evolve one.
The Supreme Court evidently overlooked th is  while considering 
the problems of maintenance grants under Section 14 of the H .S.A., once 
again c learly  ignoring that there was a controversy raging in  the 
High Courts which could constitutionally only be resolved by the 
Supreme Court.
An excellent but perhaps more creditable example of th is  is
Vaidialingam J .'s  judgement in  J. V ithal Rao Gajre v *athankhan*‘ where
the CouXt ignored to ta lly  the fact that there was a controversy raging 
2on the subject and held that an alienation by a de facto guardian was 
va lid . The result is  ju s tifie d  on the ground that since the father 
had been away for twenty years and had taken no in terest in  hdas child,
3
the mother could be treated as the natural guardian. This is  certain ly  
ju d ic ia l c rea tiv ity  in  the face of a hard case. But i t  is  also 
extremely piecemeal and suffers because the Court neglected to take a
1. (1970) 2 S.C.J. 17.
2. Derrett: I.M .H .L. (1963) 84-8; Ib id : C.M.H.L. (1970) 185 f f .
3 . (1971) 2 S.C.J. 17 at pr.5 p .19 c o l. l .
comprehensive view of the whole problem, ignoring Section 11 of the 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 which specifica lly  forbids the 
de facto guardian to deal with a minor’ s property*
In  actual fact we can see that the Supreme Court neither
f u l f i ls  i ts  constitutional function of creating uniformity, nor can
i t  re a lly  be considered a Court of reform. I f  we look at i ts  decisions
on P.O., i ts  decisions on adoption (excluding Srinivas v Narayan) , i t s
view that a woman cannot be a Karta of a jo in t family, and i ts  creative
but nevertheless trad itio n a l judgement in  Guramma v Mallappa, we can
see that even in  areas where the Court has not derived i ts  theoretical
nourishment from the Privy Council or the High Courts, i t  has
in stin c tive ly  followed the trad itio n a l approach. But often the Court
has not even sensed the s p ir it  of these trad itio n a l notions and
concentrated mechanically on interpreting the legal norms i t  has
inherited from Anglo-Indian law. Too much attention has been paid to
word play, too l i t t l e  to the fact that the problems before the Court
are Indian problems and should be considered in  the h is to rica l context
4in  which they evolved.
In  none of these areas has the Court even fo r a moment applied 
i ts  mind to substantial questions of psychological and social need.
What is  adoption fo r, and about ? How fa r  can a power to incur private  
debts in terfere  with the father-son relationship fo r the future ? H0w 
fa r  can the statutory interference (in  1956) with the grant, by law or 
by deed or w i l l ,  of land to a woman by virtue of her relationship and
4. A sim ilar complaint is  made by G. Sitarama Sastry: Judicial 
process in  India : A study of ju d ic ia l in terpretation in  some aspects 
of Hindu law (1968) Lawyer 14; Note also the comments of Derrett: Legal 
education and the future of Hindu law in  M.B.Mujumdar (Ed): Principal 
Pandit, Law and Legal Education (1972  ^ 34 at 43-41 suggesting
that the climate is  changing.
status as a dependant, be spelt out without im perilling  the expectation 
of women ( s t i l l  by fa r the weaker sex in  Ind ia) from th e ir  "men-folk" ? 
On these great matters, fa r more important than technical or procedural 
points, the Supreme Court has had nothing to say. Here at least the 
various Benches, whatever th e ir  constitution, have been uniform and 
consistent, in  th e ir silence I I f  they have avoided copying out the 
^rivy Council’ s, or any foreigner’ s, view on the subjects (as 
irre levant), they have equally fa iled  to find any insp iration in  
India. Was i t  because there was non ,^ or because they were not looking ?
ts n<U‘ \-A '4
CHAPTER VII
A Miscellany of Supreme Court Cases
In  this Chapter we shall consider certain branches of the 
law where the Supreme Court adopts both in  theory and in  practice a 
different approach from the one assumed in  various other aspects of 
the same problem. We w il l  also consider any d istinct example of 
judicial intervention peculiar to the Court,
The best examples are to be found in  the area of c iv il  
liberties  like  ’’Obscenity*1, **Contempt of Court” , and ’’O ffic ia l 
Secrecy” where the Court takes a conservative attitude without 
explaining why the law in  Indig, which proceeds with the same theore­
t ic a l bias, arrives at a different resu lt, while paying l ip  service 
to cosmopolitan norms. This contrasts with th e ir  theoretical attitude  
that fundamental rights are sacrosanct and should be protected at a l l  
costs, even though we have already seen in  Chapters I I I  and IV that 
their actual performance in  this area is  hardly spectacular. This 
overt theoretical approach culminated in  Golak Nath v Punjab^ which we 
shall also consider b rie fly .
Equally important is  the Supreme Court's attitude while 
considering the right to relig ion, group rights and the problem of 
minority protection. Here we w il l  concentrate on two particu lar 
issues (1) the problem of cow slaughter; (2) the concept of positive 
discrimination.
No account of the Supreme Court would be complete without 
considering, in  passing, the Supreme Court's contribution to problems 
of industrial relations, into which sphere the Court has strayed.
1. A.I;R. 1967 5»C. 16*i3• For other examples of this overt attitude 
see supra Chapter II Section 3* For extrajudicial statements see 
K.Subba Rao: Mein and Society (1971) Chapter 1.
1. A Miscellany of Cases on Civil Liberties.
I t  seems strange that a Court which in  Golak Nath v Punjab
had refused to allow Parliament to amend the Part on fundamental rights
because i t  was sacrosanct, should assume a re s tric tive  a ttitude in
other areas of c iv i l  lib e rtie s , while at the same time trying to
ju s tify  th e ir  approach on cosmopolitan rather than Indian grounds.
This is  certain ly true of th e ir  attitude to Obscenity and to
Contempt of Court by scandalising the judges. But what is  more
remarkable is  th e ir  extremely conservative attitude to the problem of
O ffic ia l Secrecy, especially i f  we remember that openness in  the
administration is  almost as ( i f  not more) important to a democracy 
2
than elections. We w ill  consider a l l  these and Golak Nath’ s case.
i. The problem of obscenity before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has considered the law of obscenity in
3 ktwo important decisions and, like most Indian jurists, has considered
the problem more as a problem of criminal law rather than as an issue
of civil liberties.
2. We must not forget that because of the "whip" and the preponderance 
of Prime M in is teria l power, Parliament is  no longer re a lly  a body control­
lin g  the power structure but merely a way of getting information. I t  is  
fo r th is  reason that one of the most important considerations when con­
sidering the establishment of the Oiibudsman was that i t s  in s titu tio n  
yould take away from Parliament i t s  most important function. See: White 
Paper (1965) Cmd. 2767 pr.4; The Times e d ito ria l Oct.18 1966 p .11; D.G.
T.Williams: Comment on the Parliamentary Commissioners Act 1967: (1967)
30 Mod.L.R. 547-
3- Ranjit Udeshi v ^aharashtra A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881} Chandrakant v 
Maharashtra A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1890. Note that both these cases are from 
Maharashtra where a large part of the Indian film industry is located.
4. See J.N.Mallick: The Law of Obscenity in India (1966 Calcutta);
G.Ranga R t^hnam: Obscene posters, lite ra tu re  and pu b lic ities  (1965) I M.L.J. 
Jn l. 17; A.K.Sarkar: Literature and Obscenity (1965) 67 Bom.L.R. Jn l. 121; 
N.Rajeshwar: The law of obscenity in  India (1969) 117- See how _ : b rie f  
the discussion on th is  is  in  Seervai: (1967) 334. For a purely criminal 
law approach see H.S.Gour and Nelson cited f .n .5 infre^. and compare with 
Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (1969) 487-500r .........................................................
Before we consider the Supreme Court cases, it will be
convenient to set out the terns of Section 292 of the Indian Penal
Code :
"whoever
Sale of Obscene books etc, (a) s e lls , le ts  to h ire , d istributes, 
publicly exhibits or in  any manner puts into circulation, or 
fo r purposes of sale, hire d istribution , public exhibition or 
circulation, taakes produces or has in  his possession any obscene 
book, pamphlet, paper drawing, painting representation or figure  
or any other object whatsoever, or
(b) imports, exports or conveys any 
object fo r any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing or having 
reason to believe that the such object w ill  be sold, le t  to h ire , 
distributed or publicly exhibited or in  any manner put into  
circulation or,
(c) takes part in  or received profits  
from any business in  the course of which he knows or has reason 
to believe that any such obscene objects are fo r any of the pur­
poses aforesaid made produced, purchased, kept, imported, 
conveyed, publicly exhibited or in  any manner put into circulation  
or
(d) advertises or make^knovn by any means 
whatsoever that any person is  engaged or is  ready to engage in  any 
act which is  an offence under th is section, or that any obscene 
act can be procured from or through any person, or
(e) offers or attempts to do any act 
which is  an offence under th is  section
shall be liab le  to be punished with imprisonment of e ither descrip­
tion  fo r a term which may extend to three months or with fine or 
with both.
Exception: This section does not extend to any book or pamphlet, writing  
or drawing or painting kept or used bona fide fo r religious purposes 
or any representation, sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise 
represented on or in  any temple or on any car used fo r the con­
veyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious purpose.”
5
The Courts have been severe in  interpreting these provisions.
They have generally taken into account the effect that the book would 
£
have on children, ruled that a book may be obscene only i f  one passage
See H.S.Gour: Penal law of India (1966 Allahabad), 11,1719-1747; 
Nelson*s Penal Code of India (1966 Allahabad) 11,1329,1542. See also 
State v Thakur Prashad A .I.R . 1959 A l l . 4-9 pr.17 p«52.
6. Sukanta Haidar v State (1959) 1 Cal. 678 at 681-2; contrast with 
the position elsewhere in  the world (discussed in fra ) .
5 ^ 0
7 ois  obscene, found reproductions from temple architecture obscene
and found great d if f ic u lty  in  showing that ancient classics like  the
9KSma-sUtra are not obscene.
This is  in  keeping with Cockbum C .J .f s test in  R v H icklin
(1869)10
r,I  think the test of obscenity is  whether the tendency of 
the matter charged as obscene is  to deprave and corrupt those 
minds open to such moral influences and (in ) whose hands a 
publication lik e  th is must f a l l.11
The problems put forward by th is  test are two-fold: F irs t ly , from the
point of view of criminal law -  i t  tends to create a crime of s tr ic t
l ia b i l i t y ,  which is  p articu larly  harsh on the innocent disseminator.
Secondly, from the point of view of freedom of speech, i t  created a
legal atmosphere whereby lite ra tu re  had to be considered by the
effect i t  had on children into whose hands i t  might f a l l  rather than
by i ts  lite ra ry  and a r t is t ic  m erit. This becomes a l l  the more
important when we consider that "obscenity" has come to include
drug taking and v io lence.^
7* C.T.Prim v State A .I.R . 1961 Cal. 177 at p r . l l  p .l80 .
8. Sukanta Haidar v State A .I.R . 1952 Cal. 214. Contrast Sec.1(1) of
the Obscene Publications Act 1959 but note that in  R v Anderson(1971)
3 W.L.R. 939 at 945 in  the case of a magazine the separate items of a
magazine may be considered separately.
9. State v Thakur Prashad A .I.R . 1959 A l l . 49 at p .l6  p .51-2; State 
v Kunji Lai A .I.R . 1970 A l l .~"gl4l
10. (1868) 3 Q.B. 360 at 367.
11. On drugs see John Calder (Publications) Ltd. v Powell (1965) 1 A ll . 
E.R. 159- See comments in  (19(>5) Crim.L.R. i l l ;  (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 29; 
(1965) Jnl. of Cr. Law 91; On violence see R v Calder & Boyars Ltd. (1969) 
1 Q.B. Comment (1969)* See generally G .Zellick: Violence as pornography 
( l970) Crim.L.R. 188. Contrast S.450(8) of the Canadian Penal Code which 
while considering violence reads sex and violence conjunctively. For a 
general lay attitude to the problem of violence as pornography see the 
a rtic le  of B.Levin The Times 18 May 1972 and the le t te r  by J.H.B.Allan  
The Times June 20 1972.
The Hicklin test has been retained; but statutory provision
12 13 in  England has been made for protecting the innocent disseminator
and to enable the Court and jury to consider expert evidence on the
Ikl i te ra ry  merit of a book.
15Some Courts (like  those in  Hew Zealand and Australia ) have 
emphasised that what should be taken into account are the "standards 
of the community11. This is  also the approach of the Canadian C ourts,^
12. Tke principle changes in  England have been the Obscene Publication 
Acts 1959 and 1964 (on which see the comments of J .H a ll Williams ( i960)
23 Mod.L.R. 285 and (1965) 28 Mod.L.R. 75 respectively). For the back­
ground to the b i l l  see 1 .Jenkins (who piloted the B ills ) :  Obseanity, 
censorship and the law -  the story of a B i l l  (1959) XIII Encounter 62.
For a background to the old law see J .H all Williams: Obscenity in  
Modern English Law (1965) Law and Contemporary Problems 630. There are 
some (see the report of the Arts Council: The Obscenity Laws (1969 London);
the le t te r  to Che Times of G.Don Nov.13 1971) who would lik e  to see the
controls on obscenity abolished. But th is  has been rejected, see Hansard 
795 H.C.D. £ols. 1558-9 (Debate Dec.l8 1969) The Times March 20 1971 
(reporting the debate on March 19 1971)* There are others who would 
lik e  some reform e.g. T.J.O.Hickey: Confusion in  the Obscenity Law The 
Times Nov.12 1971 and the comments of D.Walker-Smith ( le t te r ,  The Times 
Nov.16 1972). For a general review of the pros and cons of the discus­
sion for reform see Street: Freedom, the individual and the law (1971) 
Chapter 5«
13« S.2(5) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959*
14-. M l )  and (2 ). But see the cases cited on th is  in fra  f .n .\&
15. See R. v Close (1948) V.L.R. 445 (per Fullagar J .) ;  Wavish v Associ­
ated Newspapers Ltd. (1959) V.R. 57; McKay v Gordon & Gotdh (Australasia) 
Ltd. (1959) V»R» 420; Kyte Powell v Heinmann Ltd. ( i960) V.R. 425. Contrast 
the statement in  Transport Publishing Co. Ltd. v Literature Board of 
Review (1958) A.L.R. 177 at 180. For the position in  New Zealand before 
the 1963 statute see Re L o lita  ( i960) N.Z.L.R. 817 on appeal (1961)
N.Z.L.R. 542 (note the dissent of Gresson P .) .  A ll th is  case law is  
reviewed by A.G.Davis: L o lita : Banned in  New Zealand (1961) 24 Mod.L.R.
768. For general accounts of the position see two refient unpublished 
Papers (circulated as Papers 9 and 10 for the LL.M. Courfeel971- 2 , 
University of London): Rutherford War :^ Offences against Public Morals: 
Control of Indecent and Obscene Books in  England and New Zealand (Paper 
No. 9); R.C.Frazer: Obscene Publications (Paper No. 10); Rutherford Ward: 
Books in  the J>©cU_ . New Society May 6 1971*
16. See in  particu lar Ss. 150 and 150A of the Canadian Criminal Code 
1955 (as amended in  1959); the leading cases on th is  are Brodie v Queen 
(1962) S.C.R. 6 8 l; Dominion News and G ifts  Ltd. v Queen (19^4) S.C.R. 251. 
The f i r s t  of these was about Lawrence^ Lady Chatterly1s Lover, which was 
also impugned as "obscene" in  Ranjit Udeshi v Maharashtra A .I.R . 1965 S.C. 
881. For Canada see generally L.H.Leigh:, Aspects, of the control of.obscene, 
lite ra tu re  in  Canada (1964) 24 Mod.L.R. 669 and R.C.Frazer (cited supra 
f.n .1 5 ) 4-6.
though we must remember that in  Canada the emphasis is  on the dominant 
17theme of the book. But m  a l l  these cases we must remember that
issues lik e  "the standards of the community1* and the "tendency to
corrupt and deprave** are not matters on which sociologists are allowed
l8to express an expert opinion, even though there are rare instances
(particu la rly  in  a case considering the effects of pictures on 
19children ) where such opinion was re lied  upon. In  the main therefore 
th is  problem rests solely in  the hands of the j£ ry . and public opinion
20reflected in  th e ir  judgement, rather than s c ie n tif ic a lly  collected data.
The problem does not end here. The standards of the community
21are "variable*1 and as Learned Hand J. put i t  in  U.S. v Kennerly
"To put thought in  leash to the average conscience of the 
time is  perhaps tolerable but to fe tte r  i t  by the necessities 
of the lowest and least capable seems a fa ta l p o licy ."
Courts are beginning to agree that the standards for children must be
d iffe ren t than those fo r the rest of society. The New Zealand Indecent
Publications Act 1963 goes a step further and c lassifies  obscenity
into the following sections (vide Section 10):
17- Note S.150(8) of the Canadian statute (supra f.n .1 6 ) states? "For 
the purposes of this Act, any publication the dominant characteristic  
of which is  the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and one or more of 
the following subjects, namely crime, horror, cruelty and violence, 
shall be deemed to be obscene."
18. For the position in  England see R v Calder & Boyars Ltd. (1969) 1 Q.B. 
151; R v Anderson (1971) 3 W.L.R. 939 at 9 ^  (but note that reliance is  
put on the experts? testimony at p .9^8); R v Stamford (1972) The Times 
March 1 1972.
19. See R v A and B C Chewing Gum Ltd. (1968) 1 Q.B. 159 and note that 
th is  case was restricted to apply only to children in  the las t two 
cases cited .
20. This is  a word of caution uttered by Dickson J.A. in  R v P ra irie  
Schooner News Ltd. (1970) W.W.R. 585 at 559 even though he generally 
admits that such evidence should be generally admitted to consider 
community standards.
21. (1913) 209 Fed. 119.
(a) Indecent
(b) Not indecent
(c) ^ndecent in  the hands of a specified age
(d) Indecent unless i t s  c irculation is  lim ited to
specified persons or classes of persons
(e) Indecent unless used fo r a particu lar purpose. 22
This tends to look at the problem from the point of view of c iv i l
lib e rtie s  instead of following the lin e  unhappily popularised in
America in  Roth v U.S. ^  (now considerably restricted^**) that ’’obscene"
publications are not re a lly  exercises in  freddom of speech worthy of
constitutional protection. But the criminal element s t i l l  remains an
important factor, and very recently Widgery C.J. said in  R v Anderson C
”We would lik e  to make i t  clear in  general terms that any 
idea that the offence of obscenity does not merit a prison 
sentence should be eradicated.”
Let us turn to the Supreme Court cases. As early as i 960
26the Supreme Court had made i t  clear in  Hamdard Dawakhana v Union that
22. Note that some variations are also recognised in  England and in
R v Anderson (1971) 3 W.L.R. 939 at 949-50 that obscenity does not have 
the same meaning in  the Obscene Publications Act 1939 and the Post Office 
Act 1933* On the standards fo r children see also the A and B C Chewing 
Gum case (cited f.n .19  supra) and Ginzburg (cited f.n .2 4  in fra );  S.292 
of the Indian Penal Code i 860 gives special protection to children.
See further Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act (93 o f) 1956
23. (1957) 35V U.S. 489. But note that we have already shown in  Chapter
I I I  Section 3 (supra) that the Supreme Court of India adopted precisely 
th is  attitude in  considering the d efin itio n  of property. Contrast the 
attitude of Douglas J. (in  dissent) that a l l  forms of speech should be 
absolutely protected.
24.See the more recent cases A book named John Cleland etc. v Att.Gen. 
(19660 $83 U.S. 413 (note the standards of community test in  the judge­
ments of Clark and Stewart J J .); Ginzburg v U.S. (1966)383 U.S. 463; 
Mishkin v N.Y. (1966) 383 U.S. 502. Note the controversy on these cases:
D.E.Engdahl: ^equiem for Roth: Obscenity doctrine is  changing (1969-70)
68 Mich.L.R. 185 and the reply by S.K.Laughlin Jnr. A requiem for requiems: 
The Supreme Court at the Bar of re a lity  (1970) 68 Mich.L.R. 1389*
25. (1971) 3 V.L.R. 939 at 930.
26. A .I.R . I960 S.C. 554. See Seervai (1967) 324-5 and supra Chapter I I I  
Section 3*
commercial advertisements, especially fo r the sale of medicines for
the cure of certain types of disorders, are not an exercise in  free
speech. We have already had occasion to show that the Supreme Court
has often used broad undefined categories to control a particular
a c tiv ity  instead of weighing the pros and cons involved. This is  very
true of the attitude that Hidayatuallah J. took in  Ranjit Udeshi v 
27Maharashtra where the Court considered whether Lady Chatterly’ s Lover 
was an obscene book. His lordship assumed that i t  was "an important
28in terest of society to suppress obscenity" and observed :
" ( I ) t  can hardly be claimed that that obscenity which is  
offensive to modesty or decency is  w ithin the constitutional 
protection given to free speech and expression, because the 
A rtic le  dealing with the right i t s e lf  excludes i t .  That 
cherished right on which our democracy rests is  meant for the 
expression of free opinions to change p o lit ic a l or social con£ 
ditions or for the advancement of human knowledge . . .  " 29
Later he added :
" I t  is ,  however, clear that obscenity by i t s e lf  has 
extremely poor value in  the propagation of ideas, opinions 
of public interest or p ro f it . When there is  propagation of 
ideas., opinions and information of public interestbr p ro fit , 
the approach to the problem may become d ifferent because then the 
in terest of society may t i l t  the scales in  favour of free speech 
and expression." 30
The Court therefore believes that free speech means only responsible
speech and that obscenity was worthy of protection only i f  i t  had "a
31prepondering social purpose". The Court read ily  took the view that 
what was harmful for the young must necessarily be harmful fo r the
27. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881.
28. Ibid at pr.7 p.885 c o l.2.
29. Ibid at pr.8 p.885 c o l.2.
30. Ibid at pr-9 p .886 c o l. l .
31. Ibid at pr.22 p.889 c o l. l
rest of society^and while paying l ip  service to the rule that the
33book must be considered as a whole was prepared to condemn the book
3kbecause of isolated passages.
H  is  clear that the Court was also trying to improve 
l i te ra ry  standards in  the country and at one stage the learned judge 
says :
"Today our National and Regional languages are strengthening 
themselves by new li te ra ry  standards a fte r  a deadening period 
under the impact of the English. Emulation by our writers of 
an obscene book under the aegis of th is  Court’ s determination 
is  l ik e ly  to pervert our entire lite ra tu re  because obscenity 
pays and true art finds l i t t l e  popular supports'.1 3%
Hidayatullah J. is  thus anxious to get Indians away from im itative
habits but continually makes the same error himself throughout his
judgements.
In  addition to th is  the Court went out of i t s  way to examine
the l i te ra ry  merit of the book, put Lawrence on t r i a l ,  and with
Hidayatuallah J . now assuming the role of lite ra ry  c r it ic ,  suggested
36that the book was w ritten  as and intended to be pornography. At the 
same time the fact that a genuine lite ra ry  c r it ic  and author, who had
given evidence in  the Court below, had approved of the l ite ra ry  merit
. .  3 7 ................................
of the book was c learly  ignored. One can understand the Court doing
32. Ib id  at pr.14 p.887 co l.2 (quoting H ick lin 's  case); pr.15 (ib id )  
reads: "This test has been uniformly applied in  In d ia ."  No authority  
has been cited fo r th is .
33. Ib id  at pr.20 p.888 co l.2 .
3k* Ib id  at pr.29 p.891 " . . .  the impugned passages viewed separately
and also in  the setting of the whole book pass the permissable lim its " . 
Note that "pass" here in  i t s  context means "exceed".
35. Ib id at pr.21 p .888- 9.
36. Ib id  at p r.2 4-28 pp.889- 891.
37• Ib id  at pr.3  p .884 col.2 where the Court stressed that despite the 
expert evidence the issue must under the terms of the Penal Code be 
decided by the Court. I t  is  submitted with respect that the Penal Code 
merely places a general a rb itra l responsibility on.the Court and the - 
expert's opinion should have been given the weight that i t  deserved.
-zO
th is  i f  (as under a law in  Massachusetts ) the book and not the persons
connected with i t  were put on t r i a l .  But in  th is  case a person was on
t r ia l  for what could have been regarded as innocent dissemination. We
cannot help thinking that while the Court was playing th is  m ulti-ro le
of critic,-censor-patron and protector of the young, the position of
the appellants, who were a fte r  a l l  only innocent disseminators of a
controversial work, was not re a lly  considered by the Court. The Court
unceremoniously rejected the argument that intention was not proved by
suggesting that i t  was not re a lly  required because two American decisions
39on the question of “scienter” were so evenly divided that i t  was d if -
i 40f ic u lt  to take the view that i t  was important: The Court quoted the
important cases before the Obscene Publications Act 1959; introduced
4.i
l i t t l e  anecdotes from the lives  of Dr. Johnson and John Wilkes;
42talked general^ about a rt and lite ra tu re ; but ignored some of the 
basic considerations of the law of obscenity* I t  is  clear that the Court 
has tr ie d  to combine the functions of judge, jury, expert and social
38. For a review of the Massachusetts leg is la tio n  see G .Zellick: A new 
approach to the control of obscenity (1970) 33 Mod.L.R. 289. Note also 
the Indecent Publications Act 1963 (of New Zealand) where the book can 
be referred to a Tribunal. For further discussion on th is  see Hutherford 
Ward: Books in  the $cck New Society May 6 1971* But in  New Zealand 
there must nethrtheless be the prosecutioi?6f a person and not just of 
a book, however expert the Tribunal may be.
39• I t  is  a well known principle of criminal law that a person must 
"intend” (mens rea) his impugned criminal action. See Smith & Hogan: 
Oriminal Law (1969 London) 37-53 and on obscenity at 494-7*
40. A .I.R . 1963 S.C. 88l at pr.12 p .896 co l.2 . One must mention in  
passing that on the question of obscenity a l l  American decisions have 
been evenly dedided (see cases cited in  f.n .2 4  supra). Again there were
5 judgement in  Golak Nath v Punjab A .I.R . 1967 B.C. 164-3 (one of them
Hidayatullah J . ’ s) that hardly means that the decision is  not an 
authority for what i t  decided.
4-1. Ib id  at p r . l l  p .886 col.2 and pr.21 p .888 co l.2 .
4-2. e .g . ib id  at pr.16 p .887- 8 , p r . l8 p .888, and prs.24-8 pp.889- 91*
reformer, and the result is  a very confused law of obscenity. I t  is  
for th is  reason that in  Chandrakant v Maharashtra^ P. J . Reddy J.
/|f,
ostensibly followed Ranjit Udeshi(s case and seemed to tid y  up
certain unexplained parts of the law. Thus i t  is  made clear that
45the book must be taken as a whole, that the Court w i l l  not s it  in
judgement on the style of the book (which i t  may not be competent to
understand ) and that what the Court had to consider was
,fwhether a class, not an isolated case, into whose hands the 
book . . .  fa l ls  suffer in  th e ir  moral outlook or become depraved 
by reading i t  or might have impure and lecherous thoughts 
aroused in  th e ir minds.” 47
Certainly some of the debris has been cleared, but even the la tes t
judgements deal with the broad categories of social reform considered
by HidayatullahJ. rather than considering the legal aspects of the
matter and considered the role of the Court in  that lig h t .
The Supreme Court has in  fact taken a trad itio n a l view that
the Court (or the Government) must defend and uphold a particu la r moral
view of a society and establish and enforce certain standards, while
fct the same time attempting to show that in  fact i t  is  re a lly  in  lin e
with contemporary jurisprudence and sophisticated enough to understand
the lite ra ry  nuances of the problem placed before i t .
43. A .I.R . 1970 S.C. 1390.
44. Ib id  at pr.5 p. 1392-3*
45* Ib id  at pr.5  p .1392 (qhoting from Hidayatullah J .)  and note the
comment at the end of the para on p.1393*
46. Ib id  at p r.4  p .1392. But note that his remarks can be lim ited  to the
fact that the book was in  a regional language which the Court was not
fam ilia r with.
47* Ib id  at p r.13 p .1393 Col.2.
48. On the functions of the Indian State see references cited in fra  
Chapter V II Section 3 f.n .3 *
ii. Contempt of Court by scandalising the Judges.
A foreign observer was keen enough to notice that the law 
on contempt of Court is  s tr ic te r  in  India than elsewhere.^ This is  
borne out by the cases decided on th is  point both by Indian^0 and
p 51
akistan High Courts where the Courts have been more keen to protect
the dignity of the judge than to look at the matter from the point of
52view of freedom of speech.
49. Grossman: Freedom of speech and expression in  India (1957) 
4 U.C.L.A.L.R. at p .64.
50. See for example the following High Court cases: Gulab Singh v P.M. 
A .I.R . 1950 A l l . 11 (F .B .); Kapur Singh v Jagat Narain  A .I.R . 1951 Punjab 
49; V.P. ▼ Bai.j Hath A .I.R . 1951 V.P. 14; Sukhdeo v B rij Bhushan A .I.R . 
1951~A11. 567; Rs Sudhir Chand A .I.R . 1952 Cal. 25B; Railway Magistrate
v Ra.j.ianlal A .I.R . 1952 M.B. 17<3 (rea lly  a case of contempt in  the face 
of the Court); State v E g"P of E. T. & P A .I.R . 1952 Orissa 318; 
Mahabir Prashad v State A .I.R . 1953 M.B. 60; State v Vikar Ahmed A .I.R .
1954 Hyd. 175; Legal Remembrancer A.I.R. 1955 ^at.135; State v Pursharti 
Gazette A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 736 (Punjab); State v"Sadhu Saran Singh A.I.R.
1955 N.U.C. 1866 ( P a t . ) ; State v Debi H eo iTA .I.R . 1955 N.U.C. 2868 jC a l) ; 
H.E.H.Nizam v B.G.Keskar A .I.R . 1955 Hyd. 264; £>tate v Rajeshwari Prashad 
A .I.R . 19&6 A l l . 588; State v Kulmani Singh A .I.R . I 966 A ll.  495; Adv.Gen. 
v Sashagiri Rao A .I.R . I 9&6 A.P. 167; State v Raghubar Sahai A .I.R . 1967 
A l l . 586; Adv.Gen. v Ramana Rao A .I.R . 1967 A.P. 299; B.K.Lala v R.C.Dutt 
A .I.R . 1967 Gal. 153; He Vinod Maheshwari A .I.R . 1967 M.P. 104; Adv.Gen
v Abbaraju ^amarao A. I.R . 1968 A.P. 207; Adv. Gen v Laxminarayan A .I.R .
1968 A.P. 370; Sher Singh v R.P.Kapur A .I.R . 1968 Punjab 217;(F .B .);
Sarat Chander vHSurendra A .I.R . 19o9~~Qrissa 117|> He Hiren Bose A .I.R . I 969 
Cal. 1 (S .B .); Abdul Jabbar v R.K.Karanjia A .I.R . 197Q Bom. 8^ .
51. See for example Snelson v Judges of High Court of Pakistan P.L.D.
1961 S.C. 237 (where the appellant had merely c ritic ised  the judgements 
of the Court in  a lecture and declared his in a b ility  to understand themd. 
More recently the Court has refused to make a d istinction  between the 
administrative and ju d ic ia l functions of the Court: Abdul Qayum v Chief 
Justice and Judges of the High Court of Pakistan P.L.D. 1971 S.C. 238;
Mohsin v Stefal  P.L.D. 1965 S.cT~~28; See also State v
Adam P.L.D. 1965 Kar.45 (where the statement was part of the application 
fo r transfer); State v Ezaz P.L.D. 1971 Lah. 445-
52. ^his is  guaranteed by the Constitution, though provision is  made
to protect the law in  the in terest of contempt of Court. See A rtic le  
1 9 (l)a  of the Constitution and read with A rtic le  19 (2 ). On the 
Constitutional aspects see the b rie f discussion by Seervai: (1967)
325-328.
Chief Justice Sikri has justified this on the ground that
the situation in India is peculiar, vaguely hinting that the status
oriented thinking of the Indian people necessitates that the Courts
53be accorded further protection. More recently Parliament has passed 
the Contempt of Courts Act (1971)» giving greater protection to the 
judges.^
55All this contrasts with the position in England and America.
56As early as 1900 it was suggested that the poster to punish for
scandalising the judges was obsolete. Although it has since been
57 58used in a couple of cases, it has generally fallen into disuse.
It is generally accepted that the power to prosecute for contempt as 
59a recent report suggests is limited to where the publication would
53* At a meeting at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, June 21 
1971 answering a question raised by the present writer.
54-. See the newspaper report:Contempt of Courts Bill Passed by the Lok 
Sabha Statesman Weekly Dec.25 1971*
55- On the position in England see generally Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law 
(1969) 14-16; Street: Freedom, the individual and the law (1971) 170-76; 
On the position in America see R.C.Donnely & R.Goldfarb: Contempt by 
Publication in the United States (1961) 24- Mod.L.R. 239•
56. See Mcleod v St. Aubyn (1899) A.C. 5^9; Contrast R v Pray (1900)
2 Q.B. 36 at 40. Both these cases are relied on by Hidayatullah C.J.
in B.M.S.Namboodripad v T.N.Namiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015 at pr.8 p.2018.
57. See R v New Statesman (1928) 4-4- T.L.R. 301; R v Colsey The Times 
May 9 1931 and see the comment (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 315-
58. See for example the latest judgement in R v Metropolitan Police 
Commr. exparte Blackburn (1968) 2 All.E.R. 319* See also the remarkable 
judgement in Craig v Harney (1947) 331 U.S. 367 where the person was not 
convicted even though he made adverse comments about the conscience
of the judge.
5§« See the Justice Report: Contempt of Court (i960) 14-16.
prejudice a trial, and the power to convict for Mscandalising” has 
been limited (as two cases from New Zealand and Canada suggest) to 
instances where the judges are accused of partiality and corruption.
The Supreme Court of India has decided ten important cases
62on contempt by scandalising; three of which involve direct allega­
tions of corruption,^ two concern allegations of class bias,^ two
make the general charge that the judge might hare been politically 
65motivated, one case involves the comments on a pending case by the
Chief Minister of a State which suggests that comments which interfere
66with justice may amount to a case of contempt by scandalising, and
67one suggests incompetence on the part of the judges. (
60. See for example Sheppard v Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333 where the judge 
and prosecuting attorney were fighting an election for judgeship and used 
the case before them as a platform; R v Savundranayagam (1968) 1 W.L.R.
I76I at 1765 where Lord Denning deprecated the extensive use of television 
interviews before a trial. Note that even in this area certain procedural 
limitations have been imposed, the innocent publisher protected and a 
right to appeal granted by Sec.11-13 of the Administration Act i960 
(commented on B.W.M.Downey (1961) 24 Mod.L.R. 261 at 263-4).
61. See R v Glanzer (1962) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 402 (per McRuer J.); Re Wiseman 
d969) N.Z.L.R. 55.
62. Ramakrishna Reddy v Madras A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 149; Ashwini Kumar v 
Arabinda Bose A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 75; Brahma Prakash v U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 
10; Hiralal Dixit v U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 743; B.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R.
1970 S.O. 1318; Re P.Sen A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1821; B.M.S.Namboodripad v 
T.N.Nambiyar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2013; Perspective Publications v Maharashtra 
A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 221; C.K.Paphtary v P.P.Gupta A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1132; 
hjnabandhu v Orissa A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 180. Note also the comments of N.G. 
Shelat (Retd. Judge); Contempt of Court (1972) 13 Guj.L.Rep. Jnl. 1-12 
taking an ambivalent attitude to the law on contempt, but defending the 
Suprement Court judgements.
63. Ramakrishna Reddy v Madras A.I.R. 1952 S.C. Ih9; Perspective Publi­
cations v Maharashtra AII.R. 1971 S.C. 221; C.K.Paphtary v P.P.Gupta A.I.R.
1971 S.C. 1132.
64. R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1318; B.M.S.Namboodripad v T.N. 
Nambiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015.
65. Hira Lai Dixit v U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 743; Brahma Prakash v U.P. 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 10.
66. Re P.Sen A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1821 at pr.8.
6 7 Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose- A.I.R* 1953 S;C; 75•
The judgements in cases where allegations of bribery and
corruption are made are quite clearly right, though one must have some
68reservations about the statement in C. K. Daphtary v 0. P. Gupta 
that to say that one particular judge ’’toed the line” was contempt.
69This is taking the protection of judges too far for, as we have shown,
the leading judgement writer plays a very dominant role and it would
be a mistake to punish any statement analysing the varying contributions
of the judges in particular cases. The statement made by the Court in
70this regard is much too wide and must be confined to its facts.
As regards other cases the Court was in the early fifties
willing to accept comment and criticism. As Mukherjea J. put it in
71Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose
”We would like to observe that it is not the practice of 
the Court to issue such rules except in very grave and serious 
cases and it is never over-sensitive to public criticism.”
But at the time the Court was quick enough to punish any attempt which
might undermine their status. Thus in Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose
the judges thought that the suggestion that politics and religion
have no place in the Courts of law was contempt. The Court said :
"It is obvious thqt if an impression is created in the 
minds of the public that the judges in the highest Court in 
the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, 
the confidence of the whole community is bound to be under­
mined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be 
imagined ... (;) where there is danger of great mischief 
being done in the matter of administration of justice, the 
animadversions
68. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1132 at pr.80 p.114-3 col.2.
69. See generally Chapters III and IV (supra) and Chapter VIII (infra).
70. We must remember that in this case the judgement writer was accused
of ’’toeing the line” under pressure from the senior judge with whom he 
formed the Bench.
cannot be ignored with equanimity." 72
73His lordship’s reliance on Ambard v Att.Gen. was unfortunate, for in
that case Lord Atkins condoned severe criticisms of the Courts’
nu
sentencing policy. Again in Hira Lai Dixit v U.P. Das J. held that
the suggestion that post-judicial appointments may tend to make the
Court pro-Government was contempt, even though it was made clear in the
impugned article that "this has so far not made any difference in the
firmness and justice of the Hon'ble judges." Indeed, if the tationale
of this judgement was strictly applied a large part of the 14th Report
75of the Law Commission would in fact be "contempt". The more recent 
unreported case Re ^asudeo Prashad*^ suggested that the Court is more 
willing to accept criticisms of the system of judicial administration 
from those entitled to make them.
77Again the decision in Brahma Prakash v U.P. which considered
the allegation that some magistrates were incompetent contrasts
unfavourably with the recent decision ofthe Court of appeal in R v
78Metropolitan Police Commr. exparte Blackburn which clearly laid down
that there was no contempt in the case even though the statements made
were inaccurate. The Supreme Court of India has found it difficult to
79distinguish the latter case.
72. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 75 at 76 col.l.
73. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141
74. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 743 at 7^.
75* 2!he Report makes a frank and critical assessment of the Indian
Judicial system.
76. drim.App.No.110 of i960 (decided May 31 1962) referred to in
E.M.S.Namboodripad v T.N.Nambiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015 at pr.10 p.2019*
77* A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 10 at 15-
78. (1968) 2 All.E.R. 319.
79. See E.M.S.Namboodripad v T.N.Nambiar A.I.R, 1970 S.C. 2015 at pr.7 •
p.2018.
More recently the Supreme Court has been criticised for 
assuming sin inegalitarian jr$ le while considering the import of the
I Ir^ U
Court’s interpretation of^fundamental right to property* The Court
has considered any attempt to describe its decisions as unfair, or
biased in favour of the middle class, as contempt. Tkus comments
80that the Bank Nationalisation case was wrongly decided and lowered 
the prestige of the judiciary was considered contempt of Court in
SiR.C.Cooper v Union. Hidayatullah J. went on to suggest that judges 
were less fallible than others and the fact that they play an overall 
arbitral role must not be overlooked :
”No one is more conscious of his limitations than a judge
but because of his training and the assistance that he gets 
from learned counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than
others* Further the supremacy of a legislature under a written
Constitution is only what is within its power but what is 
within its power and what is not, when any specific act is 
challenged, it is for the Courts to say. If that were realised 
much of the misunderstanding would be avoided and the organs of 
the government would function truly in theiybwn sphere.” 82
It appears that the Court wanted to-assert that its constitutional 
responsibility accords them a role at least co-equal with that of the 
legislature and the Court would expect the respect due to them con­
comitant with that position :
"Respect is expected not only from those to whom the judgement 
of the Court is acceptable but also from those to whom it is 
repugnant.” 83
The picture that emerges is very much that of a feudal landlord
extracting tribute from his serfs and punishing any criticism as an
indiscretion.
80. Discussed supra, Chapter III, as R.C.Cooper v Union A.I.R. I>9?0 S.C.S~t>Lf
81. A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 1318.
82. Ibid at pr.6 p.1320.
83. Ibid at pr.6 p.1321.
r-r r* /,
By far the most interesting example of self protection is
84 /£» M. S. Namboddripad v T. N. Nambiyar where the appellant (a
Marxist Chief Minister from Kerala) was accused of contempt because
he said that it was clear from Marxist principles that Courts in
India suffered from class bias. The actual decision in this case
85that this was contempt has been supported and is in accord with an
86Australian decision on the same point. But what is significant is 
that Hidayatullah C.J. went out of his way to make a rough-and-ready 
summary of the doctrines of Marxism to show that even Marxism believes
87in the independence of the judiciary in a bourgeois state. The Court
actually reducedthe fine of the appellant because they had exposed his
error about Marxism. It appears that the Court went out of its way to
89display its knowledge of Marxism because the counsel for the appellants
’’sneered that many people learn about Marxism through Middleton 
Murray I” 90
This lecture on Marxism can be justified on the grounds that the Court 
was willing to condone a bona fide error, but there is nothing in the 
judgement that suggests this. The judgement suggests that the Court 
wanted to avoid the charge of ignorance as well as bias. Indeed the
tone of the judgement suggests that the Court occupies an important
91 . .position in the democratic setup and is not willing to accept xnticism
84.. A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 2015.
85. Seervai: Supreme Court and Contempt of Court (1971) 73 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 
5* But note that he too deprecates the Court’s general lecture on Marxism.
86. Dunbanin (1935) 53 C.L.R. 434. Note particularly Rich J. at 442-3>
87. A.I.R. 1970 B.C. 2015 at pp.2019-2023.
88. Ibid at pr.34 p.202$-5*
89. See supra f.n.87.
90. Ibid at pr.27 p .2023.
91. Ibid at pr.30 p.2023-4.
"which is calculated to aise in the riLnds of the people a 
general dissatisfaction with and distrust of all judicial 
decisions." 92
93Some aspects of Hidayatullah J. s comments on Marxism axe incomplete, 
and as the appellant himself has shown, the general comments made ai 
the position of the judfees in Marxist theory are clearly misleading.
The Court’s effort to acquire theoretical respectability was hardly 
necessary and reflects on the Court’s desire to extract respect even 
from left-wing politicians. It would seem that the Court underrated 
the complexities of the criminal-law aspect of the problem, and con­
sidered the importance of critical ©mmentary as a means to develop the
95law, only in passing. Hidayatullah J. suggests that the Indian
Supreme Court’s position is like that of the American Supreme Court
„ 96 97
during the New Deal, but despite his briedt approval of American law
clearly ignores the feet that in America the "clear and present danger"
98applied to this area.
The Court’s desire to justify its decision by appealing to 
the principles of Marxism and its awareness <£ them, is really yet 
another indication of the fact that status-oriented thinking is an 
important part cf the Court’s jurisprudence while considering the
92. Ibidat pr.31 p.2024.
93* Ibid at pr.l6 p.2020 where his lordship tries to sum up the whole of
3 volumes of Das Kapital in one paragraph without even analysing the
Marxist theory of cycles and crisis. Again Marx’s theory of alienation 
has been ilearly ignored altogether, although it is an important com­
ponent of Marxism.
94. See Namboodripad’s letter (1971) K.L.T. Jnl. 2-6.
95* A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015 at pr.ll p.2019; at pr.32 p.2024.
96. Ibid at p%30 p.2024.
97. Ibid at pr.12 p.2019.
98. See the articles cited f.n.55 supan. |p 9
offence of scandalising the judges. The fact that the Court believes 
that the Constitution has assigned to it sin important role has given 
further stimulus to its view. The result is that the importance of 
criticial comment in developing the law is overlooked. One always 
regrets that in contempt cases the maxim "nemo judicet in causa sua" 
("a man must not be a judge in his own cause") is peculiarly difficult 
to observe. Hence most Courts are exceptionally careful to rest 
their decisions on objective criteria. These decisions are clearly 
policy decisions and one cannot help thinking that the remark 
"others abide our question, thou art free" may well have been true of 
Shakespeare, but it is certainly not true of the Supreme Court and 
ought not to be so.
iii. State privilege as to documents 
a. Background to the problem.
The relationship between the judiciary and other arms of 
the State can be viewed from yet another angle., viz. its attitude to 
Official Secrecy in procedural matters. In addition to discussing the 
general problem of Official Secrecy we shall make an extended analysis 
of the Supreme Court decision on the subject, because it is an excel­
lent example of statutory interpretation in India and the manner in 
which different judges selectively use precedent to suit their own 
purposes.
The problem of Official Secrecy has aroused great interest
99 100in England amongst lawyers as well as the Government* The
problem of Crown privilege has also received a lot of attention,^”
so much so that the Law Reform Committee on Privilege in Civil
102
Proceedings thought that it should be the subject of a special report.
10"z
More recently, in Conway v Riinner, the House of Lords 
upset a long line of authority which culminated in
99* See D.G.T. Williams : Not in the Public Interest (1965); «*•
Wiggins : Freedom or Secrecy (19(>4 - revised edn.) ; Street : Freedom, 
the individual and the law 11971) Chapter 8; Williams : Official 
Secrecy in England (1968) 3 Fed. L. R* 20.
100. See e.g. Grigg Report on Departmental records (1954) Cmnd. 9163; 
Radcliffe Report on Security Procedures in the Public Service (1962)
Cmns. l68l; Report of Privy Councillors on "D" notices (1967) Cmnd. 3309; 
White Paper on the "D" notice system (1967) Cmnd. 3312; Statement of
the findings of Privy Councillors on security (1956) Cmnd. 9715;
Report of Privy Councillors on the interception of communication (1957) 
Cmnd. 283; Reports of the Security Commission Cmnd. 2722 of 1965;
3151 of 1961; 3365 of 1967. A good deal of the controversy has 
centred upon the Official Secrets Acts, which have been described 
by an M.P. and ex-Minister as a "refuge for incompetence" (see Hugh 
Fraser^ article in The Times Nov. 171 1970 p.10); a view which 
received endorsement from academic quarters (see the Letter of Prof.
H. Thomas: The Times Nov. 21 1970) although evoking a corresponding 
protest from a civil servant (The Times Nov. 24, 1970). One of the 
main obstacles of reform, as the former Attorney General Sir Elwyn 
Jones suggests, is that the matter cannot be left to the Courts since 
"the public interest cannot be properly decided by a judge." (quoted 
in Fraser1s article supra)
101. e.g. D.H.Clark : Administrative Control of Judicial Action ...
(1967) 30 Mod.L.R. 489; de Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action (1969) Appendix III.
102. (1967) Cmnd. 3472 at pr. 7-
103. (1968) 1 All. E.R 874.
104the "Thetis11 case and ruled that the Court could examine the docu-
105ment fo r i t s e l f  and see i f  the claim for privilege was ju s tifie d .
There is  a tenuous lin e  of authority which suggests that the 
Courts do have the power to enquire whether the document fo r which
104. (1942) A.C. 624. The long line of authority includes R v Watson 
(1817) 2 Stark 116; Home v Bentinck (1820) 129 E.R. 907; £arl v Vass 
(1822) 1 Sh.Sc.App. 229; Homer v Ashford (1825) 3~‘Brig. 522; Smith v 
East India Co. (1841) 1 Ph. 50; Wadeer v East India Co. (1856) 4 W.R.
421; Beatson v Skene (i860) 157 E.R. 1415 (note the dissent of Martin B.);
H.M.S. Bellerophon (1874) 44 L.J.Adm. 5» Hennessy v Wright (1888) 21 
Q.B.D. 509; Hughes v Vargas (1893)"9 T.L.R. 551; Chatterton v Secy of 
State for India (1895) 2 Q.B. 189; Re Joseph Hargreaves (1900) 1 Ch.
"67^ ,; but the point on privilege is mentioned only at 20 T.L.R. 258; 
Williams v Star Newspaper Ltd. (1908) 24 T.L.R. 297 (though here the 
Court appears to have said that prison reports ought to be produced);
West v West (1911) 27 T.L.R. 189 (refusal of the Lord Chamberlain to 
answer a question, upheld); Ronnfeldt v Phillips (1918) 34 T.L.R. 556; 
Anthony v Anthony (1919) 55 T.L.R. 559; Ankin v L.N.E.Rly (l930T 1 K.B. 
527 (where despite the statutory mandate that railway companies must 
report accidents, Scrutton L.J. did not order the documents to be 
produced); Ellis v Home Office (1955) 2 Q.B. 135 (note Devlin J.'s
plea that the powers of the Court be increased. We must note however
that in Conway v Rimner Reid L.J. said of the earlier cases that
"most if not all" dealt with matters which were "political or at 
least of a more important character than ordinary routine reports". 
Moreover in some cases evidence as to the contents of the documents 
was allowed. See for example Williams v Star Newspapers (supra);
Anthony v Anthony (supra), though in some cases even this was 
objected to successfully (e.g. West v West (supra); Chatterton v 
Secy of State for India (supra )TI
105. In Conway v Rimner No. 2 (1968) 2 All.E.R. 304 the Court held
that the claim for privilege was not justified.
106privilege is requested is connected with affairs of state. But this
line of authority is less definite that the Scottish line of cases
which allow the Court to examine a document for itself to see if the
107
claim was justified. The position is the same in America even
though the leading case on the subject in America is a wartime case 
like the Thetis case. We have set out the case law on the subject
clearly to show the selective referencing of the Indian judges.
The Indian law on the subject is contained in Sections 123 
and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 ;
106. Note the dissent of Martin B. in Beatson vSk^e, (supra f.n.104) 
where even Pollock C.B. admitted that Martin B. could have been right 
(on this see the comments of Morris L.J. in ^onwav v Rimner (1968)
1 All. E.R. 874 at 893-6); Stace v Griffith '(1869)' L.R. 2~.C. 420, 
where Lord Chelmsford said that the trial judge ought to have considered 
whether the document was official or not; Kain v Farrer (1877) 37 B.L.R. 
469 where Grove J. ordered a further affidavit from the Admiralty; 
Hennessy v Wright (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 309 where Field J. made an obiter 
observation that he had the power to call up the documents for inspec­
tion (Note how in Union v S.S.Singh A.I.R. I96I S.C. 493 different 
judges make different uses of this case - e.g. Gajendradkar J. at 
pr«39 p«510; Kapur J. at pr.75 p«523); Marks v Beyfus (1890) 23 Q.B.D. 
494 (names of informants - note Esher M.R.'s view that the rule about 
state privilege could be departed from); Re Joseph Sargreaves (supra 
f.n.104) where Lindley M.R. reserved comment on the extent of the power; 
Leigh v Gladstone (1909) 26 T.L .R. 139 (reports by medical officer on 
forced feeding in prisons not privileged but note the comments of 
Mofris D.J; in Conway’s case (1968) 1 All.E.R. 874 at 899); Asiatic 
Petroleum Oq. v An^lo Iranian Co. Ltd*. (1916) 1 K.B. 822 where 
Scrutton L.J. inspected some documents, but note the same judge's 
observations in Ankin's case (supra f.n.104); Robinson ▼ State of 
Australia A.I.R. 1931 P«C. 274; Spiegelman v Hocker (1933) 30 T.L.R. 87; 
For criticisms of the rule see Devlin J. in Ellis v Home Dffice (supra 
f.n. 104); Merrick v Nott Bower (1965) 1 Q.B. 37; Wednesbury Corpn. v 
Minister of Housing & Local Government (1965) 1 W.L.R. 2(>1; Re Grosvenor 
Hotel No. 2 (1963) Chn. 1210.
107* See Glasgow Corpn. v Central ^and Board (1956) S.C. (H.L.) 1 
reconciling Earl v Vass (1822) (supra f.n.104) and Admiralty Commr. v 
Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. (1909) S.C. 335 with the main 
stream of Scottish law.
108. U.S. v Reynolds (1952) 345 U.S. 1 (per Vinson C.J.).
? 0
"Sec.123. No one shall be permitted to give any evidence 
derived from any unpublished official records relating to any 
affairs of state except with the permission of the Officer at 
the head of the Department concerned, who shall give or with­
hold such information as he thinks fit.*’
Sec.162 "A witness summoned to produce a document shall if it 
is in his possession and power bring it to Court, notwithstanding 
any objection which there may be to its production or to its 
admissability. The validity of any such objection shall be 
decided on by the Court.
The Court if it sees fit may inspect the document, unless it 
refers to matters of state or to take evidence to enable it 
to determine on its admissability."
The controversy has centred upon the last phrase in Section 162 and
the extent.to which the Court can take evidence on the contents of
the documents. Courts in India tend to rely on the wording of the
109Act rather than English law. Thus in V. Chettiar v S. Chettiar
(1908),1^° privilege was claimed for an Income Taxx statement; the
Court followed the Act rather than Re Joseph Hargreaves'^ ^  on the
same subject. But the conservative English attitude protecting Crown
privilege seems to have seeped through as can be seen from two notable
112cases. The first of these cases, V. S. Irwin v D. J. Reid, was
later dissented from in Ijat Ali v K. E.,^^ and the second, Nazir 
ll^ fAhmad v K. E., was also later dissented from in a case from E$st 
115Punjab. There are a lot of cases where the Courts have not accepted
109* See Sarkar on Evidence (1953 Edn.) 1026-103^.
i
110. (1908) 32 Mad. 62.
111. (1900) 1 Ch. 3^7- But note that the Court did rely on the English 
[ case of Lee v Birrel 3 Camp. 337*
| 112* A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 282
H3. A.I.R. 19^3 Cal. 539.
1U. (1945) 26 Lafr. 219.
115. G. G. v Peer Mohd. A.I.R. 1950 E»P. 228.
the plea of privilege. Equally, there are also a large number of
cases where the claim for privilege was allowed, covering a large
variety of circumstances from telegram cables, matters under the Sea
117Customs Act and cases on promotion. Conway v Rimner has been 
generally ignored except in two cases.
116. Most of the examples are taken from after 1950 after the promul­
gation of the Constitution. See R.M.D.Chamarbangwala v Y.K.Papria 
A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 230; G.G. v Peer Mohd. A.I.R. 1950 E.P. 228; Apparao v 
Syryaprakash (1951) 1 M.L.J. 526; Debajyoti v Dr. Nalinakshya A.I.R.
1954 Cal* 210; flirath Ram v H.H.Govt. of J.K. A.I.R. 1934 J.K. 115 
Ajit Singh v Ashwini Kumar A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 1011 (Punjab per Kapur J.); 
R.S.Anand v P.P. A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 2769 (All.); Public Prosecutor v 
Vetnkatanarsayya A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 466; Krishna Nandan v State fl.I.R. 1958 
feat. 166 (but Sahai J. hoped that the privilege would not be claimed in 
future); Ramchandra v Alagirswami A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 450; Union v Indra 
Deo A.I.RT“l963 *at 129 on appeal A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1118; Union v S.Kumar 
A.I.R. 1963 Orissa 111; Kalliath v Kerala A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 274; Union 
v Raj Kumar A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 387; H.S.Bande v State A.I.R. 1967 Bom.
174 {about a Conciliator*s report); Suryamani v State A.I.R. 1967 
Orissa 189; Excelsior Film Exch. v ^nion A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 322; Joti 
Prashad v Addl. Civil Judge A.I.R. 19&& All. 42; Naranjan v State 
A.I.R. 1968 Punj. 255; Ramasrinivasan v Shanmughan A.I.R. 1970 Mad.373; 
Kotah Match Factory v State A.I.R. 1970 Paj. 118.
117* See for example Iqbal Ahmad v Bhopal A.I;R. 1954 Bhop. 9 (arrest 
and documents connected with it); Madras v B.H.Battaki A.I.R. 1954 
Mad. 926 (on what is ’’head of department” see prs. 7 and 6 for English 
decisions); Re Suryanarayana A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 278 (a case of Black- 
marketing); R v Sultan Ahmad A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 6154 (a Pakistan case 
on proceedings against a clerical cadre subordinate); Krishna Nandan 
v State A.I.R. 1953 Pat. l66; E.B.Souza v J.K.Souza A.I.R. 1958 Cal.TO 
(knowledge based on privileged document not admissible); Harbhajan 
Singh v Punjab A.I.R. I96I Punj. 2l£ (involving a former Chief Minister’s 
son). American decisions that an acquittal should be granted where the 
Government claims privilege were not accepted; Firm Mohiuddin v J.K. 
A.I.R. 1961 J.K. 21 (involving commercial activities); S.B.Chowdhry v
l.PLChangkati A.I.R. I960 Assam 210 (Mehrotra J. considering a large 
amount of case law); H.P.Gupta v U.P. A.I.R. 1963 All. 415; Ganga Ram 
v Union A.I.R. 1964 Pat, kkk; Pulin Behari v State A.I.R. 1965 Tripura 
33 (an inconclusive case on the meaning of "head of department”0;
V.Dasan v Kerala A.I.R. 19&3 Ker. 63; G.Subha Rao v K.B.Reddy A.I.R. 19&7 
A.P. 155 (on anelection matter); Lakshmandass v State A.I.R. 19^ BomT~ 
4X) (on Sea Customs Act and cables received by the Government); H.Rodney 
v Delhi Admin. A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 247 (promotion);
118. Ram Srinivar v Shanmughan A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 378; R. Ramanna v State 
A.I.R. 1971 A.P. 197 at 205-6, 209.
119b. Union of India v S. S. Singh
The Supreme Court first considered the problem in S. S. Singh*s
120
case which has been followed by all Courts including the Supreme Court,
thought there is a notable Punjab case where the Court took a common-
sense view of the problem and refused to allow the claim for privilege
to camouflage official misconduct.121
S. S. Singh*s case is a curious case. To begin with the
arguments of another case from Bombay were transferred to this case,
the Bombay case having been decided by consent. The Bombay counsel
(Mr. H. M. Seervai) was thus able to play the role of •’intervener’1
122and present a wideir view of the problem. Secondly, we must not
forget that the plea for privilege was in fact made with respect to
the proceedings of the "PEPSU" cabinet and the Report of the Public
Service Commission about the removal of a District and Sessions judge.
The three judgements took up different stands. Gajendragadkar J.
(for Sinha C.J. and Wanchoo J.) felt that the Courts had the power to
enquire whether the documents were official or not and take evidence to
that effect. Kapur J. stuck to the orthodox English view and denied
123
the right to take evidence, and Subba Rao J. felt that the only
119* &.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493* For comments see S.Rajgopalan: (1963) Lawyer 
l8l at 18(3-187. The atticle characteristically discusses English law 
rather than Indian; The Law Reform Group: The law regarding privileged 
documents and communications made in official confidence (1966) 68 Bom. 
L.R. Jnl. 82-88.
120. See Union v Indra Deo A.I.R. 196^ S.C. 1118; Amarchand v Union 
A.I.R. 196*1- S.C. 1158; Sub.Div.Off. v Srinivas A.I.R. 1966 S.C. Il6*f; 
Hussain Umar v Dalip Singhji A.I.R. 1970 S.C. W? (where no case law is 
cited at all).
121. Niranjan Das v State A.I.R. 1968 Punj. 235 at pr.28.
122. On intergeners generally see supra Chapter II Section 5* la the 
instant case the contribution of Mr. Seervai is indicated by Gajendragadkar J 
at prs. 5i 8, 10-11.
’’limitation on the Court was that they could not inspect the document.
But what makes these conclusions interesting is that all the judges rely
125
on English law and Common law categories.
Gajendragafikar J. realised that the law in India was different
126bcause of the provisions of Section 162 and relied on Indian case.law.
He stressed that the Courts had to be vigilant in view of the extending
powers of the State but at the same time took care to justify the”Thetis”
127case and soften the effect of Rohinson v Minister (a case from
Australia) where the ^rivy Council had given wider powers to the Court.
His reference to English law is therefore selective. He emphasised the
123
statutory reason for the decision in Smith v East India Co., stressed
129Martin B.’s dissent in Beatson v Skepe , mentioned thatoLord Thankerton
and Lord Russell of Killowen were party to both the ’’Thetis” case as well
as Hobinson1s case,^^ read Devlin J.’s reservations about the existing
131state of law in Ellis v Home Office with Field J.’s obiter in
132 133Hennessy v Wright (which really went the other way), Asiatic
132f
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Anglo Persian Oil Co. Ltd. and Spiegelman g 
124-. Ibid at pr.97 p.528.
125. See Gajendragadkar J. at prs. 33-8 pp.507-510; Kapur J. at pr.71 
pp.522-3; Subba Rao J. (summary paragraph) pr.105 pp.531-2.
126. Ibid at pr.28 p.506; see also pr.31 p.50^
127. Ibid at pr.36 p.509. Note also the reference to C.K.Allen: Law and
orders (2d.) 374- f.n.5a.
128. (1841) 41 E.R. 550. Ibid at pr.7 p.4-99- Note that the references to 
the cases cited in the text are given in earlier footnotes.
129. Ibid at pr.9 p.500«
130. Ibid at pr.32 p.507.
131. Ibid at pr.39 p.510.
132. Ibid at pr.39 p.510.
133. Note that ffnthony v Anthony (supra f.n.104) follows Hennessy v
Wright as supporting the claim forprivileges............................
134. Ibid at pr.39 p.510.
135v Hocker, and took care to mention that the two Indian decisions 
that had followed the strict English law had themselves been over­
ruled.^^ It is clear from his lordship’s analysis of Glasgow v 
137Centred. Board that he was trying to find a compromise solution
from the English case law, while at the same time trying to make
it appear consistent.
Kapur J. however stuck to the orthodox English position and
even observed :
’’The correct way of looking at the Indian statute ... is to 
interpret it in the manner which is in accord with the English law
i.e. the Court has not the power to override ministerial certifi­
cate against production.” 138
But his references to the English cases also selective. He thus
139quotes from Lord Kinnear in Admiralty Commr. v Aberdeen Steam Trawling Co.
140and Eldon L.C. in Earl v Vass but omits to mention the treatment
141that those cases got in Glasgow Corpn. v Central Land Board. Again
142he quotes Isaacs J. in Marconi Wireless Co. v Comm. overlooking the
. 143
different interpretation <tzfr that case in Robinson’s case. He wants
135* Ib id  a t pr.39 p.510-11
136. Ibid at prs. 29-30 pp.506-7* The decisions in question are discussed 
in the text correspnding to f.n. 112-115-
137. Ibid at pr.38 p.509-11.
138. Ibid at pr.84 p.525* We can see from our references (supra f.n. 104* 
106) that the English law on the subject was slightly unsettled. See 
further Whitley Stokes: I Anglo-Indian Codes XXVI-XXVTI For the tra­
ditional nature of public documents see Thakur : Hindu law of Evidence 
(1933 Calcutta) 1201 ff.
139* Ibid at pr.55 p.515•
140. Ibid at pr.57 p.516.
141. (1956) S.C. (H.L.).
142. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493 at pr.56 p.516.
143- See A.I.R. 1931 P.O. 274 at 258 col.2.
to protect the public interest at all costs and quotes the flowery
144language of English judges to sustain his point of view. The
difference of approach between the two judges can be seen from the
difference of approach that they adopt to, for example, R. M. D.
145Chambarabaugwala v Y. R. Papria, Public Prosecutor v Venkatta
146 147 148
Narsayya, W. S. Irwin v D. J. Reid, Ijat Ali v K. E.t
Naair Ahmad v B. E.,^ -^  Home v Bentinck,^^ Smith v Eadb India Co.,^*
152 153 154
Beatson v Skeane, Hennessy v Wright, Robinson’s case, Asiatic
Petroleum ^o. Ltd, v Anglo Persian Oil Co.,'^* the nThetis” case,^^
Ellis v Home Office the Glasgow Corpn. case,^^ We will also
144. Ibid at pr.£8 p.517 (quoting Pollock C.B. in Beatson v Skeane); at 
pr.60 p.517 (quoting Best C.J. in Homer ▼ Ashford 7l&25) 130 E.R. 557); 
see also pr.64(S) p.519-20.
145- A.I.R. 1950 Bom, 122; Gajendragadkar J. at pr.28 p.506; Kapur J. at 
pr.77 p.524. Hereafter Kapur and Gajendragadkar JJ will be referred to 
as K. and G. respectively•
146. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 486; G, at pr.28 p.506; K. at pr.8l p.525»
147* A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 282; G. at pr.29 p.506; K. at pr.75 P*523.
148. A.I.R. 1943 Cal. 559; G. at pr.29 p-506.
149. A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 434; G. at pr.30 p.506-7; K. at pr.76 p.523.
150. (1820) 129 E.R. 907; G. at pr.6 p.499; K. at pr-57 p-517-
151. (1841) 41 E.R. 550; G. at pr.6 p.499; K. at pr.59 p*517.
152. (i860) 157 E.R. 1415; 0. at pr.28 p.506 and pr.8 p.499-500; K at
pr.58 p.517.
153. (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 509; G. at pr.39 p-510; K. at pr.75 p.523.
154. G. at 507; K. at pr.77*
155. (1916) 1 K.B. 822; G. at pr.39 p.510; K. at pr.62 p.5l8.
156. G. at pr.34-5 pp.508-9; K. at pr.68 p.522.
157. (1953) 2 All.E.R. 149; 0. at pr.39 p.510; K. at pr.69 p.522. G. uses 
the case to illustrate a trend, K. kerely mentions that there was a note 
of dissatisfaction.
158. G. at pr.38 p.510; K. at pr.56-7 PP-518-7*
159notice that Kapur J. does not cite Spiegelman v Hocker and that
Gajendragadkar J. does not cite many English’* ^  and Indian”*’^ ’ cases
which Kapur J. cites to defend his orthodox position. Equally Kapur J.
l62does not cite some cases relied upon by Gajendragadkar J. We can
165see from our earlier classification of case law how selective the
choice of case law has been.
The third judge, Subba Rao J., quite clearly wanted to
164maximise the Courts power as much as the statute permitted. He
165therefore openly criticises the "Thetis11 case and reads the Glasgow
Corpn. case, Robinson1s case, together irith a host of Indian cases, to
166suggest that the powers of the Court are similar in India. His
159• at pr.39 p.510.
160. R v Hardy (179*0 24 St.T 1099 (at pr.64(a)); R v Watson (1817) 2 
Stark 116 (at ibid); Homer v Ashford ( at pr.60); Wadeer v East India 
Co. (1836) 4 W.R. 421 (at pr.58); Dickson v Earl of Witten (1839) 175 
E.R. 790 (at pr.58); Stace v Griffith (l8£>9) 16 E.R. 633; H.M.S.Bellerophon 
7 W 4 ) ;  Morris v Edwards (I89Q) 5 A.C. 309; Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 
Q5B.D. 494; Hughes y Vargas (1893) 9 T.L.R. 551; Griffin v South Australia 
(1925) 38 C.L.R. 378 - Note that the last 6 cases are all cited at pr.64(a). 
Mackintosh v Dun (1908) A.C. 390 (at pr.60); Marconi Wireless case (1913) 
l T c Z  .R. 178 (at prs. 58 and 65); some of the Scottish cases at prs.63 
and 69 and Auten v Rayner (1958) 3 All.E.R. 586 at pr.70.
161. Tilkav State A.I.R. 1957 All. 493 (at pr.83); Jehangir v Secy of 
State (1904) 6 Bom.L.R. 131 (at pr.75); Re Mantubhai Mehta A.I.R. 1945 
Bom. 122 (at pr.77); I.M.Lal v Secy of State A.I.R. 1944 Lafe. 209 (at 
pr.76); Bhaiya Sahib v Ram Hath A.I.R. 1938^Hag^35^ (at prl54 an4 80); 
Lakhuram v Union A.I.R. 1980 Pat. 192 (at pr.82).
162. e.g. G.G. v Peer Mohd. A.I.R. 1950 E.P. 228 (at prs. 28 , 30, *<0 - 
note that Kapur J. wrote a judgement in this case); Kaliappa v K.E. A.I.R. 
I937 Mad. 492 (at pr.28).
163. See supra f.n. 104, 106, 116, 117.
164. See A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493 at pr.94-5 P-527; pr.100 p.529; pr.104 p.531*
165. Proposition 4 at pr.105 pp.531-2.
166. At pr.100.
selection of case law is very confused and one is tempted to query the
1
huddling together of I.iat Ali*s case with Nazir Ahmad1 s case. But
the inspiration behind Subba Eao J. is not the belief that official
secrecy is incompatible with democracy, but rather the pique that a
168judge cannot look at what the lowest-in-the-cadre clerk can. But
yet we are offered no reason why judges are more suited for deciding
169matters of public interest.
What is amazing about the attitude of all the judges is that
they are all happy to regard the problem before them as a typical
English law problem and it almost appears as if they were looking at
170an English law problem ip. the abstract. We find no discussion about 
the problem of Official Secrecy and still less about Indian democracy 
and the possible repercussions that might ensue if the administration 
were called upon to be more frank in their disclosures. This may have 
been the underlying assumption behind both Kapur and Gajendragadkar 
JJ.’s judgements, but this assumption never comes to the surface. We 
are forced to admit that, despite the Court*s general belief in 
democracy and freedom, in fact it was unable to assume a consistent 
theoretical position about the importance of frankness in an adminis­
tration, received its inspiration almost solely from English legal 
thinking and was content with accepting one of the varied solutions 
profferred by English case law.
167* at prs. 98-9 pp.528-9.
168. at pr.100 p.529.
169. Note the statement of Sir Elwyn Jones in f.n.100 that judges are 
not suited for deciding such problems.
170. See Gajendragadkar J. at prs. 14-16; Subba Hao J. at pr.100; 
Kapur J. almost openly admits this at pr.84.
iv. Golak Nath v Punjab - a doctrinaire decision*
In direct contrast to the Court’s views on Obscenity,
Contempt of Court and Official Secrecy, is its judgement in
171Golak Nath v Punjab, where the Court held by a 6 : 5 majority that
the rights contained in Part III of the Constitution are so fundamental
that they cannot be amended by Parliament and a special Constituent
Assembly would have to be convened to make alterations in that Part*
172This decision has raised a great controversy}. a very few jurists
171. A.I.R, 1967 s.c* 164-3 •
172. A.R.Blackshield: Fundamental rights and the economic viability of the 
Indian Nation (1968) 10 fl.I.L.I. 1-120, 183-240; P.R.Baldota: Amendability 
of Fundamental Rights (1968) 70 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 84; P.S.Chaudhri: The Golak 
Nath Case - a critical appraisal A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 90; Ibid: Amendability 
of the Constitution A.I.R. 1967 Jnl* 146-9; C.V.Ramanajachari: Some obser­
vations on the criticisms of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Golak Nath’s 
case (1967) 2 M.L.J. Jnl. 34; S.M.Kumaramanglam: The power of Parliament 
to amend the Constitution (1967) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 47; K.L.Gauba: The Supreme 
Court and Fundamental Rights A.I.R. 1967 Jnl7 84-5; K.V.Kurikose: Consti­
tutional amendment in India (1968) K.L.T. Jnl. 27; C.K.Paphfcary: Is right 
to property fundamental (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. Jnl. 9 (not really directly in 
point, but a useful statement of attitudes); R.S.Gae: Amendment of Funda­
mental Rights (1967) 9 J.I.L.I. 475; U.N.Gupta: Constitutional paramountcy 
of Fundamental Rights (1969) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 43; V.K.K.Iyer in Law College 
Magazine Ernakulam as reviewed in A.I.R. 1971 Jnl. 22-3 (critical of the 
judgement from a political and economic point of view); D.P.Mohanty: The 
procedure for Constitutional Amendment in the Commonwealth (1968) S.C.D. 
Jnl. 67; see also ibid (1969) 11 J.I.L.I. 87; V.S.Mani: Constitutional 
Amendment and Fundamental Rights (1968) S.C.D. Jnl. 8 = Cut.L.T. Jnl. 3» 
P.B.Mukharji: Critical Problems in the Indian Constitution (1968) 188; 
M.K.Nambiyar: Amending the fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution 
(1969) Law. 6l; G.S.Pande: Parliament&s power to abridge Fundamental 
Rights (197O) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 53; K.B.PadiaP Golak Nath v State of Pun.iab - 
an erroneous ruling A.I.R. 1968 Jnl. 138; S.K.Patil\: Times of India
Dec. 25, 1968 (a politician praising the decision); MV.B.R.”: Amendment 
of the Constitutional provisions relating to Fundamental Rights A.I.R.
1967 Jnl. 146; N.Ram: Can Parliament amend Fundamental Rights (1969)
Law. 31; S.V.Ramanna: Judicial review and the Supreme Court of India 
A.I.R. 1969 Jnl. 122; 130 esp. at 122 col.2 and 130; M.D.Vidwans: A plea 
for Constitutional Amendment A.I.R* 1968 Jnl. 63. M.Imam: The Indian 
Supreme Court and the Constitution (I966 Delhi) 321-45; Merrillat: Land 
and the Constitution (197Q$o^bay) Chapter 11; Seervai: (1967) Chapter 30* 
Note: An exhaustive study of the problem was made by S.P.Sathe: Fundamental 
Rights and the Amendment of the Indian Constitution (1968 Bombay); Ibida. 
Amendability of of Fundamental Rights (1969) 1 S.C.J. Jnl. 33; Ibid:
Supreme Court, Parliament and Constitution (1971) VI Economic and Political 
Weekly 1821-8, 1873-9.
9173have welcomed it, while others have argued that it is technically
17 if. 175
incorrect or that it is a bad policy decision.
176
The majority of the Court argued that an Act amending the
Constitution is a ’'law” within the meaning of Article 13 and its
validity must be determined by the very Fundamental Rights which it 
1 7 7
purports to amend. At the same time it was asserted that Article 368
which contains the procedure for amendment is merely procedural in
nature and that it does not grant a "power to amend", which since it
was not contained in the legislative lists must lie not in Parliament
but in a hypothetical Constituent Assembly which in turn would be
178constituted by Parliament under its residuary power. The majority 
dearly stated that they believed that Fundamental Rights were 
"sacrosanct" and that there were certain "implied limitations" which 
they had to infer when considering what would otherwise be a virtually
179
uncontrolled power of amendment. It is clear from the Constituent
173» e.g. Blackshield (supra f.n. 172); see more recently M.C.G.Kagzis 
Unamendability of a Bill of Rights - a norm of Indian Constitutional 
Jurisprudence (1971) Public Law 203 who makes the wholly absurd suggestion 
that changes in Fundamental Rights should normally require a Constitutional 
referendum forgetting that issues tend to get diffused in an election or 
referendum. Note also the comments of T.K.Tope: in his contribution to 
M.B.Mujumdar (Ed.) Principal Pandit l*aw and Legal Education (1972 Poona)
71 as well as the contribution'of M.B.Mujumdar at Sd ff.
174. The best example of this is Seervai (supra f.n.172).
175. See on this S.P.Sathe (supra f.n.172).
176. Subba Rao C.J. read the judgement for Shah, Sikri, Shelat and 
Vaidialingam JJ. Hidayatullah J. read a separate supporting judgement.
Note Subba Rao1 s justification of his judgement in Man and Society (1971) 
51-4.
177. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643-
178. Ibid at pr.55 p.1670 (per Subba Rao C.J.); pr.163 p.1705 pr.196 
proposition (v); p.1718 (per Hidayatullah J.) contra pr.270 p.1737 (per 
Raraaswami J.).
179* Ibid at pr.22 p.1657 (per Subba Rao C.J.); pr.163 p.1704-5 (per 
Hidayatullah J.) contra Wanchoo J. at pr.77 p.1675-6.
Assembly Debates that the Assembly first expressly, and later 
l8limpliedly, made it clear that there was no restriction on the
iUs
power to amend Fundamental Eights, Thus»argument is a creation of
the majority in the Court.
We have already shown that the curious twist given by
the Supreme Court to the doctrine of prospective overruling makes
Golak ^ath* s case really some kind of threat against a possible
hypothetical exercise of the power of amendment. The majority in the
Court were in the position of being aware that their lecture to
Parliament on good constitutional behaviour could not really cause any
real damage. Golak Nath/s case was virtually a confrontation between
the "lawyer judges" of tfcre Court (who formed the majority) and the
Civil Service judges, all three of whom led the minority of five and
183wrote two of the three minority judgements. Wanchoo J. (the leading 
minority judge) rightly pointed out that the most important consideration 
that Parliament, if it had a comfortable majority, could do away with 
Fundamental Rights (and indeed any other important part of the
180. See IV C.A.D. (for Apr.29,1947) at 397 where an Amendment by 
Santhanam purports to make this clear; although this Amendment was 
accepted it does not appear to have been incorporated into the 
Constitution.
181. . Tkrs is clear from B.R.Ambedkar1 s speech at VII C.A.D. 43-44 
where he stresses that apart from the exclusions in the proviso of 
Article 368 "All other articles are left to be amended by Parliament."
He issues a word of warning and says that any future Constituent Assembly 
would necessarily be partisan.
182. See Chapter II Section 1 (the discussion on prospective overruling). 
Note Subba Eao J.Ss statement in ^ an and Society (1971) 84-5 that pro­
spective overruling makes room for social reform.
l83« The Civil Service judges are Wanchoo J. who read the main minority 
judgement on behalf of Bhargava (another Civil Service judge) and Mitter 
JJ. Ramaswami J. (the third Civil Service judge) and Bachawat JJ. wrote 
their-separate concurring judgements.
Constitution like Parliamentary Government) was really no more than an 
184"argument of fear” and therefore political and doctrinaire in its
approach. To support him was the fact that the Court had itself
185rejected the majority argument on two occasions, albeit in the
186second instance it was not really directly in point and two judges 
made obiter observations similar to the ones later used by the
187majority in Golak Nath.
A large part of the majority judgements in fact consist really
l88of theoretical arguments about the nature of democracy and rights.
An excellent example of window dressing and extrajudicial argument is 
a delightful gem in Hidayatullah J.!s judgement, where he quotes in 
French a statement on ministerial responsibility in England, only to
184. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at pr.70 pp.1673-4; prs.111-113 pp.1688-9.
183. Shankari Prashad v Union A.I.R. 1951 S»C. 458 (where the argument 
was rejected for a unanimous Court in a judgement by Shastri C.J.);
Sajjan Singh v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845* On the latter case see 
the approving comments of A.R.Blackshield: Fundamental Rights and the 
Institutional viability of the Indian Supreme Court (1966) 8 J.I.L.I.
139; Contrast Atul M.Setalvad: Amending the Constitution (1966) 68 Bom. 
L.R. Jnl. 65? and comments on the case by C.V.Ramanujachariar (1966)
I M.L.J. Jnl. 21; R.Krishnamurthy (1966) I M.L.J. Jnl. 36. Note also the 
comments of C.S.Venkatasubramanian: Are Constitutional Amendments 
affecting Fundamental Rights valid (1966) I M.L.J. Jnl. 31*
186. $he point directly at issue was whether the amendments of Fundamental 
Rights by indirectly affecting the powers of the High Courts of the States 
under Article 226, could be questioned because the State legislatures had 
not ratified the Amendment. The Court unanimously held that it did not.
187. The majority judgement was read by Gajendragadkar C.J. (for Wanchoo 
and Dayal JJ.). Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ. wrote separate judgements 
concurring in the main result but questioning generally whether fundamen­
tal rights could themselves be amended.
188. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at prs.16-23,ppl656-8; pr.54 p.1670 (per 
Subba Rao C.J.); pr.126, 129 p.1693} pr.130 p.l694; pr.138 p.1697 
("democracy must not walk in fear of itself"); pr.141-1 **6 pp.1608-1700; 
pr.142-3 and summary pr.195 (per Hidayatullah J.).
tell us in the footnote that both the original and the translation are
189taken second hand from a text book. One is forced to accept a critic’s
argument that political and philosophic discussion have no place in the
Court where the matter before it is a simple problem of statutory 
190construction. It has always been recognised that the power of 
amendment is a constituent power and the only real limitation on it is
191political and procedural and not to be implied from political theories.
Subba Rao J.’s reference to two Privy Council decisions to
show that an Amending Statute is in fact a law simplicieter is of
doubtful value. All that those decisions establish is that certain
parts of a Constitution can be ’’uncontrolled” and do not require a
192special procedure to be followed. They are hardly authority for the 
proposition that an Amending Act should be treated by the Courts as a 
’’law" for all purposes and tested by the very Part of the Constitution 
they seek to change. Equally doubtful is the majority’s excessive 
reliance on "marginal notes" in an effort to show that Article 368
189. Ibid at pr.l60 p.1703-4.
190. Seervai (1967)1108.
191. See R (O’Brien) v Military Governor N.D.U.Internment Camp (1924)
1 I.R. 32; Harris v Minister of the Interior (1952) (2) S.A.
Ibid (1952) (4) S.A. 769; Collins v Minister' of the Interior (1957)
(l) S.A. 552; on the procedural aspect see Hensbn: Assays in Constitutional 
Law (1961 Edn) Chap.I; contrast O.Hood Phillips: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 51-76; Wade: The Basis of Legal Sovereignty (1955)
C.L.J. 172 accepts the political factors. Contrast C.F.Amerasinghe: The 
Legal Sovereignty of the Ceylon Parliament (1966) Public Law 65.
192. Macawley y R. (1920) A.C. 691 (P.C.); Bribery Commissioners v 
Ranasinghe (19657 A.C. 172.
193* On the relevance of these cases in this judgement see generally 
Seervai (1967) 1101 ff.; for a general review of the second case (1965) 
and the particular problem in the Ceylonese Constitution that it is set 
in see generally C.F.Amerasinghe (supra f.n.191) 65 ff. But note that 
the problem is set in a different context there.
relates merely to the procedure and does not describe the power to
a m e n d use Qf sub-headings to emphasis that FunAmental Rights
are in fact fundamental - so fundamental that they are sacrosanct, not
195amenable to amendment. The Court also went out of its wqy to consult
Constituent Assembly Debates to explain their position but taking care to
mention that their reference was to illustrate the importance attached to
196Fundamental Rights. To reinforce their decision they also stressed the
Preamble to show that "Sovereignty” vested not in Parliament but in the 
197Constitution.
We can see that what the Court did in fact was use all possible
techniques, stretching them to the limit, taking a doctrinaire view about
the importance of Fundamental Rights, expressing its horror at the frequent
Amendments (which the leading judge Subba Rao C.J. has often done extra- 
198judicially ) and, having done all this, state that the impugned Amendments
were valid even prospectively. In the end Golak Math must be regarded as
an ill-conceived decision, using dubious techniques, and as more of a
199political testament or outburst than a jurisprudential decision.
19^. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at pr.25 p.1658 col.l (per Subba Rao C.J.); 
for a contrary interpretation see prs.77-98 pp.1675-1682 (per Wanchoo J.). 
Also note the comments of Bachawat J. at prs.205-7 pp.1719-20* On the 
Supreme Court's usual attitude to the importance of marginal notes see
G.P.Singh:Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1966 Allahabad) 87-88.
195* Ibid at pp.1655 ff.(per Subba Rao J.) see further and contrast
G.P.Singh (supra f.n.l9*f).
196. This is discussed supra Chapter II Section 2.
197* Ibid at pr.15 p.1655 (per Subba Rao C.J.) Hidayatullah J. also refers 
to the Preamble in passing at pr.129 p.l693-4-»
198. See for example Subba Rao: Frequent tampering with the Constitution 
undermines freedom (1968) K.L.R. Jnl. *f5» Ibid: Man and Society (1971 
Bangalore) 51-^ (where Golak Nathfs case is discussed).
199* Note that the 25th Amendment purports to avert the imbroglio perpetu­
ated by Golak Nathfs case. Articles 13 and 368 have been suitably altered.
It has been suggested (by S.P.Sathe: (1971)(supra f.n.172) that the Amend­
ment is valid because Art. 13 merely defines law and does not take away any 
rights. The Court had however made it clear that Part III cannot he amen­
ded even indirectly. In any event, the 25th Amendment can hardly be directly 
questioned because it does not affect anyone*s rights (no one therefore has 
any locus standi to challenge it) but merely gives Parliament a "power”. A 
litigant can only question later amendments like the 26th Amendment and the 
question that will arise in that circumstance is whether the 25th Amendment 
affords any defence.
To sum up, we must accept that despite its notional acceptance
of the importance of Civil liberties, in actual fact the Court*s attitude
to Civil liberties is hardly inspiring. They have tried to follow 
cosmopolitan learning but no attempt has in fact been made to justify 
all this in India*s context. Thus we must accept that D. H. Lawrence 
wrote an "obscene book”, rather than that it is obsfiene in the Indian 
context; we are forced to accept that any criticism that might make 
a judge appear in a bad light is contempt rather than be told that in 
the context of Indian society*s tendency to think in a status-oriented 
way judges need more protection than elsewhere; we are led through a 
plethora of English precedent on Offical Secrecy (even though the 
latest English ruling which reverses all the earlier ones is con­
veniently neglected in the later decisions) but no real attempt is 
made to explain what must be the Court's attitude to Official Secrecy
in India. While not totally neglecting unformulated indigenous pressures,
the Court has been very mechanical in its approach to the problem on 
which it was called upon to adjudicate. Golak Nath*s case must be 
considered as an incomplete and unconvincing attempt to make us think 
otherwise. The Court has increased its powers and generally broadened 
its role (in for example matters like "Obscenity") but it is unsafe to 
predict any definite patterns.
2. Secularism, Freedom of Religion and Minority Protection.
i.(<^  Secularism and Freedom of Religion.
A lot of analysis has centred upon the nature of Indian 
secularism. *t is impossible for Indian Courts and the Indian 
Parliament to preserve the American theory of the "wall of separation" 
between religion and the State, for that would be inconsistent with 
Indian tradition which assigns to the State a moderating role in 
matters of social reform and which culminated in the Constitution 
itself which has sought specifically to accept this role. The relevant 
provisions are :
"Article 25* Freedom of conscience and free profession, 
practice and propagation of religion.
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to other 
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise 
and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any 
existing law or prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political
1. From a lawyers point of view see Derrett: R.L.S.I. (1968) Chapter 13; 
Galanter: Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary (1971) 21 
Philosophy East and West 467* From a general point of view see D.E.Smith: 
India as a secular State (1963 Princeton^; Dr. V.P.Luthera: The concept 
of a secular state in India (1964 London); G.S.Sharma (ed): Secularism:
Its implication for law and life in India (1966 Bombay); V.K.Sinha (ed): 
Secularism in India (1968$ombay); Gajendragadkar: Secularism (1972);
H.S.Ursekar: Legal Secularism in M.B.Mujumdar (ed) Principal Pandit, Law 
and Legal Education (1972 Poona) 95 espt. at 96 and 102-3; see also 
Sharif A1 Mujahid: Indian Secularism (1970 Karachi) - a criticism
by a Pakistani. For a contrary view by,a Muslim see B.Tyabji: The Self
in Secularism (1971 Orient Longmans Delhi).
2. For a comparison between the United States and India see Harry 
Groves: Freedom of religion (1962) 4 J.I.L.I. 191; C.H.Alexandrowicz:
The secular state in India and the United States (i960) 2 J.I.L.I. 273; 
P.K.TripathiP Secularism: Constitutional provision and judicial review
(1966) 8 J.I.L.I. 1. From the purely constitutional point of view see 
also M.Imam: The Indian Supreme Court and the Constitution (1968) 167 ff»; 
Seervai (1967) Ulb-i+'i'O
3- For the role of the Ancient Indian state in this regard see Kane III
H.D. 61-3, 235-41; R.K.Gupta: Political thought in Smriti literature (1970 
Allahabad) Chapter V. Also see generally J.W.Spellman: Political theory 
in Ancient India (1964 Oxford).
or other secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practice;
(b) provide for social welfare and reform or the throwing 
open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character 
to all casses and sections of Hindus.
•  ♦ •
- Article 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs. Subject 
to public order, morality and health, every religious deno­
mination, or any section therefore shall have the right -
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for charitable 
purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to acquire and own moveable and immoveable property; 
and
(d) administer such property in accordance with law."
V/e will see that the St^te could either seek to reform 
religion within the terms of that religion and pretent that there is 
an inherent "secularism" in Indian religions (a point of view put
ij.
forward by Hindu and Muslim judges fro© Allahabad ); alternatively 
it could rely on Article 25(2) and expand "secular" categories at 
the expense of religious ones. In the first case they would be 
called upon to decide what a particular religion includes and put a 
reforming feloss on it and in the second to stress the cause of
social reform and juxtapose it as a justifiable exception to freedom
5
of religion. Both pose a problem for the "common law judge". As
a foreign observer puts it :
"But how is a common law judge to do this ? Is he to 
confine himself to making an assessment solely on the basis 
of the record before him ? Or may he draw upon his own 
experience and prepossessions ? ... How aboutthe non-Hindu 
judge ? Is he to disqualify himself ? ... Once qualified 
to sit, how is the judge to proceed ? An exponent of a 
tradition of textual exegesis, the common law judge employs 
certain techniques of selecting authorities, interpreting 
and reconciling texts, and introducing innovations. Is is
4. See the contributions of S.S.Dhavan and M.H.Beg in G.S.Sharma 
(cited f.n.l).
5. See Tripathi (cited supra f.n.2); Dr. V.P.Luthera (cited f.n.l supra) 
96-7; M.Ghouse: Religious freedom ad the Supreme Court of India (1965)
2 Aligarh Law Journal 60-85; Setalvad: Secularism (1967 All India Radio 
Patel Memorial Lecture, Delhi) 21-29*
open to him to apply these techniques to the Hindu textual 
tradition ? Should not the judge enter into that tradition 
to ascertain its own internal rules and techniquew, its 
methods of assessing the relative importance of its various 
elements, and the admissability of innovations ?'* 6
Very ealy in the day -fe Supreme Court took the view that
Article 25 (1) sought to protect what it called in Commr. H. R. E. v
L. T. Swamiar "the essential part" of a religion, and made it clear
that this essential part was to be derived from the doctrines of the 
n
religion itself/ The Court’s sensitivity to the views of the partisans 
of the various religions can be gauged from their decision in
g
S. Veerabadran Chettiar v E. N. Ramaswami Naicker, where the Court 
held that the public destruction of a clay statue of the Lord Ganesa 
was a crime within the meaning of Section 295 of the Indian Penal 
Code i860 (prohibiting the intentional insult of anything religious)
even though the statue was not consecrated - a fact made much of by
9 10 
the Court below. Equally important is the case of Saraswathi v Rajgopal
where the Court refused to allow a Hindu to make a bequest for the
worship of his tomb and where Jaganadhadas J., reading the judgement
of the Court, made clear :
"The heads of religious purposes determined by belief in 
acquisition of religious merit cannot be allowed to be widely 
enlarged consistently with public policy and the needs of 
modern society." 11
6. Galanter (supra f.n.l.) 482-3.
7* A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282. For comments on the change of trend from this 
position see Tripathi (supra f.n.2); Seervai (supra f.n.2).
8. (1959) S.C.J. 1 discussed in passing by Derrett: R.L.S.I. (1968) 
449-50.
9. See A.I.R. 1955 Had. 550 at 551 col.2.
10. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 491. 
11- Ibid at pr 6 p.495*
Equally important are the early decisions on the control of religious 
endowments, where the Court admitted the importance of administrative 
control but at the same time would not allow the State to intrude
into the esoteric innermost sanctuaries of a temple for administrative
12 13purposes and even for social reform.
But gradually this policy was abandoned. A clear example
of the tensions within the Court can be seen in Saifuddin Saheb v 
14Bombay where the Court had to consider whether a State statute pro­
hibiting excommunication in a certain sect violated the right to
religion and the freedom to manage religious affairs. Sinha C.J. took
15the straight line that social reform was important, but this was
only partly accepted by the majority which considered, through Das
Gupta J., that excommunication was an important part of -the right to
management, ^ and not connected with social reform.^ A very realistic
note of warning was given by Ayyangar J. in his separate concurring
judgement in which he stressed that Article 25 (2) was not intended to
idreform a religion out of existence. It was obvious, given India’s
12.Commr. H.R.E. v L.T.Swamiar A.I.2. 1954- S.C. 282.
13* Sri Venakataramana Devaru v Mysore A.I.R. 1958 S.C, 1032; discussed 
Derrett: R.L.sTlT (19&8) **68-50; Seervai (1967) 491-2;Tripathi (supra 
f.n.2) at 18 - the last named critic suggests that T.L.V.Aiyar J. who 
read the judgement of the Court nno longer confined himself to the ’rites 
and ceremonies* referred to in the dicta of the Swamiar case, and enhanced 
the scope of denominational authority far beyond what Mrl Justice 
Mukherjea is likely to have contemplated.11 Ihis is based on an extremely 
textual account of whqt Mukherjea J. said.
14. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853* Note the extremely incisive comments by 
Derrett: (1963) 10 I.C.L.Q. 693; Ibid: R.L.S.I. (1968) 473-77; Seervai 
(1967) 484-7; Tripathi (supra f.n.2) at 16-18
15« Ibid at pr.ll p.860; pr.17 p.863 col.2; p.866.
16. Ibid at pr.42 p.869.
17. Ibid at pr.44 p.870.
18. Ibid at pr.63 p.875 col.2. He observed that u ... very few pieces of
legislation for abrogating religious practices could fail to be subsumed 
under the caption of a 'provision for social welfare and reform’ •"
t. D Q>
context, that Article 25 (2) could not be used for steam roller reform
in religious matters and that the basis of reform had to be found in
Indian religions themselves. An unconvincing attempt to do this was
19made by Kapur,J. in V. V. Giri v D. Suri Dora where in a dissenting 
judgement we find the learned judge arguing strongly in favour of 
inter-hierarchical mobility between castes, ignoring almost completely 
the limitation placed on this by both the theoretical and practical 
suppositions underlying Hinduism.
20Gajendragadkar J.’s judgement in Yagnapurushdasji v Huldas
is equally important. Here the 0Ourt was called upon to decide whether
the denominational temples of the Narayanaswami sect could be thrown
open to the general public. It was denied that the members of the
sect were in fact Hindus. In what has been described as a "remarkable 
21judgement" the Court widened the definition of a Hindu beyond recog­
nition relying in the main on western inspired philosophical accounts 
of Hinduism rather than trying to define the problem in social amid
3L9* A;I.R. 1959 S.C. 1318 at 1331* '^his case has been exhaustively dis­
cussed S>y Galanter: The problem of group membership:Some reflections on 
the judicial view of Indian society (1962) 4 J.I.L.I. 331 where he con­
trasts the doctrinaire and fictional approach in this case with the 
empirical commonsense approach of the Courts in Vithaldas Jasani v 
Moreshwar (195*0 S.C.R. 817; Sfryamsundar v Shakkar Deo A.I.R. 19^0~Mys.
27; Wilson Reade v C:S.Booth A.I.R. 1958 Ass. 128. Note also the comments 
of Derrett: (article cited infra f.n.2© 19^8) 70 Z.V.R. 110 at 125-8.
20. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119. Note the comments of Derrett: The definition 
of a Hindu (1966) 2~S.C.J. Jnl. 67; Ihid: "Hindu": a definition wanted
for the purpose of applying a personal law (1968) 70 Z.V.R. HO; M.Galanter: 
Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian Judiciary (1971) 21 Philosophy East 
and West k67» Note the Arya Samajists are much more sympathetically treated 
by Reddy J. in D.A.V. College Hullundur ▼ Punjab A.I.R. 1931 S»C« 1737 
at 17*f3-*f.
21. Derrett (supra f.n.20:1968) 70 Z.V.R. 110 at 113* The "secularist" 
and reformist pressures are much more clearly brought out by Galanter 
(supra f.n.20).
22popular terms. The Court went out of its way to stress the importance
23of reform in Hinduism itself. This is a totally different approach 
and reveals that though the Court is much more prepared to take a 
western educated elitist view of the question of reform, it relies 
less on an undisguised affirmation of the necessity of social reform 
(as we saw in the case of B. P. Sinha C.J.) and much more in trying 
to find theoretical refuge in a modern and predominantly occidental 
view of traditional notions. This has the advantage of preventing 
a head-on collision between ’’traditionalists” and ’’reformers”, both
2kof whom are forced, however unwittingly, to talk the same language.
Gajendragadkar J.’s discomfort at being conditioned by the ’’essential
25practices” test laid down in the L. T. Swamiar case can be seen in
26some other judgements delivered by him and has been commented on
22. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119; note the reference to Monier Williams at 
pr.27 p.1128; pr.31 p.1128; the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics 
at pr.28 p.1128; Dr. Radha Krishnan at pr.30 p.1128 pr.32 p.1129; pr.35 
p.1130; Max Muller at pr.34 p.1129-30- Thus as Derrett says at (1968)
70 Z.V.R. 110 at 123 ”A main who believes in what Dr.S.^adhkkrishnan and 
Max Muller and Monier Wiliams and B.G.Tilak would recognise as compo­
nents of Hinduism may well be a Hindu and any temple he amd his companions 
build and use may be a Hindu temple within the meaning of a statute 
concerning temples.”
25- A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119 at pr.56 p.1135-
2k» This is precisely what Derrett (who can hardly be accused of being 
partisan) begins to do in (1970) 68 Z.V.R. at 120-12^ where he finds 
textual justification for the broader view of Hinduism and secularism.
25- Commr. H.R.E. v L.T.Swamiar A-I-R- 195^ S-G- 282.
26. e.g. in Purgah Committee v Hussain Ali A.I.R. 1962 S.C. I*t02 at pr.33 
p.lJfl5 where he denies validity to ’’practices, though religious, may have 
sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extra­
neous and unessential accretions to religion itself.” Consider also 
Tilkayat v Rajasthan A.I.R. 19&3 S-C. 1638 at pr.6l p.l66l where he 
assumes that a right to management must be a purely secular matter.
This as we have shown in Chapter II Section 3  (supra) contrasts with 
Mukherjea J.’sview that proprietary rights in managers of temples and 
other religious institutions were of a religious nature.
27by various jurists.
2d
Azeez Basha v Union demonstrates yet another technique in
dealing with problems where religious and cultural rights are involved.
Here the Court was asked to prevent the Government for superintending
the management of the Aligarh University whifih has always been regarded
2 9as a minority, Muslim University. The Constitution makes no reser­
vation for social reform in Article J>0 (1) which reads :
"All minorities whether based on religion or language, shall 
have the right to establish and administer educational institutions 
of their choice."
The Court therefore relied on on a technicality and insisted that 
since the Muslim College established in the nineteenth century was 
formally converted into a university by an Act in 1920, the university 
was not a minority institution. This decision, which relies on sophis­
ticated legal and presumably reformist notions, rather than social,
cultural and historical facts, has been rightly criticised both by a
30constitutional law jurist as well ss a Muslim one.
27* Note the comments of Tripathi (supra f.n.2) at 19, 2 5^-27; Seervai
(1967) 487-489. These judgements were delivered by Gajendragadkar J. 
on whom see also the comments of Galanger (supra f.n. 20) at 478-9*
This view is largely substantiated by the learned judge*s book Secularism 
(1972). Gajendragadkar J. has been recently appointed Chairman of the 
Law Commission, which in turn is to consider various aspects of the 
reform of personal laws.
28. A.I.E. 1968 S.C. 662
29. Note the comments of W.C.Smith cited by D.E.Smith (supra f.n.l) 426. 
These comments are also quoted by M.Ghouse (infra f.n. 30) at 322. See 
also Sharifal Mujtahid (supra f.n.l) Chapter IX.
30. The following comments are useful: M.Ghouse: A minority University 
and the Supreme Court (1968) 10 J.I.L.I. 521; Seervai (1967) Supplement 
for the year 1968 "A-43-7n» contrast the recent cases on the right of 
Arya Samajis' : D.A.V.College, Bhatinda v Punjab A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1731 
at pr.9 p»1734t5» pr.17 p*1737» D.A.V.College Jullundur v Punjab A.I.R. 
1971 S.C. 1737 at $743-4.
The cow slaughter cases.
The cow slaughter cases create a very difficult problem for 
the Courts. The Court has to contend with, and ceconcile with the 
demands of orthodox Hindus who claim thqit the cow is sacred, Parliamentary 
statutes which endorse this point of view, the demands of butchers 
(usually Muslims or low caste Hindus) who claim that their right to 
follow any trade or vocation guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the 
Constitution is infringed by the statutes, the claim made by Muslims 
that the Koranic texts demand the sacrifice of the cow, and the common 
sense view (supported by economic data, and inserted as a Directive 
Principle of State Policy^-) that an agricultural economy can’ ill 
afford indiscriminate killing of cows or the indiscriminate preservation 
of all cows. Mao Tse Tung commenting on a similar problem in China 
adhered to a common sense (even if fanatic) point of view and observed 
in one of his earlier "Reports” :
"Oxen are a treasured possession of the peasants. ’Slaughter 
an ox in this life and you will be an ox in the next' has become 
almost a religious tenet; oxen must never be killed. Before the 
peasants had power, they could appeal only to religious taboo 
in opposing the slaughter of cattle and had no means of banning 
it. Since the rise of peasant associations their jurisdiction 
has extended even to cattle, and they have prohibited the slaughter 
Of cattle in the towns. Of the six butcheries in the county town 
of Hsiangtan, five are now closed and the remaining one slaughters 
only enfeebled or disabled animals. The slaughter of cattle is 
totally prohibited throughout the county of Hengsshan. A peasant 
whose ox broke a leg consulted the peasant association before he 
dared to kill it. When the Chamber of Commerce of Chuchow rashly 
slaughtered a cow, the peasants came into town and demanded an 
explanation and the chamber besides paying a fine, had to let off 
firejcrackers by way of apology." 32.
31* Article 48 of the Constitution states:"Organization of agriculture 
and animal husbandry: The state shall endeavour to organize agriculture _ 
and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall in parti­
cular take steps for improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, 
of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle." In a recent book 
J.Dalmia (Ed): A review of beef in Ancient India (1971 Gorakhpur) it is 
suggested that the Ancient texts sanctioned the killing of cows for par­
ticular occasions. On the position in the Constituent Assembly;VII C.A.D. 
568-3^ 1.
32. Mao Tse Tung: Report on an investigation of the peasant movement 
in Hunan (March, 1927) reprinted in Sleeted Works of Mao Tse Tung (1967 
Peking) Volume 1, 23 at pp.5C-l.
In India the problem takes slightly different proportions 
befause a large part of the economic considerations are in fact con­
cealed by the fact that various other religious and sentimental 
considerations assume importance. In effect the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion is the same as Mao Tse Tung’s (viz. only enfeebled cows 
should be killed) but it must be considered in greater detail.
The Indian Supreme Court has considered the problem in three
cases. The most important of these cases is M. H. Qureshi v Bihar^
3*fsince the other cases merely follow it. The Court appears to have 
been determined to consider the matter purely from a constitutional 
and economic point of view in an effort to keep clear of some of the
religious subterfuges that were presented to them by Interveners and
35others. The Court wished to make it seem that religious and social 
considerations were subsidiary:
"There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Hindus in 
general hold the cow in great reverence and the idea of the 
slaughter of cows for food is repugnant to their notions and 
this sentiment has in the past even led to communal riots.
^t is also a fact that after the recent partition of the 
country this agitation against the slaughter of cows has been 
further intensified. While we agree that the constitutional 
question before us cannot be decided on grounds of mere senti­
ment, however passionate it might be, we, nevertheless think
33 • A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731• Das C.J. writing the judgement for T.L.V.Aiyar
S.K.Das, Gajendragadkar and Bos JJ. Note the comment by Derrett (1959)
8 I.C.L.Q. 221. Contrast the comments of V.K.S.Chaudhary at A.I.R. 1962 
Jnl. 25-7.
3*f. A.H.Qureshi v Bihar A.I.R. I96I S.C. kkS at ^55-6. S.K.Das J. 
reading the judgement for Imam, &apur, Sarkar and K.Subba Rao JJ. Note 
the comments of Derrett: Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution: 
The requirement of reasonableness (1961) 10 I.C.L.Q. 91^; Mohd. Faruk v 
M.P. A.I:R. 1970 S.C. 93 at 95 (following the earlier judgements).
Shah J. delivering the judgement for Hidayatullah C.J., Ramaswami,
Mitter and Grover JJ.
35• Court appears to have heard the testimony of Pandit Thakurdas
Bhargava, but not allowed the Bharat Go-sevak Samaj, All India Anti- 
slaughter Movement Committee, Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and 
the M.P. Gorakshan Sangh to intervene in the proceedings. See A.I.R.
195S S.C. 731 at pr.ll p.738-9.
it has to be taken into consideration, though only as one of the 
many elements, in arriving at a judicial verdict as to the 
reasonableness of the restrictions. ” 36
37Thus although the Hindu texts are briefly referred to, the 
Court in fact concentrated on statistical considerations. But Hindu 
sentiment was not at issue in the Court; what was at issue was 
whether the slaughter of cows formed part of the Muslim religion.
This aspect of the matter is dealt with in an even more perfunctory
way. The argument that this might be a religious practice is referred
38to as a ”bald allegation” and after a brief reference to the Koran
39and Hamilton*s translation of the Hedaya, the Court dismisses the
argument on the facile argument that the Koran, by giving an option
of the slaughter of goat for one person or a cow qnd camel for seven,
1^0
did not oblige the Muslims to slaughter a cow. Again the Hindu posi­
tion (which one must stress was not in issue before the Court) was 
properly explained by interveners, whereas as regards the Muslim posi­
tion the Court was content with declaring
”We have no affidavit before us by any Maulana explaining the 
implications of those verses or throwing any light on this 
problem.” 41
It thus appears that in order to establish an
’'essential practice" the petitioners must present inverveners, whom in
36. Ibid at pr.22 p. 743 Col.2.
37• Ibid at pr.22 p.744-5- ^he Court referred to Kane II (ii) H.D.722-3
A.C.Das Bjgvedic Culture 203-3 and some of the vedic texts in original.
38. Ibid at pr.13 p.739 col.2.
39* Ibid at pr.13 p»739-40 citing Koran Surah 22 verses 28, 33 and 
Surah: 107 along with Hamilton’s Hedaya Book XLIII (p.39S)«
kO. Ibid at pr.13 p*7^0 col.l.
41. Ibid at pr.13 p.740.
turn the Court will in all probability now allow to intervene. The 
Court seems to have abandoned the salutary practice of looking at the 
religious practices suo raotu as it seems to have done in earlier cases.
The Court therefore concentrated not on the religious
problem at all but rather on the rights of the butchers under Article
19(1)(g)- It had no difficulty in showing that the Directive Principles
of State Policy were designed not to protect Hindu sentiment, but to 
43
improve livestock. After this the Court considered statistical
44information from various sources to conclude that a blanket slaughter
of cows was unreasonable and that the slaughter of a cow should in
k5fact be directly linked with its age and utility.
Thus the Court seems to have wandered around a typically 
Indian problem and considered only the secular and economic aspects of 
the controversy. The result must inevitably please everyone. As a 
foreign observer puts it :
” 5S)entiment was respected, while Muslim practitioners 
retained a large part of their trades; but the question remains 
whether a cosmopolitan (and perhaps a peculiarly American ?) 
approach to questions of ’’freedom of religion” applying no tradi­
tional standards, will become established - in other words how 
secular a secular state may be when its inhabitants include 
practising adherents of various religions.” k6
We can see that the Court was aware of the various ’’Indian” 
pressures on them, but adroitly evaded a position in which they might
42. See supra f.n.35 and on inverveners generally Chapter II Section 5 
(supra) with Appendix I (infra).
43. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 751 at pr.6 p.736; pr.12 p.739-
44. Ihid pp.745 col.2 to 753 col.2. A vast amount of information inclu­
ding specialists' reports, even details like the amount of animal manure 
which cows are responsible for creating.
45. Ibid at 755.
k6. Derrett (supra f.n.33) 221 at 224.
be forced to comment on them. It appears that in an effort to be 
fair the Court is now increasingly relying on secular attitudes; but 
can the Court use Common law techniques to gauge these attitudes ? Do 
they have the research facilities ? Further, one must question both 
the capacity as well as the desirability of the Supreme Court's not 
considering traditional matters in their own terms. The Court's 
techniques are legalistic but this overt legalism is really another 
indication of how India's educated elite react to, and bypass, tra­
ditional problems.
We can now turn to an equqlly delicate matter on which 
modern occidental thinking and traditional needs conflict.
ii. Equality, Positive Discrimination and the Problem of 
Backward Classes, k7
The Constituent Assembly thought it necessary to include
provisions in the Constitution which would serve as an exception to
A-9the general provisions guaranteeing "equality" so as to enable the
k7 • On this topic see generally the unpublished Ph.D theis of G.Luis: 
Protection of minority interests in the Indian Constitution (1970 London 
University: Thesis No. Jt+O at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies); 
Galanter: "Protective discrimination" for Backward classes in India (1961) 
3 J.I.L.I. 257; Ibid: Equality and preferential treatment: Constitutional 
limits and judicial control (1965) l*f Indian Year Book of International 
Affairs 257; N.Radhakrishnan: Reservation to the backward classes (.19640 
13 Indian Year Book of International Affairs 293; Ibid: Unit of social, 
economic and educational backwardness (1965) 7 T.I.L.I. 262; M.Imam: 
Reservation of seats for backward classes in Public services and edu­
cational institutions (1966) 8 J.I.L.I. 441; Ibid: The Indian Supreme 
Court and the Constitution (1968) 60-9; V.Narayan Nair: Protective ^is- 
crimination - The Supreme Court retreats (1969) II S.C.J. Jnl. 34.
48. See the debate at VII C.A.D. 653 ff* on K.T.Shah’s amendment that 
it should be made clear that the provisions were meant for the "advan­
tage, safeguard and betterment" of the backward classes.
49* The general provisions in Articles 14-18 of the Constitution.
v-r" r?W O' ^
Government to go out of its way to help "backward classes" to catch
up with the rest of the country. These provisions include •
"Article 15 (k). Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of
Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and education­
ally backward classes of citizens or for Schedule Castes 
and tribes.
Article 16 (4). Nothing in this article shall prevent the 
State from making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward classes of 
citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately 
pepresented in the services under the state." 50
The question that arises is : What role do these provisions
assign to the Supreme Court ?
The Supreme Court ha$ decided a large number of cases both
51on the meaning of the word "backward" as well as on the lengths
to which the Government can go while taking advantage of the provisions
52permitting "protective discrimination". In its latest judgement in
53A. Periakaruppan v Tamil Naidu Hegde J. seems to have gone out of
his way to examine the scheme of examination used by medical colleges
in Madras and even comment on things like whether earmarking 75/275
5kmarks for the interview is excessive.
50. Note that the reference to Article 29(2) to the Constitution arose 
because of Das J.*s observations in Madras v Champakam A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 
226 at pr.5 p.227 th^t a protective discrimination could be violative 
of Article 29(2) which laid down that no restrictions be placed on the 
entry of students to educational institutions on the grounds only of 
"religion, race, caste, language or any of them."
51. Madras v Champakam A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226; Venkataramana v Madras 
A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 229; Balaji v Mysore A.I.R. I963 S.C. 6k9; Chitralekha 
v Mysore A.I.R. 196*f S.C. 1823; Triloki Nath v J.K. A.I.R. 1967 S.C.
1283; Ibid (the same case was continued at A.I.R. 19&9 S.C. l); A.P. v 
Sagar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1379-
52. Balaji v Mysore (supra f.n.51); Devadasan v Union A.I.R. 196*f S.C. 
179* Punjab v Hira Lai A.I.R. 1971 B.C. 1777 (a case brought to the 
Court prematurely); A.Periakaruppan v Tamil Naidu A.I.R. 1971 B.C. 2303.
53. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2303.
5k. Ibid at pr.13 p.2306.
o o
(ri) tfFor whom are these provisions intended ?"
Very early in the day the Supreme Court made it Clear that
it was going to have a sgty on the nature of these provisions, Thus
in Madras v Champakam^^nd Venkataramana v Madras^Das J. invalidated
an order which made reservations on a community-wise basis, without
any reference to backwardness. The Court considered the issue not
57from the point of the equqlity provisions but from the point of view
of Article 29 (2) and put another bar on the operation of protective
discrimination. The Constitution had to be suitable amended by the
First Amendment Act 1951 to remove the bar. These early and extremely
brief judgements are a constant reminder that the Court planned to
treat these exceptions in a fairly limited way because they considered
59the rights guaranteed in Part III as sufficiently ”sacrosanct” not
to be affected by considerations|of policy, even if these were contained
60in Directive Principles of State Policy.
55. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226.
56. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 229.
57. See A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226 at prill p.228; A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 229 at 
pr.4 p.230. But note that in the latter case the effect of Article 16 
(equqlity in matters of employment) is considered at pr.4 p.229-30.
58. Supra f.n.50.
59. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226 at pr.8 p.228.
60. Ibid. C o n s i d e r  Hegde J.*s extrajudicial comments in his lecture: 
Directive Principles of State Policy (1971) I S.C.J. Jnl. 50 at
that this case was a regressive case as an approach to the interpretation 
of the Directive Principles of State. On the problem of interpretation 
see also supra Chapter II Section 3 (iii). ^he relevant Directive 
Principle in this case is Article A6 : Promotion of educational and 
economic interests of Schedule Castes, Schedule Tribes and other weaker 
sections - The State shall promote with special care the educational 
and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in 
particular, of the Schedule castes and tribes, and shall protect them 
from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.
The problem of trying to define "backward classes1’ is very
difficult as can be seen from the Report of the Backward Classes
Commission (1955) which identified 2,399 backward groups (not including
6lwomen) one third of which by one estimate constitute 32 per cent of
62India’s population. The criteria adopted by the Commission were
63occupation, representation in the Administration and social position.
The question was what criteria should the Supreme Court adopt (assuming 
that they should review the criteria at all) and could it adopt the 
criteria of "religion, race caste, sex, descent, place of birth and 
residence” which are prohibited by Articles 15 (l) and 16 (2) on the 
grounds that both Articles 15 (A) and 16 (4) begin with a non-obstante 
clause•
This matter was first considered by Gajendragadkar J. in 
64
Balaji v Mysore. His Lordship was anxious to limit these provisions 
as much as possible, referred to the Backward Classes Commission in an 
effort to that they too though the same way, and suggested the
adoption of
”a rational and scientific approach which is consistent with and 
true to the noble ideal of a secular welfare democratic set up 
by the welfare state of this country.” 65
66His Lordship thought that casfe was an "artifical growth” struck down
67the Mysore order because it laid excessive reliance on it, and laid
61. See Galanter (supra f.n.47 19&1) 3 J.I.L.I. 39 at 53 f.n.69.
62. Now see 1961 Census.
63. Backward Classes Commission (1955) Vol.l, 45-71 107 (for the causes 
of backwardness). The list of "backward classes" is given in Vol.2.
64. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.
65. Ibid at pr.36 p.664 col.l.
66. Ibid at pr.22 p.659»
67. Ibid at pr.25 p.659-60.
down a very comprehensive, even i f  ec lectic , approach :
’’Social backwardness is  in  the ultimate analysis, the result 
of poverty to a very large extent. The Classes of citizens who 
are deplorably poor automatically become socially backward . . .
(and th is ) is  lik e ly  to be aggravated by considerations of case . . .  
(B)ut that only shows the relevance of both caste and poverty in  
determining the backwardness of c itizens.
The occupations of citizens may also contribute to make 
classes socially backward. There are some occupations which are 
treated as in fe rio r according to conventional beliefs  and classes 
of citizens who follow these occupations are apt to become socially  
backward. The place of habitation also plays not a minor part in  
determining the backwardness of a community of persons. In  a 
sense, the problem of social backwardness is  the problem of Sural 
India, and in  that behalf, classes of citizens occupying a socially  
backward position in  ruaal areas f a l l  w ithin the purview of A rt.
15 (*0 . The problem of determining who are socially backward 
persons is  undoubtedly very complex. Sociological(and)social and 
economic considerations come into play in  solving the problem, 
and evolving proper c r ite r ia  for determining which classes are 
socially backward is  obviously a very d if f ic u lt  task; i t  w il l  
need an elaborate investigation and collection of data and 
examining the said dat(a) in  a rational and sc ien tific  way." 68
The "Gajendragadkar catalogue" ( i f  one can ca ll i t  that) is  
very pedestrian; i t  gives us a long l i s t ,  excludes trad itio n a l c r ite r ia ,  
kvu//~ I ' V v e s t a b l i s h i n g  
"rational" c r ite r ia , -^ he main d if f ic u lty  in  th is  a l l  too academic 
approach is  that the Government is  never precisely told now the Court 
intends to balance a l l  these c r ite r ia  apart from the statement that 
caste cannot be the sole c r ite r io n .^  Further, the responsibility of 
trying to find the right c r ite r ia  seems to have shifted from the 
Government to the Court, ^he judgement is  incompletely worked out and 
therefore an unhappy compromise between trad itio n  and ra tio n a lity , 
between ju d ic ia l restraint and usurpation of powers of review.
68. Ib id  at pr.23-*f p*659 co l.2. Note that at pr.23 p*659 c o l. l .  the 
judge rejected the use of Kcaste" generally because i t  did not apply to 
"Muslims, Christians or Jains or even Lingayats". I t  is  submitted that 
the fact that caste groups do not exist everywhere in  such groups does 
not make i ts  existence less relevant for Hindus. Indeed sociologists 
may conceivably find the existence of identifications analogous to 
caste ih  such groups as w ell. On th is  see Derrett: R .L .S .I. (1968) 291; 
L.Dumont: Homo Hierarchus (1970 London) 202-8; and on caste amongst 
Muslims see Z.Khan: Caste and Muslim Peasantry in  India and Pakistan
(1968) Man in  India 133-1*$.
69•. Ibid. at pr.25 p.659»
C C 1
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This approach was reconsidered in Chitrftlekha v Mysore
which brings out all the imperfections of the Balaji ruling, on which
the High Court below naturally relied to support their view that a
criterion(used by the Government in this case) based solely on
economic notions was not ju s tifie d  because i t  excluded caste altogether.
When the matter fame before the Supreme Court Subba Eao J. (reading the
judgement for Sinha C.J., also party to Balaji*s case, Dayal and
Ayyangar JJ.) in trying to find a dominant theme in the Gajendragadkar
71catalogue stressed that ’’caste” need not be one of the tests at all.
The reasons that he gave for this were the fact that Article 15 C^ f) 
talked in terms of “classes” not castes (hinting vaguely that caste
72
should be excluded altogether). Mudholkar J. (concurring on th is  one 
point) seemed to go one step further and while taking note of the non- 
obstante clause suggested that none of the factors mentioned in  A rtic le  
15 (1) and 29 (2) ( i .e .  “re lig ion , race, caste, sex, place of b irth ,
73language, or any of them” ) should be considered as a valid  c rite rio n .
Thus gradually the Court, relying on the Gajendragadkar catalogue, 
seems to be shifting  to a solely “secular, s c ie n t if ic  and ra tio n a l” 
criterion  and ignoring the trad itio n a l factors which Gajendragadkar J. 
himself had admitted were relevant. Yet even th is  change of emphasis 
seems as loosely phrased as Gajendragadkar?s catalogue i t s e l f ,  giving 
discretion to the Courts to change the balance unpredictably.
70; A .I.R . 196** S.C. 1823.
71. Ib id  at pr.15 p .1833* Note Subba Rao*s view in  Man and Society (1971) 
13, 81- 83, that “caste” should become obsolete.
72. Ib id  at prs. 19-20 pp.1833-4-* At pr.19 p.l834 c o l. l  i t  is  suggested 
that caste may only have some relevance. S a rlie r his Lordship suggested 
that i f  the Constitution had intended caste to be a c riterion  they would 
have made i t  e x p lic it .
73* Ib id  at pr.43 pp.1842-3. deferring to the non-obstante clause 
Mudholkar J. says “But that does not ju s tify  the inference that castes 
have any relevance in  determining what are socially  and educationally 
backward communities.” On caste and backwardness see generally A.C. 
^aranjpe- : Caste, prejudice and the individual, (1970 D elh i).
7bIn Triloki Nath v J. K . Subba Rao J. went one step further
by suggesting that the Gajendragadkar catalogue considered the economic
75crite rion  of poverty more important than any other. The problem in
this case was whether a l is t  based on the importance of the adequacy
of representation in  the services was a valid l is t  7 This was
*
certain ly a secular crite rio n , but i t  was also, as the Court suspected
7 6and made clear la te r , a basis for a community-wise allocation which
77the Court had frowned upon in  1951* Subba Kao J. therefore directed 
that further information be given on the communities involved, sug­
gesting that though th is  was a va lid  criterion , i t  had to be carefully  
applied in  each case. I t  was natural enough' that on receiving th is  
information the Court la te r  ruled that community-wise allocation  
between Hindus and Muslims in  the State of Jamur and Kashmir was not 
a valid  c rite rio n . A ll th is  does however go to show that the Court 
has assumed a very important role in  determining the exact meaning 
of backwardness, even though i t  has not i ts e lf  been so exact.
I t  is  with a sense of confusion and shock that one reads 
78Ra.iendram v Madras where Wqnchoo J. reintroduces trad itio n a l factors
and in  particu lar ju s tifie s  the importance of caste. Although his
observations can be reconciled with the broad c r ite r ia  of the e a rlie r
judgements, the accent is  to ta lly  d ifferent :
n . . .  ( I ) f  the reservation in  question had been based only 
on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational 
backwardness of the caste in  question, i t  would be v io lative  of 
A rtic le  15(1). But i t  must not be forgotten that a caste is  also
7b. A .I.E . 1967 S.C. 1283.
75* Ib id  at p r.6 p .1285.
76. See the la te r  developments on this.case reported at A .I.E . 19&9 S.C. l .  
77* This was the view taken in  Madras v Chamfttpakany A. I .R« 1951 S.C. 226. 
78. A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 1012.
a class of citizens and i f  the caste as a whole is  socially and 
educationally backward reservation can be made in  favour of such 
a caste on the ground that i t  is  a socially and educationally 
backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art.lfK^f) • • •  I t  
ife true that in  the present cases the l i s t  of socially and edu­
cationally backward classes has been specified by caste. But 
that does not necessarily mean that the caste was the sole con­
sideration and that persons belonging to these castes are not 
also a class of socially and educationally backward c itizens." 79
V irtu a lly  the same approach was adopted by Shah J. in  
80A. P. v Sagar, where his Lordship (like Mudholkar J. as we have seen
g1
e a r lie r ), gave only p a rtia l effect to the non-obstante clause but 
observed :
"The crite rion  for determining the backwardness must not 
be based solely on re lig ion , race, caste, sex or plac$6f b irth  
and the backwardness being social and educational must be 
sim ilar to the backwardness from which the Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes suffer." 82
At the same time the learned judge thought i t  necessary to go out of
his way to suggest that the observations made by Wanchoo J. in Rajednran*
case made
"no departure from the rule enunciated in  the e a rlie r  cases." 83 
What makes th is  case even more remarkable is  the fact that the Court 
considered i t  i ts  duty to find out fo r i t s e lf  whether the classes were 
in  fact backward, rather than leave th is  question in  the hands of the 
Government.^
79* Ib id  at pr.7 pI101*f. This entire passage is  quoted by Shah J.
A.P, v Sagar A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1379 at pr.6 p .1383.
80. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1379.
81. Ib id at pr.6 p.1382. "But clause (*f) is  an exception to Clause (1 ). 
Being an exception, i t  cannot be extended so as in  effect to destory 
the guarantee of clause (1 )."
82. Ib id  at pr.6 p.1383 c o l. l .
83. Ib id  at pr.6 p.1383 c o l.2.
8k. Ib id  at pr.8 p.1383 co l.2.
85These la s t two cases have rig h tly  been called "a re trea t" , 
for the Court has quite clearly withdrawn from the e a rlie r  attempts 
made by both Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao JJ. (the former no less 
than the la t te r )  to make the meaning of backward classes as secular 
and ra tiona l as possible. This inconsistency can only be explained 
on the basis of d ifferin g  Bench construction in  each case. But the 
demand for further information in  T r ilo k i1s case, and Shah J . 's  
assertion that the Court must i t s e lf  decide these issues, when read 
along with the Court's e a rlie r  statements that the meaning of "back­
wardness" must be considered on the basis of carefully collected 
86date, make us seriously question the Court's policy of putting
its e lf  in  a position where i t  is  sole judge of the issue. I t  is
clear that when considering the meaning of Schedule Tribes and Castes
87the opinion of the Government is  conclusive. I f  th is  is  so i t
lo g ica lly  follows that th& determination of th is  vexed question
should be le f t  to the Government and ju d ic ia l restra in t is  called  
88fo r. The Court must play a moderating role but should intervene 
only in  such cases where the reservation is  made for classes which 
are patently not backward, as in  the cases on community-wise a llo ­
cation, rather than attempt to impose secular c r ite r ia  and withdraw 
such c r ite r ia  each time the personnel on a Bench of judges changes.
1 'The extent of the reservation".
The Supreme Court has also thought f i t  to f ix  lim its  on the 
extent to which th is  power of protective discrimination may be used.
85. V.Narayan NairR (supra f.n .47)»
86. See the statement of Gajendragkar J. cited supra
87. Bee fo r example A rticles 3^1-2.
88. This is  the suggestion made by George Luis (cited supra f .n  k-7) 357*
We must at the outset notice that there is  no concept of reasonableness 
(as in  A rtic le  19 (2) to (6) )  which might suggest that the exercise
of the power must be reasonable or w ithin s tr ic t  lim ites . But once
again the Court assumed the role of educator and even verged on taking
89a p o lit ic a l stand. In  Bala3i  v Mysore Gajednragadkar J . was very- 
perturbed that excessive protective discrimination would lead to a
decline in  educational standards in  the country. Relying on the views
90of the University Grants Commission his Lordship observed :
11 (R)eservation should and must be adopted to advance the 
prospects of the weaker sections of society but in  providing fo r  
such special measures in  that behalf care should be taken not to 
exclude admission to higher educational centres to deserving and 
qualified  candidates of other communities.” 91
S tr ic tly  spgaking, the question whether the f ir s t  p r io rity  should be
educating Ind ia ’ s most talented people, or whether the country should
try  to spread out education fa c il i t ie s  to the weaker sections, is
prim arily a question of educational policy and there is  nothing in  the
Constitution which lends support to the : idea that th is  issue is
justiciable  before the Courts. Gajendragadkar J . ’ s view that
reservation ofseats should be of 50 per cent or less depending on the
92circumstances of the case, seems to suggest that even where the 
figure is  less than 50 per cent i t  is  the Court which must u ltim ately  
decide whether th is  is  ju s tif ie d . Clearly such an issue is  meant to 
be an issue to be fought at elections and questioned in  State leg is ­
la tu re , for i t  is  (theoretica lly  speaking) the representatives of the 
people who must decide whether public revenues should be spent on th e ir  
children or on anybody else1s.
89. A .I.R . 1963 S.C. 6if9
90. Ib id  at pr.32 p .662.
91. Ib id  at pr.3^ p .662-3
92. Ib id  at pr.3^ p .663.
But the Court managed to find a legal technicality on which
to base th e ir  would-be reformist conclusions, ^his is  the ’’doctrine
93of colourable leg is la tion” which as we have seen e a rlie r , has been
re lied  upon by the Court whenever i t  cannot find an effective lagal
9kground for intervention. We have already shown that that doctrine
should be lim ited only to such cases where the existence of the power
is  in  question. I t  cannot be used, i t  is  submitted, as a general.
residuary technique to question the reasonability or des irab ility
95of the exercise of a c learly established power.
Although fia jendragadkar J . ’ s comments were lim ited to matters
of education, the 50 per cent requirement was re lied  upon even while
considering the "carry forward'1 rule in  administrative matters. Thus
96in  Devadassan v Union Mudholkar J. applied th is 50 per cent require­
ment to prevent the Government from carrying over to the next year
reserved seats which had not in  fact been u tilised  in  the previous 
97year or years. Although Gajendragadkar J. was not a party to this
judgement, he obviously approved of th is  extension of the 50 per cent
rule to a to ta lly  d ifferent situation by concurring in  Wanchoo J . ’ s
98judgement in  B. N. Tewari v Union.
93* See supra Chapter III pp.
9^ -. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 6*f9 at pr.35 p .663- No authority is  cited to 
fidpport the application of the doctrine in  th is  area.
95• See supra Chapter III pp.
96. A.I.R. 196 -^ S.C. 179 at pr.13 p .186. Note the bland statement on 
the a p p licab ility  of B a la ji's  case at c o l.2 (of the same page) "What 
th is  Court has la id  down there would also apply to the present case."
97* Ib id . But note the emphasis on equality at pr.15 p . l88.
98. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1430 at lf+32 Note the fact that Wanchoo J. is  in  
fact a C iv il Service judge and is  usually mindful of the need to respect 
administrative convenience. Thus he dissented in  General Manager v 
Rangachari A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36 where i t  was held that A rt. 16(^) applied 
also to promotions.
This whole policy was e ffec tive ly  questioned by Subba Rao J. 
in  his dissenting judgement in  Devadassan1s case. Subba Rao J. r ig h tly  
stuck to the constitutional problem (perhaps, i f  one may venture a 
w itticism , for the f i r s t  time in  his career in  the Court) and stated P
"The only question . . .  is  whether in  the instant case the 
State did not provide fo r the reservation of appointment or 
posts, (s ic) I  find i t  d i f f ic u lt  to say that the provision for  
'carry forward* is  not fo r the reservation of appointments for 
the said Cadfes or Tribes. I t  is  not for th is  Court to prescribe 
the mode of reservation." 99
m, 10<The learned judge took the view that the overall picture must be taken 
and that there is  only cause for complaint i f  the reservation is  dis­
proportionate taking the needs of the community as a whole.
"Reservation made in  one selection or spread over many 
selections is  only a convenient method of implementing the 
provision of reservation. Unless i t  is  established that an 
unreasonably disproportionate part of the cadre strength is  
f i l le d  up with the said Castes and Tribes, i t  is  not possible 
to contend that the provision is  not one of reservation but 
amounts to an extinction of the fundamental r ig h t."  101
One must endorse this approach. We can see how the majority of the
Court created an argument on the legal excuse of questioning a colourable
exercise of power, found i t  a colourable exercise of power because the
reservations could lower standards of education, but la te r  completely
forgot both the context in  which the 50 per cent rule was mentioned as
well as the doctrine of colourable leg is la tio n , the a p p licab ility  of
which was at no stage adequately discussed.
99. A .I.R . 1964 S.C. 179 at pr.26 p.190.
100. Ib id  at pr.27 p .192 where commenting on the "carry forward" rule  
he makes the commonsense observation: "This provision certain ly caused 
hardship to the individuals who applied for the second and th ird  selec­
tio n , . . .  though the non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes, 
taken as one u n it, were benefited in  the e a rlie r  selection or selections. 
This in justice to individuals, which is  inherent to any scheme of reser­
vation, cannot in  my view make the provision for reservation any-the-less 
a provision for reservation."
101. Ib id  at pr.28 p .192.
r r*v.-  ^o
To conclude, one can see thqt while approaching the problem
of protective discrimination, the Court has not re a lly  been able to
102get away from its  cosmopolitan notions of equality and taken a 
reformist stand in  search for a secular criterion  for backwardness*
But the task of trying to find a proper secular c riterion  is  in  
i t s e lf  a task which the Court is  i l l  equipped to take on. Notions 
of ’’equality of opportunity" have once again persuaded the Court to 
impose severe lim itations on Government administrative schemes lik e  
the "carry forward" ru le . There is , in  its  only su perfic ia lly  consis­
tent judgements, a lo t that smacks of reform and p o litic s . One is  
forced to make the conclusion that in  matters of re lig ion  and problems 
peculiar to an Indian setting the attitude of the Court is  more that 
of in te lle c tu a l mandarins relying on th e ir  fund of reformist ideas 
and trying to impose these ideas on the Government.
■^ t is  respectfully submitted that in  a large number of these 
problems, whether concerned with re lig ion  or minority protection, the 
Court should stick to the problem before them rather than assume the 
general moderating ro le . Such matters should be decided with reference 
to the lives  of the Indian people and in  the lig h t of governmental 
problems and not according to abstract, though conceivable well meant, 
theories of equality and secularism -  however progressive these 
theories may appear to be.
102. See for example the ex tra -ju d ic ia l comments of K.Subba Rao: Man. 
and Society (1971) 81-82.
3. The Supreme Court and Industrial Law - an interesting example of
judicial intervention ?
An extended and considered analysis of the Supreme Court’ s
contribution to industria l law is  beyond the scope of th is  thesis and
can be traced elsewhere,'*' but at the same time one cannot ignore th is
2contribution altogether. By one estimate the Court had decided 593
reported cases, which is  a significant proportion i f  we remember that
its  o f f ic ia l reports disclose a to ta l of approximately 5i000 cases.^
Of course not a l l  these cases are d irec tly  concerned with in dustria l
A
law. Some, lik e  Bharat Bank v Employees , were concerned with the 
Court’ s power to in terfere  with decisions of labour appellate tribunals. 
Again the famous case on the Bonus Act of 1965i Jalan Trading Co. v
5
M ill Mazdoor Sabha can quite easily be described (as we shall show 
la te r )  as a case on delegated leg is la tio n . But the cumulative effect 
of a l l  these cases is  that the Courts (and particu larly  the Supreme 
Court) exercise a fa ir  amount of supervisory control in  industria l 
matters. So much so that the present Chief Justice of India com­
plained b it te r ly  :
"No other such Court has to settle  the labour disputes of 
a country. Our Supreme Court deals with dismissal of employees,
1. The best (even i f  w ritten for practitioners) is  that given by 
Soonavala: The Supreme Court and Industria l Law ( I967 Bombay).
2. Ib id : The l i s t  of cases is  given at the beginning of the book. 
Though the figure in  the book is  588 note that 5 cases belong to the 
Federal Court, and there are 10 extra cases inserted in  the te x t.
5 . See the deta ils  in  Chapter I ,  Section 5«
k. A .I.R . 19g0 S.C. 188.
5. A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 691.
retrenchment, bonus, wage scales, g ratu ity , t i f f i n  allowance, 
and a host of other things.11 6
This view is endorsed by a former Attorney General who goes one step
further to add :
11 Controversies have however, in  my view been r ig h tly  raised 
as to the correctness and wisdom of some of the trends underlying 
th is  formidable structure of labour jurisprudence. In  a number 
of judgements rendered by the Court, there are phrases lik e  
"social welfare*, 'social justice' and dynamic development. Does 
the Code of Jurisprudence evolved by the Court re a lly  assist 
these desirable objective ? Having regard to the circumstances 
of our country, has not the Court gone woefully astray ? We 
seem to have adopted ideas and maxims prevailing in  certain  
western countries without consideration of our own existing  
conditions . . .  Responsible persons with close knowledge of the 
needs of industry have expressed the view that the slant given 
by the jurisprudence of the Court has harmed the country." 7
And this takes us to the crux of the problem. Can the Supreme Court, 
as a supervisory Court of Appeal, manned by judges trained in  Common 
law methods, rea lly  tackle the problems of Industria l policy ? Are 
they re a lly  in  a position to question wage increases or decreases, 
measure the amount of bonus to be paid, work what amounts to a prices 
and incomes policy, play the umpire and pass an opinion els to whether 
a particu lar punishment, promotion, retrenchment or transfer is  ju s ti­
fie d , or question the edtent and leve l of minimum wages ? Assuming 
that they have both the time and information, can they use th is  
information through the lim ited in terstices within which th e ir  Common 
law methods operate ?
6. S.M .Sikri: Speech before the Chandigarh Bar -  reported at (1971)
I  S.C.J. Jn l. 72 at 73 c o l. l .  Similar remarks were made in  his informal 
ta lk  at the In s titu te  of Advanced Legal Studies. "T iffin "  allowance 
means lunch allowance -  " t i f f in "  being the metal box in  which an Indian 
workman ( i f  he is  fortunate enough to possess both i t  and the food to 
go in  i t )  carries his food to work. A sim ilar eomplaint was constantly 
made by one of his predecessors, M.Hida^atullah (see Setalvad: My L ife  
(1971) 603.
7. Setalvad: My L ife  (1971) 568-9. I  haye omitted references made 
in  the passage quoted suggesting that the Supreme Court followed an 
in fla tion ary  wage policy. For a non-legal survey see A.S.Mathur:
Labour Policy and Industria l Relations in  India (1968 Agra).
The development of Industria l law in  the Court is  associated 
with Justice Gajendragadkar, who himself regards industria l jurisprudence
g
as a "distinguishing feature of Indian democracy’1. His readiness to
in terfere  in  industria l matters can be contrasted with the fcrepidity
9 Twith which English judges approach the problem. J-f we are re a lly  to 
believe in  what Justice Gajendragadkar calls  Industria l Democracy, 
surely i t  should be clear to the Court that i t  is  up to the Unions to 
fctrengthen themselves and bargain with Industry, using whatever per­
suasive permissable legal tactics are available to them. The Court's 
intervention is  disapproved by management and in  the ultimate analysis 
must unquestionably weaken the v ia b ility  of the Unions in  the long run 
because they have to sacrifice th e ir  own independent tactics in  favour 
of Court in te rven tio n .^
In  fact one can safely argue that in  certain matters the 
policy of the Court has led to the creation of d iffe re n tia ls . Thus 
in  J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. M ills  Co. v Labour Appellate Tribunal,^* 
Gajendragadkar J. held that "gardeners” attached to a m ill colony
8. Gajendragadkar: The Constitution of India (1970 O.U.P.); see also 
his comments in  his forword to ^atel: Industria l Disputes Act 1947 (19^3 
Bombay) v i i i .  Gajendragadkar J. wrote the Report of the Bank Award 
Commission (1955) • His la te r  role in  the Supreme’.-Court shows that he 
was to continue this "a rb itra l” attitude even as a judge. The best, 
though extremely u n critica l, account of his contribution in  th is  area 
is  by S.Dhyani: Justice Gajendragadkar and labour law (1967) 7 J a i.L .J n l.
69. On Industria l Jurisprudence in  India see also P.B.Mukharji: The new 
Jurispcudence (1970) Chapter 11.
9- Note the lecture of Lord Donovan (who wrote a general report on Trade 
^nions (1968) Cmnd. 3623) Trade Union Law, Middle Temple H a ll, A pril 29- 
30 1969* The lecture has been reproduced. See also the comments of Lord 
Justice Scrutton quoted in  K.W.Wedderburn: The worker and the law (1971 
London) 26. See generally the comments of Wedderbum on intervention  
at pp.17-30.
10. Note Subba Sao J . ’ s comments in  Man and Society (1971) 73*4- that 
trade unions must be controlled.
11. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 737
, rv
V. J. ^
were industrial workers and were entitled to the benefits that other
workmen got. But in  the recent decision in  Madras Gymkhana Club Employees
Union v Management the Court held that a large club employing almost
200 employees and having a wage b i l l  of Rs. 2,00,000 was not an ’’industry” .
13Even though, as has been suggested, th is  decision may have been
Hidayatullah C .J .'s  l i t t l e  attempt to lim it  the Court’ s a c tiv ity  in
industria l matters, the decision could affect fa ir ly  seriously the
14mobility of labour towards certain kinds of jobs. Indeed th is  
dmonstrates that even simple matters of interpretation may ultim ately  
involve carefully  considered policy matters.
Consider the recent case on the Bonus Act 1963* Jalan Trading
15
Co. y M ill Mazdoor Sabha, where the Court had to consider whether 
the Government plans to give statutory effect to the bonus scheme 
created by the Courts in  what has been Sailed the F u ll Bench Formula.^  
Here the majority of the Court were obviously disturbed by the fact 
that the Government’ s formula d iffered from the Court’ s formula in  as
17much as i t  considered entitlement to bonus irrespective of the p ro fit .
But instead of invalidating i t  on thqt ground, the majority of the 
Court invalidated i t  on the ground of ’’excessive delegation”. That
12. A .I.R . 1968 S.C. 334. Note the analysis of P.G.Drishnan: The meaning 
of Industry under the Industria l Disputes Act (1970) 12 J . I . L . I . 177*
13. Setalvad; My L ife  (1971) 603.
14. Since persons working in  an ’’industry” w ill  naturally  be in  a 
stronger bargaining position.
13. A .I.R . 1967 S.C. 691- Note the comments of G.S.Sharma: Economic 
Justice and the Indian Constitution; Some implications of the Bonus 
Case (1966) 8 J . I . L . I . 457-
16. Ib id  at pr.22 p .703-4; pr.55 p.713-4.
17- Ib id  at pr.26 p .703 Col.2; see also pr.62 p .216-7•
the use of this Constitutional law technique is not free from question
can be seen from Hidayatullah J.’s judgement (for Ramaswami J. and
himself) that the Court had condoned such a delegation of power in 
l8the past* But this case demonstrates how the Court caught up in
common-law fears about the delegation of power may confuse "economic
policy and objectives" with a technical legalism which may not really
be suited to the task that the Court has assigned to itself.
Examples of how the Court has introduced legal notions into
19industrial matters can be multiplied. In the end we must also remember
that the Court is twice ( and in some cases thrice) removed from the
scene of litigation. Can the Court really undertake to test the
yeracity of, digest and evaluate the material placed before them with
an impartiality which satisfies labour, the businessman and the needs
of the economy ?
Once again the Court has moved on the theoretical assumption
that it must provide the lead in these matters. Thus we find Wanchoo J.
commenting on the need to continue the employment of women who get 
20married, and Gajendragadkar J. commenting on the need to remove socio-
21economic disparities. The mainspring of the Court’s interference is
22that due attention must be paid to Directive Principles, even though
18. Ibid at pr.85 p.723.
19* See generally the examples collected by S.N.Dhyani (cited supra f.n.8)
Although the account is uncritical, one can see how interventionist the 
policy of the Supreme Court has been. At one stage (p.70) Dhyan*. speaks 
approvingly of how "The Court arranged itself into ’a third Chamber of 
legislature’ for protecting the interests of socially and economically 
privileged segments of Indian society."
20. Bombay Labour Union v Industrial Franchises A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 9^2»
21. See supra f.n. 11 at pr. i<\ p. "71*3 . This is the attitude that
Gajendragadkar J. has consistently taken. See generally the comments 
in the various references cited in f.n.8 (supra).
22. Gajendragadkar : The Constitution of India (supra f.n.8 ) 51-55 
suggesting that "some of the Directive Principles are intended to serve 
as the foundation of industrial jurisprudence in India.”
as we have already seen, the Court has generally followed these
23principles to suit its own convenience. But these principles have
been addressed to the legislatu res and are not justiciable in the
24 r-uCourts. ^he Court1 s assumption of the role of paymaster and school 
teacher, who adjudicates on the amount of pocket money a worker may 
get and when his "action” can be considered not mischievous enough 
to be considered (^ legitimate industrial action leaves a lot to be 
desired. Unlike its attitudes in religious matters, its undisguised 
protectionism in industrial matters not only freezes the initiative 
which the various contending groups should try to build up, but 
intrudes directly into matters of economic policy, which common-law 
techniques of interpretation are ill equipped to handle.
23« See generally supra Chapter II, Section 3 (iii) on "Directive 
Principles of State Policy".
24. A rt ic le  37-
4. Conclusion
V/e can see from our miscellany of cases that in general the 
Supreme Court has tried to keep abreast of cosmopolitan learning, and 
even tried to justify its obviously traditional attitudes to issues 
like "Obscenity” and Contempt of Court in the terms of that learning. 
But in spite of this instinctive traditional attitude, the Court has 
in the main tried to be academic, reformist and "secular". "Secular" 
here must be taken to mean an attitude whereby the Court does not 
consider traditional aspects of the matter but seeks to place them 
on what is described as a "rational basis", ^he Court seems to 
want to play the part of "social reformer" and moderator on a large 
number of issues, stretching from the definition of Hinduism to intri­
cate matters of wage determination. It does not seriously question 
the capacity of tis techniques to cope with these situations. We 
are still faced with problems of inconsistert voting behaviour (which 
is the only explanation for the ghange of emphasis in the meaning of 
backwardness) and the use of dubious technical doctrines to usher 
in their poiht of view. The Court has in some of these areas gone 
far behond the role of a third Court of Appeal, it has taken on the 
role of social reform. This approach has varied from time to time 
and depended disconcertingly on the attitude of the individual judge.
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusions and some comments.
The limitations on effective judicial action.
Before we proceed any further, we must make a preliminary 
point about the nature of the judicial process. We have already shown*' 
that, inter alia, the fear of anonymity has made many lawyers and 
judges in India think that they can become "leaders” and "social 
reformers" through their vocation. Irrespective of the possibilites 
that may be created by their social position (if any) we must at the 
outset state that the "judicial methods" they have inherited from the 
common-law tradition impose severe limitations on the extent to which 
judges (and still less lawyers) can take an active role in intitiating, 
preserving and furthering the cause of social reform. The lawyer and 
the judge are really technicians performing a function, whether this
consists in disposing of the "trouble case", in "preventive action" or
3
in allocating the emphasis within the power structure. Indeed, one 
must support the view of an American jurist that in the ultimate analysis 
even the broad presumptions that often underlie a judgement must in 
fact emanate eventually' from the parties themselves.^ f^his is not to
1. See Chapter I, Sections 1-3 (supra).
2. For an extremely good, even though eclectic analysis of these 
methods from the point of view of an Indian Supreme Court judge see 
Hidayatullah: Judicial Methods (1970* B.N.Rau Lectures).
3* ^he terminology is taken from Karl Llewellyn: The normative, the 
legal and the law jobs (19*t0) 4-9 Yale L.J. 1355- A very realistic 
account of the real role that lawyers and judges play.
4. L.Fuller? The forms and limits of adjudication reprinted in edited 
form in Hart 8c Sacks: Legal Process: Basic Problems in the making and 
application of law (1938, Cam. Mass. ) 421-6; Ibid: Adjudication and 
the rule of law (i960) 34 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law 1. Note also his comments in The morality of law (1964) 
170 ff. but contrast his somewhat wider stand in The anatomy of law 
(1972 Penguin Books) part 2 generally.
deny that the law has to he defined within a certain background of
social consensus and in terpreted in  that l ig h t .  A large part of the 
5
Cftrdozo thes is , which would see the lawyer and judge as playing a 
v i ta l  ro le  in  the rearrangement of social a f fa ir s ,  must be amended 
to take note of the lim ited  functions that the le g a l machinery plays 
in  disposing of the problem case -  fo r u ltim ate ly  lawyers are concerned 
w ith only those problems that a society is  unable to resolve otherwise. 
Equally one must not make too much o f the range of social in te res ts  
that ju r is ts  l ik e  Roscoe Pound sought to introduce in  the law at the
g
turn of the century. But changing the rules (and a ttitu d es  to these 
ru les) o f in te rp re ta tio n  is  one thing and re-assessing the ro le  of the 
lawyer and the judge in  the l ig h t  of the wider p o s s ib ilit ie s  afforded 
by the new rules quete another.
But yet lawyers and judges in  Ind ia  s t i l l  seem to nurture the 
view that they have an important re le  to play in  the rebuild ing of the 
nation, Thus as la te  as 19&5 Gajendragadkar, then the Chief
Justice of In d ia , said :
”We lawyers and Judges, are often inclined to concentrate 
a l l  our a tten tion  on the work w ith which we are busy from day 
to  day and are apt to forget the purpose which our work is  
intended to serve and the motive force on which adm inistration  
of ju s tice  in  a democratic country is  founded. I  o ften fe e l 
that lawyers and judges who take delight and pride in  using 
th e ir  tools in  the discharge o f th e ir  professional duties, 
are l ik e  the workmen who helped to build  the Taj without ever 
having appreciated the synthetic beauty of the magnificent 
structure they were bu ild ing . The beauty of the law and i t s
B.CBtrdozo: The nature of the .judicial process (Lectures delivered  
at ^ale in  1921). The u t i l i t y  of these lectures in  exposing the factors  
that go in to  making the leg a l process should not be underestimated.
For a ty p ic a l reaction to Gardozo see^G.N.Vaidya*s (Judge, Bombay High 
Court) contribution to M.B.Ma|umdar: P rinc ipa l Pandit^Law Legal 
Education (1972) 3-^*
6. For the survey of in terests  that Pound thought the law must encom­
pass see I I I  Jurisprudence. See also the discussion by Julius Stone: 
Social dimensions of law and justice  (196^) Chapters *t-6.
mighty role in the democratic process are not present in our
minds as we do our duties from day to day.
Law in a democracy works as a mightly weapon in the 
achievement of democratic ideal of socio-economic justice 
... Democracy is now set on its dynamic ideal of establishing 
an Egalitarian State, and in the achievement of this ideal
law is the great ally and indeed its major weapon. 7
It is impossible to judge the Supreme Court by these standards. We
must in the main revert back to legal criteria and pass comment on judges
the Supreme Court on the basis of their legal disciplines and the
manner in which they used the techniques available to them to make
law in India as India1s needs require from time to time, which one
must stress is quite a different thing from social reform.
Methods used in decision making.
Some comment on the formal techniques used by the Court is
called for. The most important feature of the Court's techniques
is the manner in which the Court is able to ignore its earlier
decisions or use or apply them arbitrarily or tendentiously or
8unpredictably. We have seen that their formal, technical attitude
to precedent is that it must be respected and not deviated from
unless there is a compelling reason to do so. Although the Court
9has been fairly casual in overruling earlier precedent in actual 
fact the Court has not relied on the established techniques of
7- Speech at the Satara Par. The quotation is taken from the summary 
report en titled : Philosophy of law (1965) 67 Bom.L.R.Jnl. 33• Note 
also the Comments of K.Subba Eao: Han and Society (1971) 26-27 1 5*1-5» 
6 l-2 . Contrast the straightforward approach of S.M.Sikri, in  his speech 
at Chandigarh:. (1971) I S.C.J. Jn l. 72 f f .  and especially that of 
Justice Kondaiah reported (1971) 1 An.W.R. Jnl. 3-12; P.J.Reddy (of 
the Supreme Court); Some stray thoughts (1970) 11 Guj.L.R. Jn l. 25*
See further R.Deb: Law in  a Changing Society (1970) 11 Guj.LTR. J n l. 11.
8. Chapter I I  Section 1
9- Chapter I I  Section 1
overruling. Instead the Court indulged in selective referencing and 
ignored the decisions which they did not want to consider. Judges 
have often changed their minds and varied the emphasis they have laid 
on earlier cases. A good example of this is Shah J.’s attitude to 
Sitabati ^evi's case while considering the effect of the concept of 
reasonableness on laws relating to acquisition.^ More importantly
the judgements of the High Courts are sometimes ignored completely.
11 12 Thus in the case of the problem of adoption and Hindu Women’s rights,
we find the Supreme Court passing judgement almost as if there was no
controversy before the High Courts. The specific approval of Ankush
13Narayan’s case in Sitabai’s case is another instance in point, and
had made one foreign critic seriously wonder if the overworked Supreme
Court judges read judgements of the High Courts other than those
14-ref erred to them in afgument. All this has created confusion in the
law' especially if we remember that even obiter dicta in a Supreme
13Court judgement are binding on all Courts in India. It hardly ever 
happens that all the important authorities are discussed while con­
sidering a particular problem. It is very difficult to assess whether 
this is because they w&re not cited ip. argument or whether the judges 
did not themselves consider them, because law reports in India have 
abandoned the practice of giving summary reports of the arguments and 
the cases cited before the Court. The fact that the Court is overworked"*"'
10. Chapter III Section 5* (iy).
11. Chapter VI Section 2
12. Chapter VI Section 3
13* Chapter VI Section 2
14-. ^his remark was made by Professor Derrett while commenting on the 
draft of my Chapter VI before it went to the typist.
15« Chapter II Section 1
16. Chapter II Section 6 and Appendix II
does not entirely explain a failuae to look at all the authorities, if
we consider the long lectures on political philosophy given ip Golak 
17Path’s case and the summary of Marxism given by the Court in
l8fiframboodripad*s case. Equally judges seem to have the time to under-
19take to deliver lectures and edit books whilfc- still on the Bench.
One must assume that lack of time and pressure of work are amongst 
the factors and that the main source of this apparent lack of 
"precedent consciousness” (in a system that lives by precedent) can be 
attributed to the ineptness of counsel and a disquieting lack of 
interest in the judges of the Supreme Court themselves in trying to 
evolve a comprehensive and complete picture of the disputed points of 
law on a particular subject. They do not aim to be "academics” and 
"academics" they evidently are not.
Even more serious is the fact that because of this lack of 
"precedent consciousness" we find that the Court often uses legal 
principles flexibly to achieve particular objectives, fake for 
example the extended use made of the doctrine of colourable legis­
lation. It was introduced into the law in dubious circumstances in
20Kameshwar Singh’s case and then extended to all kinds of situations
21like the meaning of "compensation" or the extent to which reservation
22can be made for backward classes, without further discussion. This 
is squally true of the rwie of . i. the doctrine that a chose of action
17• Chapter VII Section 1 (iv)
18. Chapter VII Section l(ii)
19. Chapter I Section k
20. Chapter III Section If (if')
21. Chapter III Section 5" (1)
22. Chapter VII Section 2 00
I '21
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cannot be acquired. These are, as we have stressed, examples of
’’non-neutrality", ^feut they are also examples of what could be dubbed
carelessness, but is probably a special style of selectivity, whi£h
may ultimately be recognised as India's own.
An even greater measure of uncertainty has been introduced
into the Court's attitudes because of the changing Bench structure.
We have demonstrated at several places in the thesis that different
judges deciding the same point of law gs part of differently constitu-
25
ted Benches reach different results. This was particularly true of 
the judgements of K. Subba Kao J. aid we have already seen how 
Hidayatullah J. has been forced to write a separate judgement to 
explain that he did not fully support some of the wide observations
26 mmade by the former. The earlier judgements are not overruled but the 
accent on the observations made in them is changed slightly,
-. _ It is characteristic of India that new ideas are added
without old ideas being discarded. A good example of this are decisions 
on the meaning of "backward classes" where we find different judges
27emphasising either the traditional or "secular" criteria before them.
The result is that law does not evolve in the Supreme Court, it meanders
28between extremes, as can be seen from the cases on compensation.
23. Chapter II Section 3
2^ . Chapter II Section 3 (i)
25. This is demonstrated at several places, principally in Chapters 
III and IV. Note K.Subba Kao's sanguine remark in Man and Society (1971) 
77 "Even so, as more than two judges and sometimes five or more sit in
the Supreme^Court benches, the personal equation will to a large extent
be offset by conflict and compromise."
26. See Chapter III p$*70 Chapter IV pp.3SD~5?l
27. Chapter VII Section 2
28. Chapter III Section S CO
This, it is submitted, is India’s version of the "happy mean", i.e. a
broad margin of tolerance, which is a variety within the common-law
pattern and not to be judged by the standards of highly integrated and
consolidated commonwealth countries.
In all this the judgement writer plays a very important role.
we have demonstrated statistically that in the Supreme Court Chief
Justices or prospective Chief Justices dominate the judgement-writing 
29 tfunction. xt is difficult to assess what really happens between the
moment when arguments are closed and when judgement is delivered. An
30incomplete picture of this was given by Chief Justice Sikri. One
judge elects to write the judgement (the seniormost judge having the
first option) and draft copies of the judgement are circulated to the
judges who constituted the Bench that decided the particular case.
These judges :.may well be, by that time, members of different Benches
and writing different judgements on totally different points of law.
Indeed Justice Sikri himself admitted to being responsible for fifteen
judgements a week - a burden which speaks for itself and excludes the
possibility (if this were wanted) of academic balance and completeness.
In the context of all this one can legitimately ask - How much attention
can the concurring judges pay to the "small print" of a leading judgement ?
3hIndeed, as we have already shown, dissent usually proceeds not because
of disagreement with the small print of tie leading judgement but rather
because of the theoretical attitude of the judge to the particular
Class of problem before him. is certainly true of Bose J.fs
32dissenting judgements in the matter of preventive detention, most of 
29- Chapter I Section 3
30. At his lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, June 21 1971-
St. .Chapter I Section 5
32. Chapter IV generally.
Subba Rao’s dissents and Hegde J.’s dissent in the Dhanwatey cases on
33the problem of directors* fees and the claims of the joint family. 
Perhaps the only examples of puie ad hoc dissents can be found in the 
judgements of Sarkar J. (a much underrated judge) and Kapur J.*s
3h
notable dissent in Nanavati*s case, which contrasts sharply with
his own overtly theoretical and doctrinaire dissenting judgement in
V. V. Giri*s case.^
Returning to our problem, should this tendency be checked
and if so how is it to be checked ? The American practice of the whole
Court sitting together is hardly feasible partly because of the nature
of the arrears that the Court has to clear^ and partly because the
Court changes its personnel at the average of two to three judges a 
37year. In any event the whole Court sitting together will hardly 
minimise the importance of the leading judgement writer. These argu-
38
ments also hold good for the reform suggested by a judge of the Court 
that permanent specialised benches bhould be established by the 
Supreme Court to consider certain kinds of cases. We are forced to 
admit that there is no structural answer to the problem and it is up 
to the judges themselves to respect earlier judgements and consider 
the views of earlier judges, in the interest of consistency if nothing
33. Chapter V AO'u}
34. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1/2 see supra Chapter I p$^- |vv aS Chapter II pp 13S 
35* Chapter VII Section 2
36. The arrears argument was relied on heavily by Chief Justice Sikri 
in his speech at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies June 21 1971* 
On the magnitude of the problem see supra Chapter II Section 6 and 
infra Appendix II.
37* Supra Chapter I Section 4-.
38. Suggested by M.H.Beg, Judge of the Supreme Court, in a letter to 
the present writer dated Feb. 1^ 1972. This was only one of the 
solutions offered.
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else. This does not imply that they should give up their power of 
overruling an earlier case. The power of overruling, discriminately 
used, taust be recognised in such a way as to leave no room for doubt 
and no loose ends. The present techniques used by the Court are 
inconsistent and,to the eye of any student of the common law system, 
a form of judicial manipulation which sits ill with the rest of the 
armoury of the Court’s techniques.
Whence does the Court get its theoretical nourishment ?
At the beginning of this thesis we asked ourselves the question 
whether the Court relied mainly on Indian or western ideas for their 
inspiration and whether they were really another kind of brown Englishman 
in India.
We have seen that in public law matters a large part of the
Court’s jurisprudence has in fact come from western sources. Occasionally
the Court tries to link modern notions with traditional learning, as
39in R. M. D. Chamarabaghwalla1 s case. Lawyers and judges have also
i|Q
tried to do this extra judicially and we find Subba Rao J. actually
Zf1
suggesting that the Indian Constitution was based on the Bhagwad Gita 1
Apart from these casual references,in the main the Court seems to rely
on cosmopolitan ideas. There are however instances where the judges
gauge the ’’Indianness” of a situation even while adopting a western
42style. Thus in a recent case we find Hidayatullah C.J. rightly 
deciding that a politician whose private life has been exposed in a 
criminal trial, would suffer enough socially and did not merit
39- Chapter III Section 3 '3Ln-9~\S ^  B S .
40. Chapter I Sections 1 - 2  generally 
4-1. Subba Rao: Man and Society (1971) 14-15 
42. Laiq Singh v U.P. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 658.
an unusually high sentence, but took care to mention that his wrong-
43doings reminded the learned judge of Justine by de Sade.
Thus while considering the law of property the Court seems
to have regarded property rights as exclusive rights and seemed willing
44to protect almost any intrusion on the right to property. They seemed
45to have overlooked the Indian theory of property which does not 
regard several claims on a property right as mutually exclusive, but 
tries to accommodate as many of them as possible, without trying to 
regard one claim as notionally more important than another. Chief 
Justice Subba |(ao had tried to justify the Court’s attitude on the
46grounds that the poor benefit from it. Sven so, the attitude of the
Supreme Court has not helped to distribute claims to property in a
manner peculiar to the theoretical and practical views of the Indian
people. Even more startling is the Court’s attitude to preventive 
47detention. Here the Court first mechanically relied on the text of 
the Constitution, but later treated the power of preventive detention 
as if it were a simple exercise of administrative power, ^he result 
has been that the Court has increased its powers of review and inter- 
fered with administrative details at the expense of what were 
considered to be the settled principles of administrative law.
The Court appears to have assumed a theoretical position about the 
nature of the individual and the State, and then arbitrated mechanically
43- Ibid at .
44. See generally Chapter III
45. Chapter III Section X
46. Subba Ra2>: Han and Society (1971) 21-2.
47. See Chapter IV generally.
See Chapter IV pp. SS'SL-3fc4- *
between the conflicting claims on the basis of cosmopolitan juris­
prudence* It is this theoretical assumption that underlies the Court's 
judgement in Golak hath*s case.
But even this theoretical assumption breaks down when the
50Court has to protect itself and the rest of the judiciary from criticism,
decide onthe meaning of obscenity,^* or make an intrusion into established
52concepts of official secrecy. In all these cases the Court seems to 
have relied on native instincts and needs even though it has tried to 
preserve its tone of cosmopolitan objectivity. Thus we can see that 
although traditional factors have operated through an undeclared but 
clearly idendifiable instinct for traditional matters, in the main the 
Court has thought of its function as not lagging behind the principles 
of cosmopolitan jurisprudence.
One would have expected that in personal law matters the 
Court would have taken a different point of view. But more often than 
not the Court has merely operated within the confines of principles 
emerging from decisions established by the Privy Council. The rare
exceptions tend to prove the rule. This is certainly true of their
53attitude to the joint family and particularly to directors’ fees.
Again there is the example of the attitude of the Court to Pious 
Obligation (P.O.) and the antecedency rule. The Court seems to have 
ignored completely the true nature of the pious obligation, and 
became caught in the Maze of principles established in the Privy Council’s 
judgement in Brij Narain*s case, relying feebly on the limited solutions
k9 . Chapter V II Section 1 (Iv )
50. Chapter V I I  Section 1 ( i i )
51. Chapter VII Section 1 (i)
52 Chapter V I I  Section 1 ( i i i )
53 Chapter V Section Gii)
£27
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offered by Anglo-Hindu law. The test of a good Supreme Court judgement 
seems to have become - was the Court ready if necessary to overrule
the Privy Council ? Sometimes this has been justified, as in the case
55of Srinivas v Narayan on adoption or the overruling of Gokal Chand's
56case in Raj Kumar*s case. This might seem to have become something
of a fashion, as can be seen in Ramaswami J.'s attempt to dispute the
^rivy Council's famous judgement in Tagore v Tagore, in Raman Nadar1s 
57case, but it was safe to do this because the learning was displayed obiter
58This has been rightly treated by a foreign observer as a want of 
legal history in the Court.
Native instinct has played a part as can be seen in judgements
^ 59
like Goli Sswariah's case and M. K. Streman s case when the Court
preserved tradition even in the face of a revenue situation. Again,
one of the most remarkable judgements in Hindu law is Guramma v Hallappa^
where the Court seems to have impliedly (and obviously inadvertently)
sanctioned the practice of giving dowries, but at the same time managed
to creatively up-date traditional notions to suit changed circumstances.
The same judge's (Subba Rao J.) judgement in Haghavamma v Chenchamma
(on communicating the intention to sever) is equally remarkable.^
54. Chapter VI Section 1
55* Chapter VI Section 2
56. Chapter V Section 3l (in)
57- A.I.K. 1970 S.C.1759
58. Derrett: ^he want of legal history in the Supreme Court (1971) 
M.L.J. ffnl. ^ 9 - 4 ^ 5 '  - " ~
59- Chapter V Section 3 0*0 (^V
60. Chapter VI Section 5
61. Chapter V Section *2>Gl0
I \ r-,, ^
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But the latter judgement seems to ignore traditional attitudes almost 
completely, while the former suffers from not having considered all 
the various aspects involved in the problem before the Court - which 
is something we have learned to fear from judgements of the Court.
Judges as Reformers, Leaders and PhilosopheryKings.
Some mention must be made of the inelegant sense of reform
that seems to find growing credence with the judges of the Court. The
Court seems to have been'committed to the view that a large part of
traditional living patters are irrational and therefore not "secular".
"Secularism" seems to have acquired a transcendental quality which
can only be identified with western ideas of rationalism. This is to
be seen only too clearly in the Court’s decisions on the definition of
property, its view of religion and religious practices and its ideas
64
on protective discrimination. A typical statement of the kind of 
attitude adopted can be seen from an extrajudicial comment made by ex- 
Chief Justice Gajendragadkar :
"Secular matters and civil problems have to be dealt with 
according to reason and according to the basic values of a 
democracy. In the discussion and decision of these matters, 
religion is entirely irrelevant. The problems which Indian 
democracy has to face are many and complex, but Indian demo­
cracy is determined not to allow any religious considerations 
to trespass into the discussion of these problems." 65
62. Chapter III Section 3
63. Chapter VII Section 2
64. Chapter VII Section 2
65» P.B.Gajendragadkar: The Constitution of India (1970) 41. Contrast
Subba Eao: Man and Society (1971) 15 » "The political attempt to im­
plant the quixotic tree of perverted doctrine of secularism of foreign 
extraction in the religious soil of India has not only failed but in 
the process has by weakening religion deflated the Indian character."
Subba Kao J.'s dissent in Devadassan1 s case shows that the
Court has often assumed a reformist stand even though the Constitution
did not give them the power to introduce such notions into the problem 
66before them. And this takes us to the crux of the problem - cam, 
and should, the judges regard themselves as leaders in matters of 
social reform ?
^his is particularly important if we consider emerging 
problems like the reform of Muslim law. Judges like V. K. Krishna
Iyer (of the Kerala High Court) have taken the view that it is up to
67 mthe judiciary to reform the law. This is even supported by Justice 
Beg, a Muslim judge who has been appointed to the Supreme Court recently.* 
The question that arises is whether the Courts or the people and legis­
lature must reform the law. One cannot help agreeing with a foreign
observer that the reform must proceed from the people and not from
69notions of reform entertained by the judiciary. This particular problem
is assuming importance as can be demonstrated by the fact that two
70important Conferences have been held on the subject. But what concerns
66. Chapter VII Section 2
67. See his judgement in ShahtotLameedan v Subaida (1970) K.L.T.
(on polygamy. Contrast the judgement of Dhavan J. in Itwari v Asghari 
A.I.E. I96Q All 68*f where the learned j£dge also does not approve of 
polygamy but tries to support his conclusion on the basis of the Koranic 
texts.). See also his judgement in Khader v Kunhamina (1970) K.L.T. 237- 
(a case on the doctrine of mushaa).
68. In a personal letter to me Jan. 6 1972. He discussed the converse 
situation of a Muslim judge trying to reform Hindu law.
69. Eerrett: A Hindu Judge's animadversions against Muslim polygamy (1970) 
72 Bom.L.R. Jnl. 6.1-3-Note generally Derrett’s views on the codification 
of Muslim law in E.L.S.I. (1968) Chapter 15-
70. See Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Congress of 
Orientalists (19^6) Vol.l. More recently the Indian Law institute 
sponsored a conference at Delhi in Dec.-Jan.1971-72. I am grateful 
to Professor J.N.D.Anderson for having given me an account of the 
proceedings and letting me have a look at his summary paper : The 
Muslim law in India' written on his return to England.
us is not the political desirability of Muslim reform coming from the
Muslims themselves but the wider question as to whether the Supreme
Court can assume the ro le  of the philosopher guardian.
The ^ourt is  hardly in  a position to assume th is  ro le .
f i r s t l y , the Court lacks the information to deal w ith fomplicated
issues of social reform. At the same time the Court lacks both the
71time and the research f a c i l i t ie s  to enter in to  the deep problems
72involved. Secondly, the common law techniques which the Court uses
make i t  necessary fo r the judge to  operate w ith in  c lea rly  defined
margins. While i t  is  true that the Court can consider a wide range
73of factors while considering the meaning of "reasonableness" i t  can
be shown that in  a large numher of cases the Court has re lie d  on leg a l
c r i te r ia .  Thus i t s  theory of permissible c la s s ific a tio n  in  A rtic le  14-
74-is  based la rg e ly  on the princip les  of delegated le g is la tio n . Moreover 
the Court seems to have attempted social reform even in  areas where
75there were no f le x ib le  concepts l ik e  reasonableness to grapple w ith .
Apart from these technical lim ita tio n s  we must question the
76view put forward by ex-Chief Justice Hidayatullah and
71* ^he Court has now got a research offices M.Iraam, who wrote a book 
called "The Indian SupremeCourt and the Constitution (1968) .
72. These are surveyed in  Chapter I I .
•73* This is  used p rim arily  in  A rtic le  1 9 (2 )-6 . This area is  being 
researched upon by T .K .K .Iyer fo r  a Ph.D. d isserta tion  fo r the London 
U nivers ity . Note that Interveners (supra Chapter I I  Section 5) can 
play an important ro le in  widening the issues before the Court. Judges 
seem to p refer to take a comparitive view of "reasonableness". See K. 
Subba Rao: Man and Society (1971) 4-9-50•
’ 174. h is is  discussed in  part in  Chapter IV  Section
75- e-g- "backward classes" in  Chapter V I I  Section 2.
76. In  Democracy and the ju d ic ia l process in  Ind ia  (1968) 6l .  One must 
in  a l l  fairness state that the learned judge has in  the main taken a 
lim ited  a ttitu d e  on the extent of ju d ic ia l in terference. See fu rth er  
at pp.66- 67•
77others that judges are , by v irtu e  of th e ir  d is c ip lin e , m  a b e tte r
position to comment on public a f fa irs  than others. This position  can
only be supported to the lim ited  extent that judges can be id e n tif ie d
with some kind of im p a rtia lity . But that is  merely a point re la ted  to
form and c re d ib ili ty  and does not necessarily mean that judges are
the most q u a lified  persons to  take a leadership ro le  in  such m atters.
In  fac t the more they in te rfe re  in  non-judicisil matters, even by lending
th e ir  services to the Government as members of Commissions, the more
78questionable th e ir  p a r t ia l i ty  w i l l  become as a social fa c to r.
One must agree w ith Professor D e rre tt1s view that lawyers (as
such) cannot re a lly  be leaders as they do not re a lly  belong to the
decision-making structure and any attempt that they might make to
assume a leadership ro le must e itjie r  be very lim ited  or be considered
79as an extra-legal activity. Indeed lawyers like N. C. Chatterjee,
77• Dr. K.N.Katju (himself an eminent lawyer and p o lit ic ia n ):  The
Indian leg a l profession A .I.R . 1965 J n l» 37* See fu rth e r C.R.Pattabhi 
Raman: Courts and the law (1970) H  sTc.J. J n l. 11; B.Jaganadha Das (a 
judge o f the Supreme Court): R esponsibilities of lawyers in  Independent 
Ind ia  A .I.R . 1952 J n l. 59; P.B.Gajendragadkar: Law, Lawyers and Judges 
( I 965) I I  S .C .J. J n l. 14; D.C.Srivastava: Legal change and the function  
of the ju d ic ia ry  (1965) 65 Bom.L.R. J n l. 8 l .  On the ju d ic ia ry  generally  
see the L e tte r o f Prof.N.B.Rakshit Sept.14 1971 Amrit Bazar Patrika  
p .6 and the rep ly of S.B.Sen on Sept. 28 1971 p.(TI
78. On th is  see the comments in  Chapter I  Section 4. Bee the Trecommen­
dations in  the 14th Report on Jud ic ia l Administration (195&) ^ o l . l ,  58 
(Recommendation l l ) .  Note that s im ila r comments havebeen made by 
G .Z e llick  in  a note on e x tra -ju d ic ia l a c t iv it ie s  of judges in  (1972) 
Public law 1-10. Since the Supreme Court has punished a s lig h tly  
d iffe re n tly  worded a r t ic le  as contempt (see H jra  La i D ix i t *s case d is­
cussed supra Chapter V I I  Section 2) one must make i t  c lear that we are 
only commenting on the e ffe c t such appointments has on the minds of 
the general pub lic.
79« D erre tt: Lawyers as leaders as part of the Seminar on Leadership 
in  South Asia organised by the Centre of South Asian Studies, hursday 
June 8 1972. "I  am g ra te fu l to both Professor D erre tt and M rl Iy e r  fo r  
discussing th e ir  views on the subject w ith me.
Mohan Kumaramanglam, Dr. K. N. K atju , must, as fa r  as any leadership  
ro le  that they might assume is  concerned, be considered p rim a rily  as 
p o lit ic ia n s  and not lawyers. To get an idea of the lim ited  ro le  that 
a lawyer is  destined to play we have only to turn to a former Attorney
SoGeneral’ s recent autobiography.
The only explanation that one can give fo r  the Supreme Court’ s
01adopting a leadership ro le in  areas of social reform and labour law 
can be on the lin e s  suggested a t the beginning of th is  thesis -  both 
the lawyer and the judge found themselves in  an unkind social limbo 
aft& r Independence, and have used th e ir  Constitutional position to  
t ry  to add to th e ir  otherwise technical functions an overt social and 
p o lit ic a l  importance. F i r s t , there was, and is ,  a vacuum in to  which 
any id e n tif ia b le  corps can move, or be forded to move; secondly, the 
t ra d it io n  of the pre-Independence ju d ic ia ry  in  Ind ia  as an arm of 
Power of the "Sarkar" enhances the self-importance and self-expectation  
of every senior ju d ic ia l o ff ic e r  in  a way unknown in  other parts of the 
commonwealth or in  the United States. The status-oriented th inking  
habits o f the Indian people have, made Indians w illin g  audiences to  
p o n tifica tio n s  from above and as a resu lt the Supreme Court's would-be 
prestige as Philosopher-Kings seems to be increasing. This has n a tu ra lly  
resulted in  the Supreme Court being caught in  a controversy w ith the 
Government« inevitab ly  see th is  as an attempt by the ju d ic ia ry
80; M.C.Setalvad: Mv life (1971)* A salient feature of the autobiography 
is the fact that there are many places where the Attorney General is 
involved in quasi political situations but, in the main, his . achieve­
ments and problems centre upon legal personalities, legal reform, Court 
judgements and legal situations.
8l. Chapter V II  Section The discussion is extremely brief. Note that 
the Ihth Report on Judicial Administration had made the following recom­
mendation: "The file ofthe Supreme Court is being clogged with appeals 
on labour matters and relief should be given to that Court by enabling 
parties to file appeals in these matters either to the ^igh Court or to 
a special tribunal constituted for that purpose•" (see ol.I pp.56-57)•
to  appeal over i t s  head to the people of Ind ia  d ire c t ly . Tb.e res ig ­
nation of K. Subba Rao from the Chief Justiceship of the Court to 
contest the Pres identia l e lectio n  adds support to th is  view. I t  is  
by no means suggested that the Supreme Court has been p o l it ic a l .  The 
Court is  not controversial. I t  has merely unw itting ly figured in  an 
in ev itab le  controversy.
We must mention, in  conclusion, that t£e Supreme Court has
in  the past been manned by judges chosen mainly from middle class
backgrounds. A large number were educated in  England. Neyertheless,
under pressure from a state of a f fa irs  unknown in  England and not
catered fo r  by English law teachers: th e ir  treatment of precedent has
been incomplete. This is  p a rtly  due to a fragmented Bench structure
and p a rtly  because in  actual practice the Supreme Court has not la id
much emphasis on consistency. The Court is  overworked and the leading
judgement w rite rs  play an excessive ro le , ^he business of the Court
is  dominated by the Chief Justice or prospective Chief Justice, who
since they are selected on a sen io rity  basis know w ell in  advance th a t,
02God w illin g , they are going to lead the Court. In s tin c t natural to  
Indians has played a part in  reaching decisions^ which we can hardly  
exaggerate*, but the Court seems to have approached very many issues 
before them from the a lie n  standards of western jurisprudence. This 
is  true even in  personal law matters where they have hardly (except 
in  a few cases) taken the discussion beyond the frame of reference 
established by Privy Council. In  view o f the sources on which they 
re ly  the Court’ s attempts to  reform must be regarded as inspired  
p rim arily  by western ideas, not unsupported by notions about Indian
82. See supra Chapter I  Section A, and note that the lA th Report of 
the Law Commission had made the following recommendation (a t Vol. 1 p.56) 
"The practice of appointing the senior most puisne #udge of the Supreme 
Court as Chief Justice of Ind ia  is  not desirab le. Instead, the most 
suitab le person whether from the Court, the Bar or from the High Courts 
should be chosen." Note that the Law Commission did not recommend e ith er' 
p o lit ic a l  appointments or the appointments of academics.
ways of l iv in g , In d ia1s needs and th e ir  own position^in Indian society) 
which a sociologist and an objective researcher in to  Indian p o lit ic s  
might w ell question.
In  the end we must regard the a ttitu d e  of the Supreme Court 
judges as typ ica l of the decision-making habits of middle-class 
metropolitan Indians: technically  unpredictable, not uninfluenced by
im ita tive  cosmopolitan habits, conditioned by native in s tin c t to a 
depth not yet predictable by the psychologist or documented even by 
the novelis t, and suffering from an over-sensitive opinion of th e ir  
lonely and unparalleled position.
APPENDICES
L is t of cases where an intervener has partic ipated  
before the Supreme Court of Ind ia  1950-70.
I I  Tables showing the in s t itu t io n  and disposal of cases
before the Supreme Court of Ind ia  i 960 to  January 1972.
Appendix I  : L is t of cases where an intervener has p artic ipa ted  before
the Supreme Court of In d ia .
Source : A .I.R . 1950-70 Supreme Court.
Abbreviations : I  = Intervener; in tervention  by the 
Government of Ind ia  is  denoted by MUnionn and those 
by the States e ith e r by the name of the State or by 
reference to the Advocate General of the State.
1 . Ramkirshna Ranath v Kamptee M unicipality  A .I.R . 1950 S.C. 11 
I  = Union.
2. Gopalan v Madras A .I.R . 1950 S.C. 27; I  = Union.
3 . Rashid Ahmad v Municipal Board A .I.R . 1950 S.C. 163; 1 = Union,
State of U. P.
4. Bharat Bank v Employees A .I.R . 1950 S.C. 188; I  = Union.
5 . Tripura v East Bengal A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 23; I  = Union.
6. Janardhan v Hyderabad A .I.R . 1951 S.C. <3.0 ; I  = A tt . Gen.
7 . Santosh Kumar v State A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 23; I  = Union.
8 . U. C. Bank v Workmen A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 202; I  = Union.
9. S. Krishnan v Madras A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 301; 1 = Union.
10. Re Delhi Laws Act A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 332; I  = Union; States of Bombay,
Madras, U. P. Capt. Deep Chand, P d t., A. N. Bharadwaj, Ajmer Elec­
t r ic  Supply Co;, Maidens Hotel Co., Munshi Lai and 2 others.
11. Shankari Prashad v Union A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 4 8 l; I  = States of B ihar,
M. P., U. P.
12. Bhim Sen v Punjab A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 48l; I  = Union.
13. Joylal v State A .I.R . 1951 S.C. 484T~I = Union.
14. Bhagat Singh v State A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 64; Counsel instructed by 
agent fo r a caveator.
15. N. P. Ponnuswami v Ret. O ff. Namakkal A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 64; I  = Union, 
State of W. B.
16. W. B. v Anwar A li A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 75; I  = States of Hyderabad,
Mysore, and Mr. Habib Mohammed.
17. Madras v V. G. Row A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 196; I  = Union, State of T . C.
18. Lachmandas v Bombay A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 235; I  = Habeeb Mohammed.
19* Shamrao v D. M. Thana A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 324; I  = Sta6e of Hyderabad.
20. U jag ir Singh v Punjab A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 350; I  = Union
21. Palvinder Kaur v Punjab A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 354; reference to caveator.
22. T. C. v Bombay Co. Ltd . A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 367; I  = Union, States of
Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad, Mysore, U. P ., Orissa.
23. Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose A .I.R . 1952 S.C. 369; 1 = Law 
Society, Secy Bar Association Calcutta, S&cy Advocates Association.. 
Calcutta, Secy Bar Association Bombay, Calcutta High Court, M. C. 
Setalvad.
24. Punjab v Ajaib Singh A .I.R . 1955 S.C. 10; Amicus curiae fo r respondent.
25. Vishwamitra Press v Workmen A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 41; I = State of U. P.
26. Venkateswarloo v Suptd. Central Jail A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 49; I = Union.
27. Sisir Kumar v W. B. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 63; I = Union.
28. Ashwini Kumar v Arabinda Bose A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 75; I = Att. Gen.
29. Darshan Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 94; I = State of U. P.
20. Election Commr. v Venkata Rao A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 210; I  = Union.
Note that the Att. Gen. M. C. Setalvad appeared for both the
appellant and the intervener.
31* Bombay v United Motors Ltd. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 252; I  = Union, States
of Bihar, Madras, W. B., U. P., Punjab, T. C.
32. Poppatial Shah v Madras A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 274; I  = Union, States of 
Bihar, Punjab, Mysore and U. P.
■ry
33* Maqbool Hussain v Bombay A .I .R . 1933 S.C. 325; States of Bombay 
and Punjab. Note that th is  is  not s t r ic l t y  speaking a case of 
interyeners but m ultip le appeals from two d iffe re n t states which 
has the same e ffe c t.
34. T. C. v S. V. C. Factory A .I .R . 1953 S.C. 332; I  = Union, States 
of Hyderabad, Mysore, Ui. P ., Punjab.
35• N. S. Thread and Co. v James Chadwick and Bros. A.I.R. 1953 S.C.
357; I  = Registrar of trade .
36. W. B. v Bela Banerji A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170; I = Union.
37• W. B. v Sirajuddin A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 193; I  = Union.
38. R. E. S. Corpn. v Andhra Pradesh A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 251; I  = Madras.
39• Commrs. H. R. E. v L. T. Swamiar A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282; £ = State 
of T. C.
40. Rajasthan v Nath Mai A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 307; I  = Union.
41. V. M. Syed Mohd. & Co. y Andhra Pradesh A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 314;
I  = States of Madras, B ihar, Mysore, T. C.
42. Dhirendra v Supflt. A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 424; I  = Union.
43- Virendra v U. P. A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 447; I  = Union.
44. M. P. v Mandawar A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 493; I  = Union.
45• Madras v C. G. Menon A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 417; I  = Union.
46. Gajanand v U. P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 695; I = reference is made to a 
caveator.
47. H ira la l D ix it  v U. P. A .I.R . 1954 S.C. 743; I  = A tt .  Gen.
48. R. M. Seshadiri v D. M. Tanjore A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 747; I  = Union.
49. Central Bank of Ind ia  Ltd . v Ram Narain A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 36; I  =
State of Punjab.
50. Muir M ills  Ltd. v Suti M ills  Mazdoor Union A .I.R . 1955 S.C. 170;
I = State of U. P.
51. Automobile Products of In d ia  v Rukmaji Bala A .I.R . 1935 S.C. 258;
I  = Union.
52. Bengal Immunity Co. v Bihar A .I.R . 1955 S.C. 661; I  = States of 
W. B . , Madras, Mysore, M. P ., Rajasthan, Punjab, Orissa, U. P .,
Tata Iron 8c Steel Co., Mr. M. K. Kuriakose.
53* R. N. Sons Ltd. v Asst. Sales Tax Commr. A .I.R . 1955 S.C. 765;
I  = Berar O il Industries and others
54. V. 0 . Vakkan v Madras A .I.R . 1956 S.C. 76; I  = State of U. P.
55. In the matter of "D" A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 102; I = M. C. Setalvad to  
assist the Court.
56. P. L. Lakhanpal v J. K. A .I .R . 1956 S.C. 197; I  ■ Union.
57* Clerks of C. T. Co. v C. T. Co. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 78; I  = State
of W. B.
58. L. D. Sugar M ills  v Pdt. Ram Sarup A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 82; I  = A tt .
G en .(b u t represented by other counsel).
Note also th4 case of P. S. M ills  v Mazdoor Union A .I.R . 1957 S.C.
95j Amicus curiae fo r the respondent.
59. Re ,lMtf -  an advocate A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 149; I  = Messrs. M. C. Setalvad
and B. M. Sen to assist the Court.
Note : Hanuman Jute M ills  v &min Das A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 194 where there
was an amicus curiae fo r  the respondent.
60. Rajinder Chand v Mst. Sukhi A .I.R . 1957 S.C. 286; I  = State of 
Punjab.
61. N. T. F . M ills  L td . v Iln d  Punjab Tribunal A .I.R . 1957 S.C. 329;
I  = A tt . ^en ., Hukam Chand and others, Atlas Industries .
62. Garikapati v Subbiah Choudhry A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540; I  = A tt . Gen 
to assist the Court.
63. Amar Singh v Custodian Evacuee Property A .I.R . 1957 S.C. 599; I  =
Murat Singh ■=
f. * ' * O'kj o
64. K. P. Khetan v Union A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 6?6; I = R. B. K. N. Khetan.
65. Bombay v R. M. D. C. Chamarabaghwalla A .I.R . 1957 S.C. 699; I  =
State of Mysore.
66. Hanumantha Rao v A. P. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 927; I  = Union.
67. I .  T. Commr. v Smt. J. Chowdhurani A .I.R . 1993 S.C. 19; I  = Adv.
Gen. Assam.
68. P. L. Dhingra v Union A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 36; I  = R. L. K nuller.
69. Sathappa C hettiar v Ramanathan C hettiar A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 245;
I  = Adv. Gen. fo r Madras.
70. Sundaramier v A. P. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 468; I = Union, States of
Madras, B ihar, U. P ., Mysore Bpg. and Wvg. Co., Minerva M ills  L td ., 
Tata Iron  and Steel Co. L td ., Madurai M ills  Ltd.
71. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. v Salivateswaran A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 507J I  =
Indian Federation o f Working Journalists; A tt . Gen. (represented 
by the Sol. Gen.) to  assist the Court.
72. Madras v G. Dunkerly & Co. A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 56O; I  = States of
Bihar, Punjab, Mysore, Kerala, A. P ., M/S Uttam Duggal & Co.,
United Eng. Co.
73• Mithan Lai v Delhi A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 682; I  = States of Madras,
Mysore, U. P ., Kerala, M/S R a ipu rP rov inc ia l Eng. Co.
74. K. Kamraja Nadar v Kunju Thevar A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 687; I  = Y. B. 
Chavan, M. R. Masani, K. P. Pawar, Ibrahim Andari.
75. Mallappa Bassappa v Basavaraj Ayappa A .I.R . 1958 B.C. 698; I  =
J . L. Nehru, Masuriya Din.
76. Qureshi v Bihar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731; I  = A Hindu Pandit and several 
States with connected appeals.
77- Banarsidas v M. P. A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 909; 1 = States of Bombay, M. P .,
Punjab.
78. Re Kerala Education B i l l  A .I.R . 1958 S.C. 956; I  = The President,
States of Kerala, Kerala Christian Action Committee, Kerala School 
Managers Assn., Kerala School Mgrs. Badogarq and Quilandy; Catholic 
Upion of In d ia , Catholic Assn. of Bombay, A ll  Ind ia  Anglo Indian  
Assn., Apostolic Ad. Soc. and R. Diocese, A ll  Ind ia  Jam ia t-u tt-  
ulema-i Hind, Kerala State Muslim League, Kerala Secondary Schools 
O ff. S ta ff Assn., Kerala Pvt. teachers Federation.
79- S. T. 0 . v Kanhaiya Lai A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 135; 1 = Union, Agra
B u llion  Exchange and 2 others.
80. Basheshwar Nath v C. I .  T. A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 149; 1 = M/S Model
K n itting  Ind. Ltd.
8l  Arunchala Nadar v Madras A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 300p I  = Union, States
of A. P ., Madras, M. P.
82. G. Nageshwara Rao v A. P. S. R. T. Corpn. A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 308;
I  = B. Samasankara S a s tri.
83. C. I. T. v Teja Singh A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 352; I  = Dalmia Jain Aviation  
Co. Ltd.
84. M. S. M. Sharma v S ri Krishna Sharma A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 395; I  =
A tt . Gen. (represented by the Addl. Sol. d en .).
85. D. S. Garewq.1 v Punjab A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 512; I  = Union.
86. Atma Ram v Punjab A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 519; I  = Lai Singh and others
87. M/S D. S. & G. M ills  Ltd. v Union A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 626; I  = Amritsar
Sugar M ills  L td ., S ir  Shadi Lai Sugar and Gen. M ills  L td ., D. H.
Sugar Factories and O il M ills  L td ., Simbhaoli Sugar M ills  L td .,  
Sasamusa Sugar M ills  L td ., Ratna Sugar M ills  L td ., L. H. Sugar M ills  
L td ., Lakshmi Khetan Sugar M ills  L td ., H. R. Sugar Factory L td .,  
M o tila l Padampat Singhania L td ., Punjab Sugar M ills , P ann iji Sugar 
and Gur M ills  L td ., Nawab Ganj Sugar M ills  Ltd.
o88. Kochunni v Madras A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 725; I  = Union, Gopalan,
T. N air Kochunni Raja.
89. Commr. S. T. v H. Adamji 8c Co. A .I .R . 1959 S.C, 887; I  = State of 
M. P.
90; Indian Home Pipe Co. v Workmen A .I.R . 1959 S.C. 1081; I  = Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha.
91. Titaghur Paper M ills  v Workmen A .I .R . 1959 S.C. 1095; 1 = P o lit ic a l  
Labour Organisations AITUC and INTUC
92. Bihar v R. B. H. R. M. L. Jute Mills A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 378; I  =
Indian Copper Corpn.
93. Kamdard Dawakhana v Union A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 554; 1 = A ll  Ind ia  
Tibbi Conference.
94. J . V. Gokal 8. Co. v Asst. C o ll. Sales Tax A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 593;
I  = A tt .  G en.(represented by the Sol. Gen), Bombay Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, G i l l  8c Co. (P) L td ., Eximport Trading 
Co., Bombay.
Note : Dr. R. M, Lohia v Supdt. Central Prison A .I.R . I 96Q S.C. 633; 
Amicus curiae fo r the respondent.
95* Rohtas Sugar Ltd . v Mazdoor Seva Sangh A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 67I ;  I  =
State of B ihar.
96. Mohd. Dastgir v Madras A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 75&; 1 = Union.
97. Vishnu Sugar M ills  v Workmen A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 812; I  = S tat4 of 
Bihar.
98. B. T. Mfg. Co. v T. L. Assn. A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 833; I  = State of 
Bombay.
99* Re Berubari Union A .I.R . I960 S.C. 845; 1 = Union, State of W. B .,
K. K. Chatterjee, R. Roy, President Bhartiya Jan Sangh, Kerala,
Secy Jan Sangh Mandi, T . S. Murthy of AKhil Jan Sanga o f Visha- 
kapatnam, Secy B harti Jan Sangh of Sitapur, Thaliparubhan Pattamb, 
Secy Jalpaiguri Development Party , Secy A ll Ind ia  Forward Bloc of 
Calcutta, Nirmal Bose.
100. Rathi Singh Mfg. Co. v In d ia  A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 923; I  = R. Rqnchoddass
101. Re Sant Ram A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 923; I  = A tt .  Gen. (represented by 
Sol. Gen.).
102. H. C. Narayan v Mysore A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 1073; I  = D. R. Karigowda.
103. Kochunni v Madras A .I.R . I960 S.C. 1080; I  = K. C. Gopalan Unni,
M. Moopil N a ir.
104. U. P. v Deoman A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 1125; I  = A tt .  Gen.
105- M. S. Sharma v Saree Krishna Sharma A .I.R . I960 S.C. 1186; I = A tt.
Gen.
106. I .  T. Commr. v Marsee Nagsee Co. A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 1231; I  = Punjab 
Bat. Bank Ltd.
107. Madras v Noor Mohd. Co. A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 1254; I  = Ambur Tanners 
Assn. R. Chenappa, P. Abdul V/ahab.
108. B. C. T rived i v N. N. Nagrashna A .I .R . I960 S.C. 1292; I  = Watvar 
Lai N ira  Lai T a la th i and others.
109. P. N. Datta v C. I .  T. A .I .R . i 960 S.C. 1346; I  = S. K. Datta
110. A n il Starch Ltd. v H. C. Workers Union A .I.R . i 960 S.C. 1346;
I  = United Planters Assn. o f S. In d ia .
111. D ir . R. D. v Corp. of Calcutta A .I.R . I 9S0 S.C. 1355; 1 = Union, 
States of Punjab, U. P ., A, P ., Madras, Bombay.
Note : Bombay v Kanaiya Lai A .I.R . 1961 S.C. 1 where there was an 
amicus curiae fo r  the respondent.
112. W. B. v Naba Kumar A .I.R . I 96I  S.C. 16; I  = Gopalpur Land Dev. Soc. 
Ltd.
113. Universal Exports Agency v Chief C ontro ller A .I.R . 1961 S.C. 41;
I =B. S. & Co. French India Importing Corporation.
114. Nanavati v Bombay A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 112; I = C. B. Agarwala as amicus 
curiae•
115. Atiabari Co. Ltd. v Assam A.I.R. I96I S.C. 232; I = Union, States 
of Bihar, Madras, Punjab, Rajasthan, U. P. and Mr. R. R. Krishna.
116. Jhandu Lai v Punjab A.I:R. 1961 S.C. 343; I = Att. Gen.
117. Dist. Board Ghazipur"v Lakshmi Narain A.I.R. I96I S.C. 356; I =
5 District Board of Saharanpur, Muzzaffarnagar and Mr. G. K. Udyog.
118. Hingir Rampur Coal Co. v Orissa A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 459; I = Union 
flat the instance of the Court see pr. 8 p. 463-4).
119. Punjab v S. S. Singh A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 493; I = H. M. Seervai,
Advocate General of Bombay.
120. Lt. Cpi. Khajoor Singh v Union A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 532; I = S. S. Lathar.
Note : Bombay v Apte A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 578 where there was an amicus
curiae for the respondent.
Godse v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 600 (at pr. 3 P* 601) where
there was an amicus curiae for the appellant.
121. Birdhichand v 1st Civil Judge A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 644; I = State of 
Bombay.
122. Rameshwar Dayal v Punjab A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 8l6; I = Union, 0. D. Sharma,
B. D. Pathak.
123. M/S Ranchhoddas v Commr. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 935; I = H. Sultan.
Note: A.I.R. Ltd. v R. D. Datar A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 943 where there
was an amicus curiae for the respondent.
124. M/S G. S. Mills v K. T. S. Kamgar Sabha A.I.R. 1961 1016; I = Brihan 
Maharashtrian Sugar Syn. and another.
125. Bhau Ram v Baij Nath A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1327; 1 = States of M. P. and 
Rajasthan.
126. Durgah Committee v Hussein Ali A.I.R. I96I S.C. 1402; I = Att. Gen. 
(represented by Addl. Sol. Gen.X!
127. Ashok Leyland Ltd. v Madras A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1433; 1 = ^ata 
Locomotive and Eng. o.
128. Mahadeo v Bombay A.I.R. I96I S.C. 1517; 1 = Vidarbha Kula Sewa 
Sangh of Phulumbti.
129. Jyoti Pershad v Delhi A.I.R. &96I S.C. 1601; I = Phool Chand.
130. Ram Saran v Domini Kuer A.I.R. 196l~1s.C. 1747; I = State of Punjab
131. General Manager, Southern Railway v Rangachari A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36;
I = G. Das.
132. Mohd. Hussain v Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 97; I = Ishwar Bhai Bechar 
Bhai and others.
133. A. I. B. E. Assn. v Nat. Ind. Trib. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 171; I = Att.
Gen. (who also represented the respondent); PunjabNat. Bank
Employees Assn., All India State Bank Staff Assn.
134. Chandrakant v Jasjit Singh A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 204; I = Tulsidas
Khimji & Co.
135• M/S Raghubar Dayal v Union A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 263; I = M/S Gian Ram 
Suresh Chand.
136. Sakai Newspapers (P) Ltd. v Union A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305; 1 =
Shantilal H. Shah and others, Printers (Mysore)' Pvt. Ltd., Firm 
Tamilnadu, B. N. Sarpotdar and another, and D. S. Potnis and 
another.
137»Saifuddin Saheb v Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853; I = Hussein Kurban, 
Hussein Sanchwala. See pr. 7 P* 858-9.
138. Kedar Nath v Bihar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955; I - Att. Gen.
139. Basfrabt Ram v Union A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 994; I = Budha Singh and others.
140. M/S Chotabhai v Union A.I.R. Y962~™S.C. 1006; Multiple appeals where 
one respondent intervened in another appeal.
141. George Oakes (P) Ltd. v Madras A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1037; I = States 
of A. P., Assam, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan.
142. Mat. Union of Comm. Employees v M. R. Meher A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1030;
I = Bombay Inc. Law Society.
143« Kameshwar Prashad v Bihar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1166; I = Union and Mr. is,
X. Joseph.
144. Hmarjit Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1305; I = S. Singh, R. Singh
145. Chunni Lai Mehta & Co. v C. S. & M. Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314;
I = State of Maharashtra.
146. In the matter of "G11 an advocate A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1357; I = Att. Gen 
147• Automobile Transport Co. Ltd. v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1406;
I = Att. Gen.,States of Assam, Madras, Punjab, Maharashtra, A. P.,
W. B., Bihar, Orissa, Gujerat, M. P., M. A. Tuloch Ltd., Nazeeria 
Motor Prince-Nellore, A. P. Motors Union.
148. Madan Gopal v Union A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1513; I = ^ata Iron & Steel 
Co. Ltd.
149• Laxman Balwant v Charity Commr. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1589; I = State 
of Maharashtra.
150. Ujjambai v U. P. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621; I ■ States of Bihar,
Tata Eng. and locomotive o^. Ltd.
151. H. C. Calcutta v Amal Kumar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1704; I = States of 
M. P., Madras, Punjab, Rajasthan, Mysore, Uttar Pradesh.
152. M/S V. R. E. D. v Madras A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1753; I = Madras State
Electricity Board, State of A. P.
153* V/averly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v Raymer & Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1963 S.C.
90; I = Att. Gen.
154. Kali Pada v Union A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 134; I = Jharia Dist of Dhanbad. 
155- Somawanti v Punjab A.I.R. 1963' S.C. 151; I = State of Gujerat.
156. Reg. Sett. Commr. v Sundardas Bhasim A.I.R. 1963 S.C. l8l; I = 
Tolaram Tekchand.
157- W. B. v S. K. Ghosh A.I.R. 19^3 S.C. 255; I = Att. Gen. (represented 
by Sol. Gen.).
158. Indramani v W. R. Natu A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 274; I = East India Cotton 
Assn.
159- C. C. Ajmer v B. Das A.I.R. 1963 B.C. 408; I  ^Union.
160. Kunj Behari Lai v Union A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 518; I = Union and three 
individuals.
161. M. B. S. Oflshadhalaya v Union A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 622; I = N. C. Ghosh.
162. M. R. Balaji v Mysore A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 649;~~I = The Mysore Chathada 
Sri Vaishnava Assn., Mysore Arya Vysya Mahasabha of Bangalore. •_
l63«Uflion v D. C. & G. Mills A.I.R.I965 S.C. 791; I = Hindustan Leveir -^ td
164. S. M. Transport (P) Ltd. v Sankaraswamigal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 864;
I = State of Madras, New Theatre Carnatic Talkies.
165. Firm A. T. B. Mehta Majid & Co. v Madras A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 928;
I = Union.
166. W. B. v Union A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241; I = State of M. P., Punjab, 
Assam, Orissa, Madras, Bihar, U. P., Rajasthan, Gujerat. See 
generally pr. 77*
167* New Central Jute Mills v W. B. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1307; 1 = States 
of A. P., M. P., and Maharashtra.
168. Re ITPM an advocate A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1313; 1 = Att. Gen. (represented 
by Sol. Gen.).
169* S. G. Prashar v Vasant Sen A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1356; I = Hunger Ford 
Invest. Trust Ltd. (in liquidation)•
170. K. S. Ramamurthy v C. L. Pondicherry A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1464; I = 
Sivarama Reddiar.
Note: Jagir Kuar v Jaswant Singh A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521 where there 
was an amicus curiae for the appellant.
171. Re Sea Customs Act A.I.R. 1963 S.C. I76O; I = Union, States of
A. P., Assam, Bihar, Maharashtra, Gujerat, Orissa, Kerala, Madras, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, W. B., M. P., U. P.
172. S. T. C. v Comm. T. Off. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. l8ll; I = States of 
Madras, Punjab, W. B., Gujerat and Rajasthan.
173. Univ. of Delhi v Ram Nath A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1873; I = J. D. Tyler,
V. Saxena.
Note: A. P. v Venugopal A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 33 where there was an 
amicus curiae for the respondent.
174. Mohan Chowdhry v Chief Commr. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 173; I = S. R. K.
Vohra (another detenu).
Note : Sushi1 Kumar v D. M. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 349 where there was 
an amicus curiae for the respondent.
175. Makhan Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 38I; 1 = Att. Gen., States 
of Assam, Bengal, Bihar, M. P., Madras, Rajasthan, U. P., Orissa 
and 72 detenus.
176. Lakshmi Narain v 1st Addl. Judge A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 489; I = Miss 
A. Nihal Singh.
177* A. V. Thomas 8c Co. v Dty. Commr. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 569; I = M/S 
Outcherloney Valley Estates (1938) Ltd., Coimbatore.
178. Punjab v 0. G. B. Syndicate A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 669; 1 = 3  individuals. 
179• U. P. v Mohd. Naim A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 70S j"""I = C. J. and companion
judges of the High Court appealed from (on notice).
180. Re Lily Isabel Thomas A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 855; I = Supreme Court judges.
181. Khyerbari Tea Estate v Assam A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 925; 1 = Desai and 
Parbuttia Co. Ltd.
182. R. Devi v Orissa A.I.R. 1964;S.C. 1195; 1 = 5  Maharajas.
183. R. L. Arora v U. P. A.I.R. 19%4~S.C. 1231; I = Patel Mangal Bhai 
and others, Kaira Dist. Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd.
184. Orissa v M. A. Tullock Ltd. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1284; I = Mr. H. S. 
Murthy.
185. A. P. R. S. T. Corpn. v I. T. Corpn. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. i486; I =
Bihar S. R. T., North Bengal S. T. C., Calcutta S. T. C.
186. Krishnaswami v Madras A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1515; I = States of M. P., 
Maharashtra, U. P., Rajasthan, Punjab.
187. B. Rajagopala v S. T. A. Tribunal A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1573; 1 =
Annamallais Bus Transport (P) Ltd.
188. Himansu Kumar v Jyoti Prakash A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1636; I = Chief
Justices of M. P., Patna, Gujerat.
189. I. T. Commr. v Mohd. Ali A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1693; 1 = Aruna 
Mills Ltd.
190. Malyalam Plantations Ltd. v Dty. Commr. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 40;
1 = M/S Outcherloney Valley Estates (1938) Ltd.
191. Madras v D. Namasivya A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 190; I = Neyveli Lignite 
Corpn., Union, States of Maharashtra and Rajasthan.
192. Poona Municipality v Dattarya A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 555; I = F. P. Shah. 
193* Bisheshwar v university of Bihar A.I.R. 196jT~S.C. 601; I = Univ.
of Bihar, J. N. Sharma.
Note : Bhagwan Sarup v Maharashtra A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 682, amicus 
curiae for the appellant.
194. Re Article 143 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745; I = Att. Gen., Judges of
the Allahabad High Court, Justice N. U. Beg, Justice Sehgal,
U. P. Vidhan Sabha, O^igf Justices of Maharashtra, Gujerat,
Orissa, Rajasthan, M. P., Patna, Speakers of the Legislative 
Assemblies of W. B., Maharashtra, Gujerat, H. P., Assam, Nagaland, 
Bihar, Speaker of the Legislative Council of Maharashtra, Adv.
Oens. of U. P., M. P., Madras, A. P., W. B., Rajasthan, Bihar,
2 individuals who were party to the events which triggered the 
controversy off, Bar Oouncii 0f India, West India Advocates Assn.,
■ ■ Allahabad High Court' Bar Assn.', Bar Assn; of India,' Lok Raksha '
Samaj, All India Civil Liberties Council, Sapru Law Society,
Delhi Union of Journalists, Bihar V/orking Journalists Union,
Institute of Public Opinion.
195• Sajjan Singh v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845; I = Maharashtra
Sugar Mills, Belapur Co. Ltd., Rao Abhay Singh and others.
196. L. I. C. v S. V. Oak A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 975; I = R. N. Shah, 
Chandrashangir and others.
197- Roshan Lai v U. P. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 991; I = R. B. Bansal.
198. Vajravelu v Sp. Dty. Coll. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1017; I = Att. Gen.
States of Gujerat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, M. P., and 2 individuals.
199. K. L. Johar & Cq. y Dty. Comm, lax Off. A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 1082;
I = Att. Gen., States of A. P., M. P., U. P., Assam, Kerala,
Rajasthan and Madras.
200. Jee Jee Bhoy v Asst. Coll. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1096; I = J. R. D. Tata,
D. R. T. Tata, K. H. Cama, N. J. Gamadin.
201. Corpn. of Cal. v Liberty A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1107; I = State of Assam,
A. K. Mukerjea.
202. Jaipuria Bros. y u. p. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1213; I = K. Y. Pillaiah 
& Sons.
203. Channabasavaih v Mysore A.I.R. 3)965 S.C. 1293; I = B. K. Kamrajiah.
204. I. T. Commr. v Ajax Products A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1358; I *
K. N. Guruswamy.
205. I. T. Commr. v M. K. Stremann A.I.R. 19&5 S.C. 1494; I =
M. Virchand
206. Mohd. Ayub Khan v Commr. Police A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1623; I = Union.
207. Kamala Mills v Bombay A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1942; I = M/S K. S. 
Venkataraman Ltd., States of Assam, Kerala, Gujerat, M. P.,
Rajasthan, U. P., W. B., A. P.,
208. Poon E. S. Co. v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 30; I = Amalgamated 
Elect. Co. Ltd.
Note : Partha Sarthy v A. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 38 where there was 
an amicus curiae for the appellant.
209. Jaora Sugar Mills v H. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 4l6; I = DimmandSugar 
Mills Ltd., Shri Chandgeo JstSngor Mills Ltd., Sriram Shahkari SoJkWc 
Karkhana Ltd., Parvana Sakhari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., State of
U. P.
210. W. B. v Ilripendra Nath A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 447; I = 3. S. Lodhi,
M. Khan, States of Assam, Maharashtra, Madras, Orissa, Rajasthan,
C. J. of Orissa.
211. Bundelkhand M. T. Co. v Behari Lai A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 455; I =
M. P. State Roadways ‘Transport Corpn.
212. A. M. Assn. etc. v Textile Labour A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 4975 I =
State of Gujerat, All India Manufacturers Organisation, I. N. T. U. C. 
$Trade Union body), All India Organisation of Industrial Employees, 
Mill Owners Assn. of Bombay, Saurashtra Mill Owners Assn., Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha.
213. Singrami Collieries Co. y c. I. T. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 5&3;  ^=
Att. Gen., State of M. P., Amal. Coalfields Ltd., Panch Valley 
Coal Co., Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd.
214. S. M. Mills Co. v Baliram A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 6l6 ; I = Babu Lai.
215. Anand v Chief Secy. Madras~~A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 657; I = States 
of Bihar, Punjab, -i-ripura, Makhan Singh and 13 others.
216. Hapur Municipality v Raghuvendra A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 693; I =
States of U. P., Madras, Rajashtan, M. P.
217. A. K. Gopalan v Union fl.I.R. 1966 S.C. 8l6; I = C. H. Kannan, 
Viswanatha Menon.
218. Bombay Labour Union v M/S International Franchises Ltd.
A.I.R. 1966 S.C, 942; I = Committee for the Defence of forking
Women’s Rights, Maharashtra State Pharmaceuticals Employees’ 
Federation.
219. S. C. Asst. Coll. of Customs v Sitaram A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 955;
I = P. R. Baldota.
220. Yagnapurushdasji v Mulidas A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119; I = Adv. Gen. 
of Maharashtra.
222.. I. T. 0. v Bachulal A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1148; I = K. Ram.
222. Amritsar Sugar Mills v C. S. T. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1212; I = Lord 
Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd.
223. C. I. T. v Shahzada Nand & Sons A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1342; I =
Bhutani Bros (P) Ltd., and 4 individuals.
224. Cumbum Roadways Ltd. v Somu Transport Ltd. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1366;
1 = P. N. Swami Naidu & Co., A. B. T. Co.
223* Bihar v Rambalak Singh A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1441; I = Att. Gen.
226. Rao Nihalkaran v Ram Gopal A.I.R. 19^3 S.C. 1485; I =
2 individuals.
227. G .  Buddana v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1523; I = Behari Lai 
Kanhaiya Lai.
228. CBotan Lime Syndicate v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1564;
I = Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., Cement Mnfg. Assn., Moolchand 
Sharma.
229- M. P. v Vishnu Prashad A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1593; I = U. P. State 
Industrial Corpn.
230. Kulathil v Kerala A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1614; I = Att. Gen. (represented 
by the Addl. Sol. Gen.).
231* Sri Sita Ram Sugar Mills v Workmen A.I.R. 1966 S.C. I67O; I =
State of U. P.
232. Badaku Joti v Mysore A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1746; I = Att. Gen.
233- Ram Chandra v U. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1889; I = Att. Gen.
234. M. P. v Shobharam A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1910; I = States of Madras,
Kerala and Gujerat.
235* B. N. Bagarajan v Mysore A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1942; I = L. V. Shinde. 
235- Chandra Mohan v U. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1987; I = R. N. Upadhyaya.
237- Nagaland v Satan Singh A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 212; I = State of Assam
238- P. L. Lakhanpal v Union A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 243; 1 = C. D. Agarwal (as 
amicus curiae).'' ■ ~~
239- P. D. Kapadia v C. I. T. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 614; I = Trustees of 
the estate of the late F. E. Dinshaw.
240. Jalan Trading Co. v Mazdoor Sabha A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 69I; I = Att.
Gen., Hind Mazdoor Sabha; Hind Mazdoor Panchayat; New Mill °o.
Ltd.; Textile Labour Union; Alta Laboratories Ltd.; Himabhai Mfg.
Co. Ltd.; New Swadeshi Mill; Glass Ind. Syn; Calico Mills
Chemicals and Plastic Diviwions, A.I.T.U.C. (a Trade Uniojj body); 
Mills Owners Assn.; Bombay Gas Co.; Tata Oil Mills Ltd.; Textile 
Lab. Assn.; New Manefi Chand Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd.; Jay Bharat 
Cotton Mfg. Ltd.; Arvind Mills Ltd.; Ahemdabad New Cotton Mills 
Ltd.
241• Hindustan Antibiotics v Workmen A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 948; I =
Saurashtra Vidya Kamdar Sangh; Workmen of Kerala State Electricity 
Board.
242. Rajalakshmiah v Mysore A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 993; I = Mr. M. Reddy.
243- W. B. v Corpn. of Calcutta A.I.R. 19%7~ S.C. 997; 1 = Adv. Gens 
for Madras, Kerala, U. P., M. P., Rajasthan.
244. Punjab v Gurjit Singh A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1214; I = Att. Gens for 
Kerala, Gujerat, U. P., Assam, Madras, W. B.
245- Maneklal Chhotalal v M. G. Makwana A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1373; I =
Adv. Gen. for Maharashtra.
246. Uaisinghani v Union A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427; I = Asst. Commr. of 
Income Tax.
247- Prem Nath v Rajasthan A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1599; I = State of U. P.,
P. K. Malhotra, Chandra Mohan, H. C. Agarwal.
248. Golak Nath v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643; I = Att. Gen., States 
of W. B., Bihar, Madras, Gujerat, U. P., Kerala, Assam, Rajasthan, 
A. P., Maharashtra, 9 individuals, 4 Sugar Mills and 1 Company.
249- Inder Singh v Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1777; I = P. Singh, K. Singh
250. Satwant Singh v A. P. 0. Delhi .A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1857; I =
C. V. Jethwani.
251. Board of Revenue v R. S. Jhaver A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 51; 1 = State 
of Kerala.
252. Kalawati Devi v C. I. T. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 162; I = D. D.Tulshan,
U. Mohatq..
253- M. M. Ipoh v C. I. T. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 317; I = Att. Gen.
(by notice~n
254. Union v Kamalbhai A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 377; 1 = 2  interveners.
255. Eerala v Cochin Coal Co. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 389; I = E. J.Mathur.
256. Kantilal Babulal & Bros, v H. C. Patel A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 44-5; 1 = 
New Shorrock Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
257- I. S. W. Products Ltd. v Madras A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 479; I = Adv.
Gen. of W. B.
258. C. M. Rajendram v Union A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 507; 1 = Central Govt. 
Sch. Tribes Welfare Assn. and 2 individuals.
259- Straw Products v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 579; I = Att. Gen.
260. Andhra Sugar Ltd. v A.P. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 599; 1 = Basti Sugar 
Mills Ltd.
261. I. T. Commr. v Lawrence Singh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 658; I = Treasury 
Office of Nagaland.
262. Baburao v Zakir Hugsain A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 904; I = Att. Gen. (by 
notice), Election ^ommr., Returning Officer for the Presidential 
Election.
263. S. B. Sugar Mills Ltd. v Union A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 922; I = Tata 
Chemicals Ltd.
264. M. S. E. Board v Kalyan Municipality A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 991; I =
Att. Gen. Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Ltd.
265. W. U. P. E. Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v U. P. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1099; 
I = Hind Lamps Ltd.
266. Udai Ram v Union A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1138; I = J. M. Gandhi.
267- Delhi Municipality v B. G. S. W. Mills A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1232;
I = Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd., Arvind Mills, Mun. Gorpn of 
Ahemadabad, Broach Borough Municipality, Shri Prithvi Cotton 
Mills Ltd., Broach Textile Mills (P) Ltd.
268. A. P. v P. Sagar A.I.R. I968 S.C. 1379; I = G. Latchanna.
269- Maharashtra v Madhavrao A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1395; 1 = Mr. Onkarnath,
S. Pandey, S. H. Shah.
270. Sudhir Chandra v W. T. 0. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 59; 1 = States of Assam 
Kerala, U. P.
271. Madras v Natraja Mudaliar A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 147; 10 interveners in­
cluding Sitalakshmi Mills Ltd.
272. Debarat v State A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 189; I = Calcutta High Court.
C S- Le
273- Jaganath Rao v Orissa A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 215; I = State of 
Bihar, B. Patnaik.
274. Rajasthan v Karam Chand & Bros. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 343; 1 = Adv.
Gen. of W. B.
275- Kerala v Haji K. Kutty A.I.R. 169 S.C. 378; I = Malanker Rubber 
Produce Co. Ltd.
276. W. Proost v Bihar A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 465; I = Rev. Fthr. Mathias,
Gabriel D’Costa,Francis Kujur, Marcel Baxla, A. Purty.
277- Metal Box Co. v Workmen A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 612; I = Steel Mazdoor 
Sabha of Bombay, Indian Oxygen Ltd., Kapra Mazdoor Electrical 
Union, Ass. Cement o., G. E. C. Ltd., Indian Sugar Mills Assn.
278. R. M. Seshadri v G. V. Paix A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 692; I = Dist. ^lec.
Off. of Madras.
279- S. V. P. Trust v Basant Ram A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 12.73 5 I = Mr. Duli 
Chand.
280. Pankaj Kumar v W. 3. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 97; I = Mr. Kaka Ram 
and 6 others.
281. Indu Bhushan v Ram Sundari A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 228; I = Att. Gen.
(by notice).
282. U. P. Electric Supply Co. v R. K. Shukla A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 237;
I = Att. Gen. (by notice).
283. A. V. S. N. Rao v A. P. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 422; I = A. P. Non-
Gazetted Officers’ Assn. A. P. Secretariat Assn.
28£. Rdyala Corpn. v Director of Enforcement A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 494; I =
Adv. Gen. of Tamil Nadu.
285. R. C. Cooper v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564; I = States of J. K., 
Maharashtra, Bihar, Kerala, A. P., Orissa, Tamil Nadu.
286. S. T. Commr. v M. P. E. B. Jabalpur A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 732; I =
The National Newsprint and taper Mills Ltd.
287. Hansraj v H. H. Dave A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 755; I = M/S Shree Agency,
M/S Lokenath Tolaram, Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd.
288. Asst.Customs Collector, Bombay v L. R. Melwani A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
962 I - B. M. Daman'ia.
289. Second G. T. 0. v D. Ii. Hazareth A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 999; I = States
of U. P., Kerala, W. B., Tamil Nadu, Bihar, M. P., Mysore, Assam.
290. J. K. (Bom.) (P) Ltd. v New-Kaiser-i-Hind Spg. & Wvg. Co. A.I.R.
T97O S.C. 1041; I = M/S Juggilal Kamlapat (Bankers) andother 
creditors.
291. Illias v Collector of Customs A.I.R. 8 . 6 , 1065; I = B. M. Damania.
292. Sampat Prakash v J. K. A.I.R. 197° S.C. 1118; I = S. K. B. Rahman,
Nizamuddin and others.
293* Baijnath v Bihar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1436; I = Dhalbham Trades and 
( Industries Ltd.
294. J. R. G. Mfg. Assn. v Union A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1589; I = Indian 
Rubber Works.
295* Union v Shreeram Durga Prashad A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1597; 1 = Orissa 
Minerals Dev. Co. Ltd., Bird Y CoT (p) Xl930)Ltd., Bachar Gray 
& Co. Ltd., Duncan Bros. & Co. Ltd., Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd.,
Mcleod & Co. Ltd., Bunge « Co. Ltd., Jay Eng. Works Ltd., S. K. Ghosh.
296. Rattan Lai and Co. y Assessing Authority A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1742;
I = Pradip Kumar and others.
Note : Re P. C. Sen A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1821 (a contempt of Court 
case) where all the judges of the Calcutta High Court are 
represented.
297- M. S. R. T. Corpn. v B. G. R. M. Service, Warora A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
1926; I = Stateof Maharashtra.
298. C. B. Boarding & Lodging v Mysore A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2042; I = 
In an associated appeal the appellant in the case cited here. 
299* V. Venugopala v I. T. Commr. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2051; I =
A. K. Antharjanam.
300. S. K. Singh V. V. V. Giri A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2097; I = Att. Gen. 
Election Comm, of Indian, Returning Officer Presidential 
Election.
Addendum
501. Shyara Behari v M. P. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 427; I = Kaira Dist. Co- 
IIilk Producers Union Ltd.
Note : Case 301 should come after Case 191*
Appendix II : Tables showing the institution and disposal of cases 
before the Supreme Court of India i960 to January 1972
Sources :
Table I
Extracted from K. Subba Rao Some Constitutional Problems (1970) 242-3 
Tables 2 - 8 .
Supplied by the Registrar of the Supreme Court by the courtesy of 
Mr. Justice S. H. Sikri, Chief Justice of India.
Tables 9 - 10«
Supplied by Mr. Justice M. H. Beg, Puisne Judge, Supreme Court of India
Table 1
S t a tement showirg filing t Dignosal (Special Leave Petition?-Oivil 
?■: Orininal) for the year 1951-66.
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